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Abstract
Name of author: Raymond Geoffrey Wainwright
Degree for which thesis is submitted: Doctor of Philosophy
The central question of this study was to ascertain how phenomena diagnosed 
as mental illness impacted upon sense of personal identity. To facilitate the 
necessary research, the aims of this study were to examine the experience of 
mental illness from the perspective of service users.
Nine adult respondents (five men, four women) participated in a series of 
unstructured interviews, each lasting approximately one and a half hours. Some 
respondents were interviewed twice. Data from the interviews were transcribed 
by the researcher and subjected to four levels of analysis. Of these levels, the 
first was the act of transcription, the second conclusions following same, the 
third close scrutiny of the transcribed document, and the fourth deconstruction 
into ‘idea units’. Integral to this exercise was the use of narrative theory to 
develop concepts of the respondents’ personal narratives with particular 
reference to the respondents’ mental health narratives.
Following the four levels of analysis, the personal narratives of the respondents 
were compared and contrasted in a cross-case analysis. With reference to 
narrative models developed for the specific purpose of this study, the 
conclusion was drawn that initial experience of mental illness has a profound 
effect upon the personal narrative. Thereafter, the resultant impact upon 
personal identity is influenced by a combination of personal and environmental 
factors. Some of these may lead to a re-evaluation of past experiences and 
associated understanding. Accordingly, the outcome of the illness experience 
may not necessarily be negative, but may be positive by virtue of insights 
gained. Implications for mental health practice and further research, including 
the personalisation agenda, are considered.
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Chapter One: Choosing the research question
1.1. Foreword
If you want to know me, then you must know my story, for my story defines who 
I am. And if I want to know myself; to gain insight into the meaning of my own 
life, then I too, must come to know my own story.
(McAdams, 1993,11: italics in original text)
My name is Ray Wainwright. Since 1967, my life has been affected by 
phenomena diagnosed as mental illness. My diagnoses have been many and 
varied, especially in the years 1994 -  1996, when I suffered several episodes 
requiring hospitalisation. In the main, this was because my symptoms proved to 
be treatment-resistant: despite a wide range of anti-depressants, anti- 
psychotics, and E.C.T., my overall condition gradually worsened. At this time, it 
was believed that I was suffering from a complex form of bipolar I disorder, 
possibly schizoaffective disorder. During the dark days of my illness, my 
behaviour was erratic, irrational and, at times, extremely unpleasant. I was 
fortunate, therefore, that my wife was an Approved Social Worker and familiar 
with the manifestations of phenomena diagnosed as mental illness. Also, by a 
ghastly co-incidence, she was writing a PhD on the problems encountered by 
family carers of adults with severe mental illness. Accordingly, by virtue of my 
illness, she was obliged to declare her own experiences in her research topic. 
Undoubtedly, our marriage was under great strain at that time, both by virtue of 
my sometimes venomous ravings and because of the sheer intransigence of my 
illness. By 1996, it was mooted that I might need psychosurgery; alternatively, it 
was suggested that I could be given sufficient medication to render me 
‘manageable’.
My recovery from this nadir can justifiably be described as strange and 
unexpected. In 1996, I was, by then, receiving a ‘cocktail’ of drugs in an effort to 
break the increasing severity of my illness. For reasons that remain essentially 
unknown, I developed a serious skin condition that was eventually diagnosed as 
a combination of erythroderma and exfoliating dermatitis. Shortly after
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admission to hospital, I began to experience additional symptoms of diarrhoea. 
This was the first indication of lithium poisoning due to dehydration by virtue of 
my skin condition. Thereafter, I developed toxic confusion: by the time the 
cause was determined, it was necessary to place me on serum dialysis. In 
tandem with this, I was sedated with diazepam to prevent me pulling out the 
various canulae that were attached to me. By now, my condition had worsened 
dramatically: in addition to the risk of kidney failure and brain damage, I had 
also developed septicaemia due to the bleeding of my skin.
I have no recollections whatsoever of these events: this account is based on 
what my wife has told me. I remember waking up in an isolation ward to see a 
cheerful face of a female nurse and hearing, “Hello, Ray, you’re in 
Dermatology.” My rash had virtually disappeared apart from a small patch on 
my leg for which I continued to receive intravenous antibiotics. Additionally, the 
symptoms of my mental illness had largely dissipated. Why this was remains 
uncertain; at the time, my consultant explained that it was understood that a 
severe physical illness sometimes ‘burns out’ a mental illness. Thus, on 
recovering sufficiently to leave Dermatology, I was returned to a psychiatric 
ward for but a short period before discharge. However, I stress that this did not 
mark the end of my problems. My diagnosis was adjusted -  or euphemised -  to 
bipolar disorder, for which I have taken medication ever since. Sometimes I 
experience what I term ‘florid periods’ in which my symptoms return though, 
mercifully, these are short-lived. Similarly, I often undergo periods of a general 
malaise or depression. However, my mental illness has not led to any further 
periods of hospitalisation.
It is the variety of diagnoses that I have received that led to this thesis. Often, in 
the months and years that followed my recovery, I would express exasperation 
at the artificiality of naming systems. As a possible solution, I would speculate 
upon the concept of all mental illness being explicable by a single line 
continuum. However, this was never pursued past opining that, “There ought to 
be a PhD in this somewhere.” As my health improved and I began to rediscover 
my former interests, my wife began to encourage me to stretch my horizons. 
Eventually, and perhaps inevitably, in 2001 she persuaded me to set out my
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ideas in a preliminary format, which she passed on to a work colleague who, in 
turn passed it on to Julie Repper, of Sheffield University. Following this, Julie 
met with me at the School of Health and Associated Research (SCHARR) to 
discuss my ideas.
I had believed that these were sound; however I was soon disappointed when 
Julie explained that she did not really follow what my aims were. In hindsight, 
this was not surprising: I had not attempted any comparable undertaking since 
achieving a degree in Applied Biology from Brunei University in 1973. However, 
Julie suggested that I try background reading with an aim to firming up my 
ideas. On our third meeting, we were joined by Gordon Grant, who suggested 
additional lines of exploration. However, in honesty, my ideas remained 
stubbornly insubstantial despite an undeniable truth that I was regaining a ‘feel’ 
for academic material. Thus, although I held on to my continuum project, our 
discussions also focussed on attendant issues. At some point in these, Julie 
suggested that I look at the ‘effect of mental illness on identity’.
Immediately I became animated, even excited. It has always been a tendency 
of mine to feel that certain words or phrases within a text hold a peculiar 
resonance. Thus, my response was instinctive: somehow, this idea 
encapsulated my overall aim. Following this, Julie, Gordon and I formulated a 
working title: The impact of phenomena diagnosed as mental illness upon 
sense of personal identity.” This remained as the title in the years that followed 
until a Ph.D. upgrade meeting in 2006, wherein it was decided that it should be 
amended to become a question. During the years 2003 -  2006, I immersed 
myself in background reading and made provisional plans for the original 
research that would be needed. The results of this were detailed in a 10,000 
word proposal and presentation at the upgrade meeting. Following a successful 
outcome, I intended to pursue the interviews necessary for collection of data. 
Unfortunately, however, in this was delayed by two episodes of dermatitis, both 
of which required hospitalisation.
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At this point I should draw attention to the two main forms of mental illness, 
namely somatic mental illness and functional mental illness. The former 
concerns mental illness which is associated with identifiable trauma to the brain, 
e.g. stroke, Alzheimer’s disease. The latter concerns mental illness that is 
identifiable only by behaviour, including verbal utterances and/or description by 
the person experiencing phenomena. On the grounds of limiting the study to 
manageable levels, this research is concerned solely with functional mental 
illness. I close this foreword by reflecting upon the beginnings as I have 
described them, particularly the day when the course of this study was 
identified: an example of what Julie describes as a ‘eureka moment’. As 
detailed above, my original ideas centred on explaining mental illness in terms 
of a single line continuum. However, my early forays into background reading, 
both academic and ‘grey’ (i.e. unsubstantiated) literature obtained through the 
Internet showed that this concept was too limited. Instead of applying a 
continuum to mental illness, I needed to apply it to mental health as a whole. Of 
the ‘grey’ references I obtained, many described experience of mental illness as 
a part of a story in which they were the central character (e.g. ‘Louise’, 2001)
Obviously, I recognized and empathized with some of the details of these 
stories through mutual experience. In particular, I recognized descriptions of 
bewilderment, lack of control and an overall sense of strangeness. Moreover, 
there was an undeniable truth that mental illness had become an integral part of 
their lives as much as it was a part of mine. Yet to what extent had this affected 
their personal qualities and how they saw themselves? Using myself as an 
example, I could only say that maybe some of them are influenced by my 
illness, or maybe not. Maybe my view of myself, as detailed in the first 
paragraph, is that of the real ‘me’, an inviolate self that persists despite all that I 
have experienced in the course of my life story. Or maybe that self has been 
moulded by my experiences; maybe my thought processes have been forever 
changed. How do phenomena diagnosed as mental illness impact upon 
personal identity? This is the question which informs this thesis, pertaining not 
only to myself, but to persons who have experienced them.
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1.2. The impact of my own experiences upon this research
Denscombe (1998) draws attention to the fact that no social researcher can 
achieve an entirely objective position from which they can study their chosen 
field. Essentially, this is because the concepts used to interpret our 
observations of the social world are shaped by our experiences of that world. 
Therefore, awareness of this relationship, termed reflexivity, should be an 
integral part of any research. Although this construct is explained in detail in 
Chapter Six, it should be stressed at this juncture that it is obvious that my own 
experiences, as detailed above, should be acknowledged. Concerning these, 
however, they are not only a source of potential subjectivity in interpretation: 
they also provide examples of concepts pertinent to discussion. Accordingly, 
where appropriate, sections of text will be preceded by my personal statements, 
of which the first opens the next chapter. In that it summarizes the dichotomy 
between an ‘insider’ (i.e. subjective) and an ‘outsider’ (i.e. objective) viewpoint, 
it illustrates the approach that will inform this entire study.
With direct reference to interviewing, the fact of my illness may have played a 
significant role. As will be explained in Chapter Five, this was due to the fact 
that potential volunteers were, in the main, sought from the membership of a 
volunteer group of which my wife was a member. Accordingly, although I was 
an infrequent visitor, persons knew of my illness. Whether this encouraged 
them to participate in this research is a moot point. Certainly, one respondent 
implied that they believed I would not be judgemental in any way by virtue of my 
own experiences.
Associated with this is the question of whether or not respondents were more 
willing to talk frankly to me than they might have been to a complete stranger. 
Again, I submit that this is a moot point. However, it is important to mention two 
factors that I believe to have contributed to the dynamics of the interview. The 
first is that all of the respondents save one wanted to talk of their experiences, 
including personal issues that may have contributed to, and/or derived from, 
their illness. The second is that at the time of the interviews I had been a 
volunteer advocate, latterly a ‘befriender’, for over ten years. In this time, I had
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learnt to maintain an outwardly relaxed but inwardly vigilant approach to 
conversation at all times. For instance, if my ‘partner’ was depressed and 
uncommunicative, one of my personal rules was never to ask more than two 
questions in a row. My third sentence would be a comment about something 
inconsequential: the weather, a personalized car number plate I had seen 
recently, and so on. Moreover, I had learnt to be silent, that it was better to wait 
than to force conversation. Accordingly, I found interviewing to be a ‘natural 
extension’ of practices that I had already acquired, particularly that resisting the 
temptation to interrupt. Nevertheless, lest I appear pompous, I must stress that 
my interview technique was developed after consulting several academic 
sources, particularly Fox et al (2001) and Terkel (2004).
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is the question of the degree of 
which my experiences of illness may have influenced my interpretation of the 
data. As explained above, no researcher can be entirely objective. However, to 
attempt analysis of one’s own subjectivity creates a paradox in that this analysis 
will also be partly subjective. Therefore, it becomes evident that reflexivity can 
be acknowledged but not entirely eliminated. Concerning this research, my own 
technique, as explained later in Chapter Six, was to submit the data to four 
levels of analysis, of which the second challenged the finding of the first, and so 
on. By this method, I hoped to obtain a consistency of interpretation when re­
reading the conclusions of the fourth and final level.
1.3: The life story
As described by Linde (1993), most persons view themselves as the central 
character in their life story:
 a life story is something most people have, something they have created,
and something that, for both personal and social comfort, must be created in a 
coherent fashion. This is a culturally warranted, non-problematic assumption in 
our culture.
(Linde, 1993, 3 - 4) [Italicised by author]
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These descriptions, particularly the concept of a ‘non-problematic’ assumption, 
are fundamentally useful in that they appeal to common sense. Nevertheless, 
they cannot be viewed as a privilege or as a convenient short cut. Thus it must 
be stressed that inherent in the construct of a life story is that it begins with 
something: that is, an individual is born with the potential to develop physically 
and mentally. In the main, this study concerns mental development: in Western 
Society, most persons believe thoughts and emotions are enabled by an entity 
termed the mind, which is situated in the brain. It is the mind, through the 
capacity of consciousness, which interprets and remembers all perception of 
the inner and outer environment.
As will be explained in Chapter Two, through consciousness we perceive 
ourselves as thinking beings, as possessing a mind and, thereby, a self.
Dennett (1987a, 161) reduces human consciousness to ‘two sets of 
considerations’ detailed as ‘from the inside’ and ‘from the outside’, the very 
simplicity of which is extremely useful in underlining the essential nature of 
consciousness. From the inside details our own consciousness: our awareness 
of experiences, including the knowledge that much will be happening of which 
we know little or nothing. From the outside details our own part in observing the 
reaction of another person to those stimuli. However, we can never know for 
certain what that person is experiencing: we can only surmise via observation of 
their reactions plus our own knowledge of similar experience. Given this 
difference, it becomes appropriate to extend Dennett’s definitions as follows: 
‘from the inside’ means, literally, inner awareness and reaction to experience:
.... what it is like to be me
(Dennett, 1987a, 161 [italics in original text])
Similarly, ‘from the outside’ means the events that are experienced, including 
the reactions of other parties. Always, the nature of awareness is the same: 
‘from the outside’ can be observed and interpreted by ‘from the inside’, but the 
converse can never be true.
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1.4: The unique nature of personal consciousness
A foundation of this study is that the consciousness of any one person is 
entirely individual: that is, it cannot be directly shared with any other person. In 
exploring this, Laing (1990:15 -  16) employs increasingly complex word-knots 
which, although convoluted, are ultimately helpful in stressing the ultimate 
unattainability of another person’s thoughts:
I see you and you see me. I experience you, and you experience me. I see your 
behaviour. You see my behaviour. But I do not and never have and never will 
see your experience of me. Just as you cannot ‘see’ my experience of you.
(Laing, 1990,15)
The descriptions by Dennett (above) and Laing are in accord with much earlier 
observations regarding the nature of consciousness, such as those of the 
nineteenth-century philosopher William James:
My thought belongs with my other thoughts and your thought with your other 
thoughts. Whether anywhere in the room there be a mere thought, which is 
nobody’s thought, we have no means of ascertaining, for we have no 
experience of the like. The only states of consciousness that we naturally deal 
with are found in personal consciousness, minds, selves, concrete particular I’s 
and you’s.
(Edelman, 2004:5 -  6, quoting William James)
However, it is also true that in more recent texts a sense of subjectivity has 
been supplanted by a more detached, scientific view. For example, the views of 
Dennett, expressed in the second edition of The Oxford Dictionary of the Mind 
(2004), differ markedly from those in the first edition:
There are many properties of conscious states that can and should be 
subjected to further scientific investigation right now, and once we get accounts 
of them in place, we may well find that they satisfy us as an explanation of what 
consciousness is.
(Dennett, 2004:211)
Were the ‘from the outside’ and ‘from the inside’ categories abandoned because 
they were considered too simplistic in the overall context of the 2004 article? 
Possibly- but in their simplicity was an elegance that ably summarised the
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essential difference between outer and inner knowledge. Moreover, the 
cautious tone of the 1987 article can, possibly, be considered as more 
representative of humanity as a whole. Throughout the world’s population, 
many persons may be unfamiliar with scientific theory or may choose to reject it. 
For it is an integral part of self-awareness that an individual may choose to 
believe or reject some of the conclusions derived by others from observed 
experience. This is the essential difference between objectivity and subjectivity.
1.5: Thesis Plan
Concerning any research, Wengraf (2006) describes the primary objective as 
the Central Research Question. Thus the Central Research Question informing 
this study is “How do phenomena diagnosed as mental illness impact upon 
personal identity?” To explore this question fully, I will explore biological and 
philosophical aspects of the major constructs involved, including the analysis of 
original data gained from interviewing persons who experience, or have 
experienced, mental illness. With regard to the early chapters of the thesis 
plan, my primary concern is continuity as I progress from an objective view of 
the self and personal identity to embrace subjective understanding gained 
through the life story.
In Chapters Two, Three, And Four, I draw from relevant literature plus 
occasional personal experiences. In Chapter Two, I begin with a brief review of 
consciousness in terms of the foundation upon which all constructs of the self 
are created. Thereafter, I progress to scrutiny of an objective view of the self 
and personal identity to embrace subjective understanding gained through the 
life story.
Concepts of the life story are developed in Chapter Three to include narrative, 
the means by which we accord our experiences with the coherent structure 
necessary for interpretation and understanding. In this way the life story 
becomes a personal narrative, of which personal identity is an integral part. 
Originally, deeming phenomena diagnosed as mental illness to be a discrete 
topic, I had intended to discuss this in Chapter Two. However, after reflection
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and experimentation, ! feel that it should be emphasized in terms of a group of 
experiences within the personal narrative. Accordingly, this topic will be the 
subject matter of Chapter Four.
Chapters Five, Six, and Seven are all concerned with the obtaining of original 
data. Chapter Five discusses the methodology of the study, including the 
strategies deployed in my literature review, the recruitment of interviewees and 
the protocols required. In all, nine persons -  five men and four women -  were 
interviewed. Chapter Six details the theories and practice associated with 
analysis of transcripts. Finally, Chapter Seven explores in detail the constructs 
that will be applied in interpretation of the analysed data.
Chapters Eight, Nine and Ten present and analyse the transcripts of the nine 
interviewees. With reference to academic literature (Boisen, 1971; Breggin,
1991) I decided that I would designate severe experience of phenomena as 
overwhelm. Associated with this, I term details of the personal narrative before 
overwhelm as prologue; and details of the personal narrative after overwhelm 
as recovery. Each stage is the subject matter of a separate chapter: Chapter 
Eight discusses prologue, Chapter Nine overwhelm, and Chapter Ten recovery.
Chapter Eleven integrates the previous three chapters by comparing and 
contrasting the experiences described. In doing so, it will meet the 
requirements of the Central Research Question.
Chapter Twelve has three main functions. The first is to critique the 
methodology of the study including my own role as researcher. The second will 
be to recommend possible avenues for future research. The final part seeks to 
to suggest ways in which the findings of this study could be incorporated into 
mental health practice.
10
1.6: Conclusion: The self, personal identity, and phenomena diagnosed as 
mental illness
My approach in the empirical chapters acknowledges the tension between 
science and romanticism. Through science there can be a belief that, ultimately, 
all will be explained in terms of natural processes. Through romanticism there 
can be a conviction that some matters will never be understood, that even the 
most rarefied knowledge can be tempered by a sense of wonder. Together, 
these constructs create the fundamental basis of the self and personal identity: 
although limited by understanding, they may be limitless by virtue of 
imagination.
At this point, I posit a fundamental definition of phenomena diagnosed as 
mental illness as phenomena that affect the workings of the mind. Concerning 
these, it is incumbent to note that biological constructs of the mind detail 
complex neurophysiological processes (e.g. Armstrong 2004). However, after 
consideration, I feel that such detail, whilst fascinating, is ultimately 
unnecessary. Similarly, I do not intend to dwell on theories of mental illness that 
centre on environmental causation. This is on the grounds that generalized 
theories of aetiology could prejudice the analysis of the data gained from the 
interviews. Instead, the focus should be entirely upon the experiences of the 
nine respondents in the context of their life stories. In this way, concepts of 
aetiology, whether biological or environmental, can be scrutinized as an integral 
part of personal understanding.
This consideration amply summarizes my approach to the obtaining of original 
data. Above all other considerations, it was essential to appreciate a respondent 
not as a subject, but as a person. Only then would it be possible to gain insight 
into the possible impact of phenomena diagnosed as mental illness upon 
personal identity.
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Chapter Two: Personal identity
2.1: Introduction: defining the self and personal identity
This chapter explores the very real issue of whether or not an individual 
possesses an understanding of their person in terms of a ‘self, and the degree 
of that understanding. As will be explained, the ‘self can be viewed in terms of 
a generalized construct of social interactions processed by neurophysiology, or 
in terms of a self-system, a complex nexus of interacting constructs. Associated 
with this is the concept, detailed by Leary and Tangney (2003), of an 
‘experiencing thing’, one that is a unique entity:
Most people have the sense that there is an experiencing ‘thing’ inside their 
heads that registers their experiences, thinks their thoughts, and feels their 
feelings.
(Leary and Tangney, 2003:7)
Such a construct can reasonably be termed a ‘subjective self; a quality that 
enables ‘personal identity’. However, this is a complex question in its own right. 
For example, Vesey (2004) chooses to discuss personal identity by way of 
Descartes, Hume, Locke and others. Although preferring Hume’s concept of a 
‘felt bond’ among ‘perceptions’, he eschews a firm conclusion in favour of 
highlighting continuing debate. In comparison, the approach of Kerby (1986) is 
to view the self through the medium of language, for which purpose he makes 
an initial definition of the self as ‘...the subject that I am’. Following passages 
posing many complex questions similar to Vesey’s concerns in that they explore 
philosophical viewpoints, he resorts to humour:
The self or subject is one of those types of beings of which one might say, with 
Augustine: “Sure I know what it is, as long as you don’t ask me to explain it.”
(Kerby, 1986, 212)
Perhaps surprisingly, the author then quotes the phenomenologist William 
Dilthey in suggesting that identity poses much less of a problem:
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We seem to have no trouble with identity over time, for as Dilthey has said:
“The knowledge of the course of one’s life is as real as experience itself”
(Kerby, ibid)
Thus, whereas the concept of a self is considered nebulous, difficult to explain 
clearly, Kerby unequivocally links identity with life experiences. Supported by 
Aleksander’s (2004:32) statement that the term ‘personal’ is indicative of 
ownership and individuality, this view leads to a provisional description of the 
difference between self and personal identity:
Self is innate, being founded upon genetic complement. Becoming 
increasingly complex as the person ages, its bio-mechanisms are the 
means of gaining and retaining experience.
Personal identity is actuated by the self. It is both an objective and a 
subjective construct derived from understanding of experiences gained in 
the course of one’s life.
I conclude this introduction by observing that development of the self and 
personal identity should properly be understood as continuous throughout a 
person’s lifetime. However, it is in the early years, in childhood, that the rate of 
development is greatest. Initially, all depends upon possession of 
consciousness, the capacity to interpret sense-perception.
2.2: Consciousness 
2.2.1: Defining consciousness
Exploration of the workings of the mind raises issues of reflexivity that cannot 
be ignored. As a scientist, I want rigour; I want well-founded constructs that will 
withstand rigorous scrutiny. As a person who has experienced phenomena 
diagnosed as mental illness for over forty years, I have asked whether or not it 
was all inevitable, if 7 had been dealt a poor hand’. And I also want to retain a 
sense of wonder; I want to be the same person who, as a boy, marvelled at the 
stars on a frosty night. If I am truthful, the idea that a phenomenon may never 
be completely explained is reassuring.
Personal statement
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Edelman (2004) identifies two forms of consciousness- primary consciousness, 
and higher-order consciousness:
Primary consciousness is:
‘... .the state of being mentally aware of things in the world, of having mental 
images in the present. It is possessed not only by humans but by animals 
lacking semantic or linguistic abilities whose brain organization is nevertheless 
similar to ours.
(Edelman, 2004, 9)
By embracing the basic construct of sensation combined with perception, 
primary consciousness is described by Edelman (ibid) as enabling complex 
responses to stimuli but not a concept of self:
Primary consciousness is not accompanied by any sense of a socially defined 
self with a concept of a past or future. It exists primarily in the remembered 
present.
(Edelman, ibid)
In contrast, higher-order consciousness enables an individual to be aware of 
their own existence. Possibly controversially, Edelman asserts that this capacity 
is present to ‘some minimal degree’ in higher primates and is most developed in 
humans:
Higher-order consciousness involves the ability to be conscious of being 
conscious, and it allows the recognition by a thinking subject of his or her own 
acts and affections.
(Edelman, ibid)
Later in Edelman’s text, this construct is amplified to include concepts of time:
Higher-order consciousness confers the ability to imagine the future, explicitly 
recall the past, and to be conscious of being conscious:
(Edelman, 2004:58 -  59)
In this context, Horner and Westacott (2000) describe consciousness as 
‘intentional’ in the sense that it is always directed: thus, in accordance with 
Edelman’s schema, higher-order consciousness is directed towards itself.
Just as we cannot be seeing without seeing something, nor hearing without 
hearing something, so we cannot be conscious without there being something 
we are conscious of.
(Horner and Westacott, 2000:90)
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Curiously, Edelman does not mention child development in connection with his 
constructs. However, Stern’s (2000) assertion that ‘some senses of the self do 
exist long prior to self-awareness and language’ is highly suggestive of primary 
consciousness. Thereafter, the following detail is obviously of higher-order 
consciousness:
Another change in sense of self is seen at about age nine months, when 
suddenly infants seem to sense that they have an interior subjective life of their 
own and that others do too.
(Stern, 2000, 9)
Accordingly, Stern’s observations in tandem with Edelman’s definitions lead to 
the possibility that primary consciousness and higher-order consciousness are 
aspects of the same mental mechanism. In effect, as a person develops, so 
primary consciousness becomes sufficiently complex to actuate higher-order 
consciousness.
An intriguing aspect of consciousness is that not all experiences are committed 
to memory. Similarly, and rather more complex, are instances of experiences 
being forgotten until recalled at a much later event; also of experiences being 
influential without the person realizing this. This leads to the positing of 
constructs within consciousness, of which one, the unconscious, can justly be 
described as compromised by hearsay and misunderstanding. Therefore, 
although detail will be brief, it is essential to examine these in their proper 
context.
2.2.2: Constructs within consciousness
When I was aged nine, I went into hospital to have my tonsils removed.
Perhaps two days later, before I was discharged, I noticed ants crawling on the 
locker beside my bed. When I told the nurse, she said, “Don’t be so silly. ”
The next time I was given orange juice, I did not drink it all but left some in the 
polythene cup on top of the locker. Later, when I checked it, it had four dead 
ants in it. However, when the nurse saw it, she said nothing. Absolutely nothing. 
She did not say, “I see, you were right after all, ” or words to that effect; she 
ignored me totally.
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The fact that I can remember this incident vividly bewilders me. Is it important?
If so, why? Maybe it has coloured my perception of ‘authority figures’, maybe 
not: the truth is, I do not know and probably never will know.
Personal statement
2.2.2.1: The unconscious
Unconsciousness can be applied to two areas of consciousness, of which the 
first can be colloquial: unconsciousness is a state of not being conscious. 
However, when used in a neurophysiological sense, it is a state wherein an 
individual is not conscious of being conscious (Edelman, 2004:9), of which the 
most common form of this is sleep (Oswald (2004: 847 -  8). The second area of 
unconsciousness is the extremely vexed concept of the unconscious mind, an 
entity that exists alongside or, more appropriately, within the conscious mind in 
terms of a reservoir of imaginations, memories, and emotions. Inextricably 
associated with this construct is the development of psychoanalysis by Sigmund 
Freud (Gregory, 2004a:926; Zangwill, 2004:357 -  8). However, further 
discussion of this field is, ultimately, not helpful to this study. Instead, it is 
sufficient to state that the construct of the unconscious mind can be distorted by 
the popular imagination into a baleful and malignant force within the mind. This 
observation also applies to a similar construct: the subconscious.
2.2.2.2: The subconscious
Although the unconscious and the subconscious are so closely related as to be 
synonymous, no reference to ‘subconscious’ was found in the later references 
used in this study. However, this term was used by authors of older texts 
detailing psychopathology (e.g. Boisen, 1936, 1971). Of all the constructs 
associated with consciousness, it is probably the most contentious:
The word subconscious has a dubious sound; and those to whom it brings 
slight illumination associate it with phenomena of rare occurrence and unusual 
significance. It should be a homely term; and its place is close to the hearth of 
our psychological interests.
(Jastrow, 2005 [1906]: vii)
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Notably, in casual discussion with friends who have experienced mental illness, 
also with some of the interviewees, I have learned that all believed in the 
subconscious. Accordingly, I believe that this term persists in colloquial use. On 
inspection, it appears so close to the Freudian model of the unconscious mind 
as to be synonymous. However, any further speculation is unhelpful: if 
appropriate, this subject will be reviewed with reference to the transcripts of the 
interviews.
2.2.2.3: Nonconsciousness and the Implicit Self
Nonconsciousness, as described by Edelman (2004:87-96), is synonymous with 
implicit memory, described above on page 26:
With practice, conscious attention is not required, and acts become automatic 
[...] At such a point, brain scans show much less involvement unless novelty is 
introduced, requiring further conscious attention.
(Edelman, 2004:93)
Associated with this capacity is the construct of the implicit self, described by 
Rudman and Spencer (2007) as follows:
...aspects of the self that are represented in memory via routinized 
associations (e.g. between self and evaluation, attributes, or social identities) 
that may not be readily available to introspection.
(Rudman and Spencer, 2007:97)
However, the authors extend the boundaries of the implicit self beyond memory 
in subsequent discussion, which includes the following applications (ibid, 98):
i) Measurements of implicit self-esteem with reference to possible 
psychological dysfunction.
ii) Investigations into the role of the implicit self in automatic 
emotion regulation.
iii) Effect on the individual of high implicit self-esteem/low explicit 
self-esteem disparity
iv) Effect of social interactions on the implicit self
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Thus this understanding of the implicit self serves to combine an overview of the 
constructs above, particularly unconsciousness, the sub-conscious, and non­
consciousness. This is by virtue of being able to implement and regulate actions 
without necessarily being aware of doing so. Obviously, given the details 
above, understanding of this construct may have an important role in 
investigations into phenomena diagnosed as mental illness (see Chapter Four).
This section concludes examination of consciousness. In summary, it is the 
interface between the person and their environment: the means by which 
experiences are perceived, interpreted, and understood. As such, it is arguably 
the foundation upon which the self is constructed.
2.3: The central character in my life story: overviews of the self
Who am I? Within the various exterior aspects that I present to the outside 
world I believe that there is an inner, private person that only few people see: 
the ‘real me’. Unfortunately, this statement seems redolent with melodrama, of 
wanting to be seen as more than I actually am. Such is not my intention: instead 
my claim derives from the essentially unknowable qualities of the mind. I might 
know who I am but I might never know my self.
Personal statement
2.3.1: Early constructs of the self
The first psychological description of the self is usually credited to William 
James in 1890:
James not only laid a strong foundation for the study of the self but also touted 
the importance of the self for understanding human behaviour and set a strong 
precedent for regarding the self as a legitimate topic of scholarly investigation.
(Leary and Tangney, 2003:4)
Holstein and Gubrium (2000) quote several sources explaining that James 
extended the view of the self from a metaphysical realm into a social 
environment. This was through his construct of the ‘Empirical Self’:
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Whatever I may be thinking of, I am always at the same time more or less 
aware of myself, of my personal existence. At the same time it is I who am 
aware, so that the total self of me, being as it were duplex, partly known and 
partly knower, must have two aspects discriminated in it, of which for shortness 
we may call one the Me and the other I.
(James, 1961 [1892]:43, quoted by Holstein and Gubrium, 2000:22. [Italics
in James’ original text])
In a rather colloquial context, the authors note that the ‘empirical self is 
subdivided into the ‘material me’, the ‘social me’ and the ‘spiritual me’
(2000:23). After James, the next major advance was Charles Horton Cooley’s 
(1902) construct of ‘The Looking Glass Self, the name of which derives from 
the concept that the self operates in the imagination, reflecting upon and 
reacting to real and imagined others (Bowling, 2002; 130; Hill, 1998:103;
Holstein and Gubrium, 2000, 24-27; Leary and Tangney, 2003:5). On 
examination, this is extremely close to the concept of the self as the central 
character in a personal life story (Chapter One): to be self-aware and assess 
our own actions, it follows that we must possess some form of self image. From 
basic feelings, the self is constructed through social experience:
What is original for us as human beings, then, are the visceral sensations of our 
individuality, according to Cooley, and this provides the bodily underpinning for 
stimulating our activities as social entities.
(Holstein and Gubrium, 2000:26)
By virtue of noting social interaction, Cooley’s ‘looking-glass self can be 
regarded as a ‘bridge’ from the pragmatic stance of James to the later 
interactionist constructs posited by George Herbert Mead in 1934 (Bowling, ibid; 
Holstein and Gubrium, 2000, 27 -35; Kerby, 2001:133). These place far more 
importance on the formation of the self through social interaction, particularly 
symbolic interactionism, whereby concepts are shared between persons 
through mutually understood symbols, including language and actions. 
Accordingly, they are highly important in that they enable consideration of the 
relation of significant others to the person.
2.3.2: Goffman’s dramaturgic self
Later constructs of the self can be viewed as refinements of interactionist 
theory, particularly Goffman’s role-play or dramaturgic self (Hill, 1998:103;
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Holstein and Gubrium 2000; 35 -  37) and Roger’s humanistic approach (Hill, 
1998:8). The latter construct stresses those aspects of individuality that Hill 
details as uniquely human:
The humanistic approach aimed to investigate all the uniquely human aspects 
of experience such as love, hope, creativity, etc. and emphasised the 
importance of the individual’s reaction with the environment.
(Hill, 1998:8) [Bold type in original text]
Goffman’s 1959 construct provides the vital link between generalized models 
and the uniquely private qualities of the individual self. Not only does he retain a 
pragmatist’s view of the ‘I’ and ‘Me’ self (Holstein and Gubrium 2000:36), he 
also explains that individuals engage in ‘performances’ designed to accomplish 
the desired outcomes in social interactions. With reference to this, McAdams 
(1993) refers to any one individual maintaining many selves as ‘the juggler’:
The juggler is especially skilled at what sociologist Erving Goffman called “the 
presentation of self in everyday life.” According to Goffman, the modern man or 
woman is like a performer enacting roles in order to manipulate the impressions 
of others.
(McAdams, 1993, 125)
However, the author finds Goffman’s model ‘deeply unsatisfying’:
... .because he fails to discern an integrated sense of self -  an identity -  behind 
the many different roles we play.
(McAdams, 1993:126)
Whether or not this charge is justified depends on an overview. It must be 
stressed that the role-playing of the self is both inward and outward: inward, 
perceived only by the individual via personal consciousness, and outward, 
perceived by the individual and other individuals via perception. If, as explained 
by the constructs outlined above, the self is constructed as an integral part of 
communicative action, then it follows that this is also inward and outward. Whilst 
an individual could, theoretically, maintain awareness of an extremely complex 
integrated construct of self, the various role-plays involved might be viewed as 
separate entities by outside observers. Accordingly, although Holstein and 
Gubrium (2000:36) successfully defend Goffman’s claim of similarities between 
‘theater and real-life’ [sic], I believe that it would be an error to over-use the
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dramaturgic construct. Used incautiously, role-play could be applied to create 
an impression of life as a continuous calculation, every action carefully 
managed to yield maximum advantage. Instead, it should be used to explain 
how individuals react according to the circumstances they find themselves in, 
whether anticipated or unexpected, rehearsed or unrehearsed.
2.3.3: Later developments: perception of subconstructs of the self
By acknowledging the essentially personal nature of consciousness, later 
developments of the self-construct are associated with the confusion that arises 
from the dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity:
Awareness, or consciousness, also includes notions of self -  notions, which 
although real and meaningful for each of us, remain nebulous and ill-defined. 
Few topics lend themselves less well to scientific research or logical analysis.
(Le Francois, 1983:58)[Bold type in original text]
Some twenty years later, when summarizing the status of the term ‘self, Leary 
and Tangney (2003) use words that are almost uncannily coincidental:
From the beginning, the topic has been bogged down in a conceptual quagmire 
as muddy as any in the social and behavioral [sic] sciences.
(Leary and Tangney, 2003:6)
Le Francois (ibid) explains that the problem arises from the essentially 
intangible nature of the self:
A self cannot be observed objectively: it can only be felt subjectively. [...] Self is 
at once part of my immediate functioning and separate from it. In other words, 
although I feel that myself is directly involved in what I am now doing, I cannot 
rid myself of the notion that there is some indefinable, elusive part of me that 
can somehow stand apart from what is happening.
(Le Francois, ibid)
However, if unconstrained, this viewpoint could result in a return to the 
metaphysical concepts cited with reference to James. Instead, it appears to 
have been integrated into understanding of the self-construct. Concerning this, 
Leary and Tangney (2003:5) note three developments beginning in the late
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sixties: empirical interests in self-esteem; a ‘cognitive revolution in psychology' 
leading to research into self-awareness, self-regulation, and identity; plus 
development of interest into the functioning self. Deriving from these, the most 
notable aspect of present viewpoints is that emphasis has moved from a 
generalised, overall construct of the self to the investigation of sub-constructs:
More often than not I find myself ignoring any occurrence of the term “self” and 
substituting whatever connotation the writer is explicitly or (more often) implicitly 
making. The strongest conclusion I can make is that the term ‘self’ has no place 
in psychological theory.
Katzko (1993:110)
Katzko's argument (ibid) is that the term ‘self’ should always be qualified in 
order to make clear what aspect or functions are being referred to. Certainly this 
concept appears to be applied with reference to articles in the journal Self and 
Identity. Leary (2004), as editor, notes:
 a wide variety of self-related constructs (such as self-awareness, self-
construal, self-regulation, self-rumination, self-compassion, self-efficacy, self­
categorization, self-enhancement, self-concept and identity)
(Leary, 2004:1)
In her first editorial as editor of the journal Self and Identity, Carolyn Morf (2005) 
stresses her affinity with her predecessor:
... I am in accord with Mark Leary that it is not useful to employ self as a 
synonym for person or personality, as these constructs encompass more than 
just a person’s self-system. Instead, I reiterate his plea for people to think 
carefully about what they mean by the term self and to use more precise terms 
in its place...
(Morf, 2005:99)
In this context, a ‘self-system’ represents re-integration:
Conceived as a coherent organized self-system, however, one can understand 
what guides the interactions of the various self-processes and how they work.
fMorf. ibid)
t ------------------*  i
Nevertheless, this overall process of re-definition feels unsatisfactory. This is 
because in solving one problem, that of specificity, another appears to have
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been created. Instead of the term ‘self, an overview is called a ‘self-system’. In 
effect, this construct is circumlocutory: is there a self-process which is aware of 
the self-system? If so, what should it be called? This leads to the questions of 
an intrinsic self and personal identity.
2.4: Self and Personal Identity: Inter-related and Inter-dependent
The recollection of the ants in my orange juice illustrates the myriads of singular 
experiences retained by memory. In tandem with my innate genetic 
complement, these combined memories confer uniqueness upon me: thus do I 
possess a sense of personal identity.
Personal statement
Throughout this exploration of the self, the impression gained is that despite 
scientific rigour and philosophical argument, researchers and academics feel 
obliged to recognize the concept of some kind of inner entity. Although highly 
subjective and conjectural, the idea of ‘an experiencing thing inside their heads’, 
as described by Leary and Tangney (see previous chapter) is too useful to 
abandon. In simple terms, the existence of a central point -  a unique self -  is 
both in accord with and a necessary part of the concept of oneself as the central 
character in a life story. As detailed above, this raises the question of whether 
this entity is a part of a self-system or a subjective expression of that system in 
entirety. In answer, it is helpful to reprise the earlier discussion. Any self-system 
requires a starting point: one that, once potentiated, can perceive and process 
events so that they can be memorized. As posited previously (see Foreword), 
such a system is almost certainly a function of genetic complement: this is the 
self. As such, it is innate; its components being comprised of the mind and its 
sub-constructs, viz:
i) Mechanisms of sensation and perception
ii) Primary consciousness
iii) Higher-order consciousness
iv) The potential to memorize events processed by means of the 
above processes (experiences)
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Genetic complement is constant in that it cannot be changed. However, the 
resultant self-system is imbued with the potential for increasingly complex 
development. Sensation and perception lead to experiences, the acquisition of 
memory; the processes of learning and, ultimately, introspective thought. Stern 
(2000, 11) divides development of the self into four stages:
i) Emergent self ( 0 - 2  months)
ii) Core self ( 2 - 6  months)
Hi) Subjective self ( 7 - 1 5  months)
iv) Verbal self (15 months +)
Of these stages, the first two are best summarized as gradual development in 
cognition. As explained in Chapter One, the third stage, the detail of the 
subjective self suggests the actuation of higher-order consciousness. The fourth 
stage, the verbal self, indicates the beginnings of linguistic abilities, so enabling 
the full potentiation of the self-construct. Within these processes, the objective 
concept of a genetically defined self becomes imbued with subjectivity: 
knowledge and understanding of this system with reference to the self as the 
experiencing entity is personal identity, of which an integral part is the concept 
of something indefinable, unique to oneself.
To explain this overall construct, I believe that it is helpful to apply an illusion 
called the Kanizsa Triangle (Gregory, 2004b:442: Edelman, 2004:36 -37). In 
Gregory’s opinion, this is the most famous of the ‘fictional’ figures developed by 
the Italian artist-psychologist Gaetano Kanizsa. As shown in Diagram 2.1 
overleaf, the arrangement of the six outer elements creates the illusion of a 
distinct white triangle. From an objective point of view, it does not exist; 
however, from a subjective point of view it does exist. In noting that ‘most 
people’ see this illusion, Edelman (ibid) states that some see an increase in 
apparent luminance within the triangle.
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Realising that this exercise could be interpreted as an intellectual gimmick, I 
stress that it is a serious attempt to portray how a wholly subjective entity can 
exist independently within the self-system. Although a paradox, a function of 
the interaction of the other elements, the white triangle is nevertheless an 
integral part of the overall system.
Figure 2.1: Kanizsa Triangle
Thus it is an ideal vehicle to illustrate how a whole can be more than the sum of 
its parts, of how the parts of a system may create another as a result of their 
interaction. From one point of view, the created part is an entity in its own right; 
from another it cannot exist independently; from yet another, the whole system 
cannot exist without creating it. Thereafter applied, by annotating the various 
elements the system with reference to the various constructs discussed in this 
chapter, the Kanizsa Triangle can be used to represent the innate self-system, 
on which personal identity is founded. The first stage in this exercise is to 
annotate the symbols that will be used in construction of a self-system diagram:
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i) The three incomplete triangles represent elements of primary consciousness:
ii) The three incomplete circles represent higher-order consciousness:
e t c
As explained in Chapter One, through primary consciousness, perception is 
processed and analysed, leading to the memorising of experiences. Thus 
potentiated, the nascent self-system is formed and begins to develop further, as 
suggested in Stern’s descriptions of the emergent self and the core self (See 
above). However, in this, the earliest stages of life, it is reasonable to speculate 
that higher-order consciousness, the mechanism that enables a subjective 
sense of self, has yet to form:
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Figure 2.2: Development of a nascent self-system by primary consciousness:
Through primary consciousness the person perceives their environment.
The beginnings o f retention o f experience by memory are shown by the outer dotted 
circle. The nascent self-system is represented by this entire construct.
Retention o f  experiences by memory
Primary Consciousness
Perception o f  my environment
/
The second in this series of diagrams shows the actuation of higher-order 
consciousness, so enabling subjective conception of the self as a thinking 
entity:
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Figure 2:3 Developing self-system facilitated by actuation of higher-order 
consciousness
Stern (2000) suggests that the development o f the core self is followed by the sense o f a 
‘subjective se lf  (between the age o f seven and nine months). These processes suggest 
that higher-order consciousness has been actuated, so enhancing the self-construct. This 
development in mental potential enables interactions within memory, so leading to 
understanding, as represented by the arrows in the outer circle.
KEY:
= primary 
consciousness
= higher-order 
consciousness
\ Interactions 
within memory
t
\Subjective
sense
of
self
The developing self is a nexus, an interactive construct incorporating ‘Who I am’ 
(self), ‘What I have experienced5 (memory5, ‘What I understand5 (evaluative 
processes), and ‘What I will come to do5 (intentionality). Concerning this 
construct, it is essential to recognize that it is continually growing, becoming 
ever more complex as experience is garnered. Thus, as an integral part of the 
nexus, the subjective sense of self will also become more complex until, at an 
indeterminate point, personal identity is potentiated. Subsequently, through 
social interaction, concepts and understanding of all aspects of the self-nexus -  
both subjective and objective -  become enhanced. Central to this process is the 
acquisition of language, whereby knowledge outside the realm of personal 
experience can be conveyed.
Ultimately, within the objective and subjective overview of a human being 
possessing physical form and mental capacity may be engendered the 
subjective concept of an intrinsic self: an ultimately indefinable part of the mind 
which is the wellspring of emotions and feeling.
This continuing complexity is depicted in Figure 2.4 overleaf, which is the final 
diagram in this chapter. However, the series will be developed further in the 
following chapter.
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Figure 2.4: Development o f the self-system to show subjective sense o f self and
personal identity
As shown by the increased size o f  the outer circle, the self-system rapidly becomes 
more complex through social interactions. Personal identity derives from continuous 
appraisal o f  the se lf  s role in, and understanding of, continuing experiences; i.e. the life 
story.
KEY:
Memory as an interactive construct, incorporating perception 
= and understanding o f new experiences with understanding o f 
previous experiences, including the role o f the self in same
< ---------- ► = interactions between consciousness and on-going experiences,
including review o f memories and revision o f understanding
I " I
Subjective
2.5. Conclusion: the foundations of personal identity
This chapter has elaborated upon the first by concentrating upon the 
development of the self and personal identity in terms of a potential, yet to be 
fully realized. Up to this point, discussion of self and personal identity has been 
mechanistic, being concerned with constructs and processes, theories and 
interactions. Yet I make no apology for taking this stance: rather my intention 
was to examine the ‘raw template’ upon which the life story is imprinted.
Implied, but not explored, were some of the many social and cultural influences 
that contribute to and enable this potential to be realized. The following chapter 
explores these with the aim of achieving a fuller overview of the ways in which 
experiences are memorized and understood. It is time to move from constructs 
to persons.
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Chapter Three: If you want to know me personal identity and
personal narrative
3.1: Introduction: And if I want to know myself
On two occasions I have received cognitive therapy as part of the treatment for 
my illness. Much of this consists of looking backwards, to try and identify 
significant trends and events that might explain some of my present beliefs and 
motivations. It is important to recognize that this should not be regarded as an 
exercise in apportioning blame. Rather it is an attempt to gain understanding of 
the complex of events within and without my life story. For my life story is not 
solely about me, it is about all that has influenced me, all that influences me 
now, and all that will influence me.
Personal statement
In the closing pages of the previous chapter, I acknowledged that my intention 
had been to explore the ‘raw material’ upon which personal identity is founded. 
For the purposes of clarity, I reaffirm my conclusion that personal identity is a 
nexus, an interactive construct incorporating ‘Who I am’ (self), ‘What I have 
experienced’ (memory), What I understand’ ( evaluative processes), and What 
I will come to do’ (intentionality). The purpose of this chapter is to focus on the 
‘outside’: the sources of experience that are essential to the shaping of personal 
identity. In colloquial terms, I intendjoput the flesh on the bones’. In academic 
terms, I intend to explore generalized aspects of social and cultural influences, 
the processes within which the beginnings of personal identity evolve into a life 
story. Initially, it is essential to make brief reference to emotional and cognitive 
development from child to adult. One reason for this is to lay a foundation for 
the later examination of the various influences involved. Another is to gradually 
introduce the phenomenological aspect of the self, so that an understanding of 
what it is or might be can be combined with subjective feeling.
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3.2: Emotional development from child to adult 
3.2.1: Attachment
With specific reference to developmental psychology, attachment describes a 
strong, long-lasting emotional bond between two individuals (Hill, 1998). Of 
particular importance is attachment between infant and parent: thus it is 
pertinent that McAdams (1993) chooses to employ the term ‘love’ in contrast to 
Hill’s pragmatism. Whilst I do not intend to explore attachment theory in detail, it 
should be noted that secure attachment at age one is associated with stability in 
later childhood (McAdams, ibid). Therefore, this topic will be raised again later 
in this chapter with reference to social interactions.
3.2.2: Agency and communion
In association with a philosophical overview of human motivation, McAdams 
(1993) cites the Greek philosopher Empodocles, who ‘....argued that two great 
forces -  “love” and “strife” -  rule the universe (1993, 70). Linking this dialectic with 
Freud, the author opines that ‘a significant number1 (ibid, 71) of psychologists 
have posited theories that encompass two general but opposing areas. In 
summary, one area embraces individuality in terms of autonomy, power and 
status, whilst the other is concerned with dependence in interpersonal 
relationships, particularly intimacy. With reference to these, the author favours 
terms applied by Bakan (1966), namely agency and communion:
• Agency refers to a striving to separate from others, to realise the full
potential of the self
• Communion refers to the desire to be an integral part of society.
Whilst it appears obvious that these two modes are probably present in all 
persons, the relationship between them can be extraordinarily complex due to 
goals desired amid social and cultural forces.
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3.2.3: 'Significant others’
A personal narrative does not begin in isolation but is influenced by parents and 
other family members. Later in childhood, the influence of other persons 
becomes apparent:
Our parents, teachers, priests, and friends all play a role in our socialization and
in doing so they impart values and instill [sic] ideas
(Novitz, 2001:154)
Such a person is referred to by Anderson, Chen and Miranda as a ‘significant 
other1:
...an individual who is or has been deeply influential in one’s life, and in whom 
one is or once was emotionally invested, including members of one’s family-of- 
origin and people encountered outside of family relations.
(Andersen, Chen, and Miranda, 2002:160)
In theory, a ‘significant other1 can come from any part of society; therefore I use 
this concept to compile the following list. In doing so, it is important to stress 
that a person may be an active participant in interaction with another person or
persons; that is, they may contribute to the outcome.
• At the immediate family level, an individual is introduced by parents and 
elder siblings (if any) to social and cultural conventions.
• At the extended family level, the individual learns that parental beliefs are 
influenced by their own parents plus those of their siblings and other 
relatives.
• Outside the family, the individual is initially influenced by informal groups, 
namely friends and play groups. Later, this extends to formalized social 
activities such as sport, and formalized organizations including school 
and, possibly, religion.
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• At a local cultural and social level, the family -  and thereby the individual 
-  is influenced by the state of the environment in terms of housing, plus 
community and civic institutions. This includes health provision, such as 
a person’s GP and other health professionals.
• At a national cultural and social level, the family -  and thereby the 
individual -  is influenced by the ‘law of the land’, organized political 
movements, the economy, and the political climate.
• On reaching adulthood, the influence of friends, social activities, religious 
belief and employment will continue throughout life.
3.2.4: Cultural and structural influences
To summarise social and cultural influences in an easily accessible form, 
Thompson (1993, 2006) devised the Personal-Cultural-Structural system, 
(abbreviated to PCS). Specifically, this was designed to demonstrate the nature 
and sources of discriminatory environmental forces -  especially negative forces 
-  that might affect an individual. To demonstrate these, the author uses 
concentric circles to show the relation of the person to their environment, as 
shown in Figure 3.1 overleaf.
Given this specialized purpose, it becomes obvious that it can be used to 
indicate all environmental influences. However, on reflection, I considered the 
PCS diagram too generalized for the purposes of this study. In particular, there 
is the question of overlapping of influences, whereby a cultural influence may be 
highly structured. Thereafter, if one attempted to differentiate between local and 
national levels within the PCS diagram, it would become cluttered and difficult to 
follow easily. However, if the principle of PCS is combined with that of 
‘significant others’, it is useful as a device to locate relationships between the 
person and their environment.
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Figure 3.1: PCS System (Thompson, 2006)
P = Personal level 
C = Cultural level 
S = Structural level
The personal level is self-explanatory.
Cultural Influences can be summarized as societal rules that apply to 
personal conduct.
Structural influences comprise the major forces governing the orderly 
function of a society, including civil law.
3.3: Cognitive development from child to adult
For the purposes of this chapter, a detailed scrutiny of cognitive development is 
unnecessary. Development is gradual, attaining sophistication in adolescence 
(Le Francois, 1983; Hill, 1998). Potential for refinement and increasing 
complexity may be realised throughout adulthood. Within the PCS system, and 
crucial in all stages of development, is social interaction with significant others. 
Associated with this, as explained in Chapter 2, is the acquisition of language: a 
system of mutually understood symbols that convey what has been stored in 
memory. If sufficiently sophisticated, it can describe all aspects of an 
experience, both subjective and objective, with extreme accuracy. To achieve 
this, language must be more than symbols; it must be able to create a coherent 
and observe a temporal sequence, wherein discrete events can be located with 
proper relation to one another and the whole event/experience. This is the 
essential function of narrative:
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....the basic medium in which human beings speak, think, grow into selves and 
understand others.
(Freeman, 1997:175)
Understanding of narrative is integral to this thesis. Firstly, as will be discussed 
in this chapter, it is the means by which virtually all experiences and 
understanding is expressed. Secondly, as will be explained in Chapter Seven, 
analysis of narrative structure will be applied in the exploration of the interview 
data.
3.4: Narrative in experience and understanding 
3.4.1: Defining narrative
The essential function of narrative is to describe a series of events with respect 
to what happened and their import to the person and/or their community.
Central, and crucial to the discussion in this chapter, is the fact that narrative is 
a social transaction. The teller of a narrative is termed a narrator; and the 
person or person receiving the narrative are termed the audience. Notably, 
narration can be introspective, thus an individual person can be both narrator 
and audience. Concerning the act of narration, Bruner (2001) divides narrative 
into three elements:
i) Story -  ‘the abstract sequence of events, systematically
related, the syntagmatic structure’
ii) Discourse -  ‘the text in which the story is manifested.’
Hi) Telling -  the action, the act of narrating, the communicative
process that produces the story in discourse’
However, as noted by authors such as Riessman (1993) and Hinchman and 
Hinchman (2001), a precise definition of narrative, plus an unequivocal concept 
of its limitations, remains a subject of debate. Riessman’s own definition (ibid, 2)
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is minimalist in that it underlines the basic function of narrative but provides little 
insight:
‘ narratives structure perceptual experience, organize memory’.
(Riessman, 1993:2)
Better is Hinchman and Hinchman’s (2001) overview of narrative, in which they 
suggest that the many definitions of narrative necessitate use of the ‘lowest 
common denominator’:
 forms of discourse that place events in sequential order with a clear,
beginning, middle, and end.
(Hinchman and Hinchman, 2001, xv)
Similarly, Elliott (2005) draws on several sources in constructing the following 
definition of narrative:
Perhaps the simplest definition of narrative, and one that has been traced back 
to Aristotle in his Poetics, is a story with a beginning, middle and an end.
(Elliott, 2005:7)
In 1967, narrative was defined as a sequence of events with reference to 
language by Labov and Waletzky in what many scholars view as a seminal 
paper:
 one method of recapitulating past experience by matching a verbal
sequence of clauses to the sequence of events which actually occurred.
(Labov and Waletzky, 2006 [1967], 8)
Bewilderingly, the authors state that this definition is ‘informal’. However, in 
reviewing this and a virtually identical definition in a later paper by Labov 
(1972), Linde (1993, 67 -  8) avers that it ‘provides the most useful skeleton for 
studying naturally occurring oral data’. Importantly, she notes that the order of the 
narrative may not necessarily match the order of events, so drawing a 
distinction between the content of the narrative and the way that it is 
communicated. This raises questions of meaning and coherence. In this
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context, Hinchman and Hinchman (2001) amplify their earlier summary to 
provide a more detailed definition of narrative:
...narratives (stories) in the human sciences should be defined provisionally as 
discourses with a clear sequential order that connect events in a meaningful 
way for a definite audience and thus offer insights about the world and/or 
people’s experience of it.
(Hinchman and Hinchman, 1997: xvi)
In that it acknowledges a need for intelligibility and coherence, this definition 
usefully informs the rest of this chapter. The following sections explore the role 
of narrative in memorizing and understanding the events of our life story.
3.4.2: Narrative in everyday life: the elements of our life story
Narrative lies at the heart of social interaction: it describes events and 
experience, and it can also inform the audience about the nature and meaning 
of same. Thus it is integral to all processes of development to adulthood.
Noting the importance of narrative in autobiography, Riessman (1993, 3) notes 
that telling stories about past events is ‘one of the first forms of discourse we learn 
as children’. In this context, it is important to recognize that such stories will 
include those we tell ourselves. Thus, in a joint role of narrator and audience, 
narrative is the means by which we make sense of ourselves and the world 
around us:
We dream in narrative, daydream in narrative, remember, anticipate, hope, 
despair, believe, doubt, plan, revise, criticise, construct, gossip, leam, hate, and 
love by narrative.
(Hardy, 1987,1)
On first examination, Hardy’s summary may appear over-ambitious by claiming 
ubiquity. However, it becomes evident that even an extremely short statement 
can constitute a narrative, by both what is said and by what is implied. For 
example, if I ask, “What did you do yesterday afternoon?” to which you reply, “I 
went to the dentist”, your answer is, within the definition given, a narrative. In a 
coherent and intelligible statement, you have summarized your experience. 
Thereafter, my prior knowledge of dental appointments allows me to either
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guess the outcome, or I will choose to ask another question. Thus supported, 
Hardy’s summary is pivotal to the understanding of a person’s life story or 
personal narrative. Through narrative, a person is the central character in a 
complex sequence of events including not only that person’s experiences but 
also their concepts, even their fantasies.
Concerning these, McAdams (1993:29) notes that Bruner (1990) described two 
modes of thought, namely the paradigmatic mode, which encompasses logical 
proofs, analyses and empirical observation; and the narrative mode, which 
describes ‘human wants, needs, and goals.’ However, it must be stressed that 
both modes of thought are to be found in a personal narrative: this is by virtue of 
the latter, more fanciful, thoughts often being grounded in the practical detail of 
the former. To elaborate, it is instructive to note Linde’s (1993) distinction 
between a life story and other constructions of the self such as autobiography or 
psychological life history. Adopting a ‘nontechnical’ definition, she explains that 
a life story is more than a collection of individual stories and explanations: it 
includes the relations between them. In tandem with this, she suggests that a 
life story does not begin to be developed until adolescence, thereby implying 
that it is a sophisticated construct requiring complex thought processes. 
Associated with this description, the author draws attention to the fact that a life 
story is constantly evolving: that when a new story is added, it must not 
contradict existing themes. In consequence, there is constant revision within the 
life story in order to enable expression of our current understanding:
This property permits the life story to express our entire sense of what our lives 
are about, or our sense of what kind of people we are, without necessarily 
forming a single narrative that organizes our entire lives.
(Linde, 1993, 25)
Much care must be taken concerning this statement. By stressing its composite 
structure, Linde describes a life story in constant flux; able to absorb new 
concepts and, perhaps most importantly, to proceed according to free will. The 
following sections incorporate the sense of self into this construct, so enabling 
the life story to become the personal narrative.
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3.4.3: Nested narratives: narratives within narratives
At this point, it is useful to begin scrutiny of narrative constructs with a view to 
their eventual application in analysis. As explained above, the personal 
narrative that describes a life story can be regarded as being comprised of a 
multitude of interlinked narratives. Within the large narrative is a complex of 
smaller narratives; within each smaller narrative is a complex of still smaller 
narratives; and so on until, ultimately, a single narrative pertains to a single ‘unit’ 
of experience. The general term applied to a narrative within a larger narrative 
is a nested narrative (Gergen and Gergen, 2001). From one point of view, 
nested narratives are separate and distinct in that they pertain to a particular 
event or chain of events. Thus nesting can be compared with Russian 
matryoshka dolls: within a large doll is a small doll, which contains a smaller 
doll, within which is a yet smaller doll, and so on. However, this analogy is 
unsatisfactory in that a matryoshka doll is composed of discrete units, whereas 
nested narratives should be recognized as being intertwined and interactive 
within the personal narrative.
Nested narratives can be large, complex narratives within the personal narrative 
or much smaller. Unfortunately, there does not appear to be a consistent term 
to describe an individual nested narrative, no matter what its size. Perhaps the 
most obvious candidates are macronarratives and micronarratives; however, 
these are employed by Gergen and Gergen (ibid) with specific reference to the 
‘temporal continuum’. In their schema, a macronarrative refers to events 
spanning broad periods of time, whilst a micronarrative can span a brief 
duration (ibid). Accordingly, I believe that the most logical course is to name a 
given nested narrative by the phenomenon it describes. For clarity, I illustrate 
this overall construct with reference to myself as an example:
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i) The course of my life is described by my ongoing personal narrative.
ii) One of the narratives nested within my personal narrative is my 
ongoing health narrative.
iii) Within my health narrative are two smaller but still complex nested 
narratives, namely my ongoing physical health narrative and my 
ongoing mental health narrative.
iv) Nested within my mental health narrative is an ongoing bipolar- 
disorder narrative.
v) Nested with my bipolar-disorder narrative are discrete hospitalization 
narratives, each defined by a known time period.
Objective and subjective categorization of nested narratives is similarly informal. 
However, as will be shown in the next section, application of the term 
‘significant’ is unequivocal. Therefore, as will be explored in Chapter Seven, the 
term ‘significant narrative’ will be used to refer to any narrative of importance.
3.4.4: Developing my personal narrative: evaluation and re-evaluation of 
experience
As previously noted, any one person, through introspection, can be both 
narrator and audience with respect to narration within their personal narrative. 
Included in this action is the potential for review:
The life story is thus comprised exactly of the most significant narratives of a 
speaker’s life, which are told and retold, reinterpreted and reshaped for different 
situations.
(Linde, 1997:283)
Whilst Linde suggests that ‘radical alteration’ due to changes in understanding 
is ‘more rarely’ applied than changes in description to suit a given audience, it 
follows that this is not necessarily true in all instances. Many experiences, 
including the learning of concepts, may be incompletely understood at the time 
of committing to memory. However, in the course of introspection amid recall, 
an experience may be reviewed in the light of new experience. In this way, a 
given nested narrative may be reinterpreted several times in a person’s lifetime
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as various understandings are accepted or rejected. Included in these may be -  
though not necessarily -  insights into personal motives and/or actions 
concerning a particular event or sequence of events. Thus the personal 
narrative is more than the raw data of accumulated experience: it is a constantly 
reviewed understanding of that data and associated emotions. This extremely 
important aspect of narrative is shown in Figure 3.2:
Figure 3.2: Reviewing of experience to include new experience
MEMORY
New
Experience
Sensation,
Perception,
Interpretation
Recollection
and
reconstruction 
leading to 
understanding
Details and understanding of related 
experiences
A precise application of this model to development from child to adult would be 
highly conjectural. All that can be safely stated is that, assuming that the 
person’s emotional and intellectual development is normal, the processes of 
assimilation and review of experience will continue throughout life. This means 
that the entire personal narrative is a construct of truly massive complexity. 
Comprised of many nested narratives and the linkages between them, it is also 
protean: ever-changing due to re-evaluation, ever evolving as linkages are 
broken and new ones formed. Novitz (2001) states:
Our individual identities and ideals of personhood are constructs produced in 
much the way that works of art are produced.
(Novitz, 2001:143-144)
As intimated in the conclusion of the previous chapter, I believe that 
descriptions of the self and personal identity are, ultimately, meaningless if they
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fail to convey the essential humanity of an individual: the personal aspect of a 
person. Novitz’s metaphor is superbly apposite: if a work of art is deconstructed 
into types and quantities of components, then its meaning is lost. Indeed are 
individual aspects relevant, but only as a part of a unified whole. Moreover, an 
integral part of constructing any artwork is entirely subjective, being derived 
from the sense-impressions of the artist. Thereafter, the interpretation of the 
completed work may remain entirely personal or become a product of social 
interaction by virtue of input from other persons. This is the way of the personal 
narrative: taken in isolation, a nested narrative has but limited meaning, but as 
part of an integrated whole, its importance may be pivotal.
3.5: Narrator-audience interactions 
3.5.1: Telling my story: social transaction and negotiation
The formation and maintenance of a personal narrative is not a neutral 
exercise. Rather, it is dependent on complex objective and subjective 
interactions with significant others within the PCS system. These interactions 
contribute not only to a person’s role and status within society, but also to their 
personal conceptions of those roles. As such, they are vital in sustaining self­
esteem and other constructs associated with self-image and personal identity. 
The first part of this section is to explore the act of narration, which is extremely 
important to this research in two ways. Firstly, for the reasons given, it is an 
integral part of attaining and maintaining status in society. Secondly, with direct 
reference to methodology, it pertains to the way an interviewee may respond to 
a researcher’s questions (Riessman, 1993).
Observations on the interaction between narrator and audience, particularly on 
the role of significant others, lead to vexed areas. Possibly the most balanced 
summary is that by Linde (1997):
...close associates can have storytelling rights to critique the speaker’s stories, 
correcting facts, interpretations, and evaluations. Life stories are thus a means 
for socially transacting an individual’s memory.
(Linde, 1997, 283)
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In comparison, Gergen and Gergen (2001) describe exchange of narrative in 
terms of an intricate political process which they call social negotiation. This is 
explained with reference to an individual’s actions thus:
...whether a given narrative can be maintained depends importantly on the 
individual’s ability to negotiate successfully with others concerning the meaning 
of events in relation with one another.
(Gergen and Gergen, 2001:177)
All is founded on an assumption so basic that it is easily overlooked. That is, a 
narrator seeks the acceptance of their narrative by the audience. However, 
there is a fine distinction between acceptance and approbation. Thus, under 
normal circumstances, a narrator wishes to convince the audience that his or 
her narrative is true. Despite this, there is the possibility that the audience may 
not welcome or approve of the narrative if it is considered ‘bad news’. In this 
context, social transaction metamorphoses into social negotiation, whereby a 
narrator seeks to justify their actions, and an audience seeks to justify its 
reactions. Concerning this, evaluation by each party may be both objective and 
subjective; moreover, judgements may be influenced by beliefs and concepts 
found at all levels personal, cultural, and structural -  within the PCS system as 
detailed in figure 3.1 above.
Associated with the above criteria, an awareness of possible audience reaction 
may lead to forethought:
In this sense, the bulk of the negotiation process is anticipatory or implicit; it 
takes place with an imaginary audience prior to the moment of action.
(Gergen and Gergen, ibid)
Unfortunately, however, the authors do not venture into discussion regarding 
the degree of introspection involved in the above process. If the term ‘implicit’ is 
applied with reference to the implicit self (See Chapter Two) then it follows that 
much of this internalized negotiation process described is a function of 
unconscious processes. Similarly, it might be postulated that much of our 
actions are, indeed, so immediate as to be automatic, thereby fulfilling the 
criteria of learned social and cultural responses. Integral to these are processes
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whereby social negotiation can be implemented to achieve desired responses 
and/or outcomes, thereby maintaining and supporting social relationships.
3.5.2: Telling my story: reciprocity in social negotiation
Described by Gergen and Gergen (ibid) following their discussion of social 
negotiation, reciprocity is so important in human relationships that it can be 
described as fundamental to them. For a person to maintain their narrative 
constructions (i.e. their memories and understanding of them), they require the 
support of their audience, i.e. their ‘significant others’. Similarly, the person is 
expected to support the narratives of those other persons. It follows, therefore, 
that reciprocity plays an essential role in maintaining social relationships, 
particularly close bonds such as those within a family unit. On the other hand, in 
the event of reciprocity breaking down or being deliberately withheld, 
consequences can be catastrophic. To show this, the role of reciprocity is best 
examined in two distinct areas: firstly, within interaction between individuals, 
and secondly within interaction between an individual and a group.
Between individuals, the concept of reciprocity appears obvious. Used 
positively, it takes the form of approbation; used negatively, it takes the form of 
censure. Concerning the latter, Gergen and Gergen (ibid) use the example of 
an adolescent son berating his mother as ‘a very bad mother’, so compromising 
her own view of this aspect of her personal narrative. Thus, at this level, the 
break-up of reciprocity can be expressed more succinctly and, arguably, more 
forcibly by the terse summary, ‘I reject your narrative’. Thus the person, as 
narrator, will feel disbelieved, unwanted, or both. However, Novitz (2001) takes 
a more complex view when referring to the ‘politics of narrative identity’:
... .we assert and maintain our own interests not just by advancing a particular 
view of ourselves, but by undermining the views that others advance of 
themselves. [...] And in this game of strategy, those who have the last word 
also have considerable power over those who do not.
(Novitz, 2001:146)
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The view of reciprocity as strategy is pursued in relations between individuals in 
a group by Tajfel’s (1978) Social Identity Theory (SIT), which is reviewed by 
Nezlek and Smith:
SIT posits that people enhance their social identities by comparing their in-groups 
with relevant out-groups. In order to boost their positive sense of self, people 
often highlight the differences between their groups and other groups, focussing 
on their group’s superiority and distinctiveness.
(Nezlek and Smith, 2005:244)
It follows, therefore, that the reciprocity involved in maintaining group 
membership can be used to denigrate another group. Similarly, reciprocity 
withheld by a group can lead to the stigmatizing and, ultimately, ostracising of 
an individual or other group. As such, it possesses the potential to be a malign 
force of unusual potency. At a personal level, this is illustrated by Peter 
Chadwick (1997) in connection with dysfunctional childhood experiences. 
Another example concerns my own illness, written by my wife, June, as part of 
her PhD thesis (Wainwright, 1997, unpublished), which describes an occasion 
when she called a GP to report a ‘florid’ episode. Desperate to avoid hospital, I 
successfully lied about my symptoms to the extent that I convinced him that she 
was wildly exaggerating. The latter example is extremely important in that it 
illustrates that social negotiation can often be a deliberate act of manipulation.
I close this section by observing that reciprocity can be internalised, so causing 
a person to ask potentially difficult questions of himself or herself. We can say 
‘yes’ when we think ‘no’; we can act when we feel we should refrain; we can 
refrain when we feel we should act. In all circumstances, to this construct must 
be added the forces of agency and communion: as social beings, we see our 
actions through lenses other than our own as we feel the demands of 
reciprocity. The perceived interactions of a relationship between two persons, 
the learned social constructs within a group, the structural and cultural 
expectations of a society: all can mediate the motivations and pragmatic 
considerations associated with acting according to a moral principle. As a 
positive force, it is crucial in enabling cooperation and interaction between 
persons. As a negative force, it can initiate and maintain forms of rejection, 
prejudice and hatred. However, it is at a group level that reciprocity within social
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negotiation can be most influential and, potentially, most insidious. At this point, 
therefore, it is pertinent to cite the stigmatization of persons who experience, or 
have experienced, phenomena diagnosed as mental illness as an example of 
negative reciprocity. Accordingly, this topic will be reviewed in the next chapter 
with reference to societal and cultural overviews of mental illness.
3.5.3: Telling my story: reportability and credibility
At this point, I want to remind you about the ants in my orange juice. I told a 
nurse that there were ants crawling on my locker. She told me, “Don’t be silly”
So I deliberately left some juice in my cup so that it would trap some ants. Yes, 
it is an odd story. Moreover, it happened a long time ago, when I was nine. So 
you may not believe me.
Personal statement
This short section embellishes the processes of social negotiation and 
reciprocity, particularly the acceptance of a narrative by an audience. A 
coherent narrative depends upon basic characterisation (the participants); 
situation (time, place, etc), details of events; and temporal sequence.
Coherence, however, is not the whole of the transaction: the successful telling 
of narrative involves several additional factors.
The first factor, authenticity, is a claim of truth. Therefore it is dependent upon 
memory: not only that of the narrator, but of the audience. The dynamics of this 
relationship is described by Ochs and Capps (1997):
... .acts of remembering are attempts to seize authority with respect to a topic of 
concern. For the presupposed truths to become recognized as such, these acts 
require validation by others.
(Ochs and Capps, 1997:84)
If the same events have been witnessed by several persons, it follows that such 
validation can be effected through comparison. Should the recall of a 
member(s) of an audience differ from that of the narrator, then the veracity of
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the narrative can be challenged. In the event of the narrator being the sole 
witness, however, validation is altogether a different matter. Instead, it becomes 
wholly dependent upon the following second and third factors.
Reportability concerns the act of crafting a narrative so that it is interesting to an 
audience, whilst credibility is the degree to which a narrative is believable.
Labov 1997) states that the two constructs are related by the Reportability 
Paradox:
Reportability is inversely correlated with credibility.
(Labov, 1997:8)
In simple terms, Labov's ‘theorem’ notes that the more interesting and/or 
exciting a narrative, the more likely it is to strain the credulity of an audience. 
However, these factors are but part of an extraordinarily complex construct of 
belief, wherein much depends upon social status of narrator and audience; the 
linguistic and intellectual acuity of same; plus, as explained above, ebb and flow 
within reciprocity. Accordingly, despite apparently unassailable truth and 
reportability, the transaction of a narrative may fail.
3.5.4: Telling my story: ‘Failed Narratives’
With reference to the nurse who did not believe me, my complaint concerning 
the ants in my orange juice was a failed narrative: I was the narrator, she was 
the audience, my narrative was rejected. And you, the reader: are you 
exasperated by my persistent use of this trivial tale? If you are, or if you 
consider that my account is coloured by childhood invention, then it remains a 
failed narrative.
Personal statement
Using the same ‘mathematical’ style throughout his 1997 paper, Labov defines 
a ‘failed narrative’ as shown below. Importantly, he stresses that failure of a 
narrative causes the status of the narrator to be diminished:
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A serious narrative which fails to achieve credibility is considered to have failed, 
and the narrator’s claim to reassignment of speakership will then be seen as 
invalid.
An “invalid claim to reassignment” is a technical way of stating that the narrator 
has suffered a loss of status which will affect future claims of this sort as well as 
other social prerogatives.
(Labov, 1997:9)
Failure of a narrative is synonymous with rejection by an audience. Thus a 
narrative may fail because it is not believed, or because it is considered 
unimportant or irrelevant. Moreover, deriving from the definition by Labov, a 
‘reverse flow’ can occur whereby a seemingly viable narrative is rejected due to 
the low status of the narrator. Thus, in the context of social negotiation, a failed 
narrative may be an extremely powerful construct: indeed, with reference to my 
literature search, I believe that this is by far the most potent of all that I have 
encountered. This is because I immediately applied it on reading to 
introspection whereby a person is both narrator and audience with respect to 
their own experiences and, particularly, their own role in the course of events. 
From this initial development it was but a small step to identifying failed 
narratives in my own life. Perhaps this is because much of my life has been 
compromised (a word I choose deliberately) by mental illness; the 
consequences of which have ranged far beyond symptoms and medication. 
Notably, there is an easy comparison with the term ‘failure’ as used in some of 
the questions in the Beck Depression Inventory, which was developed by Aaron 
Beck et al in 1961 (Williams, 1995) [As part of my on-going treatment, I 
completed this many times in the 1990’s]. Moreover, in the context of social 
negotiation (see above) there is an obvious link between a failed narrative and 
loss of self-esteem. Given that social negotiation is also internalized, it is 
possible that the consequences of prolonged mental illness may be viewed in 
terms of a failed narrative.
Lastly, it is possible that a failed narrative may be finite. For example, my 
marriage to my first wife ended in failure: the narrative is over; it cannot be 
restored. It was this observation that disturbed me most in that it was 
confrontational: I could not help but acknowledge the past and feel again some
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of the hurt, some of the sadness, and yes, much of the guilt. Yet in this bleak 
overview it is easy to be broadsided by emotion and overlook basic concepts 
associated with narrative. As stated previously, all narratives are subject to 
constant review and reinterpretation in the light of new experiences and new 
understanding. This is particularly so if an on-going narrative such as prolonged 
mental illness is still active. Accordingly, to apply the term ‘failed’ can be 
unwarranted and pessimistic: instead, if a term is desired to designate a 
continuing negative narrative, ‘unresolved' is far more appropriate. Obviously, 
however, to apply this logic to a finite narrative deemed as failed -  such as 
divorce - is more difficult. My considered answer is that unhappy events are 
nested in all personal narratives. Cautiously, I submit that sometimes they are 
the source of an essential understanding. More confidently, I would argue that 
in the context of the on-going personal narrative, even an unhappy nested 
narrative may contribute to understanding of other nested narratives.
Further development of narrative theory will be examined with particular 
reference to narrative analysis in the context of methodology (Chapter Seven). 
This chapter continues with exploration of that which can rightly be viewed as 
the apex of the self construct. This is the combination of experience, beliefs, 
and ideals that constitute the personal myth.
3.6: And this is how I want to be known: the personal myth 
3.6.1: The ‘central monomyth*
Explored in detail by Campbell (1949,1993) as the introduction to his 
religious/philosophical text The Hero with a Thousand Faces, this concept is 
reviewed by later authors in the context of social identity (Gergen and Gergen 
2001; McAdams, 1993) and narratives of illness (Frank, 1997). Concerning all 
possible applications, the most apposite approach is a simple summary. The 
monomyth describes a journey, wherein a hero overcomes trials and tribulations 
to achieve a prize. Throughout Campbell’s entire text, this is paraphrased with 
reference to Jungian psychodynamics, including subconscious ideation, and
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metaphor concerning human thought and ambition. Thus, often, the prize 
sought by the hero can be explained in terms of apotheosis leading to a 
transcendent mental condition.
Essential to the understanding of Campbell’s text is the concept of the hero as 
exemplar. Indeed, a hero need not possess any specific powers or ability: the 
fact that they are the central figure in a narrative is qualification enough. Thus, 
whilst Campbell’s writing may seem somewhat florid and therefore out of 
context, it is highly relevant by virtue of calling attention to the essentially 
personal nature of a personal narrative. Thus far, it has been described mainly 
in terms of an interactive vehicle. Not only is it the means by which an individual 
communicates with other individuals, it is the continuous process by which 
experience is retained and, possibly, understood. As noted by Barbara Hardy 
(above) it enables the person to anticipate and plan future actions. Yet, in 
combination, these constructs are insufficient to form a complete personal 
narrative. In addition is the dimension of our imagination, wherein lies our 
capacity to plan future actions and, especially, our fantasies. Thus the hero may 
become an internalized expression of our self, providing the basis for an iconic 
image of what is possible. This aspect of the monomyth is explored in research 
by Sullivan and Venter (2005), which shows that heroes can be more than 
exemplars in that they become incorporated into the self. In this their influence 
is similar to that of ‘significant others’ (above).
3.6.2: The personal myth
Our imagination enables the formation of a personal myth within the personal 
narrative or life story:
A personal myth delineates an identity, illuminating the values of an individual 
life. The personal myth is not a legend or a fairy tale, but a sacred story that 
embodies personal truth.
(McAdams, 1993:34)
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Due to its religious context, extreme caution is necessary to pinpoint the precise 
use of the term ‘sacred’. Whilst McAdams suggests a conventional meaning, he 
is not entirely successful in positing an unequivocal alternative to religion. 
Careful examination of his text, however, suggests that his application is 
intended to combine the qualities ‘of exceeding worth’ with ‘uniquely personal'.
Thus it follows that the ‘personal myth’ is a complex expression of personal 
identity: in this it accords the dimension of reflexivity and learning to the 
individual as the central character in his or her personal narrative. Whilst it may 
incorporate imaginative or even fantastical ideas, it is rooted in the other 
concepts detailed in this chapter. First and foremost, it is a narrative in its own 
right. Thereafter, in common with all narratives, it is subject to introspective 
scrutiny and revision as new experience and new understanding is 
incorporated. Thus the truth is somewhat prosaic: although a personal myth can 
be associated with quintessential realms, it is, fundamentally, a narrative 
expression of who and what we would like to be. In this context, McAdams (ibid) 
refers to existentialism; however, his summary of a personal myth could apply 
equally well to a person who acknowledges a religious figure as exemplar:
 we are challenged to create our own meanings, discover our own truths,
and fashion the personal myths that will serve to sanctify our lives.
(McAdams, ibid)
This observation leads to areas rife with speculation. Let it be known that I am 
unwilling to discuss my own personal myth because I wish my most private 
thoughts to remain my own -  in this they are sacred to me. However, I am 
prepared to acknowledge an ideal of ‘hoping to do the right thing at the right 
time’. Deriving from this, I suggest that most persons wishing to pursue their 
lives within the laws and culture of their environment follow the same 
approximate doctrine. Yet, apparently simple, this adage is deceptive. This is 
due to the gulf between what I can do, what I cannot do but hope to attain, and 
what I aspire to do but will never achieve.
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Where are the boundaries between these three concepts? Undoubtedly there is 
a degree of overlap, particularly between the first two. As a result, my 
aspirations become subject to an internalized social transaction: by what means 
do I measure the worth of my actions? Thus my personal myth is not a 
constant, rigid concept, but interwoven with uncertainty.
3.6.3: ‘Imagoes’: the ways in which I perceive myself
‘Imago’ is the term employed by McAdams (1993) in developing divergent 
characters within the personal myth:
An imago is a personified and idealized concept of the self. Each of us
consciously and unconsciously fashions main characters for our life stories.
[....] Our life stories may have one dominant imago or many.
(McAdams, 1993:122)
In that this term is also used to define the final stage of insect development, it is 
curiously apt in that it indicates the conclusion of metamorphosis. However, on 
scrutiny, McAdams’ construct is not static but dynamic, being composed of 
interacting and often conflicting influences. In short, these can be divided into 
two areas: the first approximating to the PCS system in that it includes cultural 
and social roles. Thus imagoes in this area include family role, employment 
status, and so on: for example, the father, the mother, the professor, the 
banker. In contrast, the second area is more nebulous in that it includes 
idealized concepts of personal attributes and aspirations, for example, the 
caregiver, the philosopher, the author.
Imagoes are important to this study in that they pertain not only to who we are 
but who we would like to be. However, a slight criticism of McAdams’ 
parameters is that he lays little stress on the possibility that a person may not 
necessarily be the sole architect of their life story. Not only are there the many 
influences defined by the PCS system, there are the unexpected events that 
may affect a life story. Insofar as an imago may concern status, it may include 
an involuntary social role: the ‘invalid’, the person whose life story is 
compromised by illness.
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3.7: Conclusion: the gradual onset of uncertainty
Whilst elaborating upon the constructs associated with the personal narrative, 
this chapter has emphasized the complex interactions between them. In 
connection with this, I ask, “To what extent are we aware of these?” When I was 
a child, my understanding was of an orderly world, one of certainty. Central to 
this was awareness that I was young, therefore I did not know very much about 
the world in terms of natural phenomena, history of humankind, and so on. 
However, a function of this awareness was a comfortable conviction that my 
learning would continue; that as I grew older, so my knowledge and 
understanding would increase.
Yet, as I acquired the ability for abstract thought so I began to realize that 
knowledge was not the same as understanding: that I might know of but never 
know a particular object or construct. Associated with this, I began to question 
social and cultural constructs and traditions that I had believed inviolate: the 
rightness of parental decisions and beliefs; the truth of religious thought.
In summary, the tension between agency and communion underwent a 
fundamental re-adjustment. Erikson (1993) describes this as identity crisis: a 
period in which:
 each youth must forge for himself some central perspective and direction,
some working unity, out of the effective remnants of his childhood and the 
hopes of his anticipated adulthood.
(Erikson, 1993,14)
Suggesting that the identity crisis will be minimal for some people, Erikson 
notes that for others it will be a ‘critical period’, marked by ‘widespread 
neuroticisms or by pervasive ideological unrest’ (ibid). Although he does not 
describe them as such, it is probable that these constructs represent opposite 
ends of a continuum. In reality, there will be many persons who have 
experienced minimal problems concerning a specific aspect of social interaction 
whilst encountering difficulties in another area. Also expressed by the author is 
the opinion that sense of identity ‘is not wanting in most adults’. Again, this
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appears somewhat simplistic: it is perfectly possible that many persons 
experience uncertainty in some areas whilst enjoying absoluteness in others.
Thus, perhaps inevitably, I return to the concept of the subjective self. I know it 
is within me, I believe it is within other people. Concerning myself, my adult 
ability to comprehend abstract concepts means that I can visualize the workings 
of this construct. Thus, although I cannot access it directly, I can perceive it, and 
thereby I interpret and understand myself. By this process is completion of 
personal identity fully potentiated. Accordingly, I modify my diagram of the self 
construct as shown in Figure 2.4 (Chapter 2) to demonstrate this reciprocity.
However, the modified diagram (Figure 3.3, overleaf) differs from Figure 2.4 
only in that the outer circle depicting the interactive construct of memory and 
understanding of experiences is larger. Similarly, the double headed arrows 
indicating interactions of memory and consciousness are also larger, so 
suggesting increasing application of understanding to the processes of a 
person’s inner environment. However, in reality, this construct will never be 
complete. As stated previously, by its very nature the subjective sense of self is 
intangible, a construct deriving from the directing of consciousness towards its 
own workings. Moreover, throughout the continuing personal narrative there will 
always be new experiences and new understanding. Thus this chapter 
concludes by reaffirming that personal identity is in a constant state of flux.
Much of it -  perhaps the major part -  exists in a state of tension between the 
reality of experience and the idealism of the personal myth. Through narrative 
we organize the memories of our experience into a coherent form; through 
narrative we incorporate any understanding gained into appropriate constructs; 
through narrative we plan our future actions to meet the required outcome. And, 
through narrative, we may anticipate the consequences of that outcome; be 
they the rewards of success or the disappointment of failure. Later, when events 
have passed, reality will, almost certainly, be reviewed in the light of that 
anticipation. In effect, we judge ourselves and our actions by comparison with 
our personal myth: what we are compared with what we hope to be or, more 
poignantly, what we are compared with what we hoped to be.
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Figure 3.4: Development of the self-system to show reciprocity of subjective
sense of self and developing sense of personal identity
The self-system has now fully potentiated the construct ofpersonal identity.
This can develop throughout the course of the personal narrative as new experiences 
contribute to increasing understanding of the self and its relationship with the physical 
and spiritual environment.
Subjective
sense
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Following from some of the themes indicated in this chapter, the following 
chapter explores mental illness; both from a medical viewpoint in terms of 
psychopathology and a phenomenological viewpoint in terms of experience. 
This chapter ends with my summary of personal identity. Whilst I am obliged to 
write it in the present tense, the second and final lines acknowledge the future.
Personal identity is my self-image in terms of my perceived role in my 
experiences:
All that I am, all that I was,
All that I hope to be, all that I do not hope to be.
All o f  my physical attributes.
All o f  my mental attributes.
All o f  my emotional attributes:
all o f  my likes, my dislikes, my habits, my hobbies, and my motivations.
All o f  my imaginings, those o f  the past and those o f  the present.
All o f  my experiences: 
all that has happened to me,
all that I can remember and all that I cannot remember.
All that I know, and all that I know of, 
including all that which I may never know.
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Chapter Four: Phenomena diagnosed as mental illness
4.1: Introduction: Where to start?
This chapter proved extremely difficult to write. Having considerable experience 
of phenomena diagnosed as mental illness, I found that the problem centred on 
two areas. One was the obvious question of what to include and what to leave 
out. The other was far more complex: it concerned identifying the point at which 
awareness of mental illness begins. In this, I often felt I w as1putting the cart 
before the horse' but, in terms of chronicity, my sequences were logical: like 
most people, I had suffered from symptoms for some time before I began to 
learn what they were.
Personal Statement
I open this chapter by taking advantage of Linde’s (1993) construct of a ‘non­
problematic assumption’ with respect to any experience of illness. That is, on 
perceiving the symptoms, the person affected will ask, ‘What is the matter with 
me?’ Thereafter, this question may prove to be the first of many, for it may not 
be enough to know what something is called. Rather, the person and/or 
interested parties may want to know details of aetiology, the implications of 
phenomena, and, possibly most importantly, the proper responses that are 
necessary if health is to be restored. This is the full measure of the question, 
‘What is Mental Illness?’ It requires not a single answer, but a nexus of different 
aspects which, obviously related by a common theme, are nonetheless 
sufficiently complex to stand as discrete entities. However, such is the vastness 
of this topic that an exhaustive review is not possible. Therefore, this chapter 
will concentrate on the understanding and experience of mental illness.
4.2: What is health? What is Illness?
To introduce this section, it is instructive to follow the precise order of events 
that led to my being diagnosed as suffering with depression in 1967.1 decided 
to visit my G.P. because I felt unwell: that is the all of it. I had no idea what
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might be the problem or what it might be called On reflection, I believe that this 
is the way of all illness experiences: first, we are aware of a feeling; then we try 
to find out what it is and what the cause is.
Personal statement
In seeking an overview of mental illness, it is necessary to first examine 
generalized constructs of health and illness, including questions of agency, plus 
objective and subjective understanding of human behaviour. Concerning 
individual attitudes towards illness and understanding of same, both are 
influenced by and contribute to social and cultural factors. As explained in the 
previous chapter, normative concepts concerning the behaviour of individuals in 
a society are mediated by cultural norms, its laws, and, possibly, its religious 
principles:
These understandings constitute part of our society’s assumptive world, the 
world that is thought of as normal, decent, and possible.
(Scheff, 1996:64)
For the purposes of this chapter, health is therefore viewed as part of the 
assumptive world detailed above: health is normal, health is decent, and health 
is possible. Thus; logically, illness is a violation of these qualities: it is 
‘abnormal’, it is not decent, and it should not be possible. Initially, it appears 
evident that this construct is rather inadequate. Yet, should this summary be 
explored, then it serves to underline both the essential nature of health and 
illness, and the attitudes of society towards them. Essentially, all three qualities 
associated with health -  normality, decency, and possibility -  are arbitrary 
measures, upheld by the cultural and social beliefs of a majority. In this context, 
the World Health Organization has continued to use the same basic definition of 
health since its inauguration in 1948:
Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not 
merely the absence of disease or infirmity.
(World Health Organization, 1948, 2010)[Obtained by internet 3.3.2010]
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Whilst a valid objection to this statement is that it is too vague, it is important to 
note that it stresses health as a positive entity in its own right. However, use of 
the concept of ‘well-being’ can lead to confusion. In the ‘New Horizons’ 
document, which is the Department of Health Mental Health policy guidance 
applicable from December 2009, well-being is defined as:
A state of mind and body, feeling safe and able to cope, with a sense of 
connection with people, communities and the wider environment.
‘New Horizons’ page 18, [italics in original]
Notably, this document then appears to distinguish between well-being and 
health:
Well-being is therefore distinct from mental illness. Someone can have 
symptoms of mental illness and still experience well-being just as a person with 
a physical illness or long-term disability can.
(ibid)
To resolve this apparent conundrum, it is necessary to recognize that the WHO 
definition is intended to be understood as an indivisible whole, that is, health is 
understood as dependent on all three aspects (physical, mental and social) 
being positive. In contrast, ‘New Horizons’ is a policy document focussing on 
factors associated with early interventions in mental illness and prevention of 
same. In drawing attention to the fact that mental illness may not affect sense of 
well-being, it raises issues that are important with reference to identifying 
illness, as will be discussed later.
4.3: Identifying illness
I’ve had cuts and bruises, often the result of something stupid such as cracking 
my fingernail with a hammer, and people have winced in sympathy. I ’ve had a 
dental abscess and people have expressed concern: after all, most people have 
had toothache. Yet, when I ’ve had a severe cold, some people have felt that I’m 
1overdoing it’; that it is, in truth, not that bad. And, with respect to my 
experiences of mental illness, some people made it clear that there was no 
problem, that I should ‘pull myself together’ or ‘get on with my life’.
Personal statement
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This section is integral to the narratives of the interviewees in that it pertains to 
the initial recognition of phenomena diagnosed as mental illness in terms of a 
discrete event. Importantly, as will be demonstrated in Chapter Nine, 
‘Overwhelm’, such may not have been by the person themselves but by another 
party or parties. This disparity between persons may lead to complex social 
interactions that can alleviate or, often, exacerbate illness. As such, therefore, it 
is necessary to examine these phenomena in more detail.
4.3.1: Signs and symptoms
To identify illness, some sign, or evidence, is needed. Somewhat unhelpfully, 
Black’s Medical Dictionary (MacPherson [ed.] 1992) uses the word ‘disease’ 
when stating that this evidence is termed a symptom. On examination of 
specific conditions listed in this text, however, it becomes apparent that this 
term is applied to all illness, including mental illness. Thus, I consider it 
reasonable to summarise symptoms in terms of physical and/or verbal 
evidence:
i) Symptoms that can be measured and/or felt, e.g. temperature; 
swelling
ii) Symptoms that are perceived subjectively, e.g. skin colour
iii) Reports of pain
iv) Thought processes as expressed verbally
v) Behaviour, including reaction to physical trauma, such as
shivering or torpor
Associated with the above criteria, the following sections will explore how 
physical illnesses are perceived before proceeding to those problems peculiar 
to the perception of mental illness.
4.3.2: Primary and secondary qualities of objects
All physical objects possess primary qualities and secondary qualities (Horner 
and Westacott, 2000). For the purposes of review these can be summarized 
thus:
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Primary qualities are described as those that ‘really do belong to the thing 
itself. (2000:41) Including physical qualities, shape, quantity, motion, 
temperature, etc, these can be measured objectively.
Secondary qualities derive from the physical structure of an object and 
are measured subjectively. They include colour, taste and smell. As 
such, they are ‘sense-impressions’ that exist in the mind of the person 
perceiving the object in question.
4.3.3: Attitudes to illness based on perception of primary and secondary 
qualities.
Concerning the presence and severity of illness, observers may differ in their 
opinions. Such differences can be illustrated by Venn Diagrams (Johnson and 
Glenn, 1967; 14 et seq; also 48et seq.) to explore syllogisms, which contain 
either universal or particular statements. A universal statement contains all the 
members of a set, whereas a particular statement contains some of the 
members of a set. Thus, with reference to opinions concerning illness, 
agreement or difference can be shown as follows in Figure 4.1:
Figure 4.1 (i): Combination A:
Person A believes that there is illness (Circle A) 
Person B believes that there is illness (Circle B)
Therefore, persons A and B are in agreement (Cross-patterned circle: A and B
completely overlap)
A
I believe that 
there is illness
B
I believe that 
there is illness
AB
We are in complete agreement 
that there is illness
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Figure 4.1(H): Combination B
Person A believes that there is illness (Circle A)
Person B does not believe that there is illness (Circle B)
Therefore the circles remain separate (disjoint)
A
I believe that 
there is illness
B
I believe that 
that there is no 
illness whatsoever
We do not agree with one another on 
any aspect of possible illness
Figure 4.1 (iii): Combination C
Person A believes that there is a degree of illness (Circle A)
Person B believes that there is a different degree of illness (Circle B)
Therefore the circles overlap
A B A B
I believe that I believe that we agree on some, but not all, aspects
there is illness some of what 0f possible illness
you say is correct
Concerning illness, it is reasonable to aver that, in the vast majority of cases, 
the combined opinions of different persons will be illustrated by the many 
possibilities summarised by combination C. Thereafter, by applying observation 
and some speculation, it is possible to refine this construct. Thus, with reference 
to primary qualities, it can be stated with confidence that such signs are obvious
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in that they can be felt. Moreover, it is likely that some can be measured using 
instrumentation, or detected by biological techniques. Accordingly, whilst some 
differences in opinion may exist, it is probable that most persons will be in 
agreement due to the largely objective nature of these signs. As a 
consequence, the degree of overlap in the resultant diagram will be almost 
complete:
Figure 4.2: Perception of illness based on primary qualities
We are largely in agreement that the 
physical signs are indicative of illness
With reference to secondary qualities, however, there is possibly more scope 
for differing opinions. This is because of the largely subjective nature of these 
qualities which, concerning illness, should include those aspects which can be 
perceived but are difficult to measure; for example, sneezing, shivering, verbal 
complaints. Accordingly, the resultant Venn Diagram will show less overlap:
Figure 4.3: Perception of Illness via secondary qualities:
We agree that these signs are indicative of illness 
but differ on how severe that illness is
Obviously, many illnesses will cause a combination of symptoms, some of 
which exhibit primary qualities, and some which exhibit secondary qualities. 
Thus it is possible -  indeed probable -  that the primary qualities, those that can
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be measured objectively, will carry the greater weight. However, it is also 
possible that some illnesses may exhibit no symptoms with primary qualities, 
necessitating a judgement based on subjectivity. Should secondary qualities 
also be absent, then this will be based on observation of behaviour and verbal 
report, particularly that of pain.
4.4: Pain: a tertiary quality?
How many times have! felt physical pain? Far too many to count: it is a normal 
and’ overall, an unremarkable part of everyday life. The worst pain I have 
experienced? In truth it is difficult to say -  a toenail avulsion; a dental abscess 
affecting a lower molar; postoperative pain following removal of an epididymal 
cyst: these are the examples that spring to mind. Yet of greater relevance are 
childhood experiences: sometimes sympathy was forthcoming, sometimes it 
wasn't. Very often, the reaction to my pain was, etOh, stop moaning, it’s only a 
scratch.” Such are the trials and tribulations of being a child: sometimes such a 
judgment was fair, sometimes it wasn’t. Sometimes I did make more of it than I 
should have: this, too, is normal behaviour.
Personal statement
Understanding of the perception of pain is a crucial intermediate stage to the 
understanding of phenomena diagnosed as mental illness. At its most basic 
level, pain derives from physical stimulation leading to the activity of specific 
sensory nerves. In turn, this activity is refined by consciousness to result in a 
combination of objective and subjective experience. This is acknowledged in the 
following definition of pain by the International Association for the Study of Pain 
(ISAP):
An unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or
potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage.
(Merskey and Bogduk [eds], 1994)
The essentially personal nature of experiencing pain is stressed by Finley 
(2001):
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Self-report is the “gold standard” for pain measurement. The concept that only 
the patient can really understand what he/she is feeling is embodied in the 
definition of pain.
(Finley, 2001:1)
Since pain is a function of consciousness, any one person cannot directly 
experience another person's pain. Whilst they may recognize that pain is being 
experienced, whilst they may even know the cause of pain, they cannot 
accurately assess its degree. For this reason, I believe that pain is properly 
described as a tertiary quality. This is because it may exist in circumstances 
akin to a perceptual vacuum: although primary and/or secondary qualities may 
be evident, so providing important evidence of trauma, they may also be 
absent. In such circumstances, the only evidence is through behaviour and 
verbal report. Moreover, through reciprocity (see previous chapter) the 
perception by an audience of a narrator’s pain may be influenced by personal 
and cultural prejudices. In this, understanding the perception of pain may be an 
extremely useful guide in perception of thought processes associated with 
phenomena diagnosed as mental illness.
4.5: Thought processes: a fourth-degree quality?
Sometimes I have felt myself to be suffering the most terrible psychic pain. This 
is not a headache or migraine but a numbing heaviness of thought, a nameless 
dread permeating all mental activity. Thoughts of death, thoughts of sadness: ill- 
formed ideas that an end will come. Thus have I been rendered helpless, 
hospitalized because my motivation had become virtually nil. Yet is this pain? 
Notin the true sense of the word. Distress, yes; pain, no.
Despite this, the comparison is a valid one. Most persons will have experienced 
a pain so severe that it envelops their entire consciousness. At such times, all 
they can think of is pain. In the same way, there have been times when all I 
could think of was my on-going illness. Yet, to a third party, my problems may 
have seemed minimal.
Personal statement
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Phenomena diagnosed as mental illness may include thought processes that 
cause discomfort to the person. In this, they are like pain: felt directly only by 
that person. Like pain, thought processes are a function of consciousness. Like 
pain, a person cannot directly experience another person’s thoughts. Like pain, 
the thought processes of another person can only be inferred by behaviour and, 
possibly, verbal report. Like pain, a verbal report of thought processes by the 
person experiencing them may be misinterpreted by a listener. Like pain, 
vocalization and other forms of behaviour -  such as facial expression -  are the 
only ways in which thought processes can be expressed. However, whereas 
pain is associated with a physical cause, dysfunctional thought processes may 
not be associated with any physical stimulus whatsoever. Thus, whereas an 
observer might assess pain by a frame of reference based on medical 
knowledge concerning the cause and, possibly, mutual experience of same, no 
similar construct may be applicable to thought processes.
Like pain, in association with the detail of all thought processes is the question 
of verbal acuity of both describer and listener. Whereas it may be possible to 
explain one’s thoughts with great precision, it is also possible that they cannot 
be properly described. On the other hand, a detailed and accurate description 
may not necessarily be understood by an audience. Indeed, it is possible that a 
particularly difficult concept may be beyond a given person’s comprehension.
On the other hand, a relatively commonplace event may be beyond a given 
person should they suffer from a disability of perception. This is easily illustrated 
by the rather hackneyed problem of describing a rainbow to a person who has 
been blind from birth.
Unlike pain, thought processes may require no stimulus other than other 
thought processes. As such, they may be beyond verbal description and 
thereby beyond the perception of any third party. Therefore, to convey this 
uniquely personal quality, I believe that they should be referred to as fourth- 
degree qualities. As a consequence, belief and unbelief play a major role in the 
dysfunctional thought processes that, in the main, constitute phenomena 
diagnosed as mental illness. However, rather than using Venn Diagrams, the
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various combinations whereby an individual person and observers may 
perceive these differently is listed in the following section.
4.6: Belief and unbelief
My father has never regarded my experiences of mental illness as a true illness. 
In 1994, on learning I was due to see a consultant psychiatrist, his response 
was, Isn’t it about time they found out what is wrong with you?’
After consultation, I telephoned him again to the effect that I had been 
diagnosed as suffering from biological depression (moderate) and obsessive- 
compulsive disorder. His reaction was to berate me furiously, ‘But you’ve got to 
get on with your life!’
The truth is that he believed that there was nothing wrong with me and wanted 
the consultant to tell me so.
Personal statement
Identification of any illness begins with a decision by someone that something is 
wrong. The subjective nature of phenomena diagnosed as mental illness being 
wholly associated with thought processes increases the possibility that an 
individual may disagree with ‘significant others’, as to whether or not they are 
experiencing illness. As explained in section 3.2.3., ‘significant others’ may 
include family members and health care professionals such as the person’s 
G.P. Whilst the following list of possible combinations can, strictly speaking, be 
applied to any illness, it can be used with particular reference to mental illness:
i) The individual is the only person who believes that they are experiencing 
illness: I feel ill but no-one agrees with me.
ii) This differs from combination (i) in degree: the individual person believes 
they are ill but family members, actively oppose this: I feel ill but people 
insist that there is nothing wrong with me and tell me to pull myself 
together.
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iii) The individual person and a family member(s) believe that they are ill 
but the person’s doctor disagrees: I feel ill, and my family thinks I am ill, 
but my doctor thinks there is nothing to worry about.
iv) The individual person believes that they are ill and are supported by an 
unrelated third party (usually, but not necessarily, a health care 
professional such as the person’s doctor). However, their family does not 
agree with them: I feel ill, and my doctor agrees with me, but my family 
think that nothing is wrong with me.
v) The individual person believes that they are ill and are supported by their 
family and an unrelated third party. I feel ill and both my family and my 
doctor agree with me.
vi) As explained in the ‘New Horizons’ document (see above), experience of 
mental illness may not affect a sense of well-being. Thus an individual 
may believe that they are not ill despite the disagreement of family 
members and/or a third party. I feel fine: there is nothing wrong with me, 
but other people are saying that I am ill.
Concerning all of these combinations, it is extremely important to recognize that 
they are unlikely to be absolutes: rather they are representations of possible 
prevailing opinion at any one time. Deriving from this, it is possible that these 
combinations may be fluid and interchangeable: unbelief may become belief as 
symptoms seem to worsen; belief may give way to rejection as tolerance and 
sympathy wear thin. Inherent in these processes is reciprocity, whereby actions 
and reactions influence one another. However, this is complex and 
unpredictable -  rejection by a third party may cause a person to deny their 
symptoms, to believe that they are not as severe as thought; alternatively, the 
same rejection may cause a person to know despair. Yet, specific to mental 
illness, no combination is more loaded with doubt and uncertainty than 
combination (vi), whereby a person believes they are not ill despite the opinions 
of family members and third parties. This is because experience of phenomena 
designated as mental illness may not be unpleasant. A person may experience
70
ecstasy, or believe that they are privy to a great truth; they may speak of their 
feelings but attempt no physical harm to another person. Nevertheless, with 
respect to concepts of normality and abnormality, a person may be adjudged to 
be in need of medical treatment. In such cases, if treatment is refused to be 
accepted voluntarily, it can -  and may -  be enforced by legal powers. Thus may 
an individual believe themselves to be a victim of society, of which medicine is 
an integral part. Thus an individual may willingly enter the medical system, only 
to change their mind as phenomena persist and/or treatment proves 
unpleasant, ineffective, or both. Yet, in fairness, it may be that a person 
responds to treatment -  despite any misgivings to the contrary -  resulting in 
recovery.
In the Western world, the probable consequence of any of the above 
combinations is that a person will enter the medical system. Thereafter, the 
course of any treatment will depend upon medical opinion in response to 
present and subsequent symptoms. As explained in the previous paragraph, 
this may be associated with the legal process.
4.7: This is being done for the safety of yourself and the safety of those 
around you: legal understanding of mental illness
In 1994, whilst in hospital, i became verbally aggressive and began to bang my 
head against a wall. I am told (to this day, I have no memory of these incidents) 
that I threatened to leave the ward and go home: by a first-floor window if 
necessary. At this point my wife was advised that We have to section him, we 
have no choice/ Accordingly, I was detained under Section III of the 1983 
Mental Health Act.
Personal Statement
For the purposes of this study, it is sufficient to state that, in the United 
Kingdom, the 1983 Mental Health Act .amended in 2007 (Jones, 2009), allows 
for persons deemed as suffering from ‘mental disorder’ to be admitted to 
hospital against their wishes. Initially, the purpose of involuntary admission is 
assessment; thereafter, if treatment is believed necessary, the person may be
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further detained under Section III of this Act. Although this is highly 
controversial, I do not consider that prolonged discussion will be particularly 
instructive. Instead, experience of detention will be scrutinized in connection 
with experiences described in the interview data.
4.8: Sometimes you become a part of the system: experience of mental
health services
This exploration has reached the point at which the possibility of illness has 
been recognised and deemed sufficient to necessitate medical attention. 
However, this is such a vast topic that it is not possible to attempt a 
comprehensive review. Therefore, this chapter continues by focussing on areas 
of controversy within mental health. These are important in that the interviewees 
contributing to the study will almost be aware of some if not all of these. 
Associated with this, their viewpoints and understanding of their own 
experiences may be influenced thereby. This is, therefore, an appropriate point 
to draw attention to the term ‘user’: a ubiquitous description given to any person 
who uses, or has used, mental health services. Associated with this term is 
‘carer1: the term applied to a family member or friend who assists in the welfare 
of a user.
As stated previously, the remainder of this chapter explores some of the more 
controversial areas within understanding of mental illness. In particular, it will 
draw attention to the paradox associated with medical generalization of what 
many hold to be wholly personal.
4.9: To see through a glass darkly: personal experience of mental illness
For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in 
part; but then shall I know even as also I am known.
The First Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians, 13:12
When searching through literature for accounts detailing experience of mental 
illness, I was constantly aware of the problem of reflexivity. Some words, some
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phrases, and some stories carried descriptions that had a particular resonance. 
When I read them I immediately thought, “Yes, I can relate to that." As to 
exactly why this should be lam  at a loss to explain. In this my feelings are truly 
personal: they are mine and mine alone. Yet the fact that I can identify with 
another person's experience means that there is some common ground. Mental 
illness may be difficult to describe and even more difficult to understand, but it is 
not unknowable.
Personal Statement
To facilitate exploration, I must begin with a massive generalization. Using my 
own experiences in tandem with background reading, I submit that all 
phenomena diagnosed as mental illness lie on a continuum between extreme 
sadness and extreme elation. Additionally, they may be associated with 
perceptions and thoughts deemed to be abnormal. Thus it is possible that a 
person may exhibit neither misery nor joy whilst experiencing unusual thoughts. 
Moreover, as a consequence of the continuum, phenomena are not necessarily 
unpleasant. Throughout over thirty years of experiencing mental illness, there 
have been many times when I have believed myself to have plumbed the 
depths of misery and, albeit, far less often, times that I was excitable and 
garrulous, not at all aware that I was ill.
In tandem with this overview is a wish to avoid other than a brief use of medical 
terminology at this juncture. Many words describing extremes of emotions or 
mood are a part of everyday language: indeed, they are frequently used to 
describe our response to various life events. Thus, at this point, terms such as 
‘depression’ or ‘elation’ are unhelpful. Instead, I begin by noting I that terms 
such as ‘schizophrenia’ may be well-known but imprecisely so; similarly words 
such as ‘madness’ and ‘loony’ are still used as colloquial descriptions of mental 
illness. For example, the former term is employed by Corry and Tubridy (2001) 
as an overview of several criteria, including the following:
• being constantly afraid that something harmful is about to happen to you, about 
which you can do nothing
• thinking thoughts and feeling compelled to behave in ways you don’t wish to, 
and being unable to stop them
(Corry and Tubridy, 2001: ix)
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A similar theme is pursued by Breggin (1993). Coining the term ‘psychospiritual’ 
with reference to human ideals, he applies the term ‘psychological overwhelm’ 
to describe mental illness:
This combination of psychospiritual passion and overwhelming helplessness is 
characteristic of almost all the people we tend to label mad, crazy, or insane 
[...] Each is an example of psychological overwhelm or, at the least, hazardous 
stumbling along life’s path.
(Breggin 1993: 33)
An objection to Breggin’s view is that he applies the term ‘psychospiritual’ 
exclusively to persons who experience schizophrenia. However, it is reasonable 
to suggest that complex philosophical thoughts may be pursued by all persons. 
This undue emphasis is a pity, for his essential construct is both sound and 
apposite. In conjunction with his own explorations, he cites the example of 
Boisen (1971) in emotional research. Possibly overlooked because of its strong 
religious overtones, this partly autobiographical work predominantly concerns 
the influences of environment and cultural beliefs. Many of the author’s writings 
detail difficulty or failure to cope with the demands of life. Indeed, in a sample of 
173 hospital patients in 1931, he reports that:
There are hardly any who have not some manifest maladjustments in the field 
of self-expression. [...] We may therefore conclude that in this group we have 
individuals who are thwarted in their effort to attain their major objectives in life 
in terms of their own picture of themselves. [...] But it cannot be too strongly 
emphasized that there is no objective measure of such maladjustments. The 
individual himself is the judge.
(Boisen, 1971, 27)
These observations are peculiarly potent in noting that individuals may judge 
their own actions and thereby condemn themselves. The consequence of this is 
an internal struggle whereby a person attempts to achieve the necessary 
understandings in achieving equilibrium with his or her environment. This leads 
to a satisfyingly clear construct:
Analogous to fever or inflammation of the body
(Boisen, ibid 29)
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Of all the possible descriptions of mental illness, Boisen’s brief summary is 
supreme in that it conveys the possible seriousness of phenomena. Thus 
severe manifestation of phenomena can be likened to severe fever in that it 
represents extreme necessity. Moreover, it serves to establish a construct of a 
part of the person -  in this case, the mind -  under attack in the same way that 
the body may be affected, leading to:
...some eruption of the subconscious which is interpreted as a manifestation of 
the supernatural. The impact of such an experience is apt to be terrific. It may 
destroy the foundations of the mental organization and upset the structure upon 
which the judgments and reasoning procedures are based.
(Boisen, ibid, 33)
On first inspection, this description may seem unduly lurid. Yet, the detail in his 
text can be applied surprisingly well to relatively modern autobiographical 
description. For example, Chadwick (1997: 24 - 35) gives a detailed account of 
the gradual disintegration of his thought processes during his illness in his text 
Schizophrenia; The Modern Perspective. This is extremely instructive in that the 
author experienced a gamut of emotions before entering a period of persecutory 
delusion culminating in a suicide attempt. Similarly, highly traumatic 
experiences are often described in the ‘grey’ (i.e. unattributed) literature that 
can be found on the Internet, (e.g. ‘Jordan’ (1995); ‘Louise’ (1998); Chovil ( 
2003)). Central to many texts are themes of continuing condemnation that only 
serve to magnify distress, whether from the opinions of oneself, relatives, and/or 
other quarters.
Associated with this is the fact that despite seeking knowledge of the possible 
biological and environmental causes of mental illness, any subsequent 
understanding may not confer resistance. This is because it requires extreme 
discipline to maintain complete objectivity in the face of constant subjective 
input from phenomena. Doubt constantly undermines logic. The consequence is 
a paradox: a person may know that they are ill, possess understanding 
regarding medical viewpoints, yet not believe that they are ill.
Admittedly, my own experiences were mild, even trivial compared to some of 
those detailed above. Yet there was a sense of strangeness, that something
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was wrong; eventually I felt forced to visit my G.P. For me, like so many 
persons, this is how it all began. To become a user of mental health services 
involved a series of diagnoses, various regimes of medication, three courses of 
E.C.T. and what seemed to be innumerable consultations. However, I deem 
further discussion on these topics unnecessary on the grounds that they are 
well known; also that they might pre-empt exploration of interview data.
4.10: Maybe I deserve condemnation: the reciprocity of stigma
Many people believe that mental illness is not a ‘proper illness’. Nevertheless, 
when I was told to ‘Snap out of it” or ‘Pull yourself together’ I rarely retaliated. 
Instead my hurt was internal: did people believe that I wanted to be ill, that I was 
deriving some vicarious satisfaction from all that was happening? Then there 
was another, more subtle, source of doubt. Were some of my actions really 
beyond my control? Or could I have made a real effort, could I have forced 
myself to deny the clattering of my thoughts? I was convinced that I could have 
done so if I had tried hard enough. The truth was otherwise: sometimes I had 
lost control to the extent of not being aware of my behaviour. Yet, to this day, 
the doubt remains. I could have tried harder. I was weak when I could have 
been strong.
Personal Statement
Although wary of exploring this topic for the same reasons mentioned at the end 
of the previous section, it is helpful to explain the various interactions involved. 
Ideally, the structure of society is founded on enlightened concepts that 
recognize the integrity of the person. However, embedded in these is an uneasy 
balance between that which is normal, or usual, and that which is normative, or 
designated to be normal. Whereas the former is, essentially, value neutral, the 
latter may be founded upon arbitrary social and cultural beliefs, acceptable to a 
majority of persons but marginalizing a minority. Inherent in this approach is 
what is best described as a socio-cultural anomaly: that is the tendency of 
humans to extend the range of a name to label an individual. Thus, with direct 
reference to illness, a person suffering from a named illness may be described 
-  or labelled -  thereby. For example, a person suffering from diabetes mellitus
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may be referred to as a ‘diabetic’; a person suffering from schizophrenia (a 
named mental illness) may be referred to as a schizophrenic. Such over­
emphasis on symptoms may suppress the identity of the person experiencing 
them, as explained by Repper and Perkins (2004):
Even if the ‘illness’ goes away, the label of mental illness does not. And when 
the ‘illness’ continues, roles and responsibilities are suspended indefinitely and 
it is all too easy to become nothing but your ‘illness’
(Repper and Perkins, 2004; 24 -  25)
When describing attitudes towards mental illness, Scheff (1996) attacks the 
‘ideology of the white middle class of Western Societies’:
The concept of illness and its associated vocabulary -  symptoms, therapies, 
patients, and physicians -  reify and legitimate the prevailing public order at the 
expense of other possible worlds.
(Scheff, 1996; 65)
The author maintains that the medical model of mental illness in Western 
medicine, as briefly described above, is explained by the labelling theory of 
deviance, developed by Becker in 1963. In essence, this details the factors 
whereby phenomena are labelled as mental illness and suggests that this 
process causes what might be a transitory episode to be viewed as a chronic 
one, with associated stigma. Accordingly, if labelling is resisted, it may be 
possible to channel the course of the illness and prevent this outcome. In 
making this assertion, he (ibid) makes brief mention of the role of shaman in 
Indian tribes, so implying that other societies and cultures take a more tolerant 
and enlightened attitude to mental illness. This may or may not be the case: 
Warner (1996) details both positive and negative attitudes to mental illness in 
other cultures, concluding with a five point summary. In the main, this is highly 
optimistic, noting but one possible exception:
Although some psychotics in non-industrial societies may be brutally treated, in 
the majority of cases vigorous and optimistic efforts are made to achieve a cure.
(Warner, 1996: 61 -62)
In the Western world, many user-campaign groups (e.g. MIND, SANE) and 
other organizations, including the NHS, insist that active methods are needed to
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combat negative personal and/or cultural attitudes to mental illness. Walker 
and Beckett (2003) note that:
The term social inclusion has gained rapid acceptance within the social work 
lexicon at the beginning of the 21st century.
(Walker and Beckett, 2003:92)
One aspect of challenging stigma is straightforward in that it draws attention to 
the ingrained social and cultural attitudes mentioned above. Another is, 
potentially, more controversial in that it attacks the motives of institutionalized 
psychiatry and pharmaceutical companies. In turn, this leads to the movement 
broadly known as ‘anti-psychiatry’.
4.11: What you are experiencing is not illness: ‘Anti-psychiatry’
I have already explained how I have often doubted myself. So, should you 
accuse me of malingering, exhibitionism, histrionics, or any other lack of self- 
control, I am obliged to resort to the claim that my illness has eroded my 
willpower. On balance, despite the ever-persistent gnawing of doubt, I believe 
this to be the truth: I have suffered, and continue to suffer, from a genuine 
illness. Nevertheless, you may decide otherwise.
Personal Statement
This brief discussion centres on an overview that the term ‘mental illness’ is 
misapplied, being an invention of society to medicalize abnormal and/or deviant 
behaviour. In this context, it is essential to recognize that Scheff s development 
of labelling theory (noted above) is a sociological theory as opposed to a 
medical one. Similarly, Szasz (1970,1997) views deviancy in terms of 
departure from socially understood norms before applying this concept to 
psychiatry:
Social deviancy is thus a term naming a vast category. Which kinds of social 
deviance are regarded as mental illness? The answer is, those that entail 
conduct not conforming to psychiatrically defined and enforced rules of mental 
health.
(Szasz, 1997, xxx)
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Notably, the author denies the concept of mental illness on the grounds that it 
does not exhibit physical symptoms (e.g. 1997:25). However, it is essential to 
acknowledge that he does not deny that the phenomena exist, only that they 
should be treated outside institutional psychiatry. This view is expressed in 
highly provocative terms:
The inquisitors who opposed and persecuted the heretics acted in accordance 
with their sincere beliefs, just as the psychiatrists who oppose and persecute 
the insane act in accordance with theirs.
(Szasz, 1997:26)
The unequivocal nature of this viewpoint means that much care must be taken 
in examining opposing arguments. One avenue is a straightforward, even 
casual denial, as exemplified by Chadwick (1997b) concerning ‘general gossip’ 
between recovering patients:
We all recognized that we were where we were because things had gone 
‘seriously wrong in our lives and in our heads’ but no one attempted to market 
the Szaszian style position (Szasz, 1971,1976) that we were ‘never ill and it
was all a political game’ [.... ] I never heard a single spontaneous remark in 10
years from anybody to that effect!
(Chadwick, 1997b, 581)[italics in original]
However, a basic problem with this stance is that it is not automatically 
applicable to all patients. For example, I know of at least one person who, 
despite regular admission to hospital and on-going treatment, is adamant that 
he is not suffering from mental illness. Therefore, it is probably better to note 
that, unsurprisingly, some exponents within psychiatry defend themselves 
vigorously. For example, Gelder, Gath and Mayou (1992) describe Szasz and 
his peers as ‘extremists’ and state that their argument:
 can be sustained only by taking an extremely narrow view of pathology, and
it is incompatible with the available evidence.
(Gelder, Gath and Mayou, 1992:77)
Similarly, Clare, in a polemical rebuff of Szasz’s arguments, fights fire with fire 
by describing them as ‘deceptive and meretricious’ (1989; 3). In doing so, he 
draws attention to psychiatry as understood by ‘the public’:
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The public, bewildered by the apparent ideological chaos within psychiatry, is 
ready prey indeed for any spokesman who peddles a simple answer to the 
difficult philosophical and practical questions facing psychiatry in its present 
poorly developed state.
(Clare, 1989, 3)
Important issues are highlighted by the above statement. It is to Clare’s credit 
that he acknowledges that psychiatry requires much development. Therefore, 
although psychopathology is the dominant paradigm within medicine, it is 
reasonable to believe that it is fallible. Moreover, practitioners of psychiatry, like 
their patients, are human -  it is always possible that mistakes can be made. As 
described throughout this chapter, the essentially personal nature of symptoms 
means that the various parties may disagree: illness may be denied, or seen to 
exist contrary to the belief of the user and/or carer. In such circumstances, the 
advice and activities of psychiatry (possibly supported by the legal system) may 
indeed seem threatening. Therefore, although the views of Szasz and other 
‘anti-psychiatrists’ are indeed controversial, I close by noting that many users 
and carers turn to them as a viable alternative.
4.12: Conclusion: Then shall I know even as also I am known: what is 
mental Illness?
Now that I draw near to completing this chapter, my overall feeling is akin to 
exasperation. The topic is vast: the exploration has been overlong but there is 
still much that I could have included. There will be opportunity to do so later, in 
relation to data gathered through interviews. In this context, throughout my 
discussion I have been aware of the need not to pre-empt this, that I should 
prepare the ground but plant as few seeds as possible. As stated earlier, my 
approach has been deliberately orientated towards theories and constructs. 
Although the result may appear somewhat soulless, it is an essential stage in 
the overall purpose of this study: the equivalent of the pencil drawing preceding 
the painting. By illustrating a clear concept of an overall construct of which 
phenomena diagnosed as mental illness are an integral part, it will be possible 
to investigate the research question.
Personal statement
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A direct answer to the question ‘What is mental illness?’ can be discerned in a 
surprisingly short summary: phenomena diagnosable as mental illness are 
thought processes leading to personal dysfunction according to the prevailing 
cultural and social climates of which the person experiencing those processes is 
a part.
However, this discussion has shown that a complete answer necessitates 
looking beyond the symptoms of illness to the person directly affected: the user. 
In entirety, mental illness is an interactive construct incorporating phenomena 
diagnosed as symptoms and the consequences of those symptoms. The latter 
include direct consequences for the individual, and those arising from the 
response of culture and society. Pertaining to the individual, experience of 
mental illness may be represented as areas of a continuum between appalling 
unhappiness -  or even terror -  and feelings akin to ecstasy. Pertaining to the 
responses of society and culture, I feel that it is useful to differentiate between 
‘formal’, ‘informal’ and ‘semi-formal’ responses whilst noting that much depends 
upon the behaviour of the individual user. Formal responses are those which 
are provided and regulated by governmental bodies. Ideally, these should be 
uninfluenced by personal prejudices; they include medical treatment, legal 
response (if any) and the provision of care after treatment, including financial 
assistance. In contrast, informal responses include the voluntary activities of 
carers and the opinions of other persons concerning all aspects of the user’s 
life. I apply the term ‘semi-formal’ to the activities of national charities and local 
support groups concerned with the welfare of both users and carers. This group 
may draw on persons from both the formal and informal groups.
This chapter completes exploration of personal identity, narrative, and mental 
illness with reference to constructs and related fields described in academic 
literature. The following chapter explores methodological issues related to steps 
towards generation of narratives about personal experiences of phenomena 
described as mental illness.
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Chapter Five: Methodology and data generation 
5.1: Introduction: research protocols
This chapter is concerned with the means of collecting original data and the 
associated protocols. It will discuss the various procedures and issues 
associated with:
• Refinement of the research question
• Obtaining approval for the research from a Research Ethics Committee
• Recruitment of volunteers
• Interview theory and techniques
• Transcribing of original data
5.2: Preparation for the research 
5.2.1: Title of the research
At a very early stage I decided that the somewhat unwieldy epithet ‘phenomena 
diagnosed as mental illness’ would be used throughout, thereby acknowledging 
differences in opinion concerning the nature of specific thought processes. As 
stated above, the original research question was a statement: The impact of 
phenomena diagnosed as mental illness upon sense of personal identity.’ The 
decision to rephrase it as a question was at the behest of the adjudication panel 
(see above), who felt that a statement was pre-emptive. Accordingly, the 
working title of the study was amended to become as neutral as possible: ‘How 
do phenomena diagnosed as mental illness impact upon sense of personal 
identity?1
Wengraf (2006) uses the terms ‘Central Research Question’ to refer to the main 
question and ‘Theory Question’ or ‘Research Question’ to refer to subsidiary 
questions. Concerning the latter, he suggests between three and seven 
research questions (p64); however, I feel that this is somewhat prescriptive. 
Therefore, I decided to adopt a ‘broad’ outlook by specifying only two secondary 
research questions prior to undertaking interviews. Described in full in section
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5.2.4., these served to define the parameters of the Central Research Question. 
In this way, my main criterion was whether or not a particular issue appeared to 
be important to the interviewee. If so, it was identified according to the basics of 
Wengraf s system. By following this protocol, I believe that my mind was far 
more ‘open’, i.e. receptive to issues that I might not have thought of if I had 
prepared a set list of research questions.
5.2.2: Literature search
My concept of a literature search is that it is akin to finding oases in a desert: 
the journey may be long, wearisome, and often unrewarded. The beginnings of 
my journey were easy in that, by virtue of my wife’s career, we already 
possessed many references on mental illness and mental health practice. 
Thereafter, once my gleaning began in earnest, it focused on two separate 
avenues:
• My supervisors, Julie Repper and Gordon Grant, encouraged me to 
search the Internet for personal stories in the ‘grey literature’. This would 
provide me with awareness and insights into common concepts and 
concerns.
• Due to my lack of experience in sociological research methods, Julie and 
Gordon provided me with ‘New Horizons: GMH 6010 Research Methods: 
A Distance Learning Package’ (Fox et al, 2001). In tandem with texts 
already in our possession, plus recommendations for further reading, this 
enabled me to acquire the necessary knowledge.
By now, my vis-a-vis contact with my supervisors was approximately six-weekly. 
In connection with this, my usual practice was to write a summary of learning 
areas suggested at a previous meeting. In this way, we were able to discuss my 
ideas, drawing attention both to progress made and to constructs or concepts 
that needed ‘firming up’ and/or further investigation. Unfortunately, it was at this 
time that I was unable to gain access to Sheffield University library facilities, 
despite the input of library staff and an experienced technician. Given that our
83
home is 2V* hours from Sheffield, this was a considerable inconvenience. 
However, to a large extent this was offset by the ‘Google’ search engine, forays 
into websites such as ‘Amazon’, frequent suggestions from my supervisors 
(including e-mails and telephone conversations), plus using the reference lists 
of academic texts. In addition, I must stress serendipity: my wife and I were ever 
alert for newspaper articles and/or recommendations, relevant magazine 
articles (e.g. ‘Open Mind) and second-hand books in charity shops. In particular, 
the latter source was fruitful in that since books were relatively inexpensive, I 
could afford to buy in hope as well as expectation.
Thus, by the time of my upgrade presentation, I had accumulated sufficient 
references to craft a full 10, 000 proposal. On re-reading this, I was aware that it 
concentrated heavily on:
• The possible aetiology and medical models of mental illness
• Philosophical constructs including interactionism
• Research methods including grounded theory
The upgrade meeting and the following months marked a turning point for two 
reasons. Firstly, I was advised to abandon grounded theory in favour of 
narrative analysis. Secondly, on transferring to Sheffield Hallam University, I 
was able to access their library facilities, including their ‘Find your reference’ 
search engine and ‘LitSearch’ database. By using the time-honoured method of 
single word of short phrase searching, this was invaluable in obtaining such 
journals as ‘Self and Identity’. Nevertheless, I also continued to use my earlier 
methods by virtue of the fact that they were tried and tested. This was 
especially so concerning the references cited by academic texts, which gave 
details not only of specific texts but also of authors. For example, since Elliott 
(2005) frequently mentions Hinchman and Hinchman (2001), I purchased same. 
Similarly, Elliott (ibid) cites Labov and Waletzky (1967): in obtaining their paper 
from the Internet, I learned of a special edition of Narrative and Life History 
(1997), which I obtained through the local library. Like Hinchman and Hinchman 
(ibid), this proved a valuable source of articles and further references.
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Throughout my research I had maintained a determination to emphasize the 
uniqueness of personal identity. Initially, I had sought to explore this with 
reference to mind-body philosophy, including neurophysiological constructs. 
Gradually, the direction of my research turned away from biological models to 
phenomenology. Whilst this decision was influenced by my supervisors, it was 
also an inevitable consequence of research into narrative models of identity. 
Additionally, as the interviews were conducted and the data processed, it 
became evident that biological concepts were rarely discussed, save for the 
‘fact’ of illness. Sometimes, as will be shown by the data, a subject area would 
be discussed that required checking and/or further search (e.g. cognitive- 
behavioural therapies, the role of support workers). Similarly, but to a far greater 
extent, the combined data often necessitated re-reading of references and/or a 
search for relevant new material.
This entire strategy continued until the final draft of this thesis. In summary, it 
was a process of triangulation involving many and sometimes disparate 
sources. At this point, I wish to thank my supervisors: despite my best efforts, 
their knowledge often provided that extra and vital reference that I would 
otherwise have missed. Thus I conclude as I began, with the analogy of oases 
in a desert. As a traveller, a researcher is often thirsty. And when they have 
drunk from an oasis, there is a sense of relief but also of frustration. There is 
always more water that might be drunk; there are always more references that 
might prove useful.
5.2.3: Obtaining a sponsor
Since I was a distance learning student, it was not practicable to conduct 
interviews in premises owned by Sheffield Hallam University. Therefore I 
obtained an honorary contract as an unpaid researcher with the Tees, Wear 
and Esk Valleys NHS Trust. This was arranged by the Trust’s User and Carer 
Involvement Co-ordinator.
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5.2.4: Obtaining ethical approval
All research involving humans requires the approval of an NHS Research Ethics 
Committee, which determines that all ethical concerns have been properly 
acknowledged. Explored in detail by Foster (2001), these can be summarised 
as a complex relationship between three approaches:
i) Goal-based: are the goals of the intended research appropriate?
ii) Duty-based: the way the research is conducted.
iii) Right-based: concerning the consent of participants and 
subsequent confidentiality.
The first stage in obtaining ethical approval for this research was the completion 
of an on-line form (NHS REC 5.0). This application was vetted on 11th April, 
2006 by the County Durham and Tees Valley 2 Research Ethics Committee, 
who then asked me in vivo questions concerning my application. During this 
meeting, recommendations were made for small alterations to be made, 
following which approval was granted.
5.2.5: Central research question
Although the prjncipal research question might be viewed as synonymous with 
the title of the research (above), in practice it was more specific. It was 
paraphrased to specify the viewpoints of intended respondents:
To explore, within the narratives of service users, the question, ‘How 
does personal experience of phenomena diagnosed as mental illness 
impact upon sense of personal identity?’
Later, this was amended, in keeping with the requirements of Sheffield Hallam 
University Graduate Studies Team to eleven words:
‘How do phenomena diagnosed as mental illness impact upon personal 
identity?’
5.2.6: Secondary research questions
The secondary research questions served to define the parameters of the 
study:
i) To explore how service users make sense of their diagnoses with 
respect to their mental health.
ii) To explore how service users construct their identities and the 
place of mental illness in these constructions.
5.2.7: What is the scientific justification for the research?
Of all the questions in the form, I considered this to be the most searching. My 
immediate impression was that an answer to these questions could, unchecked, 
develop into a small essay. After wrestling with possibilities, I realised that it is, 
essentially, one question requesting specific aspects within a single answer. 
Although the issues cited have been explored in depth in Chapters One and 
Two, it is important to recognize that the Ethics Committee base their 
judgements on the completed form alone. Therefore, in illustration, I provide my 
full answer, which is written in italics. When formulating this, I felt that the most 
difficult issue was the tension between providing an accurate summary of the 
intended study whilst avoiding pre-empting any findings:
The primary objective of the study is to build on the literature which 
explores the effects of the experience of mental illness on the lives of 
service users. In particular the study will seek to examine the impact of 
mental illness on the user's sense of self and/or personal identity.
For the purposes of this research, 'identity’ refers to a person’s self- 
image in relation to personal expectations and understanding of an 
individual’s role in the society and culture that they live in.
Work by writers such as Peter Chadwick (1997) and Anton Boisen (1936) 
acknowledge the profound impact that symptoms of mental illness have 
on a person’s life. This is particularly apparent during their early adult life, 
when they are seeking to secure a firm psychological foundation on 
which to build relationships with themselves, others, and the world at 
large. Similarly, ‘grey’ literature, i.e. unattributed and academically non­
validated stories on the Internet, stress the feelings of isolation and many 
other problems associated with mental illness.
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The overwhelming impression is that mental illness causes great distress 
by disrupting the client’s life. In particular, the person’s sense of self- 
worth and role in society may be challenged by incapacity which may, in 
turn, lead to hospitalisation or long-term sickness. Associated with this 
may be stigma due to relatives or friends holding negative views of 
mental illness.
However, authors such as Chadwick and Boisen (above) plus Peter 
Breggin (1991) and Ronald Laing (1967) imply that mental illness may be 
a way of resolving or attempting to resolve life trauma. As a result there 
is a question as to the extent to which personal identity, as defined 
above, and some of the symptoms of mental illness overlap.
Alternatively, this question could be described as to asking to what 
extent, if any, some of the symptoms of mental illness are, in fact, an 
integral part of a person’s mind.
This area has not been fully explored, especially through the vehicle of 
narrative analysis, which will allow users’ own voices to be heard. Of 
particular interest will be the ways in which users can incorporate and 
assimilate symptoms yet successfully maintain a positive sense of worth.
The study will contribute to and deepen present understanding of 
experience of mental illness.
5.3: Arrangements for the obtaining of original data 
5.3.1: Quantitative or qualitative?
To explore the research question, I would require the stories and views of 
persons who had, or continued to have, experience of phenomena diagnosed 
as mental illness. Some psychiatric assessments (e.g. Beck’s Depression 
Index; PSYRATS; PRIME-MD PHQ-9) attempt to make quantitative 
measurement of phenomena diagnosed as mental illness. This is achieved by 
devising set questions, to which the multiple choice answers are allotted 
arbitrary values. By adding the answers, a final score is achieved, which serves 
to gauge the severity of an illness. Also, and perhaps more importantly, 
successive questionnaires serve as indicators of progress in recovery. By 
recording a measurement or ‘score’ over a period of time, the course of an 
illness can be plotted. However, in terms of assessing illness at any one time, 
the value of such devices can only be regarded as superficial. This is because 
the standardized set of value-rated questions upon which they are based can 
take no account of any aspects of illness that are not included. Moreover, it
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must be stressed that the according of any value to a phenomenon or mood is 
highly artificial, being largely subjective.
Given these disadvantages, I did not consider any form of quantitative 
assessment. Instead, I deemed qualitative data, the description of the quality of 
experience, as the most appropriate vehicle for gaining the required data to 
meet the research question. Whilst such data could have been obtained by 
requesting written responses to questions, I considered that the best method 
would be face-to-face interview.
5.3.2: Choice of interview type
After some deliberation, I decided that the data would be best obtained by 
interviewing individuals as opposed to organizing focus groups. My reasoning 
was based on experience of small conversation groups at user involvement 
events, including social functions. Inevitably, a group would be dominated by 
some individuals whilst others contributed very little. Therefore, I felt that the 
only way to ensure an uninhibited exchange was to speak person-to-person.
The next question concerned the type of interview that I would use. There are 
three basic types of interview (Bowling, 2002; Fox et al, 2001; May, 1997; 
Parahoo, 1997; Wengraf; 2006):
i) Structured Interview: Questionnaire
ii) Semi-structured interview
iii) Unstructured or In-depth interview
Questionnaires invite short answers to specific questions.
Semi-structured interviews invite open-ended answers to prescribed questions.
Unstructured or in-depth interviews invite detailed answers to questions based 
on a central theme.
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I rejected the first two options on the grounds that they would prove too 
prescriptive. Thereafter, to term an in-depth interview as unstructured is, 
possibly, misleading: although it is extremely fluid, the underlying intent is, 
ideally, wholly focussed on achieving the aim of obtaining, and exploring, 
original data pertinent to a research question. Much depends, therefore, upon 
whether or not a researcher believes that a selected interview technique will 
maximise the exploration of the research question. For example, the 
conversationalist methods of Studs Terkel were based on the concept that from 
all persons could be evoked a wealth of information providing that the right 
questions were asked. Terkel’s own description of this technique was 
‘....idiomatic rather than academic’ (Terkel, 2004; xx). Noting that Terkel was a 
‘consummate journalist and interviewer1, Holstein and Gubrium (2004) suggest 
that his technique ‘permeates the social sciences’. However, this is intended as 
a warning against naivety:
....we typically believe that we merely have to ask the right questions and the
other’s reality will be ours.
(Holstein and Gubrium, 2004:143)
In querying as to whether the concept of the respondent as a ‘passive vessel of 
answers’ is wholly desirable, the authors make a valid objection. As noted in 
Chapter Three with reference to Linde (1997), an individual may constantly 
review and re-evaluate some of their experiences. Therefore, if an interviewer 
accepts a ‘passive’ view with little or no questioning, any re-evaluation will not 
be attempted. In contrast, Holstein and Gubrium (ibid) propose an ‘active’ 
approach, whereby an interviewer invites mutual exploration of a respondent’s 
experience that may lead to fresh (and important) insights. Against this, 
however, is the possibility that a researcher may, albeit inadvertently, ‘give 
directions’ to the interviewee, so potentially straying into a form of therapy 
(Wengraf, 2006:129). By virtue of my own knowledge and experience, I realised 
that the very subject matter of my interviews would involve reminiscences and 
self-exploration similar to those used in cognitive therapy. Accordingly, I 
deemed this to be a significant risk.
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Most of my objections can be countered by scientific protocol. Firstly, 
Hammersley and Atkinson (1990) making a telling argument that the 
descriptions of interviews above are, strictly speaking, inaccurate. With 
reference to social interaction, all interviews are structured by both researcher 
and respondent (pp 112 -113). Instead, the authors distinguish between 
standardized and reflexive interviewing. As implied in their titles, the former 
depends upon set questions, whereas the latter is more open, directed by 
issues that the researcher wishes to explore. My own interviews were of the 
second type: given that I hoped to explore an interviewee’s concept of personal 
identity, I wished to obtain a narrative that concerned their own ideas in their 
own words. To meet this requirement, I decided to try to model my approach on 
that of Studs Terkel, by using Single-Questions-lnducing-Narrative (SQUINs) as 
described by Wengraf (2006). A SQUIN may be formulated by a researcher 
prior to an interview, or arise in the course of an answer to another SQUIN.
Thus the interview proper can be said to begin with the first SQUIN. Thereafter, 
the interview is ‘unstructured’ in the sense that a respondent may pursue a 
narrative course unanticipated by a researcher. In such an event, the 
researcher is faced with the undeniably problematic issue of whether to allow 
the respondent free rein or to steer the interview back to the research question. 
The first choice risks a lengthy excursion into irrelevance; the second could 
mean the loss of valuable insight.
Although the interviews would be conducted in a ‘conversationalist mode’, I 
intended that my approach would be in a ‘narrative mode’ whereby my 
questions maintained focus of the purpose of the interview. Associated with 
this, my proposed method would be motivated by one wish alone: to intervene 
as little as possible. However, in stating this, I stress that my ideas were not 
instinctive but informed: during my experience as a Samaritan and, later, as an 
Advocate, I had learned what I consider to be two vital lessons:
i) To listen intently to the other person. Whilst it is reasonable to
allow possible responses a fleeting attention, your thoughts should 
not be given to what you intend to say next.
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ii) To maintain the focus of the conversation upon what the other 
person is saying. Unless absolutely relevant, details of one’s own 
life experiences should not be disclosed.
With reference to the second issue, the Research Ethics Committee was 
concerned about the possible degree of self-disclosure. For clarity I reproduce 
their entire comments:
On the guide to interview for participants, it was acknowledged that 
although self-disclosure was a useful tool to make people feel at ease, 
members felt it would not be appropriate for the researcher to go into so 
much detail about his personal details, as this may lead to comparison of 
experiences rather than focussing on the research question.
I make further observations concerning the conducting of my interviews in 
Section 5.4 later in this chapter. For the purposes of the NHS REC form, it was 
noted that the overall interview procedure would be as described by Elliott 
(2005). This deploys an iterative process wherein data from a first interview is 
used to format questions concentrating on specific aspects in a second 
interview. Seidman (1998) is quoted by the author in suggesting that three 
interviews with each respondent should be sufficient to obtain the required data.
5.3.3: Saturation
In simple terms, ‘saturation’ is self-explanatory: describing the complete
extraction of data. However, it is used in two ways in research: the first,
‘saturation’ is applied by Morse (1995) and Elliott (2005) with reference to
collection of data. The second, ‘theoretical saturation', is used by Strauss and
Corbin (1998) with reference to identification of ‘properties, dimensions and
relationships’. With reference to interview strategy, it is the former -  ‘saturation’
-  that is the primary concern. Accordingly, I suspect that I was like all
researchers in hoping and intending that my interviews would yield the
maximum possible data, thus comprehensively exhausting all possible avenues
of discovery. However, as explained by Morse (ibid), ‘there are no published
guidelines or tests of adequacy for estimating the sample size required to reach
saturation (p147). Therefore, it becomes evident that saturation can only be
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assessed retrospectively: if a researcher finds sufficient material in transcripts to 
effect convincing analysis, then saturation has been achieved. If however, 
concepts remain indistinct, then it is obvious that saturation has not been 
achieved and more data is required.
5.3.4: Identification and recruitment of respondents
I made an early decision that I would not attempt to interview any person who 
was undergoing in-patient treatment in a hospital. My reasoning was that I felt 
unqualified to judge whether or not a person would be well enough to participate 
in prolonged conversations. Similarly, because of the possibility that they might 
be unwell at the time of interview, I felt that it would be unwise to interview any 
persons detained under Section III of the 1983 Mental Health Act. Thereafter, 
the salient question was whether or not a person undergoing out-patient 
treatment and/or receiving medication could be interviewed without suffering 
undue distress. Thus it was agreed that prospective participants should, ideally, 
be service users who were actively involved in Service User interest groups 
within one particular NHS Trust; and that an initial approach should be made by 
the User and Carer Involvement Co-ordinator at the Trust. Alternatively, should I 
contact any party(ies) directly, then I was to appraise her that I had done so and 
provide pertinent background information. If interest was shown, then she would 
provide them with a Study Information Sheet (see above and Appendix) plus 
accompanying letter from me as principal researcher. The purpose of the 
Information Sheet was to summarize the purpose of my study; explain the need 
for details of personal experience of phenomena diagnosed as mental illness; 
and, in inviting the reader to participate, detail any risks involved. Associated 
with this last aspect is the need for ‘informed consent’ (see below).
5.3.5: Number of interviewees recruited
Given that in-depth interviewing is a lengthy process, it is usual to limit the 
number of respondents. After discussion with my supervisors, I decided that six 
respondents would provide sufficient data for analysis but that more could be 
recruited if required (i.e. if subsequent analysis suggested that saturation had
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yet to be reached). This number was queried by the Ethics Committee on the 
grounds that it might prove insufficient but it was accepted after discussion 
regarding the potential scope of in-depth interviews. Subsequently, I interviewed 
nine respondents. The pseudonyms used by these were:
Mr. CBA 
Dorothy 
Mr. K.
Eddie Hooper-Smith 
Mr. P.
Anita 
Anne 
Sandra 
Mr. Gwent
Mr.CBA is a single man in his fifties. After successfully completing a degree 
course he was employed in a professional capacity before becoming ill in his 
twenties due to symptoms diagnosed as schizophrenia. Since then he has been 
unable to work due to persistence of some phenomena; however, his financial 
security is safeguarded by an occupational pension.
Dorothy is a single woman in her thirties. In the second year of a university 
course she became ill for the first time due to phenomena subsequently 
diagnosed as bipolar disorder and, possibly, personality disorder. Despite this 
and later episodes , she managed to complete her university course. Since then 
she has pursued varied careers, both vocational and professional; however, 
continuing episodes have restricted her capacity to work full-time. At present, 
she is in receipt of benefits and occasionally works in a voluntary capacity.
Mr. K. is a single Asian man in his early twenties. In his teenage years he 
developed schizophrenia, which eventually led to four periods of hospitalization. 
Since stabilization due to medication he has been an active participant in the 
user movement. At the time of the interview, he had obtained his first 
employment as a user support worker.
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Shortly after obtaining employment in a professional capacity following a 
successful university career, Eddie Hooper-Smith developed schizophrenia 
necessitating prolonged hospitalization. Following this, he lived at home to 
facilitate a gradual recovery. In his late thirties at the time of interview, he has 
progressed sufficiently to be able to move into his own flat.
Mr. P. is a single gay man in his thirties. Following a series of adverse life 
events in his twenties, he succumbed to depression, leading to a suicide 
attempt. Following this, he lived in sheltered accommodation and attended a 
day centre, at which he received counselling. This led to a sustained recovery 
and voluntary involvement in user activities which, in turn, led to paid 
employment in this field.
Describing abuse during childhood, Anita explained that she was placed in care 
at the age of ten, from which she later ran away. In adulthood she has been 
involved in several partnerships including marriage, from which she has had 
several children. Despite her problems, she is proud of having bought a house 
and kept her family together. However, persistent symptoms of illness, 
particularly bipolar disorder and depression, have prevented her returning to 
employment. At present, in her mid-forties, she is undergoing further tests in an 
effort to stabilise her illness.
Anne is in her late twenties. Following a successful university course, her career 
prospered for a short period. However, during a holiday to the Far East, she 
developed symptoms of schizophrenia. At the same time, she separated from 
her long term partner: a combination of events that led to two suicide attempts. 
Since periods of hospitalization, she has lived in supported accommodation. 
Unable to work, she lives on social security benefits and attends local user 
support groups.
Sandra is also in her late twenties. Although suffering from depressive
symptoms for many years, she successfully completed a university course.
However, shortly afterwards, she was sectioned under the Mental Health Act
due to experience of paranoia and bizarre delusions. Subsequently involved in
user activities, she has suffered a further episode before recovering sufficiently,
at the time of interview, to initiate a return to her intended career.
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Mr. Gwent is a married man in his fifties. Having pursued a successful 
professional career for many years, he suffered a sudden episode of depression 
necessitating a prolonged absence from work. Thereafter, although encouraged 
to consider early retirement, he has recovered sufficiently to resume his 
responsibilities at their former level.
5.3.6: Informed consent
In accordance with usual practice, a Study Information Sheet was to be 
forwarded to a prospective respondent as soon as possible after interest had 
been shown. Subsequently, prior to interviewing, an interviewee would be 
asked if they had any questions. If the interviewee appeared to fully understand 
what was required of them, they were deemed capable of giving informed 
consent; that is their agreement to be interviewed. To document this, two copies 
of a consent form were to be given for signing by the interviewee and 
countersigning by me as Principal Researcher. This was compiled using the 
guidelines associated with the Internet NHS Ethics Form. (Nevertheless, as one 
of the first stages of the interview process, the reading and signing of the 
Consent Form seemed somewhat unwieldy. As a result, I quickly learned that 
the best -  i.e. most relaxed -  method of fulfilling this obligation was to read the 
form aloud.)
Copies of the Study Information Sheet and Consent Form, plus a specimen 
letter to an interviewee’s GP are provided in Appendix II.
5.3.7: Reflections (i): How informed is informed consent?
Amid currents of reflexivity arose a crisis that led to the temporary halt of this 
study. This experience is detailed in the first of my reflections, which, in part, is 
a precis of an article authored by me that was published in 2007 as part of an 
exploration of narratives of mental health service user researchers (Shields, 
Wainwright, and Grant; 2007).
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In the year following my upgrade meeting, my studies were, essentially, 
suspended for two reasons. The first was two separate episodes of severe 
exfoliate dermatitis requiring hospitalization. The second was that, for reasons 
that remain unknown to me, my CRB clearance was delayed for almost twelve 
months. Of these issues, the second far outweighed the first. Although suffering 
greatly from soreness and lack of sleep, my mind was active whilst in hospital: I 
even managed to read a text on research methods. The lack of CRB clearance, 
however, was an imponderable factor, a frustrating obstacle that was beyond 
my efforts to solve. All that I could do was to continue with appropriate 
background reading. Thus momentum was lost, so allowing the pervasion of 
doubt. I suspect that many studies fail in this way: a researcher may become 
daunted by the size of the task ahead or disillusioned by a lack of progress. In 
my case, I focussed upon the probable course of my interviews and began to 
question the morality of what I intended to do. Not only would I invite persons to 
talk of their experiences of phenomena diagnosed as mental illness. I also 
intended to ask them to reflect upon those experiences, and the life events 
preceding and following them; in short, their hopes and their disappointments, 
their triumphs and their failures, their opinions and their beliefs. As indicated by 
its title, my study would call for them to reveal their own understanding of their 
personal identity so that I could ascertain any possible impact of their 
experience of mental illness.
I was, perhaps, fortunate in that the major source of my dilemma was both 
readily identifiable and irrefutable. In 1999, I had participated in research 
organised by the Royal Victoria Infirmary (RVI), Newcastle, into the possible 
application of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) in the treatment of 
psychotic illness. My role was as a client/respondent: I was interviewed for 
approximately one hour at fortnightly intervals. These interviews consisted of 
exploring my past and my present; my interests, my motives, and my beliefs. 
From the outset, I was wary: during our first interview I said to the therapist, “I 
fear that you will let the genie out of the bottle and not be able to get it back in 
again.”
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In some ways I enjoyed the sessions that followed. In particular, I found the 
concept of core beliefs exciting. Nevertheless, my fears were realised: I found 
that whilst I could mount an intellectual challenge to the strangeness within, I 
could not withstand the emotional efforts involved. Increasingly, as the sessions 
continued, the car journey home with my wife became a debriefing session 
during which I unloaded my burden. The end was inevitable: I wrote to the 
therapist requesting that our meetings did not continue. Her response was to 
thank me for my participation, at the same time enclosing a self-help booklet. At 
the time, that hurt: I felt that she had no insight into the reason why I had written 
to her. I saw her shortly afterwards -  a coincidental meeting at the RVI -  and 
she exhorted me to try harder with the therapy: that hurt also. Later, I learned 
that that I was not alone in my reaction to cognitive therapy. In 2006, the RVI 
published its findings: they showed that CBT is effective in the early stages of 
an illness. However, in the case of prolonged illness, it is not as effective as 
medication and can even be counter-productive (Scott et al; 2006)
I did not imagine that my proposed interviews would be a form of cognitive 
therapy. However, due to the degree of introspection that they would involve, I 
considered that there would be marked similarities. As a result, the problem 
seemed insurmountable: I could not, in clear conscience, invite persons to 
undergo an experience that I would refuse. Accordingly, I notified my 
supervisors of my intention to abandon the study and, later, destroyed my files 
and my computer discs on a garden bonfire. Looking back, I believe I needed 
that act of finality to break the mindset into which I had become entrapped. For, 
after a short period, I began to look at the wider picture of informed consent and 
realised its true extent. That is, by providing a person with detailed information 
and discussion leading to an invitation to make an informed choice, I was 
respecting their integrity and their right to choose whether or not to participate in 
my study. Obviously, it was essential that I retained awareness of the potential 
sensitivity of their contribution, alert to the possibility of the interview morphing 
into a form of cognitive therapy. However, these were issues associated with 
interpersonal reaction and interview protocol, which is discussed in the second 
of my reflections. This reflection closes by noting that the bulk of my material
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was recovered by means of my wife’s arcane computer skills and files held by 
my supervisors.
5.4: Arrangements for the conducting of interviews 
5.4.1: Welfare of interviewees
Associated with the obtaining of informed consent, it follows that the welfare of 
all participants is the responsibility of the researcher. This issue is addressed 
both directly and indirectly by several questions in the NHS REC Form. 
Concerning direct questions, I opined that an interviewee might find the 
interviewee process upsetting. Therefore I instituted the following 
arrangements, details of which were included in the Information Sheet given to 
prospective interviewees:
i) That the interviewee could terminate the interview at any time should 
they wish to do so.
ii) That the User and Carer Co-ordinator of the participating NHS Trust, 
would be appraised of the outcome of all interviews.
iii) That additional support could be arranged if the interviewee wished, 
including that of their G.P. and/or Care Co-ordinator.
Associated with this are the obvious problems involved in interviewing female 
respondents. To satisfy the needs of the NHS REC Form, I noted that I should 
be accompanied by a female volunteer. In this I was extremely fortunate, for my 
wife is both an Approved Social Worker and a researcher in her own right, 
having obtained a PhD in 1997. After some discussion concerning advantages 
and disadvantages, we decided that she should accompany me in all 
interviews. There were three reasons for this; firstly, that the research personnel 
would be the same in all of the interviews; secondly, that her experience as a 
social worker could prove important should support for an interviewee be 
required (see above); and lastly, that she would be able to monitor my own 
health (see immediately below).
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5.4.2: Welfare of the researcher
This issue is specifically raised by the NHS REC Form. By virtue of my own 
illness, my answer was almost a ‘mirror image’ of that pertaining to prospective 
interviewees. For clarity, I reproduce this:
It is possible that the researcher could be distressed during revelations by 
the participants. If this occurred the researcher would seek the advice of:
i) The User and Carer Involvement Co-ordinator of the participating 
N.H.S. Trust. This person will act as the researcher’s clinical 
supervisor throughout the research.
ii) The Research and Development Manager of the above Trust, and his 
academic supervisor.
5.3.3: Place of interviewing
The venue for conducting interviews was to be made by mutual agreement 
based on the most convenient arrangements for the respondent. Four 
interviews were conducted in a designated room at an NHS Trust site, being the 
main meeting place for users regularly attending meetings organised by the 
NHS Trust. Three interviews were conducted in the interviewee’s homes at their 
request, whilst two were conducted in my own home.
5.4.4: Recording data
Provided that an interviewee gave permission, I used a cassette tape recorder 
to record an interview. (On the other hand, should permission have been 
withheld, the interview would have been written during the interview and 
counter-signed by the interviewee as a true record.) All nine respondents 
agreed readily to the use of the tape recorder. Not only did this enable full 
transcription of each interview, it enabled study of the ebb and flow of 
conversation: in short, a ‘living’ document’. Following interviews, the tapes were 
transcribed as soon as possible and a copy of the transcript given to each 
interviewee for checking. Concerning this, it is important to emphasize that this 
was a ‘raw version’ in that I appended no remarks whatsoever. This was for two
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reasons. The first was that I wished to avoid any possibility that a respondent 
would believe my interpretations to be judgemental as opposed to academic. 
Secondly, the main purpose of this exercise was not analysis but internal 
validation: it was important that an interviewee agreed that a transcript 
constituted a true and proper record of the interview. Associated with this, some 
of the experiences described might be referred to or further explored in a 
second interview. If so, although I never had need to make use of same, a 
transcript would be available to remind either an interview or myself of the fine 
detail of a narrative.
5.4.5: Beginning an interview
Although I was interviewing each person concerning specific experience of 
phenomena diagnosed as mental illness, the research question meant that, 
inevitably, I was inviting them to reflect upon the course of their lives. Initially, I 
found the interview process awkward due to preliminary procedures. 
Nevertheless, I tried to maintain a relaxed atmosphere by talking through the 
Consent Form and explaining the need for this protocol: to facilitate this, I read 
questions aloud. Following this, the tape recorder was tested to make sure that 
all parties could be heard clearly from where they were going to sit throughout 
the interview.
As explained above, included in these protocols was the choice of a 
pseudonym. After my first interview, in which I suggested ‘Mr.CBA’, I realised 
that the interviewee should be given autonomy. In doing so, I was sometimes 
surprised by the responses.
Dorothy hesitated before deciding on the name of a distant relative.
Mr. K. was quite happy to use his real name: Mr. K.’ was, in effect, an after­
thought.
Eddie Hooper-Smith answered me immediately, explaining that this was his 
chosen epithet when participating in any research.
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Mr. P. suggested ‘Porky Pie’ because ‘he was feeling mischievous at the 
moment'. Together, amid some amusement, we agreed that such an alias might 
not be appropriate for academic research. Thus, like ‘Mr. K.’, ‘Mr. P.’ was an 
afterthought.
Anita seemed genuinely pleased to be asked for her choice of name. I felt that 
this assisted in establishing a rapport very quickly.
Anne was used to research etiquette: accordingly her choice was matter-of-fact.
Although Sandra was also used to research etiquette, she was rather amused 
by the question. After suggesting ‘Sandra’, she laughed, adding ‘It’s the first 
name that comes into my head for some reason.’
Like Mr. K., Mr. Gwent was perfectly happy to use his real name.
In keeping with the conversationalist style as advocated by Studs Terkel (2004), 
I felt that much depended on maintaining an informal relationship. Therefore, I 
began every interview with words to the effect, “This is Ray Wainwright
interviewing N . Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed. (Pause) How
are you?” Often, this question was sufficient to begin the interview process 
proper. If, however, this was not the case, then my next question was intended 
to hand the initiative to the interviewee:
“Do you have any ideas of the sort of questions I might ask you?”
My purpose in this was two-fold. Firstly, as explained above, I wished to
establish an informal atmosphere. Secondly, I wished to allow the interviewee
choice of initial direction with respect to experiences within the personal
narrative. In the event, the first question sometimes led to an overview of an
interviewee’s present circumstances (e.g. Mr. CBA; Dorothy) whilst others (e.g.
Mr. K.) would give a generalized answer. Concerning the bulk of the interview,
some of the interviewees (e.g. Mr. CBA; Eddie Hooper-Smith) would give short
answers then pause, obviously awaiting another question. On the other hand,
some interviewees (Dorothy, Mr. K.) would range far and wide in their
responses. Rather than interrupt, I would listen intently, trusting that they would
return to the subject matter. In the event, this nearly always proved the case.
Indeed, I feel that much valuable data was gained by allowing such free rein.
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5.4.6: Reflections (ii): Listening skills and the processes of interviewing
My intention was that an interviewee would remain relaxed, as though in 
conversation, but enter ‘narrative mode’ concerning their experiences, to be 
guided by my questions when appropriate. In contrast, I was in ‘interview mode’ 
as opposed to ‘conversation mode’ with respect to my listening skills and 
technique. In making this statement, I realise that it is difficult to avoid homilies 
whilst pinpointing crucial differences between the two modes. For example, it is 
obvious that one should pay attention to the interviewee, show encouragement 
by non-verbal cues when appropriate, and not interrupt too much (Wengraf, 
2006). Notably, whereas in conversation one might respond verbally, 
interjections may alter the focus of an interview, therefore they should be 
withheld if possible. However, associated with this is the rather more difficult 
aspect of concentrating upon what is being said whilst making a mental note of 
important issues that might require elaboration.
I appreciate that this procedure may appear idealistic, even pompous; 
nevertheless, it can be followed providing a researcher accepts that they can 
relinquish control of an interview so that the interviewee can speak unhindered. 
In practice, I found this aspect of interviewing tiring; akin to a mental pinball 
machine wherein I wondered where a flow of narrative was going. More than 
often, I felt that an interviewee had wandered far into areas of total irrelevance 
and that I would have to subtly intervene. Yet, gradually, and almost always, 
they would return to the central focus of the study. Thus, with hindsight, I realise 
that all of the interviewees, without exception, were in ‘recall’ or ‘reminiscence’ 
mode which could be described as a combination of narrative and conversation. 
By being allowed free rein, interviewees often appeared as relaxed as they 
might be in a casual exchange. The benefits to the study were two-fold. Firstly, 
gaps in narrative flow were usually entirely natural, so allowing the next 
question, which was either pre-planned or engendered by earlier narrative. 
Secondly, with respect to the amount of data gathered, all of the interviews 
were extremely productive.
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5.4.7: Ending an interview
In the first of my reflections (above) I queried the extent of informed consent 
and opined that the interview process might be upsetting. Therefore, it was 
agreed beforehand that, on ending the interview, all participants would remain 
together for comments and, most importantly, ‘small talk’. Whilst I recognize the 
value of making notes immediately after an interview (Wengraf, 2006:42) I feel 
that the welfare of the interviewee should take precedence. In this, my motives 
were not entirely altruistic: for my own peace of mind, I wanted to know that an 
interviewee had returned to conversational mode. In the event, all interviewees 
said at the time that they had enjoyed the interview. Intermingled with such 
feedback were the types of inconsequential questions that make up much of 
everyday exchange: plans for later, who is seeing who and so on.
Approximately mid-way through my interviewing of respondents, the NHS 
Trust's Research and Development Co-ordinator advised me that, although the 
interviews had been unusually long, people had, overall, felt empowered by 
them. However, concerning his second interview, one respondent (Mr. CBA.) 
sent an e-mail to me that encapsulated my fears concerning inadvertent 
therapy. In short, whilst giving me permission to use both interviews in my 
study, he explained that although ‘June and I might be able to analyse our 
feelings, I cannot -  it just leads to me having bad thoughts’. Associated with 
this, he included two vituperative messages that he had forwarded to a family 
member. Although full analysis of the relevant transcripts will be detailed later, it 
is pertinent to note that Mr. CBA.’s reminiscing had led to exploration of highly 
sensitive subjects. At the time, I appended a note to the relevant data to the 
effect that I remained convinced that I had properly complied with informed 
consent. Thereafter, I expressed the private hope that Mr. CBA would come to 
realise that his revelations had not diminished him in my eyes. Yet, this sombre 
experience is instructive: despite all my precautions and determination to 
exercise sympathy and empathy, an interview had proven painful for the 
interviewee.
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5.4.8: Confidentiality of personal data
Prospective interviewees were to be advised that every attempt would be made 
to ensure confidentiality by altering or withholding personal details. However, 
my opinion is that this applies to an ‘ideal world’ where all is possible and 
straightforward. Whilst the proposed safeguards should be rigorously applied, it 
is likely that to do so in all cases would render a transcript difficult to 
understand. Moreover, given that most persons are well-known to at least one 
other person, it is probable that an informed third party make an ‘educated 
guess' as to the identity of a respondent. The following text is my answer given 
on the NHS REC form:
i) Personal details will be altered so that participants will not be 
recognisable via description in the research report.
ii) Any details of personal addresses will not be referred to in the 
research.
iii) All access to research material will be via a password known only to 
the principal researcher.
iv) Tapes of interviews will be destroyed after the research has been 
completed.
In addition, the Local Ethics Committee recommended that I stored data on a 
removable data stick as opposed to the hard drive of my home computer.
5.4.9: Personal qualifications
One of the main functions of the NHS REC Form is to draw attention to all
issues associated with the welfare of the participants in the research. In this
context, question A13 requested details of proposed interviews and the training
received by the persons undertaking it. Whilst experience of interviewing is not
a mandatory requirement, I noted my training as a Samaritan, also that as an
Advocate for mentally ill persons. However, it is stressed that this question
concerned training; therefore I did not consider my own experiences of
phenomena diagnosed as mental illness to be relevant. However, by virtue of
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my intermittent participation in events organised by user activity groups (e.g. 
‘Develop’, a group that met regularly in Hartlepool), I was known by almost all of 
my prospective interviewees to be a user of mental health services. This fact 
had, potentially, extremely important issues concerning this study.
5.4.10: Reflections (iii): Can only a user understand another user?
The purpose of this reflection is to explore not only the truth of these words but 
their implications concerning this study. My starting-point is my own role as a 
user of mental health services which, in recent years, I have not attempted to 
disguise or deny. Consequently, although they did not know the details, all of 
the interviewees in this study knew of my mental illness. That this created 
‘common ground’ upon which we could tread is undeniable. Nevertheless, this 
claim requires clarification: by virtue of the fact that I was known to be a user of 
mental health services, an interviewee was likely to assume that we possessed 
mutual experiences. Although I could cite many probable examples of these, 
caution decrees that I mention but four, of which three are medical and one is 
social:
• Consultation with a G.P.
• Treatment with medication
• Consultation with a psychiatrist and associated personnel
• Stigma
The significance of this ‘common-ground’ shared between me and my 
prospective interviewees can be summarised by two aspects:
• the confidence that I would believe their narrative
• the confidence that I would not judge their worth as individuals through 
the lens of their experience of mental illness
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Yet, prior to the conducting of interviews, my own experience of common 
ground is that it has become extended and distorted into a wholesale 
assumption of knowledge. Why have other users told me that my illness can’t 
have been as bad as it was; that I didn’t need to be sectioned? Why, when I told 
them that my thoughts had become dangerous, did they respond by telling me 
they were sure that I would not have done anything bad? Why did so many tell 
me that I didn’t need ECT, that ECT should never be used, that ’they’ could 
have given me something else which would have been just as good? Why did 
many insist that cognitive therapy is the answer to all my ills and pooh-pooh my 
misgivings? Why is it that a good friend could not understand that lithium 
carbonate had no effect on me despite it being her salvation? Why do so many 
users declare that, ’Only a user can understand another user, ’ despite having 
no knowledge of me save that I am another user?
I appreciate that my exasperation could lead to this review becoming an 
intemperate rant. Instead, I wish to draw attention to the fact that insight and 
understanding are widely separated points on a continuum. Thereafter, I believe 
it is reasonable to make comparisons to explain the difference between the two. 
For example, familiarity with the works of popular classical composers does not 
constitute a deep understanding of all classical music. Similarly, appreciation of 
well-known paintings is but the beginnings of knowledge of the many 
movements within art.
As explained in Chapter Four, the range of phenomena diagnosed as mental 
illness is vast. In tandem with this, the ranges of personality traits and other 
experiences pertaining to humans is also vast. Thus it follows that any one 
user’s experience of phenomena diagnosed as mental illness can only be 
described in terms of an entire illness-experience construct. Although focussing 
essentially on the phenomena diagnosed as illness and their treatment, it 
necessarily incorporates all other aspects of a person’s life, including ancillary 
social, cultural, and political issues. Thus any one user of mental health 
services is more than a user: they are a person in their own right. Accordingly, 
to fully explore the ramifications of this issue could be an entire thesis in itself. It 
would have been easy to prove how difficult it is for one person to understand
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another by references to the philosophical constructs of reality as discussed in 
Chapter One, plus exploration of linguistic acuity. In this context, Stern (1984) 
examines in great detail the meaning of words, even to the extent of whether or 
not they are wholly understood by their author. Associated with this, I call 
attention to my personal identity as an aspect of my consciousness, which 
cannot be directly accessed by you, the reader, or anyone else. To claim 
understanding, even of oneself, is a massive statement. Insight yes, but the 
depth of knowledge required to achieve understanding is much greater.
To explain why users claim understanding, I am forced to speculate that the 
issues cited above, particularly stigma, engender an understandable 
defensiveness. As a result, the concept of common ground becomes magnified 
into a stronghold, a sanctum wherein users are known to one another. Yet the 
consequences of this, if unchecked, are extremely worrying, both within and 
without research. The terrible irony of believing that only a user can understand 
another user is that stigma is perpetuated by those very persons who are its 
victims. To claim that only a user can understand another user is to dismiss 
without qualification the opinions of any person who has not used mental health 
services. It negates the sympathy and empathy of any person who has not had 
experience of phenomena diagnosed as mental illness. And worse, it reifies the 
label: by emphasizing their differences, users invite others -  the non-users -  to 
overlook the similarities between them.
With particular reference to this research, to believe that I, as a user of mental 
health services, can automatically understand another user would be 
catastrophic. Interviews would be seriously jeopardised for the basic reason that 
I would fail to listen. By virtue of believing to know most of the answers already,
I would fail (sometimes, not always) to ask the right questions: although the 
narrative would be recorded faithfully by tape, its flow would be lost. ‘Truth’ 
would be broadsided by prejudice: analysis of transcripts would be carried out 
through the lens of foreknowledge, serving only to confirm what I believed to 
know already. Yet not all would be enthusiastic self-approbation, for I would be 
constrained by pessimism. If only a user can understand another user then it 
follows that anyone who does not use mental health services will not
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understand this study. So might I falter, ultimately to fail, in resentment that few 
academics could see the rightness that is undoubtedly mine. Obviously, I 
unreservedly reject this possibility. However, it underlines the necessity to craft 
as complete a picture as possible of an interviewee’s personal identity. Only 
then can the possible impact of phenomena diagnosed as mental illness be 
properly explored.
I close this reflection by observing that I have often felt a terrible loneliness 
because of my illness. Often this has been because of the phenomena 
themselves, often because of the condemnation of other persons, and often 
because of those people who insisted they knew me when, in truth, they knew 
only that I suffered from a mental illness. Thus I say to all persons, irrespective 
of whether or not they are ‘users’: First and foremost, a user is a person, a 
person whose many experiences include the use of mental health services. So, 
by all means, refer to me as a user; but never forget that I am a person. So can 
you understand me? A part of me, yes; but not enough to assume that you 
understand all of me.
5.5: Transcribing of data
Transcription of interviews was to begin as soon as possible. This was to be 
carried out by me manually typing on a lap-top computer, an exercise that 
would necessitate constant playing and rewinding of the tape to be sure that I 
had transcribed the data correctly. In addition to words, I recognized that it 
would be essential to convey the flow of the interview by means of accurate 
notation. Elliott (2005) and Wengraf (2006) both refer to a procedure derived 
from conventions devised by Gail Jefferson. However, Wengraf (ibid: 216) also 
quotes Scheff (1997) in stressing that notation is intrinsic and does not 
necessarily have to be formal. In practice, by far the most important aspect of 
any system of notation is its applicability.
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The following system was adopted for all nine interviews:
i) Apart from my wife’s contribution as assistant researcher, the 
transcript is typed in Arial, Font 12
ii) My own questions, remarks and/or interjections are aligned left
iii) My wife’s (research assistant), questions and/or interjections are in 
Times New Roman Script, Font 12, aligned left, and preceded by her 
name in brackets [June]
iv) The respondent’s answers, remarks and interjections are aligned 
right
v) Personal details and other details that might enable the respondent 
and associated persons to be identified are italicised and bracketed.
vi) Significant pauses are indicated by rows of dots
vii) Stressed words or phrases are indicated by underlining
viii) Word whispers are indicated phonetically or as aspirant (sigh)
ix) Instances of emotion are indicated in italics and brackets
x) A hyphen at the end of a sentence indicates interruption
5.6: Initial analysis of transcripts
An integral part of transcription was a preliminary analysis. Although this will be 
discussed in detail in the next chapter, it should be noted that a first interview 
was fully transcribed before a second interview. In this way, data from the 
former could be used to inform questions in the latter.
5.7: Further correspondence with interviewees
Although it was mandatory that interviewees received a copy of the transcript, 
some pre-empted me by requesting a copy. As stated earlier (page 137), I 
returned the ‘raw’ data only, i.e. omitting any analyses. Generally speaking, the 
reaction to the transcripts was pleasure, sometimes accompanied by disbelief 
that one ‘could say so much’.
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Additionally, some respondents asked if they could have a copy of the 
completed study. In answer, I had stressed in my Information Sheet that, on 
completion, the completed study would be available to all participants.
5.8: Conclusion: research and identity
This chapter has described the crafting of the means that I hoped would 
achieve my desired end: the analysis of raw data provided by persons 
describing, in their own words, their experiences of phenomena diagnosed as 
mental illness. Essentially, this process is impersonal: it is, ideally, a carefully 
managed process wherein each stage is designed to facilitate the next. Yet, in 
research like this, I feel it is incumbent to be aware of when an impersonal 
approach should give way to a personal one. Obviously, as explained above, 
this was most evident in the conducting of interviews. On reflection, this was 
much easier that might be imagined: I like to believe that through a combination 
of good judgement and good fortune a productive atmosphere was engendered.
Given the main aim of my study, I feel it is supremely important that I do not 
lose sight of the person, and thereby personal identity, within the data. This 
possibility applies to a greater degree concerning further analysis, where 
aspects of data will be ‘isolated’ from an original transcript. The following 
chapters explain the application of narrative analysis in deconstruction and 
reconstruction of the data.
111
Chapter Six: Analysis of Transcripts
6.1: Introduction: the purpose of analysis
A transcript is a glimpse into a respondent’s personal narrative; it contains 
biographical details pertinent to the Central Research Question. This chapter 
will describe the intended analytic process, the close examination of the 
transcripts obtained from the taped interviews. In doing so, it will inevitably 
create an overview involving both anticipation and retrospection. The reason for 
this is straightforward: long before gathering of data was initiated, I had 
researched the many and varied methods of analysing same. Accordingly, 
whilst I was confident that I had selected a method or combination of methods 
suitable for analysis, it proved necessary to modify these in response to the 
narrative form of the transcripts. Initially, therefore, this chapter will define the 
precise purpose of analysis by exploring the overall research question. Different 
methods of analysis will then be compared with a view to deciding which, 
whether singly or in combination, will be used. Finally, there will be a critical 
discussion of my own viewpoint as researcher with reference to the gathered 
data.
6.2: Narrative analysis
Broadly speaking, narrative analysis can be divided into two approaches that 
are very different despite the fact that each can contribute to the other. These 
are:
i) Differentiation of a narrative into biographical elements and 
linguistic structure
ii) Differentiation of a narrative into separate nested narratives
As detailed in Chapter Three, the first approach was pioneered by William 
Labov and Joshua Waletzky in the paper ‘Narrative Analysis: Oral Versions of 
Personal Experience’ [1967, reprinted 1997]. This study formalised narrative 
structure into five features, which can be summarized thus:
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Orientation: concerns person, place, time and behavioural
situation.
Complicating Action: The events described by the narrative; what actually
happened
Evaluation: This emphasizes the relative importance of the
events to one another. Importantly, this may be both 
subjective and objective, so indicating the attitude of 
the narrator to the narrative.
Resolution: How the narrative ended. Resolution may coincide
with evaluation. Thus, in the event of a narrative 
which is on-going, evaluation and resolution are 
constantly formed and reformed.
Coda: An element which relates the verbal perspective of a
past narrative to the present day.
To this list is added-
Abstract This term is not included in the elements cited in the
1967/1997 paper by Labov and Waletzky. However, 
Labov (1997:5) refers to an abstract clause as 
reporting ‘the entire sequence of events in a 
narrative.
Labov and Waletzky’s system remains highly influential. Since its inception, it 
has been elaborated upon, both by the original authors, and by many other 
researchers. This has led to development of other systems, including Bruner’s 
(1997) application of Burke’s ‘Dramatic Pentad’ (1945); the ‘Recount, Anecdote 
and Exemplum’ system of Martin and Plum (1997); and the approach of 
Rosenthal and Fischer-Rosenthal referred to as the Biographical-Narrative- 
Interpretive Method (BNIM) by Wengraf (2006). Concerning all methods, it is 
crucial to recognize they represent but the first stage of narrative analysis. 
Following differentiation, an element requires further deconstruction in order to 
identify its role and potential significance. This is particularly true of the 
Complicating Action and the Evaluation: without the fine detail of these 
elements, it is not possible to determine exactly what happened or its meanings 
and implications.
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This observation leads to scrutiny of the second approach, namely 
differentiation into nested narratives. As explained in Chapter Three, the 
personal narrative that describes a life story can be regarded as being 
comprised of a multitude of interlinked narratives, each pertaining to a life 
experience. With reference to this construct, the general term applied to a 
narrative within a larger narrative is a nested narrative (Gergen and Gergen, 
2001). For the purposes of analysis, nested narratives can be identified and 
categorized according to ‘theme’, i.e. in terms of the event described.
Comparison of the two approaches shows that linkages can easily be made. If it 
is to make sense, a nested narrative requires some, but not all, of Labov and 
Waletzky’s five elements. The main difference concerns applicability to a 
complex narrative containing a large number of nested narratives. If Labov and 
Waletzky’s system is applied to the entire narrative, then there arises a 
necessity to sub-group each category (e.g. Complicating Action would need to 
be CA1; CA2; CA3 and so on). If however, a narrative is first differentiated into 
nested narratives, this cumbersome and potentially confusing procedure can be 
avoided. Thereafter, once identified, nested narratives can be subjected to 
further analysis, either by Labov and Waletzky’s system, or by different means, 
as will be discussed in the following sections.
6.3: Coding of data 
6.3.1: Definition and function of coding
Miles and Huberman (1994:56) summarize coding in three words: ‘Coding is 
analysis’. Rather more helpfully, they define a code as ‘a tag or label for 
assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential information compiled 
during a study’ (ibid). Thus codes can be applied to data of any size, from a 
single word to a paragraph. However, with regard to the latter, some care must 
be taken to ensure that it can either be described according to a single code or, 
if necessary, more than one code. Concerning the creation of codes, they 
describe three methods:
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i) A provisional ‘start-list’ which is clarified as the data are processed.
ii) Development by induction of codes from the data
iii) A combination the first two approaches by creating general ‘accounting 
schemes’ in which codes can be developed.
In discussing these, the authors (ibid, 61) state a preference for the first method 
but do not say why. Thereafter, whilst no opinion is expressed concerning the 
second method, a slight wariness is noted concerning the third. This is because 
although it offers greater flexibility, the accounting frame may become ‘little 
more than a catalogue unless the categories are meaningfully developed.
These different approaches serve to highlight the tension that permeates all 
analysis. Essentially, the aim is straightforward: it is to deconstruct and interpret 
the data from as many viewpoints as possible until no further differentiation is 
possible. In practice, however, such is not possible: instead, it is governed by 
pragmatism. As explained by Strauss and Corbin (1998:186) the process of 
data-collecting could become endless if limitations are not applied. Thus, there 
will always be room for speculation or a new question: in this sense, coding is 
an infinite process. Additionally, as will be explained later, the analytical process 
may be subject to the prejudices and expectation of the researcher, albeit 
unwittingly. However, before elaborating upon these, it is logical to proceed to 
examination of the system used in this study.
6.3.2: Level of coding
Miles and Huberman (1994) state that codes should be recognizable as 
applying to the concept they describe and not be over-elaborate. Although this 
advice might appear obvious, it is, in fact, important: not only does a researcher 
need to be able to analyze data without having to check their own system; the 
results need to be accessible to a reader. Accordingly, the authors suggest that 
a code of two or three facets is acceptable for manual analysis. Concerning 
this, it is not my intention to use software such as NUD.IST (Non-numerical 
Unstructured Data. Indexing, Searching and Theorizing) in the final analysis of 
data. Although there are undoubted advantages in using this programme
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(Kendall, PhD Thesis, unpublished), I preferred the manual approach to 
analysis throughout. This is because it inevitably involves many re-readings of 
the data, so providing opportunity to revise analysis and also check for 
instances of personal bias (see section 6.4.2.2.Reflexivity).
6.3.3: Initiating coding
Wengraf (2006) explains that the act of transcription should be the first part of 
the analytical process:
You could argue -  almost -  that the only point of doing the slow work of 
transcription is to force the delivery to your conscious mind of as many thoughts 
and memories as you can, forced as you are to work slowly [...] while your mind 
has time to think fast and widely about the material and the event in which the 
material was gathered.
(Wengraf, 2006:209 [italics in original text])
Concerning this research, transcription proved a labour-intensive exercise. Of 
the nine respondents, four were interviewed twice; of the thirteen transcripts, 
the shortest was 8,787 words plus provided attachments, whilst the longest was 
22,882 words. One of the most difficult aspects of transcription was keeping up 
with the pace of a respondent’s speech: in one case, although the tape recorder 
had been correctly positioned, the respondent often spoke so quickly that they 
were inaudible. As a result, I was obliged to replay sequences several times 
until I fully understood what had been said (rather perversely in the context of 
this discussion, I interviewed this respondent twice). Occasionally I would 
interview a respondent for a first time before I interviewed another respondent 
for the second time. However, in the interests of maintaining a reasonable 
workload, I avoided arranging another interview before completing analysis of 
interviews already conducted. In other words, as stressed below, ‘I did not have 
a backlog’ of tapes awaiting transcription.
In an ideal world it would be possible to interview a respondent, transcribe the
interview, subject the data to an exhaustive coding procedure, then use the
initial findings to inform later interview questions and analysis (Miles and
Huberman, 1994; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). However, I considered that the
following preliminary stages were adequate in this regard:
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i) First level coding: The transcription of the tape into prose form, this level 
was probably the most important in that it included casual observations 
and methodological notes, plus recommendations for follow-up 
questions. With reference to the respondent, this would include notes on 
tone of voice, expressed emotions, and so on. With regard to myself, I 
would include reflexive comments, i.e. those relating to my own 
knowledge, emotions, and biases both at the time of interview and at the 
time of transcription. These will be discussed in greater detail later in this 
chapter.
ii) Second level coding: This would be a summary of the first level coding. 
Strictly speaking, this level did not represent a further process of 
analysis. Instead it was an overview of the transcript, including my 
speculations, comments on procedure, and recommendations for a 
second interview (if possible and/or desired).
6.3.4: Completing coding
First level and second level coding were always completed before a second 
interview. Thereafter, all transcripts were subjected to two further levels:
iii) Third-level coding: This would be the detailed analysis of the transcript. I 
hoped that I would be able to undertake this in time for a second 
interview with a respondent (as stated, this was not always possible). 
However, I stress that although this was instructive, it was not 
exhaustive. Instead, I viewed this operation as the prequel to successive 
coding until saturation was reached, that is no new categories emerged 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Miles and Huberman, 1994).
iv) Fourth-level coding: Division of narrative into 'idea units’. Both Elliott 
(2005: 54 etseq.) and Riessman (1993: 44 etseq.) discuss the work of 
James Gee (1985,1986, 1991) who viewed the smallest unit of 
discourse as ‘a line’. In this context, Elliott (ibid) uses the extremely 
useful concept of an ‘idea unit’. Somewhat contentious, however, is the 
fact, as stressed by Riessman, that this results in a poetic structure.
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Indeed, the main application of this method is with reference to structure, 
particularly the rhythm of a narrative and emphasis of constituent events. 
As such, this aspect undoubtedly contributes to understanding of 
content. However, as stressed by Elliott, it is time-consuming and 
therefore unlikely to be used where content is the main criterion. 
Accordingly, it is usual to apply it to a portion of data as opposed to the 
entire transcript. Therefore, my expectation was that this device would 
prove useful if a portion of data contains more than one category or 
theme. Where appropriate, I appended short notes, some of which 
included a question mark to indicate speculation. This level differed from 
the first and the third in that scrutiny was repeated until I believed that 
saturation had been reached.
An obvious and valid criticism that can be asked of me is, ‘Why did you conduct 
your interviews in a relatively short space of time instead of waiting until you 
were fully ready?” In answer, I found that I had entered an ‘interview mode’, 
wherein my thoughts were directed towards the interactions of my interviews. 
Perhaps most importantly, the fact that I had interviewed other respondents 
recently meant that their narratives were fresh in my mind. Therefore, 
comparisons came easily at this time, facilitating both my interview technique 
and analysis at the time of transcription. As an integral part of the interview and 
eventual coding, I regarded this as a crucial aspect of the research. Thus my 
overview of this procedure was that it would be sufficiently rigorous to meet the 
advice of Miles and Huberman (above) whilst acknowledging practical 
limitations. With regard to subsequent interviews, I anticipated that the 
preliminary analyses would be particularly useful in identifying areas for 
subsequent questioning.
6.3.5: Choice of codes for this research
After consideration, I decided that a priori codes would be pre-emptive. 
Nevertheless, it is obvious that I was influenced by the Central Research 
Question: therefore it was self-evident that I would be particularly alert to details 
of mental illness, plus any mention of self-image. Given that these are 
extremely broad areas, I anticipated that differentiation by categorisation would
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be required for clarification. Therefore, I intended that my overall approach 
would be inductive in that I would allocate categories to portions of data 
according to the content described.
6.3.6. Reflection (i): Maintaining interest in the research
It is often said that ‘one cannot see the wood for the trees.’ After what seemed 
an interminable exercise in concentration when transcribing, I found myself 
confronted (I use this word deliberately) by an unruly and only partially tamed 
mass of data. Whilst my first-level coding had proved successful in identifying 
many important themes, there was also a feeling that much of the narratives 
contained in the transcripts remained incoherent. Much of this depended upon 
the interactions between me and the interviewee: whilst some told a story in an 
approximate chronological order, others ranged far and wide, mixing past and 
present in a tangled weave of comment and reflection. The obvious answer, to 
re-examine each transcript, was only partially successful. Although first-level 
coding could be challenged and qualified by additional observations, I felt that 
the overall product was lifeless, giving little insight into identity or experience of 
illness.
It was at this point that I felt more than a little frustration. My attempts at 
elucidation were compromised by the fact that I was unhappy with the overall 
concept of specific codes or themes. In reality, a personal narrative -  which is 
what each transcript was -  consists of hundreds, if not thousands, of nested 
narratives which are linked to other nested narratives. In consequence, I felt 
that to isolate and label any single narrative contributed little to the coding 
process. For example, to draw attention to ‘low self esteem’ in the context of 
past events meant little unless the import of same was speculated upon through 
deduction. However, to do so was not necessarily helpful, especially if 
accompanying detail in the transcript was not specific. Yes, the possible impact 
of low self-esteem at a particular time in a person’s narrative appeared obvious, 
but this was not always stated as such. Given that this scenario recurred 
concerning other events or concepts throughout the transcripts, my overall 
feeling was an intuitive conviction that they contained a wide variety of reactions 
to mental illness.
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From an academic point of view, such is dangerous ground. It would be easy to 
transgress the tenets of analysis by looking for codes in the data as opposed to 
looking at the data. Yet, perhaps oddly, this led to a return to basics: in citing 
the linkage of nested narratives, I was repeating the question, ‘What all is going 
on here?” Thereafter, the means of obtaining answers -  though not necessarily 
the completed answers -  lay in the data itself. It is the interview itself that 
informs the answer; it is the respondent telling their narrative. When, despite 
misgivings, I experimented with division of portions of transcript into ‘idea units’ 
(see page 117) the results of this were immediately apparent. The act of 
division was in itself a form of coding by drawing attention to a single aspect of 
narrative: an event, a place, a person, a thought and so on. Sometimes, the 
wording of an idea unit surpassed any analysis in conveying meaning. For 
example, ‘Mr. P.’s’ description of playground bullying, ‘It was like a stone in my 
heart’, encapsulates emotional pain and rejection in eight short words.
Naturally, not all phrases were so eloquent: many were ‘link units’ providing 
details of time, persons and places, so meeting the requirements of orientation 
with respect to complicating actions. In this context, most lines were self- 
explanatory; however, I was able to append brief interpretive labels to others. In 
particular, I could make an important distinction between a definite and a 
speculative item. For instance, when ‘Mr. P.’ told of losing his job, this was a 
fact, a statement of truth. Thereafter, it was reasonable to speculate by 
deduction that this would have impacted upon his self-esteem.
From a practical point of view, reduction into idea units was both exhaustive and 
exhausting. Although I discarded irrelevant sections of the transcripts, even this 
process was sometimes exasperating due to the afore-mentioned linkages 
between nested narratives. Moreover, the reduction of the selected passages 
was indeed time-consuming; particularly if it transpired that I needed to refer to 
the original transcript to check on the location of a chosen extract. However, a 
crucial aspect of this exercise was that it forced me to constantly look at the 
data. In its unadulterated form, a reduced transcript (i.e. one free of appended 
comments and codes) is virtually guaranteed to be true to the original data. 
Perhaps the only objections are that the act of reduction is somewhat arbitrary, 
also that it may accord an undue emphasis on a mundane idea or comment.
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Once completed, the reduced transcript was re-read several times in assigning 
codes if appropriate. Often, a code was merely ‘self-explanatory’; at other times, 
it would be interpretive, e.g. ‘stressor’. The end-product of these codes was 
summarized in my ‘fourth level coding’: this followed the relevant extract in all 
cases.
In truth, I had not anticipated the sheer volume of work or that ‘idea units’ would 
prove to be the most effective means of analysis. Despite this, the last transcript 
was finally reduced to my satisfaction. Following this, the closing exercise of 
cross-case analysis was greatly facilitated by the accessibility of the processed 
data. However, it should be stressed that, on occasion, I felt it necessary to 
refer to an original transcript in order to be certain that I was expressing a 
concept in its proper context.
6.4: Cross-case analysis
Described as ‘cross-case analysis by Miles and Huberman (1994) and 
‘comparative analysis’ by Strauss and Corbin (1998), this is the final refinement 
of categorization. Whilst the former text notes that it ‘enhances generalizability’ 
(p172), both stress that it will increase understanding of the data. My own view 
of cross-case analysis is that it is synonymous with the instruction, ‘Compare 
and Contrast’ with reference to units of data. This can be pursued by two 
related but distinct avenues:
i) To compare and contrast the course of single nested narratives as 
identified by named categories with reference to the nine 
respondents.
ii) To compare and contrast the entire personal narrative of each 
respondent. This would be reconstructed from the nested 
narratives categorized as above.
Associated with both schemes, it was necessary to arrange the personal 
narrative was arranged in chronological order. This was achieved by manually 
sorting a printed copy of the data after it had been subjected to fourth-level 
coding. If a respondent had been interviewed twice, it was at this point that data
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from the two interviews could be intermingled. Thereafter, I decided that it would 
be instructive to divide the chronology of the personal narrative into three 
stages determined by the course of mental illness:
The first stage covers a respondent’s life before the onset of mental illness. In 
some cases this is very detailed by virtue of description of childhood 
experiences, including family life. For example, Dorothy, Anita, Mr. P., and 
Sandra covered much of their entire personal narratives in the course of the 
interviews. In contrast, the other five respondents (Mr. CBA, Mr. K., Eddie 
Hooper-Smith, Anne and Mr. Gwent) made much less reference to the early 
stages of their lives. Nevertheless, all nine respondents provided sufficient 
detail to enable me to gain some insight into their personal narratives before the 
onset of mental illness. Accordingly, I have termed this stage prologue.
The second stage is accounts of significant experience of mental illness 
whether this concerns a single, relatively short-lived episode that is now 
resolved with or without the aid of medication (Mr. K., Mr. P., Mr. Gwent); a 
longer episode leading to on-going symptoms (Mr. CBA, Eddie Hooper-Smith, 
Anne), or recurring episodes associated with on-going symptoms requiring 
medication (Dorothy, Anita, Sandra). Concerning all respondents, each 
experienced a first significant episode, that is phenomena sufficient to cause 
severe problems. Although a range of feelings associated with this (e.g. fear, 
bewilderment) is described by Corry and Tubridy (2001), I prefer a 
phenomenological description by Boisen (1971) of ‘acute disturbances’.
Although this is written with reference to schizophrenia, I believe it applies 
equally well to the onset of all severe phenomena:
The impact of such an experience is apt to be terrific. It may destroy the 
foundations of the mental organization and upset the structure upon which the 
judgements and reasoning processes are based.
(Boisen, 1971:30)
In keeping with the above and with an overview used by Breggin (1993), I have 
termed this stage overwhelm.
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The third stage is an accounting of experiences following overwhelm. In that the 
interviewees have recovered sufficiently to tell me their story, I term this stage 
recovery. However, it is essential to recognize that the degree of recovery may 
vary and may not be ‘complete’ by virtue of continuing experience of mental 
illness (for example, both Dorothy and Eddie-Hooper-Smith continue to require 
the input of a support worker, whilst Anita continues to experience problems 
with medication). Also, in the event of recurrent episodes, the path of recovery 
may not have been ‘smooth’, but may have been interrupted by subsequent 
periods of overwhelm.
(important note: in the event of an interviewee’s health worsening during this 
research, I had not pursued any further interviews.)
In making these distinctions, I stress that they are arbitrary: in real life, they are 
not separate and distinct but overlap with one another. Nevertheless, they are 
useful in that they enable a detailed personal narrative of each interviewee to be 
fashioned. In particular, I believe that they facilitate understanding of the 
interviewee as a person, the man or woman of whose personal experiences 
mental illness is but a part.
6.5: Neutrality in research 
6.5.1: Is coding a neutral process?
Whilst every effort can -  and should -  be made to ensure neutrality in research, 
it is inevitable that understanding, and therefore coding, of data is modified by 
the sense-perception and pre-conceptions of the researcher. The following 
section explains how this came be moderated by awareness of the processes 
involved.
6.5.2: Bias of respondent and researcher
In a section called Waving the Red Flag’, Strauss and Corbin (1998) state that 
it is important to:
....recognize when either our own or the respondents’ biases, assumptions, or 
beliefs are intruding into the analysis.
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998:97)[Bold type in original text]
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Given that the Central Research Question concerns personal identity, I maintain 
that a respondent’s personal beliefs concerning any topic should be regarded 
as an integral part of the data. Far from eschewing it, a particular belief should 
be investigated if deemed to be of importance to an interviewee. However, my 
own biases are a different matter entirely. In the main, these are of two types. 
The first is straightforward: it is possible to be lazy, careless, and/or make 
genuine mistakes: to attribute causation where none exists, to ignore 
categories, to claim that data supports a particular stance despite evidence to 
the contrary, and so on. The second is much more complex in that it concerns 
my personal beliefs and understandings, both those pertaining to my personal 
narrative and those pertaining to my reading of the literature in the context of 
this research.
6.5.3: Relativism and reflexivity
Concerning the epistemology of research, these terms are regarded as 
separate and distinct despite an apparent overlap between them. This is 
probably because, unlike reflexivity, relativism is a named philosophical 
construct. Accordingly, these will be discussed as separate topics before review 
in the context of this research.
6.5.3.1: Relativism
Epistemologically, relativism can be described as non-realism (Horner and 
Westacott, 2000) in that it denies the realist concept of an independent reality. 
With reference to ‘cognitive realism’ the authors provide a useful summary, 
explaining that relativists believe that....‘the truth or falsity of a statement is 
relative to some particular standpoint’ (p55). Later in their discussion, they apply 
the coherence theory of truth (that the truth of a statement consists in its 
coherence with other statements) in combination with a non-realist view of the 
relation between the mind and reality. Concerning this, it becomes evident that 
relativism can be viewed as deriving from the tension between the rather 
simpler concepts of direct realism (that reality is independent of our cognition of 
it) and representative realism (that some qualities of objects exist only in the 
mind of the observer (Horner and Westacott, ibid).
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Much care must be taken in application of relativism. Pursuing a convoluted 
course of discussion, Horner and Westacott (ibid) note critiques that centre on 
areas of inconsistency. Similarly Hammersley (1992) notes ambiguity 
concerning declaration of certainty. In summary, to adjudge the veracity of a 
particular stance, it is necessary to declare that a referential point is true; 
however, this may not be justifiable. However, Horner and Westacott (ibid) 
suggest a solution that is satisfactorily clear. If the referential standpoint 
includes a relativist view of the relationship between the mind and reality (i.e. 
incorporating representational reality) then it is possible to acknowledge 
uncertainty without contradiction. This approximates to Hammersley’s (ibid, 50 - 
54) construct of subtle realism, whereby recognition of our own assumptions 
and beliefs is applied to ethnographic research.
6.5.3.2: Reflexivity
In some texts, especially Woolgar (ed) [1988], discussion of reflexivity is 
extremely elaborate. Therefore, rather ironically, it is best to apply relativism by 
beginning with a text that takes a definite standpoint. Denscombe (1998)
defines reflexivity as ‘concerns the relationship between the researcher and the
social world’ (p240). Thereafter, he explains that since a researcher is a part of 
the social world, they can never be entirely objective. Thus his definition of 
reflexivity is very close to Horner and Westacott’s closing remarks concerning 
relativism (above). However, whereas this observation is echoed by other 
authors (e.g. Hammersley and Atkinson (1990), Woolgar (1988) uses the 
ambiguity inherent in relativism to challenge this stance. Accordingly, it is 
necessary to explore further the nature of the relationship between ‘the 
researcher’ and the ‘social world’
Again, Denscombe (ibid) is helpful when discussing reflexivity in the context of 
ethnography. Broadly speaking, his observations can be divided into two linked 
groups. The first concerns our observations of events and our interpretations of 
them, being the product of our own experiences. The second, the writing up of 
same, is also affected in that an author is never entirely objective concerning 
the presentation of text. Undoubtedly important with regard to any research, this
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concept is explained in much greater detail by Atkinson (1991). However, this 
discussion concentrates on the first concept, namely the role of our experiences 
in interpretation. In particular, what are those experiences and interpretations?
In short, the answer is ‘air. All that happened to a person, all that they have 
remembered, and all that they have understood, including constant re- 
interpretation of memories as new understandings are gained through new 
experience. As suggested in previous chapters, experience can be both direct, 
whereby the person participates in events, and indirect, through the narratives 
of others.
In this context, reflexivity becomes explicable in terms of an active process 
within the larger construct of relativism. Included in this is a self-referential 
aspect, namely that awareness of relativism and reflexivity is in itself a part of 
both processes. Whilst this observation risks over-elaboration, I believe that it 
enables an overview of reflexivity. To achieve this, I take a diversion into biology 
by viewing reflexivity as pertaining to a a reflex in terms of a reaction to a 
stimulus. Fundamentally important to this viewpoint is that a reflex can be 
involuntary, involving no conscious processes. In physiological terms, the 
pathway of a reflex is termed a reflex arc, of which a simple type involves three 
neurons (Bennett, 1990):
Figure 6.1; Reflex Arc
sensory receptor: (feeling of 
stimulus)
Intemeuron 
in spinal cord
Motor end plate makes 
muscle contract: (reflex)
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The crucial aspect of this comparison is that almost immediately after the reflex 
has been effected, the conscious mind becomes aware of it. For example, if you 
touch something very hot, (e.g. a ring on an electric cooker) you jerk your hand 
away before realising why. Therefore, the reflex process consists of two parts: 
the reflex itself and the subsequent appraisals of what happened, why, whose 
fault it was, and so on. Arising from this appraisal, future behaviour will probably 
differ from previous behaviour: since you know that the cooker ring may be hot, 
you will avoid touching it. Moreover, this act will become automatic, involving 
nonconscious processes (Edelman, 2005).
Applying this process to a research setting, the vast majority of researchers are 
in the position of ‘knowing that the cooker ring may be hot’. However, 
application of reflexivity demands that we are aware of that knowledge and that 
we may react to it. That is, we undertake research with the aid (or burden) of 
foreknowledge gained either from previous research, or background reading, or 
personal experience: original data are gathered and, initially, interpreted amid a 
welter of involuntary or unconscious experiences. Try as we might, we cannot 
altogether avoid the possibility that an event will remind us of something we 
have seen, heard, or read. However, we can try to be aware of a possible 
reaction prior to data collection and plan accordingly. In my own case, the NHS 
Local Ethics Committee raised the possibility that mutual disclosure of 
experiences during interview could lead to a loss of focus. Also, we can try to be 
aware of our reactions when transcribing data: providing that these are 
recorded, they can be acknowledged as part of the eventual analysis. 
Concerning this study, my own technique was to detail my responses during 
transcription and first level coding, i.e. my reaction to statements -  and the way 
in which they were said -  made by the respondents as I heard them again on 
the tape. Occasionally, but much less often, I was fortunate enough to be able 
to remember my reaction at the time of the interview.
In conclusion, whilst there are similarities between bias and reflexivity, there is 
an important difference between them. Both are associated with the knowledge 
and experiences of the researcher plus the understanding of same. Both can 
derive from a non-conscious influence of these through reaction of memory to
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on-going collection of data. Both may be subsequently recognized to exist. 
However, recognition of bias does not necessarily lead to a remedy: indeed, it 
may continue to be exercised in the crafting of the research. Reflexivity, on the 
other hand, includes the acts of reflection and appraisal in determining the 
influencing of the researcher upon the research. In short, if properly applied, 
reflexivity acknowledges that although we can forget something we have 
learned, we cannot unlearn it. Therefore, a researcher needs to be aware of 
their pre-conceptions and assumptions when planning the research, collecting 
original data, analysis of same, and presentation of the findings. If this can be 
achieved, then the rigour of the research will be maximised. That said, the very 
nature of reflexivity means that an ever-present criterion in research will be 
imperfection. Despite the levels to which research is scrutinized for objectivity 
and neutrality, no-one is immune from subjectivity and the vagaries of 
understanding. The key question for the researcher, therefore, is not ‘what is 
the perfect methodology and analytic scheme’ but, rather, ‘what methodology 
and analytic scheme is fit for purpose?’
6.6: Reflection (ii): My personal experience of mental illness
As emphasized throughout this thesis, I have experienced phenomena 
diagnosed as mental illness for over forty years. Colloquially speaking, my 
experiences are innumerable. Concerning the phenomena -  the symptoms -  
themselves, my diagnoses have been many and varied: depression, 
endogenous depression, psychotic depression, ‘don’t know*, bipolar disorder, 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, schizo-affective disorder, schizophrenia, and, 
latterly, ultra-rapid cycling mixed affective bipolar disorder. Concerning the 
medical personnel whom I have seen, there have been those I have liked, there 
have been those I disliked, even those I have feared. There have been those I 
have admired, those whom I thought had made their minds up before I walked 
through the door; those whom I felt tried to help me, those whom I thought 
couldn’t be bothered. Concerning medication, there has been a succession of 
tablets, either in isolation or as part of a regime: Tryptozol, Imipamine,
Stelazine, Droperidol, Prozac, Clopromazine, Risperdal, Sodium valproate, 
Zispin, Efexor, Lamotrigine, Gabapentin, Citalopram, and Quetiapine.
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Concerning other treatments, I have received Cognitive Behavioural Therapy 
(CBT) and Electro-Convulsive Therapy (ECT). Concerning the effects of the
combinations of symptoms and treatment This is the mass of my personal
experience, my own memories and understandings.
From an epistemological viewpoint, I recognize that my status could present a 
reflexive nightmare. Perhaps curiously, however, I found that I was able to set 
aside the bulk of my experiences when interviewing and transcribing. Instead, 
my style was (as detailed in the last chapter with reference to Studs Terkel) that 
of an interested observer occasionally prompting the main speaker in a guided 
conversation. Occasionally, and inevitably, there would be mention of my own 
experience if the context was relevant, particularly from my wife, June, in her 
capacity as Assistant Researcher. Whether these were in keeping with the 
overall spirit of neutrality is a moot point. Although it is probable that some of 
our remarks were unnecessary, I maintain that they contributed to the often 
convivial nature of the interviews. Moreover, though I am less sure of this, I 
suggest that the exchanges assisted both the interviewee and myself to retain a 
person-to-person relationship. In truth, despite being constantly aware of my 
role as researcher, I never felt that I conveyed an academic detachment.
This attitude persisted during transcription: when playing and replaying the tape 
I could often see a mind’s eye image of the interviewee as I heard their words 
and the way they were said. As stated earlier, there were also the demands of 
sheer concentration in listening to the tape: sometimes my whole attention was 
devoted to successive replays in order to capture a quiet word or statement. 
Therefore, whilst acknowledging the risk of hubris, I was, and remain, confident 
that the interviews were conducted and transcribed without the undue influence 
of my own experiences. Against this, I was alone when transcribing, more able 
to give myself to my thoughts as opposed to ensuring the smooth flow of the 
interview. Accordingly, the person within worked alongside the academic: ideas 
formed and reformed as existing knowledge was recalled.
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6.7. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have explained how the raw data of a transcript is 
deconstructed through a series of four levels into ‘idea units’, that is, a form 
suitable for scrutiny and cross-case analysis with other transcripts. In doing so, I 
have discussed at length the various sources of personal bias that can, 
potentially, affect all research. Additionally, in this context, I have explored the 
possible impact of my own experiences of mental illness upon my 
interpretations.
The following chapter will explore narrative theory before applying this to the 
four levels of coding. In particular, it will discuss evaluation of narrative 
trajectory and named narratives of illness described in academic literature. This 
will lead to the development of narrative diagrams to illustrate the three stages 
of illness named by me on pages 166 -7 ,  namely prologue, overwhelm, and 
recovery.
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Chapter Seven: Significant narratives
7.1: Introduction: interpretation of data: words and pictures
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the application of narrative analysis to 
the data and how this can be used in the creation of visual interpretation of the 
relevant aspects of personal narratives. In discussing the importance of visual 
displays, Wengraf (2006) invites controversy by averring that ‘....most social 
scientists under-use such displays’. This accusation is then compounded by the 
statement that:
It is a mistake -  a mistake that qualitative researchers not trained in quantitative
display devices are most likely to make.....
(Wengraf, 2006, 359) [italics in original text]
Associated with vraisemblance (Atkinson, 1991) this charge highlights a vexed 
issue. The presentation of research is not a neutral exercise, but is crafted to 
meet the needs of scientific rigour and, perhaps of equal importance, the 
expectation of the reader. Described by Atkinson (ibid) as ‘intertextuality’, a text 
is persuasive by obedience to linguistic and academic conventions. If follows, 
therefore, that reflexivity plays an important role in the manner in which this text 
is received. Not only is the methodology and findings of a research project 
under scrutiny, but also the way in which these are described. In this context, if 
Wengraf s generalizations are correct then sociologists not only under-use 
‘visual displays’, they are also suspicious of them when reading.
To explore this issue, it is necessary to view it as a problem of accessibility. An 
important lead is provided by Atkinson (ibid) in noting that ‘arcane jargon’ need 
not be a prerequisite in textual construction. In simple terms, easily understood 
words will not devalue or diminish important findings. However, it is also true 
that clumsy syntax and ill-chosen words will have that precise effect. 
Consequently, the ideal path is a ‘middle road’ whereby research is presented 
in a format of acceptable academic standard. Nevertheless, the problem of 
prejudice through reflexivity remains. In practice, it is virtually impossible to
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produce a piece of work that does not contain a few jarring notes. A sentence 
that is too long for some readers, the frequent use of a particular adjective or 
conjunction, a word considered obscure by some persons despite its everyday 
use by an author, all can evoke a negative reaction.
To concentrate overmuch on these aspects of access and accessibility would 
be unproductive. Instead, it is better to focus on a common-sense approach to 
presentation of findings. Thus written reports should be lucid: clearly written, 
unencumbered by obscure words or phrases. Concerning diagrams, my belief is 
that they are indispensable providing that they are clear and easy to 
understand, particularly in the case of flow diagrams. However, such idealism is 
not necessarily easily applied. With reference to generating a life-story in 
interviewing, Keady, Williams, Hughes-Roberts and Quinn (2007) make use of a 
Venn Diagram to summarize respondent-interviewer interaction. Later in the 
same text, a ‘personal theory’ of experience of living with Alzheimer’s disease is 
summarized using a flow diagram. On the other hand, whilst many of the 
diagrams found in Miles and Huberman (1994) are excellent in their clarity, 
others are difficult to follow due to the number of factors illustrated. Thus one is 
faced with a dilemma: whilst the desired aim is clarity through simplicity, it is 
essential to include all relevant data concerning a construct. It was this 
consideration that led me to devise a visual means of depicting narratives, the 
entire process of which will form much of the discussion in this chapter. Firstly, it 
is necessary to finalize exploration of narrative constructs.
7.2: Narrative coherence
An important aspect of coding is that, despite deconstruction, the document -  
the narrative -  can still be viewed as a unified whole. This quality, the continuity 
and overall meaning of a narrative, is termed coherence (Linde, 1993; Elliott, 
2005). However, a detailed exploration of this construct leads to realms of 
apparent artificiality. For example, when quoting Baerger and McAdams (1999), 
Elliott (ibid) itemizes four qualities of coherence:
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i) Temporal, social and personal context.
ii) Structural elements of an episode system.
iii) Evaluation to give emotional significance
iv) Meaning of experiences within context of larger life story.
Similarly, using generalized views of science and history as examples of 
narrative, Landau (2001:116) identifies three linked ‘premises’, which can be 
can be summarized as follows:
i) the beginning-middle-end template of all narratives
ii) evaluation to designate certain events as being of especial significance
iii) causality: the possibility that one event leads to another
Basic narrative structure has already been discussed in Chapters Three and 
Five. The specific purpose of this chapter is to review those elements which, 
more than any, convey coherence, namely causality: the possible linkage 
between events; and plot the essential meaning of a narrative. Thereafter, it will 
develop the concept of nested narratives with references to constructs cited in 
academic literature. In particular, it will explain how nested narratives can be 
designated as significant or even dominant within the entire personal narrative. 
This understanding will then be discussed with reference to future analysis and 
interpretation of the data obtained from the interviews.
7.3: Narrative structure: causality
An essential part of narrative coherence is a logical temporal sequence of 
events. Within this, as explained above, causality is the concept that one event 
can lead to another. Concerning this linkage, Elliott (2005:8 -  9) stresses the 
difference between a causal link and a causal law. The former describes an 
events or events leading to a subsequent events or events, whereas the latter 
states that an event will inevitably lead to a specific later event. However, in the 
context of these explanations, she draws attention to an obvious but 
fundamental fact: that causality does not always exist. Associated with this is a 
common human error, whereby causality is assumed to exist, even if it is not 
stressed (ibid). In this context, Horner and Westacott (2000: 2 - 3 )  explain that
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the concept of everything having a cause is known as determinism; and that the 
idea that every event has a cause is termed the causal principle. In contrast is 
the concept of free will, leading to the following observation by the authors:
...if determinism is true, then human decisions and action must, like all other 
events be the necessary effects of prior causes. Yet most of us believe that at 
least some of the time we are responsible for our actions...
(Horner and Westacott, 2000:5)
Concerning this research, the possibility that causality might be assumed to 
exist, despite a lack of evidence, must be examined from two viewpoints, those 
of narrator and audience. In an interview setting, the interviewee is the narrator 
and I, the researcher, am the audience. If, within their narrative, an interviewee 
speaks of causal links between events, then these are part of the data despite 
whether or not they appear to be valid. As such, it is incumbent upon me to 
include them in analysis of the narrative. However, when conducting that 
analysis, I must exercise extreme caution if looking for causal links not identified 
by the respondent. In particular is the risk of a subjective assumption that 
causality must exist and awaits discovery:
And even if two events seem not obviously interrelated, we infer that they may 
be, on some larger principle that we will discover later
(Elliott, 2005:8 quoting Chapman [1978:46])
In combination with other narrative components, causality contributes to the 
meaning of the entire narrative. This, the coherent sequence of events, is 
termed plot.
7.4: Narrative structure: plot and genre
As a device for enhancing the flow and cohesion of a narrative, plot applies the 
various elements of a narrative to enable an overall understanding of events:
...the main device that we use in trying to make sense of our lives.
(Hinchman and Hinchman, 2001:1)
Similarly, Riessman (1993) quotes Cronon (1992) in explaining that plot enables 
individuals to make sense of experience:
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Narrators create plots from disordered experience, give reality “a unity that 
neither nature nor the past possesses so clearly. In so doing, we move well 
beyond nature into the intensely human realm of value”.
(Riessman, 1993:4, quoting Cronon, [1992:1349])
Incorporating all aspects of causality including the potential for error, plot 
presents probably the greatest problem in narrative analysis. Riessman’s text is 
crucial in highlighting the fact that plot is an artificial device, a human construct 
involving subjectivity as well as objectivity. Moreover, underlying any narrative is 
the possible incompleteness of memories plus reinterpretation of same. In this 
context, Hinchman and Hinchman (2001) ask:
Is the past something that can be reconstructed, on the basis of memories, or 
can it only be constructed? [...] Can there be any true stories about the past, or 
do interpretations as such inherently falsify experience?
(Hinchman and Hinchman, 2001:1-2)[ltalic script in original text]
Intentionally or unintentionally, a narrator may alter the plot of a narrative by 
emphasizing, diminishing, or even omitting specific details. Notably, such 
alteration may be wholly due to the influence of memory, whereby some events 
are rendered more vivid whilst others are forgotten. As Carr (1986) explains, a 
storyteller can make a ‘selection of all the events and actions the characters 
may engage in’. However, in the context of an interview, as cited above, a 
narrator’s concept of plot may be of fundamental importance. Narrative analysis 
may be concerned not only with the ‘raw facts’ of the data, but also in the way 
the narrator perceives his or her own experiences. Therefore, study of this 
process, an integral part of personal identity, will be one of the central tenets of 
this thesis. However, in keeping with the observations on causality, there is a 
significant risk that a researcher will believe plot to exist where it is, in fact, 
absent. In consequence, they may pore through data in search of same; 
moreover, there is a possibility that even the most tenuous of links between 
events will be over-exaggerated.
According to its central theme and course as determined by ‘...the persistence of 
certain conversational elements’, plot can be classified into categories termed 
genre (Riessman, 1993, 18). With reference to this study genre is crucial in that
can be applied to experiences of illness.
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7.5: The role of genre in describing the course of a narrative
Also discussing the application of genre by describing commonalities of plot, 
Gergen and Gergen (2001) begin by identifying three simple forms which are 
‘rudimentary bases for more complex variants’ (ibid, 166). Expressed in terms of 
good -  bad dimensions, these are:
i) Stability Narrative -  the course of experiences remains the same. 
Experiences may remain good, bad, or neutral.
ii) Progressive Narrative- the course of experience improves from bad 
to good.
iii) Regressive Narrative- the course of experience worsens from good 
to bad.
Reproduced in figures 7.1, 7.2. and 7.3, these forms are fundamental in 
describing change or evaluation over time. Covering all options for 
evaluative movement, they form the basis for development of more complex 
variants.
Fieure 7.1: Stability Narratives
With reference to trajectory, this model represents three stable states:
Positive stability narrative 
Neutral stability narrative 
Negative stability narrative
 ►
Positive stability narrative
 ►
Neutral stability narrative
 ►
Negative stability narrative
E
V
A
L
U
A
T
I
O
N
+ ve
-  ve
136
Figure 7.2: Progressive Narrative: improvement
+ ve
Course of narrative
0
- ve
TIME
Figure 7.3: Regressive Narrative: worsening
+ve
0
Course of narrative
ve
TIME
Although the potential variety of combinations is, theoretically, infinite, genre is 
reduced to four dramatic types with reference to plot (Gergen and Gergen, ibid; 
Riessman (1993). These are: comedy/melodrama (triumph over adversity); 
romantic saga (a series of triumphs and setbacks; tragedy (fall into adversity); 
and irony/satire (unexpected outcomes). However, far more relevant to this 
study are named narrative types that describe the trajectory of illness, for 
example Frank (1997) and Charmaz (1997). Also associated, by virtue of being 
nested narratives contributing to plot, are descriptive terms such as psycho­
spiritual overwhelm (Breggin, 1993); ‘phoenix’ and ‘epiphany’ (Frank, 1993); 
‘failed narratives’ (Labov, 1997); ‘aspiration and victory’ (Kleinman, 1988);
‘disruption’ and fragmentation’ (Rimmon-Kenan, (2002); and ‘broken narratives’
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(Hyden and Brockmeier, 2008; Frank, 2008). These are sufficiently important to 
merit examination later in this chapter.
7.6: Application of named types of narrative in analysis
With reference to the four genre forms noted by Gergen and Gergen, also 
Riessman (above), it is stressed that these are archetypical, therefore they have 
little use other than in basic description. Nevertheless, the basic concept of 
genre; that of naming narrative types, proved extremely important in developing 
my own interpretations of narrative trajectory. To begin, I felt that I needed to 
develop a generalized system wherein important nested narratives could be 
scrutinized. In this context, and deriving from the terminology employed by 
Linde (1997, 283), I decided that I would name a complex nested narrative 
detailing a series of events a ‘significant narrative’ to indicate its importance 
within the personal narrative. Thereafter, I preferred not to speculate overmuch. 
Instead, in order to gauge the possibility of impact on personal identity, I looked 
for a means of retaining an awareness of a significant narrative as an integral 
part of the personal narrative.
7.7: Development of narrative constructs to show influence of significant 
nested narratives 
7.7.1: Imagoes
As noted in Chapter Three, ‘imago’ is the term applied by McAdams (1993) to 
describe ‘the characters that dominate our life stories’. Whilst obviously 
influenced by Jungian psychology, the author is at pains to explain that 
imagoes are not archetypes (ibid, 133). Instead, suggesting that they are 
formed in early adult years, he explains that imagoes are an interaction of social 
roles with divergent aspects of the self. Thus it follows that they are aspects of 
the subjective self, that reflexive part of our awareness that acknowledges our 
role in the on-going events of the personal narrative. Under normal 
circumstances, imagoes co-exist in interactive flux as explained in the following 
extract:
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With maturity, we work to create harmony, balance, and reconciliation between 
the often conflicting imagoes in our myth.
(McAdams, 1993,123)
Thus it follows that, in narrative terms, an imago is a significant narrative within 
the personal narrative. Within a personal narrative an individual may possess 
many imagoes, each an internalized concept of their self relating to an aspect of 
their life. McAdams (ibid) explains that, although imagoes can be classified 
according to agentic and communal types, they are unique and personalized 
with reference to and aspect of identity. To illustrate this, I use myself as an 
example:
Ray -  as -  husband (lover)
Ray -  as -  father (care-giver/teacher)
Ray -  as -  eldest son
Ray -  as- friend/member of the local community (humanist)
Ray -  as -  PhD student (academic)
Ray -  as -  house-owner/country-lover 
Ray -  as -  user of health services
At certain times, one particular imago may become dominant. For example, as I 
write and rewrite these words, the Ray -  as -  PhD student is most active. Later, 
when work is finished for the day, another imago (though not necessarily) may 
become dominant. In this context, McAdams (ibid) notes that:
Our life stories may have one dominant imago or many. The appearance of two 
central and conflicting imagoes in personal myth appears to be relatively 
common.
(McAdams, 1993,122)
The relevance of imagoes to this study is obvious. In keeping with the nature of 
the personal narrative, they are in a state of constant flux and reinterpretation. 
Moreover, new imagoes may be generated as a consequence of significant 
events. Such an imago could be positive or negative: for example, positive 
imagoes might be a result of graduation or marriage; negative imagoes could 
result from prolonged unemployment or divorce. This observation leads to a
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vexed question of the precise limits of an imago, especially whether or not a 
narrative is sufficiently significant to be considered as such, and whether or not 
a narrative is sufficiently distinct from other narratives.
The latter problem can be partially resolved by applying the agentic and 
communal categories named by McAdams, for example, ‘counsellor’ and 
‘caregiver’. The former problem is much more arbitrary; being dependent on 
both an objective and a subjective assessment of content and duration. To 
explain this, it is necessary to provide examples. If I enjoy a fortnight’s holiday in 
a foreign country, then although I would view this event as a significant 
narrative, I would not consider myself to have generated a ‘tourist imago’. 
Similarly, if I am ill for a month due to influenza, then I would not consider this 
event to have generated an ‘illness’ imago despite it being a significant 
narrative. On the other hand, if I travelled the world for one year or more, then I 
would view my identity as including a temporarily dominant ‘backpacker’ imago. 
Similarly, as indicated above, I view my on-going illness, which has persisted for 
years, to have generated a ‘user-of-services’ imago.
Thus, in summary, a personal narrative includes one or more imagoes, each of 
which is a significant narrative. In keeping with previous detail, it follows that an 
imago will likely contain many nested narratives. In addition to imagoes are 
other significant narratives which are lesser due to insufficient content and/or 
duration. However, under normal circumstances, all narratives, including 
imagoes and these lesser significant narratives, interact to create balance.
7.7.2: The ‘balanced narrative’
In the to and fro of daily life, we encounter many trivial events. Examples of 
these are designated arbitrary values in the ‘Hassles and Uplifts Index’ 
developed and revised by Kanner, Lazarus et al in the 1980’s (Cooper and 
Dewe, 2004). ‘Hassles’ were described as ‘experiences and conditions of daily 
living that have been appraised as salient and harmful to the endorser’s well 
being’. ‘Uplifts’ were defined as the exact opposite -  ‘experiences and 
conditions of daily living that have been appraised as salient and positive or
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favourable to the endorser’s well-being’ (ibid, 46 -  47). In all, 117 hassles and 
135 uplifts were used to make up the Index in 1981. Thus this is peculiarly 
instructive in two ways. Firstly, it indicates the sheer number of nested 
narratives that may exist at any one time, whether important and trivial. Firstly, it 
appeals to a common-sense view of personal narrative in that alongside a 
significant nested narrative, such as severe illness, minor events can still occur 
(a simple example is a visit from relatives). Secondly, it indicates the sheer 
number of nested narratives that may exist in a personal narrative at any one 
time.
If one extends this construct to cover a long period of time, it follows that the 
number of nested narratives and interactions between them can be huge. 
Therefore, I submit that to portray the personal narrative as a straight line 
against time is inadequate. Instead, I use a band spanning positive and 
negative values either side of a central axis on shown in Figure 6:1 below. This 
diagram enables an assumption that the overall value or rating of the personal 
narrative is neutral. Accordingly, I term this type of narrative a balanced 
narrative:
Figure 7:4. Personal Narrative drawn as a band containing positive and 
negative values: a Balanced Narrative
+ ve
Personal narrative
TIME
- ve
The personal narrative is shown as a band spanning an axis o f  neutral 
value. Each short line in the banded narrative represents a short-lived 
nested narrative pertaining to a minor positive or negative event, such 
as those detailed in the Hassles-Uplift Index.
141
The balanced narrative is the most important of my constructs in that it enables 
the activity of any chosen variable to be shown in terms of a nested narrative 
with respect to the personal narrative. To illustrate this, I choose two trivial 
examples: one pleasant and the other unpleasant (or, better, stressful), namely 
a visit to a cinema and a dental appointment to have a molar filled. Both events 
can be shown as a short, discrete nested narrative as shown in Figure 7.5:
Figure 7.5: Balanced Personal Narrative showing specific positive and
negative nested narratives
+ve
-ve
Cinema visit (positive nested narrative)
♦TIME
Molar filling (negative nested narrative)
For the purposes o f development this series o f  diagrams, the 
balanced narrative remains neutral. In this context, it is important 
to recognize that less significant nested narratives, as shown by the 
short lines, continue to occur.
Up to this point, my development has been straightforward. The next stage 
explores the possible impact of a significant narrative.
7.7.3: Impact of significant narratives upon the personal narrative
In contrast to the ‘Hassles- Uplifts’ Index is the Holmes-Rah6 Social 
Readjustment Scale, devised by Thomas Holmes and Richard Rahe in 1967. 
Based on data from 5,000 patients, the authors attempted to qualify and 
quantify 43 mayor life events (e.g. divorce; loss of job; serious personal injury or 
illness) in terms of stress value. However, as reported by Cooper and Dewe
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(ibid, 45) this has largely fallen in disrepute because of various perceived 
failings related to over-generalizability. Most prominent of these was the 
unanswered question of:
...whether it is the objective presence of life events that should be the focus of
interest or the person’s appraisal of them as being stressful.
(Jones and Kinman, 2001:24 [quoted by Cooper and Dewe, 2004:45)
Although the Holmes-Rahe may not be useful for analysis, it serves as an 
indicator of significant narratives. Also, the objections above are highly pertinent 
in that they stress that any narrative pertaining to an event is dependent not 
only on the nature of the event itself, but on the person’s reaction to same. That 
is, a person’s reaction may be directly proportional to an event; or that may 
over-react, or that they may under-react. Thus significance of a narrative may 
depend more on personal reaction than the event itself. In turn, this leads to the 
question of dominance: that is whether or not a narrative can become 
sufficiently significant to dominate other narratives within the personal narrative. 
This possibility has already been established in principle concerning the 
interactions between imagoes (see above). It follows, therefore, that reactions 
between significant narratives can follow a similar pattern if the combination of 
content and reaction is of sufficient import. To illustrate this, I choose an 
example from the Holmes-Rahe Scale, namely ‘Fired at work’. The reason for 
choosing this example is simple: in that it is not directly related to the research 
question, I will avoid any charge of prejudice. Moreover, it illustrates a narrative 
that, if long-term, will gradually affect the entire personal narrative, even 
generate new significant narratives. For instance, it is logical to believe that 
long-term loss of employment will cause financial problems, loss of self-esteem, 
possible relationship problems, and so on. In this way, it is possible that a 
significant narrative may become both more substantial and more complex. The 
overall effect is to displace the personal narrative in a negative direction as 
shown in Figure 7.6:
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Figure 7.6: Personal Narrative drawn to show persistent dominant narrative e.g.
loss o f employment.
+ ve
0 TIME
Employment
narrative- ve
The humdrum events o f  daily life, as shown by the short lines, 
continue. Gradually, the employment narrative becomes 
dominant and displaces the balanced narrative in a negative 
direction
Once the concepts of significance and dominance are established, they can be 
realistically applied to all narratives. In doing so, it can be shown that 
dominance may be almost entirely due to the reaction o f the person as opposed 
to the objective content of the narrative. For example, concerning the visit to the 
cinema as cited above, I assume that the film is of sufficient quality to hold the 
viewer’s attention and concentration. Similarly, concerning the visit to the dentist 
to have a molar filled, I assume (and compare with my own experience) that 
virtually my entire concentration will be given to the process. Moreover, it is 
reasonable to assume that both experiences will include a degree of 
anticipation and, probably, continue afterwards: imagery of the film will remain 
fresh in iconic memory, whilst the filling may remain painful. Therefore, the 
impact of both examples within the personal narrative will, in the main, be as 
follows:
Objectively: all nested narratives within the personal narrative continue
their course unaffected by the course of the temporary pursuit.
Subjectively: all other nested narratives are virtually forgotten: evaluation is 
suspended during the course of the temporary narrative.
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Thus, objectively, the temporary nested narratives have little impact on the 
balanced personal narrative. However, subjectively, the same narratives 
detailed dominate the personal narrative during their course whilst all other 
aspects of the personal narrative are subordinate. Accordingly, I designate a 
cinema visit as a positive dominant narrative and a visit to the dentist as a 
negative dominant narrative as shown in figures 7.7 and 7.8:
Figure 7:7. Personal Narrative drawn to show positive dominant subjective 
narrative e.g. cinema visit
+ ve
TIME
^  (hours)
ve
The visit to the cinema is a short-lived positive dominant narrative. 
During this experience, other nested narratives may remain active but 
they will be temporarily forgotten by the person
Figure 7:8. Personal Narrative drawn to show negative dominant subjective 
narrative e.g. molar filling
+ ve
- ve
TIME
(hours)
The visit to the dentist is a short-lived negative dominant narrative. During 
this experience, other nested narratives may remain active but they will be 
forgotten by the person. N.B. Although I have shown the course o f  this 
narrative as a curve, it may continue as a significant negative nested 
narrative if  discomfort persists
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7.7.4: Named genres of illness
In his text The Wounded Storyteller Frank (1997) uses the central monomyth of 
Joseph Campbell (1949) as described in Chapter Three. To reprise, the 
monomyth describes the person as a hero, the central character engaged on a 
journey to discover an ultimate truth. Applying the experience of illness to this 
construct, Frank develops three types of narrative:
i) Restitution: This is based on the concept that illness is curable, that a 
person can regain health.
ii) Chaos: This is the opposite of restitution in that illness is acknowledged 
as incurable.
iii) Quest: Of the three types, this is closest to the central monomyth in that 
it approximates to transcendence, whereby the experience of severe or 
terminal illness leads to the discovery of knowledge and understanding.
The approach of Charmaz (1997) differs from that of Frank in that she uses 
narrative types with specific reference to chronic illness:
i) Interruption: the sufferer expects that they will eventually recover. This 
level differs from the others. Thus this can be compared with a restitution 
narrative.
ii) Intrusion: persons accommodate symptoms and treatment, and learn to 
plan their lives accordingly. Thus it is possible that the degree of intrusion 
will be mediated.
iii) Immersion: the severity of the illness is sufficient to necessitate 
prioritization. Of the three types, this is the closest to a chaos narrative. 
Associated with immersion, Charmaz describes transcendence: a 
process of re-invention, of discovering new feelings, and re-interpreting 
the illness experience. As such, this echoes Frank’s quest narrative.
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The first type, the interruption narrative, differs from the other two types in terms 
of duration by virtue of being finite. Therefore, strictly speaking, it should be 
applied to an acute illness as opposed to a chronic illness. Types (ii) and (iii), 
the intrusion narrative and the immersion narrative are both chronic, i.e. 
recovery is not expected. The difference between them is in terms of severity: it 
follows, therefore, that the boundary between the two types will be indistinct.
7.7.5: Named genres of illness as significant narratives
Whilst the narrative types named by Frank and Charmaz are highly informative 
as devices for discussing general narratives of illness, they are far too restrictive 
for extensive use in analysis. The reason for this is simple: following coding and 
reconstruction, there would be an attempt to ‘fit’ a respondent’s narrative into 
one of the named types. However, it is obvious that the principle of illness 
narratives is far too useful to discard. First and foremost, they are significant 
narratives in their own right: as such, they possess the potential to become 
dominant within the personal narrative. Thus, discussion returns to the issue of 
imagoes; specifically, whether or not a significant narrative can become of 
sufficient import to be considered an imago. To meet this, it is helpful to 
consider the possibility of illness as a dominant narrative.
7.7.6: Illness as a dominant narrative
To illustrate this possibility, I use a generalized example based on combining 
Charmaz’s (1997) constructs of illness as interruption, intrusion and immersion 
with Frank’s (1997) restitution narrative. As explained earlier, the degree to 
which a narrative is significant depends upon a combination of content with 
duration. Thus it follows that the most potent of Charmaz’s constructs is 
immersion: that state of illness requiring prioritization. Associated with this, it 
follows that the longer the duration of immersion, the more likely the possibility 
of the illness narrative becoming dominant. Thereafter, the question of whether 
or not the narrative becomes an imago is, to some extent, dependent upon a 
combination of personal persuasion and social conventions. As explained in 
Chapter Four, ‘labelling theory’ is a process whereby narratives deemed to be
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abnormal are identified by labels, often pejoratively so. Thus, by these means, 
the creation of complex process. In theory, I can reject the label of ‘mentally-ill 
person’ in favour of ‘user-of-mental-health services’; nevertheless, I find myself 
unable to do so. Therefore, in an attempt at compromise, I use both: the imago 
can have two names without contradiction.
Finally, in this section, I return to the strength and duration of imagoes as 
discussed above. In the event of recovery from illness, it follows that the illness 
narrative will become less significant. Accordingly, the imago will also come to a 
logical end, to persist only in memory. In such instances, the overall trajectory of 
illness would be shown as interruption despite including a period of intrusion, 
followed by immersion (Figure 7.9).
Figure 7.9: To show interruption o f the personal narrative by a dominant illness 
narrative
INTRUSION IMMERSION INTRUSION/RECOVERY
+ ve
Illness
narrative
*  TIME
- ve
As the symptoms of illness worsen, so the associated nested narrative 
becomes dominant until it is sufficient to severely displace the entire personal 
narrative as shown by the position of the patterned areas. This complies with 
Charmaz’s (1997) construct of illness as interruption: initially the illness intrudes
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into the person’s life then, as symptoms become severe, the personal narrative 
is immersed. Notably, minor events continue to be a part of the personal 
narrative (as shown by the short lines); however, the frequency and import of 
these will be reduced when the illness narrative is most dominant, i.e. 
immersion. Later, as the symptoms of illness lessen and the person recovers, 
immersion ends as dominance decreases. The person then enters another 
period of intrusion before final recovery. This entire process is in accord with 
Franks’ (1997) construct of a restitution narrative.
7.8: Identifying significant narratives in analysis
The four levels of coding represent a deconstruction of the data into significant 
narratives. After consideration, I have decided not to append titles to these on 
the grounds that the first three levels are intermediate, their purpose being the 
identification of relevant passages for differentiation into ‘idea units’. Concerning 
these, I feel that the subject matter of each, being a discrete narrative, is 
sufficiently self-explanatory without the need for a title.
7.9: Application of narrative diagrams
The following three chapters will explore, in order, the prologue, overwhelm, 
and recovery stages of the narratives of the nine respondents. Within each 
chapter, the concepts of significant narratives will be applied to inform and 
summarize their experiences. Concerning these, I found after experimentation 
that the best results were obtained by using one diagram for each respondent. 
The reason for this was simple: if I attempted to show more than one narrative 
then the resulting diagram was too cluttered. Also, I wish to stress at this 
juncture that the diagrams are intended to be a representation of narrative 
trajectory as opposed to a wholly accurate reproduction. In particular, it is 
obvious that a narrative does not proceed in straight lines: instead, it will show 
minor fluctuations in response to positive or negative events. Lastly, the 
narrative diagram is not intended to be the whole of the final product, but to 
enhance understanding and appreciation of the particular stage under review.
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7.10: Conclusion: perception and coherence
Central to the discussion in this chapter is the concept of narrative in terms of a 
coherent structure. Integral to this are concepts of causation associated with 
evaluation of events. However, it should be stressed that unstructured 
interviews, such as those conducted in the course of this research, are 
comparatively undisciplined. Instead of an ordered catalogue of events in 
chronological order, a typical interview contains asides, repetitions, abrupt 
change as something overlooked is suddenly remembered, and so on. Rather 
than mediate these trends, my role as interviewer often exacerbated them: this 
was due to a perceived need to ask a question, or request clarity. Therefore, to 
obtain a viable personal narrative of a respondent, it was often necessary to ‘cut 
and paste’ sections of data. This exercise was mandatory in the event of a 
second interview, wherein data would often, at my request, reprise an event in 
greater detail.
Nevertheless, this procedure did not alter the data or its context in any way. 
Instead, I termed the end product as ‘Final transcript’ or, in instances where a 
respondent was interviewed twice, ‘Final combined transcript’. With reference to 
the latter, portions of text were labelled (1) or (2) according to the transcript from 
which they were taken. For the purposes of cross-case analysis, these were 
then reduced by removing data deemed irrelevant and/or superfluous to the 
research questions. In this way, ‘Reduced transcripts’ suitable for division into 
the three stages of illness -  prologue, overwhelm, and recovery -  were 
produced. These form the subject matter of the next three chapters, following 
which there will be discussion on the integrated findings.
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Chapter Eight: Before it all began: prologue
8.1: Introduction: before experience of mental illness
This chapter explores the prologue: that part of the interviewees’ personal 
narratives before the first onset of phenomena diagnosed as mental illness 
sufficient to cause overwhelm. Appearing in the order that they were 
interviewed, the narratives are presented in the format of ‘idea units’ as 
described in Chapter Six. Concerning this, it is important to stress that this form 
of reduction is not intended to represent the inflections and pauses made by the 
speakers: these are indicated as detailed on page 149. Instead, it enables 
emphasis of important events within a narrative. Thus, for the purposes of 
demonstration, the concept of idea units can be explained thus:
The purpose of idea units 
is to separate and emphasize 
important events 
within a section of narrative.
Thus all data have been analyzed through the four levels of coding detailed in 
this chapter. Concerning these, I stress that an integral part of fourth level 
coding was to append notes alongside individual idea units. However, in the 
interests of space, and to avoid possible confusion, these are not included in 
the examples of text provided. Similarly, it is not possible to include long 
extracts of coded data. Instead, the process of coding data is shown in full in 
Appendix III.
For reference purposes an introductory comparison of the nine prologues is 
shown in Table 8.1 on the following page. The main purpose of this table is to
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summarize the entire personal narratives of each of the interviewees up until 
the time when overwhelm was imminent However, an essential part of this 
procedure is that it avoids the wisdom of hindsight. Although it is possible to 
speculate that some of the interviewees knew unhappiness and even a sense of 
strangeness, it is certain that they were not aware of the coming onset of 
overwhelm. As will be shown in the next chapter, this is because the very nature 
of overwhelm is that it is, once initiated, unstoppable. Accordingly a prologue, 
no matter how compromised by negative dominant narratives, should be viewed 
as continuing until the mental health narrative becomes dominant.
In the course of analysis and discussion, I produced a narrative diagram for 
each of the nine prologues. However, in the interests of continuity and space, 
these are not included in this chapter. Instead, examples are included in 
Appendix IV.
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Table 8.1: Comparison of prologues: personal narratives
Name Sex
Age at 
onset of 
overwhelm
Employment
Status
Possible
Complicating
Factors
Personal
Narrative
Mr.
CBA
M 2 0 - 2 9 Professional
i) Loneliness
ii) Drug use (Cannabis)
ii) Pressure from 
family re employment
iii) Immaturity (stated)
Slightly
negative
Dorothy F 2 0 - 2 9 Student
i) Social difficulties 
esp. with ‘boys’
ii) Overworking (?)
Slightly 
negative; 
more so 
than 
Mr. CBA
Mr. K. M Late
Teens
School
leaver
None apparent Even,
Balanced
Eddie
Hooper-
Smith
M 2 0 - 2 9 Professional University life (+ve) 
Drug use (Cannabis)
Even,
Balanced
Mr. P. M 3 0 - 3 9 Various
unskilled
i) Childhood infirmity
ii) Low status in family
iii) Withholding of 
emotions
iv) Bullying due to 
speech impediment
v) Relationship (+ve)
Childhood 
negative 
then even in 
adulthood 
due to 
relationship
Anita F Late
Teens
Various
skilled
i) Sexual abuse by 
father
ii) Rejection by mother
iii) Repressive early 
childhood
iv) Taken into Care (age
10)
v) Sexually abused in 
Care
v) ‘Living rough’(Age 15)
Childhood
strong
negative;
improving in
adulthood
but
dominant 
narratives 
persist by 
virtue of 
memory
Anne F 2 0 - 2 9 Professional
i) Career (stressed +ve)
ii) Relationship (ve+)
iii) Drug Use (‘skunk’)
Positive due 
to work and 
relationship
Sandra F 2 0 - 2 9 Student
i) Dysfunctional family 
background due to 
father (bipolar disorder) 
mother (depression)
ii) Death of friend
iii) Death of close 
friend’s mother
iv) Social difficulties at 
university
v) Drug use (Cannabis, 
LSD)
Negative 
due to 
stated 
problems 
with family; 
also social 
isolation
Mr.
Gwent
M 5 0 - 5 9 Professional None apparent Even,
balanced
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8.2: THE NARRATIVES
8.2.1: Mr. CBA: isolation and black periods
Mr. CBA has known both June and myself as friends for many years. After 
speaking concerning the present, Mr. CBA spoke of his years at university. By 
far the most significant theme of these was an inertia bordering on loneliness. 
He found coursework difficult and coped as opposed to prospered. Thus the 
social pursuits associated with university life were of great importance.
I didn’t like it.
I didn’t like it.
I just scraped through
with the minimum amount o f  work.
You know, I just had a great time at University 
and the work was sort o f  a ... 
sort o f ... Nuisance.
I had probably the best time o f  my life 
but I didn’t do any work.
In the second year of his course, Mr. CBA lived alone. In that he describes 
feeling ‘isolated’, I speculate that he may have felt lonely. The following 
passage is a summary of all three years of his course: notably, he describes his 
happiness with his girlfriend in the third year:
U m ... There were black periods to be honest.
[....]
The crowning glory was the last year 
where I had a steady girlfriend,
I’d found my feet, 
and I knew
I was going to get some sort o f  degree,
that was great,
but the first year I realised
I wasn’t going to make an honours degree
and ...The second year l felt-
I lived out,
which was a stupid thing to do, 
and I felt very isolated.
So it wasn’t three years o f  fun 
but the last year was glorious.
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In my fourth level coding I made the following observations:
i) An overview o f  Mr. CBA’s university career suggests that he was often lonely 
and unhappy ( ‘Black periods’). With reference to his putting in a minimal 
amount o f  course work, the impression gained is that this was due to the 
difficulty o f same as opposed to an active choice. Accordingly, course work 
should be regarded as a source o f stress, a constant reminder o f  a difficult target.
ii) Although living alone was a choice, it was obviously a mistake.
iii) The reference to a single long-standing relationship, (i.e. steady girlfriend in 
the final year) is instructive from two points o f  view. Firstly, Mr. CBA’s final 
year was a happy one in which he gained self-esteem and a sense o f  direction. 
Secondly, he may have felt his solitude in the first two years acutely.
Mr. CBA became engaged but, unfortunately, this was short-lived. Thus, in 
terms of an unhappy conclusion to the above extract, this will probably have 
impacted considerably on his self-esteem. Thereafter, his life seemed to ‘drift’ 
into a career amid a stated need to prove himself to his family:
You’ve got to do something with-
I mean, I had to earn a living
and get on, you know, that’s-
I really didn’t want to live at home,
so big, big impetus to retain my independence, y es ...
(Ray:) So how did you see yourself at that time?
(Sigh) I felt there wasn’t-
I didn’t have very much emotionally or anything.
In addition to being lonely, Mr. CBA was compared unfavourably with his 
brother concerning academic and post-university achievement. Also, as detailed 
below, he was obviously unhappy in his work: thus it is probable that his self­
esteem remained very low at this time.
I was too young and too immature.
I should never have been in the job.
I’m not being modest,
I shouldn’t have been in it.
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This detail led to the following observation in my fourth level coding:
Despite an apparent desire for a quiet life, Mr. CBA seems to have been beset by 
stressors. He was obviously unhappy in his work, he was lonely, plus he was 
compared unfavourably with his brother.
This extract is the last in Mr CBA’s prologue. After an unhappy spell in his first 
post, he changed careers and, gradually, became withdrawn. This was the 
beginnings of illness that would lead to overwhelm. After some consideration, I 
view his personal narrative at this stage as slightly negative due to a complex of 
negative significant narratives of loneliness coupled with low self-esteem. 
Concerning the factors involved in Mr. CBA’s narrative, it is essential to 
recognize that loneliness, low self-esteem or, indeed, any stressor is not 
necessarily an indication of on-coming phenomena diagnosable as mental 
illness. Instead, they should be regarded as phenomena in their own right, an 
aspect of his personal identity.
8.2.2: Dorothy: feeling left out and different
Dorothy has known my wife, June, as a colleague in mental health user activity 
groups for many years and also as a personal friend. She has known me for 
about the same time but not nearly as well. The interviews took place at 
Dorothy’s home. Initially, the first interview was traumatic for Dorothy as she 
spoke of the hurt and frustrations associated with her on-going illness. Then, as 
she warmed to the overall subject, she spoke quickly and at length, reminiscing 
upon many periods in her life. From my own point of view, interviewing was 
difficult due to trying to keep up with this flow whilst formulating possible 
questions that emerged. In two interviews, Dorothy did not always maintain a 
linear narrative, instead making reminiscences that had recurrent themes. 
However, unlike Mr. CBA., the prologue contains many references to childhood:
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 what Dad used to say.
[....]
‘You’ve got to learn in this life 
that you don’t get pats on the back 
every time you do things right.’
So obviously I sought reassurance back then -  
I think if  somebody is bom  
with a natural sensitive disposition 
then events that follow on from that 
impact a lot harder.
It’s the meaning you attach to events.
In my fourth level coding I noted that:
This extract is o f  supreme importance in that it sets the tone for Dorothy’s 
personal narrative, i.e. she feels driven to prove herself. This is complicated by 
her stated impression o f  ‘feeling different’ as detailed in the following extract 
from Interview 2:
I think I felt different 
even in High School.
And that even though
we had a good laugh at my school -
and that was a girls ’ school (Dorothy's stressing)
and I had a solid group o f friends
that I’m friends with now
all these years later.
Yet Dorothy stresses that although she was friends with others, she was less 
certain that they were friends with her:
So all through school,
I didn’t have one particular best friend.
[....]
I would generally be able to socialise, 
because I was a quite sociable... person... 
with the naughty kids, the naughty group.
And the shy group, and the shy thick group- 
[ ]
I think I put more weight into the times 
I spent being a best friend to somebody than they did.
Also important is an overall impression gained during the interview that Dorothy 
was a sensitive child who disliked change. However, in childhood and 
schooldays, change is inevitable:
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there was a few boys [sic]
from the local Boys’ School up the road
who came to the Art Department for a taster class-
[ ]
Well, I couldn’t handle it- 
It was horrible,
having those boys in the Art class.
Guardedly, I submit that the above extract describes a pivotal event in Dorothy’s 
personal narrative in that it represented a disruption of her environment. 
Although she spoke at length about subsequent events and her associated 
emotions, I feel that the following passage provides the best summary of these. 
Given her stated comments about writing a journal, it is possible to speculate 
that she was often suffering greatly.
I think I wrote it i f  I was distressed 
and something had affected me.
That’s what it seems to be-
more than just a reflection on the day.
Like one o f  them starts- 
This is about feeling like my friends 
and feeling left out 
and feeling different- 
[ ]
And it’s all about me
feeling completely emotionally and mentally left behind
Although Mr CBA did not speak of his schooldays, I felt that there was a 
similarity between Dorothy’s expressed unhappiness and his description of 
‘black periods’. Moreover, it is incumbent that I declare similar feelings of 
isolation and ‘difference’ prior to my first illness at the age of 17. Thus it is was 
probably fortunate that university life marked the possibility of resurgence, a 
new dawning of opportunities for Dorothy:
I was so nervous about going, 
that far away from my family,
I thought, ‘Right, I can be whoever I want to be 
and I’m not going to be shy 
or nervous any more.
I’m going to be sociable.’
[ ]
and we formed a close-knit group straightaway.
There was only four girls on the course
out o f  all men because it was an [— ] course (details given)
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so there was very few women 
and we shared a bedroom
so we formed a close-knit group right from the word ‘o ff .
As noted above, I felt that Dorothy prospered because the close-knit group 
would be, in the sense of same-sex friendship, reminiscent of her schooldays. 
In the summer, she decided to remain on the university campus. However, old 
problems began to resurface:
And... I had quite an enjoyable first year 
but then in the summer a few o f us decided 
that we were going to stay down on the campus- 
w e were allowed to stay there 
and work during the summer holidays 
[....]
And I got a job as a chambermaid- 
But at the same time 
I would not go in the cafe 
and socialise with the other girls 
because there was boys in there- um 
... I was just a socially nervous wreck.
[....]
I was awful- like a social phobia,
Dorothy also took on work in a supermarket and in the Student’s Union Bar. 
Concerning this, the obvious observations are that her motives were financial 
and that she risked tiredness through overworking. However, I speculate that 
she may have felt driven to compensate for the anxieties caused by her ‘social 
phobia’. Also, other symptoms had begun to manifest that suggest ‘highs’ and 
‘lows’:
I was working the bar and I was- 
And I was-1 remember doing the tables 
and I was knackered and exhausted 
and other times I would be full o f  beans, 
absolutely full o f  beans 
but then on the nights I was exhausted 
[....]
it ... it was a very old building.
And I felt like the trees 
were all conspiring against me 
and I was absolutely scared 
walking home from the bar late on, 
on my own back to my room.
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With reference to Dorothy’s expressions of fear, I am reluctant to speculate 
overmuch on these, preferring to view them as understandable given that she 
was alone late at night. Nevertheless, the demands of her various pursuits were 
undoubtedly considerable: in the second year of university, the combination of 
these with those of her course began to cause serious problems. Therefore, I 
conclude her prologue at this point. Although her persona! narrative includes 
several significant narratives, all appear to focus on unease in social circles. 
Accordingly, I view this as a negative dominant narrative that displaces the 
personal narrative. As described above, this fluctuated accordingly to later 
schooldays and the problems during the first summer at university (above). Like 
the diagram pertaining to Mr. CBA’s personal narrative, it is important to 
recognize that the phenomena described should be viewed as pertaining to 
Dorothy’s personal identity. Despite any indications or ‘warnings’ of impending 
overwhelm, this is all that can be safely stated at this stage in her narrative. 
Notably, other than interpreting her shyness as ‘social phobia’, she made no 
mention of suspecting illness at this stage. In this context, I regard feelings of 
‘being different’ as a frequent and unfortunate aspect of adolescence.
8.2.3: Mr. K.: no dominant negative narratives
Mr. K. spoke on many subjects in his one interview, giving his views on many 
aspects of user involvement politics, psychiatrists, the mental health system and 
so on. However, this was often in a generalized sense, as opposed to specific 
topics. Indeed, the only mention of his life prior to overwhelm was a relatively 
fleeting reference to his early childhood in the context of racial prejudice. In the 
interests of uniformity of discussion, I include parts of this extract:
Let me give you an example- 
as me being an Asian,
[ ]
Went to school, 
all white friends, 
at the High School-
all white friends, played with white friends, 
really good, miss them a lot.
Hopefully I will go on Friends Reunited to catch up.
Just to say that when I was in Hospital B 
there was a nurse called Nurse A.
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(  Confidential personal details are deleted; the following details centre on the 
fact that Mr. K. knew Nurse A ’s relatives.)
She was shocked!
“How do you know all that?”
“Because your brother was in the same school as me, 
the same High School as me, 
same class in primary school as me.
That was a good attitude-
up here you know I didn’t feel racism ...
Went to Bradford 
which has a large Asian,
Black African people and white.
You would think that the Asian ...
Walked down the street
and someone called me a racist name, racist abuse.
You say that my attitude changed 
i f  that makes sense.
Because in a way that I didn’t know
I’d never experienced that sort o f  thing in my life.
Shocking.
Ostensibly, this presents a problem with regard to the presentation of the 
prologue of Mr. K.’s personal narrative. Against this, I posit that it is the very 
lack of data that is significant. Unlike Mr. CBA, who cited a form of loneliness; 
and Dorothy, who describes difficulties in mixing with other people, Mr. K. 
seems to have had no significant problems whatsoever. Obviously, I 
acknowledge that this is speculation. Nevertheless, I suggest that Mr. K.’s early 
personal narrative was a balanced narrative in which there were no dominant 
narratives (other than the usual ones of family, friends, school, money and so 
on). This includes the fact that he reported no significant instances of racial 
prejudice until his visit to Bradford.
8. 2. 4: Eddie Hooper-Smith: achievement, experimentation and 
speculation.
The interview with Eddie Hooper-Smith differed markedly from the previous
three in that he had prepared a written narrative to accompany the interview.
With hindsight, I feel that this influenced the flow of the interview in that he
concentrated much on the period of overwhelm and recovery but said little of a
prologue. However, like Mr. CBA, he spoke of his university days. Also like Mr.
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CBA, he mentioned cannabis, though more directly as a possible cause of 
mental illness.
Eddie’s account of university life was much more positive than those of Mr. CBA 
or Dorothy:
I used to enjoy myself, yes.
I’d enjoy my cider 
and I used to smoke...
I used to smoke a bit of cannabis as well
and people say
‘that’s what’s made you ill’
but I don’t know if it is so...
That’s one of the things I have to admit to. i
It might have caused some trouble.
The use of cannabis as a recreational drug is a vexed issue, particularly if, like 
Eddie, the user is vague concerning the amounts. I include the following 
exchange because my question led Eddie to mention a number of possible 
factors.
(Ray:) Do you think that the cannabis did anything, 
or do you think it’s other things, Eddie?
Everything adds up, doesn’t it?
It might have caused some trouble.
Um .... It’s a combination o f things.
Pushing yourself.
Drinking.
Probably....
How you initially, you know, your initial make-up; 
the actual make up of your head.
Might leave you predisposed to illness.
On balance, I believe that Eddie is describing what many persons would believe 
to be a ‘normal’ student lifestyle involving use of drugs and alcohol, occasionally 
to excess. Therefore, I am reluctant to speculate on the long-term effects of 
these. Instead, I close his prologue by noting that, later, in the context of 
overwhelm he explains that he obtained employment after leaving university 
and that his girlfriend was supportive. Similarly he notes that his parents had 
had ‘high expectations’ for him and were supportive throughout his illness.
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Thus, although the data concerning the prologue phase of Eddie’s narrative are 
sparse, I feel there is much that can be gauged by induction. The fact that his 
parents had high expectations for him, and that he attended university, 
suggests that he enjoyed a successful school career. Thereafter, his description 
of university life, including the fact that he had a girlfriend, suggests continuing 
success: despite experimenting with drugs, he was able to complete his degree. 
This leads me to believe that the prologue of his personal narrative is an evenly 
balanced narrative across a central axis. Cautiously, I speculate that the 
entirety of university life was a dominant positive narrative during its duration (I 
assume that this was three years).
8.2.5: Mr. P.: insulation, suppression and changed expectations
In contrast to the first four respondents, Mr. P. adhered to a chronological 
narrative in his first interview. Whether or not this was due to the fact that he 
identified his problems as possibly beginning in early childhood is a matter of 
conjecture. All that can be stated with confidence is that his self-awareness and 
recall made this a relatively easy transcript to structure.
 although it didn’t really appear on the surface
until I was nearly thirty,
I actually think it was there in my childhood................
I had it in my childhood- 
I think it stemmed 
from being an ill child, physically, 
even the fact
that I was one o f three: (Note: Mr. P. has two sisters)
I was the middle one
and I was quite protected as a child.
My mom would stick up for me,
more so than my dad, but I was still -
Even my sisters to a certain degree protected me
in a cocoon if  you like,
from the outside world
Mr. P. explained that this had an effect akin to smothering. In that he 
suppressed his emotions, his childhood can be compared to Dorothy’s with 
respect to the formation of a negative nested narrative leading to a core belief:
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all the other voices in the household 
were more dominant than mine.
I felt as though my voice wasn’t heard 
So when it came to anything emotional,
I bottled it up.
Bottled it up inside-
When Mr. P. was seven, his father left home to work away. This led to the 
formation of another negative nested narrative:
although he’d shown a lot o f  love and affection 
before he went away; 
suddenly that all stopped.
And I was told that I had to be 
the man o f  the house 
and protect my sisters 
and look after my mom.
In my fourth level coding I noted that:
This sudden change in personal circumstances would have presented Mr. P with 
a form o f  paradox whereby he was obliged to behave in an overtly masculine 
way despite any inclinations to sensitivity (cf. Chadwick, 1997).
Mr. P.’s relationship with his father changed forever:
I never really gained that relationship back 
that I lost with him.
[......] We couldn’t get emotionally or deeply involved
I couldn’t get involved in his emotions 
and he couldn’t get involved in mine.
Even to the point of-
even when my mom died
We never showed any emotion to each other:
[.......] and that lasted until the day he died......
And I never really got to show 
how much I loved him really
So far, Mr. P. had created the impression of a rather stern, unhappy childhood 
leading to the formation of negative core beliefs and nested narratives (need to 
withhold emotion; perceived gulf between father and self). However, obviously 
aware of this, he was keen to show the other side:
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...although I did point out
the negative side o f growing up,
there was a lot o f positives as well.
I did come from a loving family
The next extracts concern Mr. P.’s schooldays. It is important to note that he 
has a slight speech problem, which led to bullying.
I did find it hard mixing at school.
I ’ve got to admit
that I only had a couple o f friends- 
I didn’t have that many, 
the speech problem also put me at a -  
a very disadvantage [s ic ] 
because children can be more cruel 
than adults can
so you stand out in every way,
it’s a stone in your heart,
the name-calling and all that
so I learned very early on
that I was slightly different to the rest.
Whilst Mr. P.’s self-description is virtually the same as Dorothy’s, I posit that the 
reasons are very different. Whereas Dorothy’s problems were broadly centred 
on adolescence, Mr. P.’s were specific, being derived from his speech problem. 
Also, his unhappiness will have been exacerbated by the fact that he had 
learned to withhold emotions (see above). Later, on leaving secondary school, 
he entered into various employment schemes, then a number of jobs calling for 
different skill levels. It is relevant to state at this juncture that he is gay and 
entered into a long-term relationship. However, at this point, his personal 
narrative shifts focus, gradually descending into overwhelm.
Despite the wealth of data in two interviews, a degree of speculation is 
necessary concerning Mr. P.’s personal narrative. Perhaps surprisingly, he 
made no mention of being bullied at secondary school. Since he did not draw 
any great attention to the early years of his employment (other than sarcastic 
comments about the Conservative party), it would seem that his life entered a 
settled period at this point. Accordingly, I feel that this area of his personal 
narrative is best described as a balanced narrative with -  speculatively -  a 
dominant positive narrative concerning his relationship. This is in contrast with
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his childhood, which was definitely compromised in his early years by brittle- 
bone disease then, later, by bullying. Guardedly, I posit that these factors will 
have been sufficient to displace the balanced narrative. Therefore they are 
shown as consecutive dominant narratives in a diagram that is more complex 
than those pertaining to the previous interviewees:
8.2.6: Anita: surviving childhood abuse
Like Mr. P., Anita’s interview approximately followed a chronological narrative. 
Also like Mr. P. her early narrative includes many significant nested narratives, 
some of which are dominant. These can be summarized as follows:
i) Childhood abuse by father
ii) Rejection by mother
iii) Raised by grandmother
iv) Taken into care when aged ten
v) Abuse in care home
vi) Running away from care when aged fifteen
vii) First marriage at sixteen
Associated with these narratives is much data: accordingly, I have selected 
apposite extracts pertaining to each narrative. First is a stark statement by Anita 
that sets the tone for subsequent extracts:
because I was quite... I was a naughty child 
my mom gave me into the care system at ten 
because she couldn’t -  
her words, not mine -  
she couldn’t cope with me.
The probable reason that Anita was placed into care was abuse by her father 
and associated rejection by her mother:
my paternal father abused m e........
So that was my first experience o f abuse, 
with my paternal father.
And that was one o f the reasons 
my mother absolutely hated me 
because I told my mom what he was doing....
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but she said I was just absolutely a liar, 
and that I was the devil’s creation 
and that all I was doing.... 
was procreating evilness in the world........
Prior to being placed into care, Anita was raised by her grandmother. She 
describes many aspects of her upbringing as repressive at this point:
My nana was very, very puritanical in thought: 
you didn’t question anything at all.
[....jchildren should be seen and not heard- 
it was very strict.
The same restrictions were applied to dress code:
My nana saw it as the devil’s work to be vain.
You know, if  you were vain about yourself 
it was the devil’s work 
If you were over-indulgent 
it was the devil’s work.
She saw that the liking o f  jewellery
and to make yourself cosmetically attractive
it was the devil’s work.
As explained above, Anita was placed into care by her mother. She describes 
both negative and positive aspects to her new life:
So going into care for me
was a double sided thing
because it was all the rejection and hurt
but it was a bit o f  freeing-up experience as well
because I could have clothes
and I could have deodorant
and I could brush my hair, you know,
I could feel
I was not going to be the spawn o f  the devil by- 
I was quite pleased... in some respects.
Nevertheless, care was not a ‘picnic’. Anita was obliged to learn a survival 
strategy:
There’s a pecking order in care,
[....] so you’ve got to establish yourself.
[ ]
And I learnt to be an extreme bully in care.......
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because that’s how you get through the care system.
So nobody touches you.
[....]
And I became a very over-the-top bully.
And with heightened sort o f mood anyway -  
It made me extremely violent.
In my fourth level coding, I speculated upon the above extract:
Anita describing herself as having ‘heightened m ood’: I do not feel this is 
sufficient evidence to suggest mental illness; rather it is more likely to describe a 
state o f awareness or readiness necessary for survival.
At the age of fifteen, Anita ran away from care:
Because the care ....
[ ]
the two care officers on a night 
were both paedophiles.
And we were all being abused.
There was a national scandal leading to a public enquiry.
So I got aw ay.... I got away.
I couldn’t handle it 
so I just got away.
In my third level coding, I speculated as follows:
(Significant others/past trauma) Self-explanatory but query post traumatic stress 
disorder?
Anita now lived rough, surviving on food stolen from supermarkets. She cited 
this as a learned behaviour that she would repeat in later life when unwell (see 
next chapter). However, importantly, she said that she felt no regrets:
I t’s all made me the person I am today, Ray.
There’s no sorrow or joy attached to it: 
it’s just the way it is
And I ’m okay most o f the time, you know ...
So that’s not bad, is it, really?
The next stage of Anita’s narrative describes her life following care. Although 
some details are missing, it is helpful to note that despite her stealing, she did 
not have any lasting involvement with the justice system. She describes
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determination in her working life; that she married an older man; and problems 
associated with the birth of her first child (puerperal psychosis). Therefore, I 
close the prologue of her narrative at this point.
Thus far, Anita’s personal narrative is as follows. Unevenly balanced, it includes 
two dominant narratives of abuse; the first mainly psychological and the second 
mainly physical. In connection with the psychological narrative, I include the 
repressive experiences of her early life. In connection with the experiences of 
physical abuse, I speculate that these could constitute significant nested 
narratives which may become manifest as psychological difficulties in later life.
It is also incumbent to ask whether or not Anita had begun to form imagoes at 
this comparatively early stage of her life. Although I am reluctant to speculate 
overmuch, I suggest that there is a strong possibility that an Anita-as-survivor 
imago was an active part of her personal narrative.
8.2.7: Anne: positive imagoes and experimentation
Anne’s narrative is similar to that of Mr. CBA, Mr. K, and Eddie-Hooper Smith in 
that she spoke little of her childhood and early adulthood. However, she made 
sufficient reference to her professional career to build what I believe is an 
accurate picture. The first extracts are an unequivocal definition of identity. 
Several imagoes are indicated, namely ‘partner’; ‘career person’; ‘mother’. Note 
that Anne refers to herself as ‘middle class’, also her idealistic views:
A part o f identity is 
a middle class identity.
So it’s GCSE’s; A levels; degree; 
possibly find your life partner at University;
First graduate job; 
buy a house; 
start a family [..... ]
1 had the best times o f  my life after University.
When 1 was with B-----
B was my partner,
[ ]
Okay, so I ’ve had these privileges- 
financially, emotionally, 
that a lot o f people don’t get.
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Following her first degree, Anne’s career flourished as she worked in two 
university departments and obtained an M.Sc. Thus I posit that her self-esteem 
will have been high at this juncture, both professionally and socially. However, 
like Mr. CBA and Eddie Hooper-Smith, she also describes drug use:
Prior to going abroad 
I was smoking a lot o f  skunk 
which is horrible s tu ff-  
evil, nasty, dangerous drug...
[ ]
Yeah-1 was part o f a recreational drugs sub-culture.
At this stage in her narrative, Anne proceeds to describe an extended holiday in 
the Far East in terms of ‘a reward’ for her success in obtaining her M.Sc. 
Concerning this, the course of the events that followed is somewhat confusing. 
Whilst it is evident that overwhelm occurred during this holiday, it is not clear if 
phenomena diagnosed as mental illness had already become manifest. 
Moreover, given that later data describes her looking for employment, the 
impression gained is that of a career break as opposed to a holiday. However, 
these observations must remain speculative. I summarize her prologue as 
follows: due to her stated success, her personal narrative is positive overall. 
Included is a dominant narrative within which is nested her schooldays and the 
early years of her career, including her dissertation. Also present is a second 
dominant narrative, namely that of an apparently stable and happy relationship 
with her partner. After some reflection, I believe that drug use should be 
mentioned on the grounds of Anne’s descriptions (see above).
8.2.8: Sandra: shut off and not fitting in
Of all nine interviewees, Sandra was the only one to describe other members of 
her family as suffering from phenomena diagnosed as mental illness:
Mum suffers from depression;
Dad suffers with bipolar.
I just think
That my Dad abuses my Mum basically.
I used to query
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whether he raped her and stuff like that, [..... ]
I can get on well with my Dad 
and I can get on well with my Mum 
but I find it difficult 
to get on with them together 
because they’re always fighting.
Associated with these observations are extremely strong statements, which 
include some confusion:
The thing is that
I’ve always hated my Dad
and I’ve always hated their illness, [...........]
(Ray) When you say you’ve always hated his illness, 
do you mean for what’s it’s done to him?
I don’t know if  I’ve I hated his illness:
I’ve hated, I’ve hated- 
I’ve always hated him.
Whether that’s the illness, I 
suppose I don’t know.
It’s going into my lifetime but er....
I think, I don’t think I’ve hated him.
Like my Dad’s always been unstable 
for most o f  his life, really.
A consequence of her father’s behaviour was that Sandra spent much of her 
time with a friend’s family. Associated with this were stressful events that 
caused Sandra to experience a crisis. However, since this was short-lived, I do 
not cite it as the onset of overwhelm:
Actually I’ve lived my life 
shut o ff from my family.
I lived my life
shut o ff from everyone, really.
I think my closest family 
was my friend’s mum that died,
I tended to live round there a bit. [....... ]
I think when I was about fifteen or sixteen 
I wanted to kill myself.
I’ve actually taken acid and then...
My friend from school died 
and then I think a year later
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my friend’s mum who I was close to died, 
and at that point
I sort o f  had a bit o f  a breakdown.
Went to see my doctor
and told him I was crazy:
he told me to come back in two weeks
and I never bothered.
So I like-1 just basically went through 
and got through it on my own.
After completing a foundation course, Sandra went to university to study 
Applied Psychology. Her student days can be compared to those of Mr. CBA’s 
second year and, especially, Dorothy, in that she was isolated. One reason for 
this is that she continued to live at home (Initially, I found this odd given her 
earlier accounts of unhappiness but her decision was probably due to a desire 
for isolation):
I was living at home;
I was living with my family still [....]
I was totally socially anxious and...
I’ve never been diagnosed with social anxiety
but I’d say......
I have, well,
very low self-confidence in that end.
Thus, Sandra appears to have suffered from the same ‘social phobia’ described 
by Dorothy. However, unlike Dorothy, who undertook multiple tasks, Sandra 
made a pragmatic choice to cope with her insecurities:
I just shut o ff...
I think that’s what I’ve done 
most o f  my life,
I just... I live in my own shell.
[...] I just cut other people out.
It’s not the easiest way;
it’s not the happiest way o f  living,
but it was the way I got through.
Associated with her choice is a self-assessment very similar to that of Dorothy:
I see m yself as individual....
as sort o f..........
not fitting in,
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just someone who’s individual: 
maybes isolated [s/c] 
but not necessarily lonely, 
because I don’t know 
that I wanted others in.
For clarity, I place Sandra’s description of her course and interest in psychology 
at this point. It is particularly important to appreciate that she acquired this 
knowledge before her experiences of serious mental illness.
I did a degree in Applied Psychology.
So I’ve always been interested in mental health, whether- 
I think because o f  suffering from depression m yself 
it’s like self-help.
I do psychology
and I can explore things,
I can help myself.
Despite Sandra’s insight and various coping strategies, she experienced 
overwhelm shortly after graduation. Thus the prologue of her narrative can be 
drawn as follows: Negative overall, it includes the following dominant narratives:
i) Her father’s bipolar disorder, also mother’s depression
ii) A complex narrative in which are feelings of ‘not fitting in’, and her self­
enforced isolation.
8.2.9: Mr. Gwent: happily married; successful career
This interview was unlike all others in that it focussed almost exclusively on the 
process and aftermath of overwhelm. Whether this is because Mr. Gwent 
differed from the other eight respondents in that his first (and only) experience 
of overwhelm occurred relatively late in life must remain speculative. As a 
result, the data pertaining to the prologue is extremely sparse. Nevertheless, 
like my appraisal of Eddie Hooper-Smith and Mr. K., I believe that it reasonable 
to apply the absence of experiences in the induction of a viable prologue 
diagram. Firstly, I note that Mr. Gwent implied in one casual sentence that he 
was a vigorous rugby player. Secondly, I include the following extract to provide 
some insight:
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I used to sing in a male voice choir:
Love it, love singing.
We entered into a national competition
and we came second in the national competition;
[...J
So w e were singing in this auditorium
and I was aware o f  the crowd around us and everything...
and as we reached the final part o f  the song
I burst into tears
Lastly, and probably most importantly, although Mr. Gwent did not go into detail 
concerning his professional career, it was sufficient to note that he had attained 
a respected and responsible position in his chosen profession. Also, he has 
been happily married for many years. Accordingly, it is possible to construct a 
simple prologue diagram that is similar to Anne’s in that it cites career and 
relationship as dominant narratives. However, the adulthood stage is 
proportionately much longer: moreover, I have not speculated on the degree to 
which Mr. Gwent viewed his employment. Therefore, his narrative is evenly 
balanced across the central axis:
Mr. Gwent’s narrative is the last to be explored in this section. The following 
section, Overwhelm, deals with the onset and subsequent experience of 
phenomena diagnosed as mental illness.
8.3. Summary and conclusions 
8.3.1: The wisdom of hindsight
Caution is required in drawing any conclusions from the narratives in this 
chapter. This is because of the prejudice of the narratives by the declared 
purpose of the interview, so introducing the wisdom of hindsight. How this might 
be avoided is imponderable. Although one method -  indeed, the only method -  
would be to interview a person without giving any indication of purpose, it is 
highly likely that the end-product would be artificial. This is because research is 
an artifice: if I, the researcher, invite you, a narrator, to tell me of your personal 
narrative in a research setting, then it cannot be otherwise. You, the narrator will 
surmise that I will be particularly interested in given areas and concentrate upon
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these. Moreover, in the context of social transaction (Novitz, 2001), it is 
probable that you will wish, in the least, to portray yourself as an interesting, 
morally upright person. If focussed by the lens of a discrete research topic, 
then it is inevitable that these tendencies will be both magnified and directed 
upon specific areas.
Similarly, my role as an audience is unavoidably influenced by that of 
researcher. In this, the problem is truly unavoidable by virtue of my knowing the 
purpose of the research. Therefore, the only way in which hindsight can be 
moderated is to make a deliberate attempt to perceive the narrator as well as 
the narrative. In this, I, as interviewer have a distinct advantage over those who 
may read these transcripts. That is, when I read and re-read the narratives, my 
interpretations and speculations are embellished by my memories of the 
demeanour of the narrator: the way they spoke, the tone used, their body 
language, and so on. In addition, I have ready access to the original transcripts 
plus many and varied notes on same. Accordingly, I wish to stress that the 
extracts in this chapter have represented gleanings from the full transcripts. In 
the context of the full narrative, they were often part of or linked to a nested 
narrative of mental illness. Taken in isolation, it is reasonable to view them as 
indicators of character, social interactions, and so on as appropriate.
8.3.2: Before mental illness
The aim of the prologues is an introduction to the respondents as persons as 
opposed to a prequel to later events. Thus the narratives should, initially, be 
viewed in terms of, “This is who I am,” and, “These are some of the things that I 
did.” Despite this, as stressed above, there is the problem of hindsight. Probably 
the best example of this is in the opening statement by Mr. P.:
I actually think it was there in my childhood................
I had it in my childhood-
This example enables a sharp distinction to be drawn between the narratives. 
Like Mr. P, Dorothy; Sandra; and Anita all began their narrative with childhood
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reminiscences, so indicating the possibility that mental illness would be 
connected with the experiences described. In contrast, Mr. CBA; Mr. K.; Eddie 
Hooper Smith; Anne; and Mr. Gwent began by talking about their illness itself or 
events immediately prior to same.
The outcome of this contrast was somewhat paradoxical in that the first group, 
by describing narrative strands that began in childhood, inevitably spoke about 
subjects other than mental illness. Therefore, in this way, I felt I was able to gain 
a reasonably accurate picture of their lives. Dorothy and Sandra both described 
feelings of social isolation, though undoubtedly for different reasons. Whereas 
Dorothy could be described as shy and disliking change, Sandra experienced 
significant stressors, including her father’s own illness. The question of family 
relations should also be raised with respect to Mr. P, who obviously felt the 
weight of his father’s expectations. Finally, Anita differed from the other three 
respondents in that she experienced severe stressors, including sexual abuse 
and being placed into care.
However, at this juncture, it is essential to recognize that the aetiology of mental 
illness remains an inexact science. Probably the most difficult question 
associated with stress vulnerability models is why a person does not develop 
mental illness. For example, Boisen (1936/71) cites a case of two brothers 
being introduced to ‘vulgarities and obscenities’ (p143) by an older boy with the 
result that one became disturbed, whilst the other embraced his new knowledge 
with enthusiasm. Concerning depression, the seminal work on women by Brown 
and Harris (1979) demonstrated statistically that symptoms were often 
associated with adverse events. Nevertheless, not all women succumbed to 
illness. Lastly, the disturbing implication of Zubin and Spring’s (1977) approach 
to psychotic illness is that all persons possess a degree of susceptibility, no 
matter how small. As a result, a combination of factors (including genetic 
complement) may combine to cause psychosis.
Given this uncertainty, I wish to remain wary concerning the significance of 
nested narratives in these prologues. In particular, it should not be assumed 
that the events described indicate an unstoppable collision course with mental
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illness. Thus far, although Anita has described several significant stressors, 
including the enforced assumption of negative imagoes (‘jezebel’; bully), she 
has also indicated highly developed survival techniques. Similarly, Mr. P., whilst 
describing negative events, was at pains to stress positive narratives in his life. 
More problematical are the narratives of Sandra and Dorothy. Both, particularly 
Sandra, described social withdrawal as a coping mechanism: this is in keeping 
with self-protective withdrawal as described by Watkins (1996) with reference to 
Strauss (1989) and Ruocchio (1991), However, Dorothy also sought company 
and stimulation through overwork, so raising the possibility of over­
compensation for shyness.
I close this section by noting some of the narrative prologues in the second 
group were so brief as to necessitate some speculation. All five respondents 
appeared to have had relatively untroubled childhoods, following which age 
should be viewed as a factor in their narratives. Thus Mr. K’s prologue 
concludes whilst he is in his late teens, whilst those of Mr. CBA, Eddie Hooper- 
Smith and Anne conclude when they are in their early twenties. As stated in 
their narratives, all were successful at university, although Mr. CBA describes 
loneliness. Finally, by virtue of having pursued a professional career for many 
years, it is reasonable to speculate that Mr. Gwent had prospered since training.
Finally, I stress that since no detail of mental illness has been discussed in this 
section, it would be presumptuous to speculate how the findings might be 
applied. Nevertheless, in combination, they can be used to emphasize a 
fundamental aspect of mental illness. That is, until it is acknowledged as a 
possibility by at least one person, (See Chapter Four), no intervention is 
possible. Whilst the value of such actions as anti-bullying counselling should not 
be under-estimated, they remain reliant upon the fact that someone, 
somewhere has identified a potential problem. Ultimately, psycho-social 
intervention before the onset of mental illness may forever depend upon being 
in the right place at the right time. The following chapter describes the onset 
and duration of overwhelm; that part of the personal narrative where mental 
illness was diagnosed and the mental health narrative became dominant.
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Chapter Nine: Overwhelm: Phenomena diagnosed as mental illness 
become a dominant narrative: 
9.1. Introduction: the boundaries of overwhelm
For the purposes of this analysis, overwhelm is represented as a continuous 
period of the personal narrative between prologue and recovery. Thus the end 
of prologue marks the onset of overwhelm; similarly, the beginnings of recovery 
are marked by the closure of overwhelm. Despite the obvious artificiality of 
these points, it is possible to refine suitable definitions for them. To achieve 
these, overwhelm should be equated with crisis, as discussed by Roberts 
(2005). Using several sources, he opines that there is ‘ a general consensus 
among social workers and psychologists’ concerning factors that are 
characteristic of a person in crisis. These include fear, tension, a high level of 
subjective discomfort and a state of disequilibrium. Thus, onset o f overwhelm is 
the point at which phenomena diagnosed as mental illness are acknowledged to 
exist; a point common to all nine narratives despite the initial failure of two 
respondents (Dorothy; Anne) to recognize same. Similarly, closure of 
overwhelm should be regarded as the point at which the person regains 
sufficient psychological equilibrium to begin reclaiming autonomy. Whilst this 
construct may appear unwieldy, it accurately describes the situation in which 
one’s mental health needs are supported by but not managed or controlled by 
third parties. In particular, it stresses that closure of overwhelm should not be 
regarded as synonymous with regaining o f one’s former level of mental health.
Some of the respondents’ personal narratives (e.g. Dorothy, Anita, Sandra), are 
greatly complicated by the fact that there are several distinct periods of 
overwhelm. Pertaining to these, each was followed by a degree of recovery, in 
turn followed by decline in a new prologue. Drawing on my own experience of 
multiple overwhelm (I was hospitalized six times in two years), I have decided to
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represent these narratives as one continuous period of overwhelm in which the 
mental health narrative will show peaks and troughs.
Examples of narrative diagrams depicting overwhelm are included in Appendix 
II. Concerning these, it is imperative to recognize that they are intended as 
summaries or representations of an extremely complex process. Integral to this 
overview is that the mental health narrative is itself composed of nested 
narratives. In keeping with the schemas of significance and dominance, it 
follows that any given nested narrative may become significant or dominant. 
Later in the course of the mental health narrative, this nested narrative may 
become subordinate to another nested narrative or narratives. Thus significance 
and dominance are not single, consistent phenomena but a nexus of the 
interacting phenomena that comprise the mental health narrative. In particular, 
a possible complication of overwhelm is that the mental health narrative may 
affect other nested narratives such as relationships, career, and so on. Rather 
than describe the narratives in order of interview, as in the prologue, I have 
grouped these according to similarities in content. To introduce these, a 
summary of the experiences of the nine respondents is shown in Table 9.1.
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Table 9.1: Summary of Overwhelm
Name Detail of 
overwhelm
Diagnosis Time in 
hospital
Medical
treatment
Duration of 
overwhelm
Mr.
Gwent
‘unstoppable 
crying’; Inertia 
Hopelessness 
Suicidal 
ideation
depression none Medication 
offered but 
declined
Unspecified
Mr. P. Numbness; 
‘like a 
zombie’
Overdose
depression 4 weeks
Medication 
withdrawn due 
to overdose. 
Sheltered 
accommodation, 
day centre
Unspecified:
Gradual
recovery
Mr. K.
Hearing 
voices; violent 
towards 
brother
schizophrenia
4 separate 
occasions; 
longest 4 
months
Medication
Unspecified: 
overwhelm 
mediated by 
medication
Sandra
Paranoia;
religious
delusions
Bipolar
disorder
2 separate 
occasions: 
length not 
specified
Medication
Unspecified: 
overwhelm 
mediated by 
medication
Eddie
Hooper-
Smith
Hearing
voices,
bizarre
delusions,
violent
schizophrenia
2 separate 
occasions:
i) 6months
ii) 1 year+
Medication 
Input from CPN 
and support 
worker
Gradual
recovery;
some
phenomena
persisted
but
controlled
Mr.
CBA.
Panic attacks; 
feelings of 
losing control
schizophrenia 4 weeks
Medication; 
input from 
statutory 
services
Gradual 
recovery but 
some
phenomena
persisted
Dorothy
Panic attacks,
Paranoia,
Anger,
sometimes
violent
Bipolar
disorder;
Borderline
personality
disorder
4 separate 
occasions: 
Length not 
specified
Medication; 
input from CPN 
and social 
worker.
support worker
Gradual 
recovery but 
some
phenomena
persisted
Anne
Hearing 
Voices, 
delusions 
2 overdoses
schizophrenia
2 separate 
occasions: 
length not 
specified
Medication
Some
recovery but
relationship
problem
Anita
Extreme
disinhibited
‘manic’
behaviour,
delusions
violent suicide
attempts
i) Bipolar 
disorder,
ii) Personality 
disorder (?)
iii) depression
iv) puerperal 
psychosis
At least 2 
separate 
occasions: 
length not 
specified
Medication;
Counselling
Some
recovery
facilitated
by
medication
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9.2: THE NARRATIVES
9.2.1: Mr. Gwent: And I started to cry....
For Mr. Gwent, the first indication of a possible problem was two years earlier:
I did have-1 did have a warning, funnily enough, 
two years before....
U m .... A particularly bad, difficult year at work [....]
I developed this terrible headache. [....]
They did various tests
and after a week
they released me and said,
“Go back and see the specialist in November.”
And he said.... “You know what it is?”
And I said, “N o”
He said, “Stress at work. Change your working habits.”
Since Mr. Gwent ended this nested narrative at this point, it is unknown whether 
or not he made suitable alterations to his working habits. The next indication of 
illness in his narrative is a comment concerning his demeanour made to his wife 
by friends. Following this, his wife telephoned his workplace to warn them that 
he might be ill. On the same day, overwhelm occurred:
So I walk into the main office 
and I thought, ‘I can’t do this.’ [....]
And I started to cry:
I burst into tears.
And, Ian you know, kind o f looked;
[...] Jane came round and put her arm round me.
All 1 can remember is Ian saying,
“Gwent, you’re our rock, you’re our rock.”
And e r That was it.
In my fourth level coding I observed that:
Although the above detail is self-explanatory, it is instructive in that it describes 
how a slow and unsuspected decline suddenly becomes overwhelm. Something, 
somewhere, at some time tips the balance. Illness is now evident to the sufferer.
The following extract summarizes the helplessness Mr. Gwent experienced 
during overwhelm:
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(Ray:)Did you.... have a subjective view of how you felt at the time?
Yes (Said with feeling)
Very frightened. [....]
Very frightened that my whole life 
had just been blown apart and....
And.... Failure.
That’s the main thing: I was a failure.
With reference to the above statement, I noted in my second level coding that 
Mr. Gwent’s description of overwhelm is similar to Boisen’s (1971) concept of 
‘an eruption of the subconscious’. Mr. Gwent described specific events within 
the immediacy of overwhelm:
[.....] And some o f  the incidents
I can clearly remember is ...
My daughter phoned
and I was speaking into the phone:
I was trying to be so brave:
I just burst into tears [.....]
Oh, it was awful......
When I heard her cry at me crying.... [....]
And I just wondered
if  I would ever stop crying.........
Following his ‘breakdown’ at work, Mr. Gwent saw his doctor and was given a 
fortnight’s sick leave. Although he was offered medication, he declined this due 
to fear of addiction. Thus his only defence against overwhelm was the support 
of his wife:
I basically cried for six months.
[ ]
You know, I would cry;
my wife would go off
to work in the morning,
and I wouldn’t answer the phone
or anything like that.
When she came back at night-time 
I was virtually the same way 
At the same time as diagnosis, Mr. Gwent’s doctor suggested that he consider
early retirement. The following details are important in that they show how
overwhelm compromised self-determination:
My doctor....
Was really very supportive about...
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Straightaway he put down ‘Stress at Work’ 7
Depression. Stress at Work.’
And Really on discussion
that I would go for invalidity....
It’s strange: that you kind o f  get carried on....
‘H e’s the expert, he knows.. . . ’
And therefore follow that route,
but I didn’t want it to finish that way
because it takes a lot o f  choices away from you...
At this point, Mr. Gwent describes a contrasting experience, namely 
consultation with a psychiatrist whom he condemns as unsympathetic. As such, 
it outlines disempowerment; however, of greater importance are two concurrent 
events. The first is continuing overwhelm as detailed above. The second is the 
judgement of the psychiatrist that he could not be certain whether or not Mr. 
Gwent would still suffer illness in later years. Paradoxically, despite Mr. Gwenf s 
anger at this, the exchange was ultimately positive in that he decided that 
retirement was not inevitable; that he might recover. However, his illness was 
undoubtedly serious. The following extract describes the initiation of a suicide 
attempt:
Well up in [....] there’s a viaduct, a big viaduct,
And this particular night 
I actually thought,
‘That’s it: I’ve had enough’. [..... ]
And I set o ff to find it.... 
and I couldn’t actually find it.
And if  I’d realised, another-
The [ ] is a famous viaduct, (another bridge, named).[... ]
If I’d just driven down there 
and I knew exactly where that was.
I would have found it -  
it would have done the biz.
And, you know, eventually I gave up looking for it
and I just sat in the car........
and I thought, ‘Don’t want to die. ’
I thought o f  my wife, the children, 
and the family.
Although Mr. Gwent’s suicide attempt can be described as ‘botched’, its 
significance should not be underestimated. For a short time the mental health 
narrative became wholly dominant, sufficiently powerful to suppress any
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consideration of loved ones (wife, daughter) or hopes for the future. Following 
this event, it is not clear how long overwhelm persisted: it appears most likely 
that its intensity lessened gradually following the exchange with his psychiatrist 
and his decision to try to return to work. Accordingly, I summarize overwhelm in 
Mr. Gwent’s case thus: following extremely sudden onset, phenomena persisted 
but gradually eased. Concerning his suicidal ideation, this was not necessarily 
the low point of overwhelm; notably, he summoned sufficient motivation to put 
his ideas into action. However, at what juncture this occurred after onset was 
not stated.
9.2.2: Mr. P.: a walking zombie: this is not who I am
Mr. P. was employed in a number of unskilled jobs (including community work) 
until becoming ill with depression when about thirty. Unlike Mr. Gwent, this was 
associated with several known antecedent events:
i) Death of father
ii) ‘Coming out’ ( as noted in his prologue, Mr. P. is gay)
iii) Ending of long-term relationship due to partner disagreeing with above 
action
iv) Loss of job
Following the loss of his job, Mr. P. consulted his G.P., who gave him 
antidepressants. However, these did not help: the following extract eloquently 
describes the depersonalising effect of overwhelm:
But the problem for me 
was that I didn’t even know 
it took time to kick in. [s/c]
Once it did kick in
I was like a walking zombie
but all the emotions
were there deep within me-
I felt that I couldn’t bring it out at all.
I couldn’t even feel any emotion 
whether it was happy, sad whatever.
I couldn’t feel anything:
I was walking round like a zombie
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and I was still tired.
And I thought,
T his is not me, this is not who I am.’
Similarly to Mr. Gwent, Mr. P. experienced a brief period in which the mental 
health narrative was entirely dominant:
And then I did a fatal thing
o f  deciding not to take them,  [....]
which sent me down even more
 and I tried to take my own life, basically.
(Note: Mr. P. took an overdose of his medication) 
And from there I was given the option 
o f either going into hospital voluntarily 
or going in on a section;
and I took the voluntary option..........
Which was really the start
o f the secondary mental health services.
Whilst suffering from depression Mr. P. neglected to pay his rent, which led to 
the loss of his flat (An example of an associated narrative complicating 
overwhelm). On discharge from hospital he was housed in a rehabilitation unit, 
where he lived for two years. He also attended a day centre, where he received 
counselling:
I was only in there (hospital) a short time: [....... ]
my social worker I was assigned to 
actually got me into (Name) resource centre 
which was a rehabilitation unit 
to get me back in the community.
So I was in there for two years. [....]
Not just going there on a daily basis
but also getting involved
in representing other service users
and having my own counselling while I was there.
Whilst Mr. P.’s diagnosis was similar to that of Mr. Gwent, their narratives differ 
considerably. Whereas Mr. Gwent is married and had the support of his wife at 
home, Mr. P. had broken up with his partner and had become homeless, 
necessitating location in a rehabilitation unit. Concerning their brief suicidal 
ideation, there is an important difference concerning timing, that is, Mr. Gwent’s
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attempt occurred some time after diagnosis of his illness, whereas Mr. P/s 
marked the onset of overwhelm. Moreover, Mr. P. actuated his intent; however,
I feel that this was facilitated by the fact that he had ready access to his chosen 
method (overdose).
Thereafter, as will be shown in the next chapter, their narratives follow similar 
trajectory in that rehabilitation in the voluntary sector is an important factor in 
their recovery.
9.2.3: Mr. K.: I was quite violent by that time
Although he did not describe associated phenomena, Mr. K. stated that his 
illness began whilst he was abroad, in Pakistan. In accordance with his native 
culture, he consulted a spiritual healer:
And he did help.
I mean he gave me some prayers to read 
and he gave me some water 
and he gave some beads- 
a necklace, kind o f  thing
However, on returning to England, Mr. K/s symptoms worsened (Note: he gave 
no reason for this). This was the onset of overwhelm, necessitating 
hospitalization:
As soon as I arrived in Britain [..... ]
My parents-
they didn’t know what to do.
They were like O.K. but that’s fine 
I mean what happened was that 
I had a fight 
with my brother.
The police came.
Told the police I was hearing voices.
Took me to the police station- 
I was quite violent by that time.
The doctor came- 
he assessed me 
and the next morning, 
well, that same night 
I went to hospital.
Mr. K. was hospitalized on four occasions:
186
The first time I went
was probably about two or three days.
The second time was probably about a month. Hospital A
The third was a couple o f  days
and the last time was four months. Hospital B
When comparing hospitals A and B, Mr. K. complained at length about the strict 
regime in the latter, opining that the treatment afforded patients was 
stigmatizing and his mental health actually worsened there. Whilst noting that 
his likening this hospital to Guantanamo Bay must be considered hyperbole, I 
noted in my third level coding that:
The above text is important in that it details hospitalization as an adjunct to 
mental illness, an integral part o f  the illness experience. As such, the regime at 
Hospital B had a considerable impact on Mr. K.’s identity in that he found it 
oppressive. It is reasonable to speculate that he felt dehumanised: a subject to be 
observed and dealt with according to procedure.
In connection with these remarks I made two contrasting observations. The first 
was speculation that the strict regime at Hospital B may well have been founded 
on sound reasoning connected with good practice. The second referred to Mr. 
K.’s use of the term ‘stigma’, so indicating a feeling that he was judged 
according to his diagnosed illness. In this, his experiences are similar to those 
of Eddie Hooper-Smith (see later), who reported that he often felt unable to 
express himself lest he was misunderstood. In the following passages, Mr. K. 
describes his affinity with his psychiatrist yet complains concerning the 
vagueness of his diagnosis:
My psychiatrist was fantastic -  
he talked to my parents, he understood, 
he was really understanding.
But like any other psychiatrist,
if  anyone asked questions- [ ]
it was only in 2003 
that I found out
what my mental health problem was called 
which was paranoid schizophrenia 
or now the term is paranoid psychosis.
Why did the psychiatrist not tell me 
the year before that?
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Mr. K. explained that a name was important despite not knowing what 
psychosis was. In the following extract he elaborates upon this:
You’ve got psychosis, bang, full-stop. [....]
I mean I was on when I was on quetiapine, clozaril, 
the nurses helped me more than Dr. A.B.
Dr. E.M. explained the medication, 
the bloods, the side-effects, things like that; 
the nurses said what effect it has, 
how it will help you,
all from the experience side........
monitoring, things like that.
Like Dorothy (see later), Mr. K. wanted to know as much about the cause and 
nature of his illness. Like Eddie Hooper-Smith, he did not want to be patronised 
or stigmatised because of his symptoms. Unlike either of them, he responded 
well to his medication. Accordingly, the period of overwhelm is much shorter 
despite including four separate instances of hospitalization. The following 
chapter describes a similar course to those of Mr. Gwent and Mr. P. in that Mr.
K. became involved in voluntary activities.
9.2.4: Sandra: in a bit of a daze and seeking religious links
As noted in their prologues, there are some similarities between Sandra’s and 
Dorothy’s personal narratives. In particular, they both report a troubled 
university career: however, their responses were very different. Whereas 
Dorothy tried to cope by overworking and involvement in outside pursuits, 
Sandra was withdrawn, living at home throughout her course. Thereafter, the 
necessity to find employment appears to have initiated overwhelm in the form of 
paranoia and bizarre delusions. As described below, her father encouraged her 
to go into hospital:
The first time I was properly ill 
and I was sectioned w as....
Just after my exams... in University. [.....]
I was in a bit o f  a daze situation:
I thought people were coming to get me;
I thought there was some sort o f threat. [.......]
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So anyway, I went home one night
and told my mum and dad [...... ]
then later on that day he said,
“I think it’s good that you go into hospital.”
And I thought if  I went into hospital 
I thought I was keeping everyone safe.
In the context of her illness, Sandra described bizarre delusions, some of which 
centre on religious ideas and beliefs. Although interesting as examples of 
psychosis, I feel that the precise details of these are ultimately irrelevant to this 
study. However, by virtue of a stated link with her father’s illness, they should 
not be ignored entirely:
The second time I was ill....
It was last year, round about March [..... ]
Both time I’ve been ill I been in (Hospital A) 
and gone onto (Hospital B)
because it’s been on an emergency admission, basically.
Both times I’ve been sectioned. [..... ]
Second time I got involved 
with the Alpha Course...
You know the Alpha Course?
[... ]  every time I’ve been ill
I’ve had religious links.
I know when my Dad is ill- 
I mean he is a very religious man- 
when he is ill, 
all these delusions 
about religion and that.
So whether it’s my illness
that makes me go after that,
or whether it’s that that makes me become ill-
I don’t know which way round it is yet.
In connection with these extracts, I noted in my first level coding notes the 
following:
GUARDEDLY- these lines indicate philosophical searching. However it is 
ESSENTIAL to examine these data at face value then stress that associated ideas 
are speculation. On this basis, it is fact that Sandra identifies a link concerning 
her illness and religious ideas but does not know the nature o f  that linkage. It is 
possible that the incidence o f  mental illness causes her to ask 
religious/philosophical questions. Thereafter, the two issues may interact with 
one another. If so, this suggests that her mental illness may be associated with 
(as opposed to engendering) examination o f  personal identity.
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As we talked in the first interview, it became evident that Sandra has a precise 
view of mental illness. This is instructive in describing her overwhelm as a 
gradual process, a continuum:
Who knows when I became ill?
It’s like...
Defining illness, isn’t it?
The only way I can say...
‘Cos it’s my illness: 
bipolar with psychotic symptoms- 
because when I’m psychotic 
I can clearly see I’m unwell.
With depression or with mania 
they’re just symptoms o f  ordinary living 
just to an increased thingy...
So at what point is the cut-off point?
We reappraised this issue in the second interview. Notably, whilst Sandra 
accepts that she has ‘a mental health problem’, she expresses doubts 
concerning classification:
I agree that there’s different levels o f psychosis 
but I do believe in psychosis.
And I do believe that 
although some people may think 
I’m not psychotic at times 
I certainly believe that I am.
And I can get there 
either through drugs,
or through my mental health deteriorating.
Rather than saying, a mental health problem.
Which I’m sure
I do have a mental health problem: 
whether it’s manic depression
or schizophrenia. [..... ]
I don’t like to say,
‘Oh, it’s because I’ve got manic depression’
Because I doubt-
That’s just my doubt o f  classification more so
Sandra embellished her narrative with much detail of her behaviour in hospital.
Whilst I consider that any surmise concerning effect on identity would be highly
speculative, I draw attention to her above statement concerning drug-induced
psychosis. Cautiously, I interpret this to be an expression of confidence, that
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she now feels able to control potential overwhelm. Therefore I close this 
section of Sandra’s narrative by noting on both occasions that her illness was 
mediated by medication.
9.2.5: Eddie Hooper-Smith: it’s a year out of your life
Following university, Eddie’s narrative is similar to that of Mr. CBA in that he 
obtained professional employment. Unlike Mr. CBA, he expressed no 
discontent with his circumstances prior to this period (see prologue). 
Concerning his illness, he describes a brief period of bizarre delusions, a 
temporary recovery, then the return of voices and delusions leading to 
overwhelm. This led to prolonged hospitalization:
I was in Hospital B for a few months, 
six months or something like that.
That was the first time 
I was in hospital.
[ ]
I’ve been through
quite a lot o f  very strong illness.
I’ve been in hospital a number o f  times.
On a subsequent occasion, Eddie was detained under Section III of the Mental 
Health Act:
I wouldn’t go in
because I thought
it was depriving me o f life,
going into hospital, (Hospital A)
taking years out o f my life-
And it was, but that’s why I was sectioned.
I’m happy now
but for a long time-
you know- it’s a year out o f  your life.
In my fourth stage coding, I draw on my own experiences of detention under 
Section III of the Mental Health Act to speculate upon the reasons for Eddie’s 
reluctance to go into hospital.
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My reaction to my own detainment under Section III was that it was a form o f  
imprisonment. It had been stated that I was not fit to participate unattended in 
society; I viewed this as ‘compromising my integrity’. Much later, following 
recovery I was able to dismiss the overall experience as merely another chapter 
in a serious illness narrative. Therefore, I suggest that the words ‘I’m happy 
now’ means that, like myself, he has now assimilated the experience.
Due to the severity of his illness, Eddie was hospitalized in Hospital A for one 
year. During this time, an important factor was the perceived attitude of staff: 
noting that he stated in his written narrative that he felt unable to confide in 
them, I asked him why:
I found it difficult to talk about things 
because if  I said something 
then they would say,
‘Oh, that’s a terrible symptom’ 
and I thought I would be in there 
for a longer period.
(Ray:) So if you said something innocently (yes)...
they’d misinterpret it.
Yes. Most o f the time.
That’s what I believed anyway.
In my third level coding I note that this interaction is, potentially, extremely 
disempowering. Essentially, Eddie is implying that some hospital staff expected 
patients to behave within specific parameters. Any deviation from these, no 
matter how ‘ordinary’, was perceived as a symptom. In comparison, with 
reference to my own illness when coding, I recalled that:
....laughing was perceived as ‘high’; any grumbling was perceived as 
‘aggressive’ etc.
I continue Eddie’s narrative by noting that although his parents remained 
supportive throughout, he feels that he has disappointed them by not living up 
to their hopes or expectations. This belief is, probably, an inevitable 
consequence of his illness; thereafter, I feel further speculation is unhelpful. Of 
far more importance is that his parents welcomed him back into the family home 
on his discharge from hospital:
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They were very worried about it
and they’ve been very supportive
I think it’s been a great strain on them really [....]
I think they had 
quite high expectations for me 
and I ended up, you know, 
sitting around hospitals 
and things like that.
Unable to live alone, Eddie lived with his parents for many years. Gradually, 
with their support and input from statutory services, he learned to cope with 
continuing phenomena. In this context, the following chapter describes the 
continuing significance of the mental health narrative despite the fact that 
overwhelm has ended.
9.2.6: Mr. CBA: feeling I was losing control
Associated with significant nested narratives described in the prologue, Mr.
CBA laboured under a feeling of world-weariness that eventually culminated in 
overwhelm seven years after leaving university. His description of this is 
‘classical’ in that it details baseless fears and the feeling of losing control:
I don’t see it as a pivotal, a pivotal event,
I think it was a gradual drifting into it [....]
You know, in some ways
I think it w as... going to happen. [...... ]
.................. I’m losing control.
I wasn’t-1 was beginning
to have trouble controlling myself. [...... ]
Feeling I was losing control.
Someone would come into the office 
and I would almost collapse 
with them coming in.
Things like that and...
(Ray:) To use layman’s language, 
you just cracked up under the strain?
Yes.
I mean in the hospital
they said I was no problem
but I can tell you I
wasn’t terribly good inside (laughs)
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Mr. CBA did not describe the precise circumstances that led to hospital.
Instead, he stated that he spent four weeks in hospital and that the eventual 
diagnosis applied to his symptoms was schizophrenia. A direct consequence of 
overwhelm was long-term absence from his employment and the eventual loss 
of same: however, financial pressures were alleviated by a work pension. Also, 
whilst his father was supportive, there was a degree of disapproval from his 
mother. In the months following discharge from hospital, Mr. CBA’s narrative 
followed a course similar to that of Eddie Hooper-Smith in that a gradual 
improvement was facilitated by medication and input from statutory services. 
Also like Eddie, he continued to experience phenomena diagnosed as mental 
illness despite closure of overwhelm. Thus, this period of their personal 
narratives is virtually identical apart from duration and associated length of 
hospitalisation.
9.2.7: Dorothy: my thoughts were too much in my head... my mind was 
trying to kill me
Dorothy's narrative includes several periods of overwhelm. The first occurred 
early in the second year of her university course. Following the events of her 
first year at university and the subsequent summer (see prologue), she 
describes a build-up of internal pressures:
I think it was like...
my thoughts w ere.......
Like not my own,
I hadn’t got proper control o f them,
[ ]
Yeah, but like my thoughts were...
too much in my head........
And I couldn’t get it out o f my head,
I think I was having
too many thoughts in my head....
And 1 couldn’t filter them 
or 1 couldn’t um ....
Dorothy’s behaviour led to the intervention of her personal tutor, who 
recommended that she consult a G.P. and a counsellor:
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 and I was telling her my mind
was trying to kill me at this point 
and I went to the G.P. 
telling him my mind 
was trying to kill me 
which is what it felt like-
Accompanied by her mother, Dorothy was interviewed by a psychiatrist. Unlike 
the previous respondents, she believed that she was not ill:
I haven’t got a clue
what he said to me apart from,
“You’re very ill,
you have to go home today.”
And I was thinking,
‘I’m not very ill’
I mean, on one hand
I’m telling you that my mind was trying to kill me 
so why I could think that on one hand 
and that I wasn’t very ill?
Dorothy was diagnosed as suffering with bipolar disorder and taken home by 
her mother, where she was interviewed by another psychiatrist. After discussion 
and negotiation, it was agreed that she could attend hospital as a day-patient. 
During this time she received counselling and therapy orientated towards 
supporting her self-esteem:
 and I just remember this A4 sheet o f  my rights- [..... ]
I have the right to say ‘N o’;
I have the right to change my mind;
I have the right to say- [...]
I have the right to say how things are
from my point o f  view
and be respected for my views.
Adjudged to have recovered sufficiently, Dorothy returned to university. 
However, despite feelings of optimism, she also harboured doubts:
I felt like I’d come through the hardest .... 
the hardest journey o f  my life.
What had I learned?
I think-1 thought I’d learned at that point in time
that I was an O.K. person..................
I felt like I’d come through hell.
Felt like I’d been to hell and back...
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And the fact that I was back 
in the real world, at university
- far too early in my opinion......
was scary as anything.
For a while, Dorothy prospered at university: in particular she is proud of her 
participation in a successful student project. However, during her final year at 
university, she became ill again, necessitating hospitalization. Concerning this 
episode, she was violent, leading social workers to warn her that she would be 
detained under Section III of the Mental Health Act if she refused voluntary 
admission. Whilst she eventually acquiesced to this, it was conditional on her 
being allowed to tear up the Section form, which she has kept to this day. Part 
of this reads:
 she is devoid o f insight and does not wish -  [..... ]
-  for admission to hospital.
She is in a manic condition 
and with paranoid features
and has a history o f  paranoid schizophrenic breakdown.
Despite the trauma of this experience, Dorothy stated that there was a positive 
aspect in that it reified her illness. I view this as an important aspect of her 
identity in that she was pleased to be reassured that her aberrant behaviour 
was due to illness as opposed to some hitherto unsuspected character flaw:
I would probably hate to be sectioned, 
but at the same time I’m glad 
they were going to section me
because it’s almost like recognition o f  the fact tha t....
I was that poorly
and I have been that poorly
and it’s not my imagination,
The severity of Dorothy’s illness necessitated her taking her exams in hospital: 
her pride at passing these should be noted:
I got my results
while I was in hospital
So I got it in my own right
without having to have allowances made.
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After completing her university course, Dorothy was transferred to another 
hospital. Although her transcript contains many anecdotes describing her 
brushes with authority during this period, these are probably illustrative of 
bipolar ‘highs’ as opposed to expressions of innate personal identity. However, 
in making this assertion, I cannot ignore the possibility that some of her 
‘misdemeanours’ were an exaggeration of her personality. On discharge from 
hospital, her personal narrative echoes that pertaining to early university life in 
that she gradually took on an imposing workload:
i) Voluntary work at MIND
ii) RSA counselling course
iii) Running sports group at the hospital she attended whilst ill
iv) Involvement with Samaritans
In Dorothy’s eyes this caused her to become high again:
 and then I was going higher and higher and higher
because I was doing all these projects
and they didn’t really notice (i.e. co-workers)
and they just thought
I was getting my confidence up
and doing really well.
In my third level coding I query her understanding:
Which comes first here? Becoming high due to the projects or taking on the 
projects because you are high? Dorothy states that it was the latter but this is not 
necessarily true.
In the late 1990’s Dorothy was hospitalized again. Her psychiatrist diagnosed 
her as suffering from a personality disorder as opposed to her previous 
diagnoses of bipolar disorder:
Dr. B ’s defence o f  thinking 
that I had personality disorder
when she changed my diagnosis in ’97 [.....]
....her theory was that I was over-medicated 
in my first episodes
and she hadn’t witnessed any major episodes
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Dorothy strongly objects to this, at one point stating that she finds it ‘insulting’ 
(see below). With reference to this, my belief is that whereas the diagnosis on 
the Section III form provided certainty, the new diagnosis served to compromise 
her sense of identity. Associated with this, she felt that her symptoms as 
experienced by herself and observed by her family were being ignored. This led 
to a feeling of disempowerment, as she describes below:
It was like having your power 
or any opinion you had
totally taken away, disregarded, [...... ]
Mum and my sister
were seeing a lot o f symptoms
that were not even being acknowledged;
at one point during a CPA meeting um
Dr B— said to my family,
“It sounds like you want Dorothy 
to be manic depressive.
Why do you want her to be?
This diagnosis is not as bad as one o f bipolar.”
And she w asn’t listening to the fact 
that they were saying...
“She’s worse than what you see her as.
She has- things happen...” [...... ]
But she said-
and I just found it insulting reallv- 
what she described as ‘mv tortured life’.
And she encompassed it by saying,
‘You have difficulty making decisions, 
you have low self-esteem’
In connection with this part of Dorothy’s narrative, I speculated in my fourth level 
coding that Doctor B may have been sympathising with Dorothy with reference 
to ‘her tortured life’. Less clear is whether the observations concerning low self­
esteem and difficulty making decisions are connected to Dorothy’s identity or to 
the effects of her illness. Nevertheless, the indisputable outcome of the above 
consultation was Dorothy felt belittled. In connection with this, an important 
aspect of the interviews is that throughout both Dorothy describes her extensive 
researches into her diagnoses. Whilst I did not ascertain when she began 
these, I suspect that it was about the time she was threatened with detention 
under Section III of the Mental Health Act. Thus, it is highly probable that she 
interpreted the diagnosis of personality disorder as an affront, a challenge to her 
previous conclusions.
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After 1997 Dorothy’s improvement was sufficient to constitute closure of 
overwhelm despite the persistence of some phenomena. In this, her narrative is 
similar to those of Eddie Hooper-Smith and Mr. CBA. The following chapter 
describes her continuing efforts to learn more about the significant mental 
health narrative.
9.2.8: Anne: my rationality is gone.... I had no control over my action
Anne’s narrative differs from the other narratives in that she cites a specific 
event, namely her trip to the Far East, as initiating overwhelm. However, it is 
pertinent that, as reported in her prologue, she was smoking skunk. In the same 
portion of text, she describes ‘schizophrenic’ symptoms prior to going abroad:
It could it have been innate-
it could have been there anyway; [...... ]
I remember feeling schizophrenic voices 
without taking any drugs
In the interview, Anne summarizes her experiences abroad as ‘going wild’ and 
mentions that she was unfaithful to her partner. Whilst my view of this is non- 
judgemental, her expression of regret is pertinent to later events discussed in 
this interview:
I did go wild.
Obviously: it was my holiday 
but 1 had this partnership back home 
and I had these friends back home-
(Ray)This is with (former partner)?
Yeah, yeah. I was unfaithful to him....
He found out...
which could have contributed....
Urn It was very irresponsible.
During the interview, Anne tended to make disconnected statements suggestive 
of events as opposed to definite descriptions of same. Fortunately, her written 
narrative is unequivocal in explaining that various events and factors associated 
with her trip to the Far East contributed to overwhelm. For clarity, I have divided 
this and other extracts into idea units:
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I believe the stress
o f  my [...... ] job prior to leaving, (n.b. details of job given)
coupled with drinking 
too much Thai whiskey, 
smoking a funny cigarette, 
being spiked
or mixing with wrong crowd, 
being a vulnerable woman abroad, 
mixing with the wrong sort o f  men 
evoked negative feelings in me 
which spiralled into schizophrenia.
However, a crucial aspect of Anne’s experiences is that she did not recognize 
the significance of her state of mind:
In January 2002,
although I did not recognise it myself,
I became ill.
Accordingly, although seriously compromised by phenomena suggestive of but 
not diagnosed as mental illness, Anne managed to remain active in society as 
detailed in the following extract from her written narrative:
I heard voices inside my head 
for an entire year;
I was hallucinating,
suffering from panic attacks (Note: Anne had not yet been diagnosed 
with acute depressive anxiety. as suffering from mental illness)
[ i
I went to work every day 
out o f  my head 
and clearly very unwell 
to fulfil my commitments 
as a partner and ( named work).
In this state, I kept applying 
for jobs up and down the country 
knowing that 
I would be short listed 
because o f  my CV.
In connection with the above text, the interview provided additional data but no 
further insight. To all intents and purposes, Anne was overwhelmed by her 
phenomena:
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And I’ll go back to the Thailand thing:
hearing the voices
and all that kind o f  stuff-
I got short-listed
for nine top academic posts:
one for the.........
U m  working for the local government,
which was a good job.
I was ill at that point......
Er, irrational, really. Um........
(Ray) Why do you use the word ‘irrational’ please?
Because my rationality is gone, [sic]
I . ... I got offered an interview
in my old department
and they didn’t want me back.
It was only a holiday.
They didn’t want me back, you know.... Um  Er......
I messed the interview up 
I was all over the place... 
because I was ill.
At an unspecified juncture in Anne’s written narrative, she describes 
intervention by her sister. Overwhelm was now acknowledged:
[......... ] My sister took me to my doctor [..... ]
who diagnosed me with acute depressive anxiety.
My partner could not cope 
and sent me back
to my childhood home with my mum, 
when she came to visit 
having been told by my sister 
that I was ill.
I was in an hour o f  need.
I had no control over my actions.
At this point, I draw attention to Anne’s relationship with her partner. Whether 
or not it was compromised by her actions in Thailand (see above) is a matter of 
speculation. However, stated in both her written narrative and the interview is 
the fact that he could not cope with the consequences of her illness. Probably 
the most significant of these was a suicide attempt:
I took an overdose o f  ninety paracetamols, 
and ended up in hospital for two weeks.
My family were supportive 
but my partner could not cope
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After Christmas he wanted to separate.
The Anne he knew 
was not there anymore.
I just wished he could have held a little longer
until I got better
but he wanted an easy life
and did not understand.
Concerning Anne’s break-up with her partner, it became evident that this event 
constituted a second dominant narrative. As the interview progressed, Anne 
referred to him with increasing frequency; for example, she summarized her 
suicide attempt as ‘selfish’, continuing:
I don’t blame him for leaving me
but I needed him so much (voice breaks briefly).
I need him so much-
I shouldn’t have taken an overdose:
it was a stupid, stupid, stupid thing to do.
I was ill at the time,
it was part o f  the schizophrenia-
Although not specified, it is evident that Anne’s first overdose led to 
hospitalization which, like that of Mr. CBA and Mr. P., was probably 
comparatively brief. Following this, she received support from a HIT team and 
attended a Drop-In Centre. However, separation from her partner led to a 
second overdose:
I was still very ill,
and it took a couple o f  months for m yself
and those around me
to recognise that I was extremely ill.
I took a second overdose
after I said goodbye
to my partner in January
and kept stealing paracetamols from shops.
Continuing suicidal ideation led to Anne being hospitalized again:
My immediate family were very supportive; [.........]
My sister fought for me
to go into named psychiatric hospital [....... ]
I was still very ill in there 
and remained for three months, 
where they treated me
and experimented with different sorts o f medication.
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Foiiowing stabilization of her medical regime, Anne was eventually discharged 
from hospital. Although she did not specify the course of events, she recovered 
sufficiently to live alone and unhappy in a bed-sit. At the same time, she 
continued to receive support from and participate in the activities of voluntary 
services. Accordingly, I close this section of her narrative by observing that 
whilst overwhelm has passed, mental illness remains significant.
9.2.9: Anita: and off I went on a mad manic spree
So complicated is the overwhelm stage of Anita’s narrative that there is 
considerable risk that a summary will diminish the detail contained within her 
experiences. In connection with these, there is the recurring problem of 
differentiating between impact upon sense of identity of the phenomena 
themselves and the impact of the consequences of those phenomena. 
Therefore, in the following extracts, it is especially important to note Anita’s 
subjective views upon the events within her personal narrative. In particular, it is 
crucial to recall her prologue, wherein there was an active, possibly dominant, 
narrative of psychological abuse. The conseguences of this continue to 
permeate her personal narrative, as described in what I regard as a pivotal 
exchange:
(Ray)When they said you were procreating evil...
...as a child, did you believe it?
1 still do, Ray.
I still believe it.
To a certain extent 
I still believe it.
In my first level coding I note my feelings that this was an extraordinary moment 
in the interview: in effect, like Mr. P., Anita acguired a dysfunctional core belief 
in childhood. Later, in my third level coding, I elaborate:
How does the possibility o f  psychosis equate with a logical origin? It appears 
unarguable that Anita’s personal identity was affected, even moulded, by the 
many admonitions during childhood. In connection with this, as reported in 
Anita’s prologue, she experienced abuse by her father and also during care. With 
reference to these events, Turkington and Kingdon (2000) cite the work o f Zubin 
(1987), which suggests that traumatic experiences such as sexual abuse may 
frequently lead to psychosis.
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I begin the overwhelm section of Anita’s narrative with details of complications 
following the birth of her first child:
The health visitor said she thought 
I had this puerperal psychosis 
and referred me to Named Hospital A, 
which was 1982,
but I wouldn’t go- I just w ouldn’t go. [...... ]
Because I was terrified o f  being mental, absolutely terrified.
I ’d heard horrendous stories 
about Named Hospital B.
At this stage, Anita turned to alcohol as a coping mechanism. Notably, she 
explains how the birth of her child made her question the past:
It wasn’t because o f him 
I started drinking.
I was because
I couldn’t cope with the baby, 
and.... being a mother and it . .. 
the birth brought about 
a lot o f things in me 
that made me realise
must have been lacking in my own mother...
You know, about how the heck
could she do the things
that she done to me:
put me in care etcetera when I was,
when I was her birth child?
Anita’s first marriage ended in divorce. A second relationship followed, as a 
result of which she had a second child. However, she describes her life at that 
time as ‘death by boredom’. Her reaction was an act of rebellion that she 
describes as a ‘manic spree’. As described below, this was associated with 
erratic behaviour and delusions: Anita was completely overwhelmed by her 
mental health narrative:
And off I went on a mad, manic spree...
[....] 1 was missing for eleven months.
I was reported missing to the police and everything,
Everywhere and anywhere,
It was the worst manic I’ve ever, ever experienced, [sic]
I ’d break into cars
and sleep in the back o f cars;
I ’d sleep in shop doorways;
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I’d meet a fella in a pub 
and go back to his place;
You name it: just anything you can think of.
Associated with this behaviour were delusions:
I’d got into really dangerous company because....
Part o f  my experience:
I believed I was
an undercover detective for the police.
And I thought that my mission... 
or my role was to-
was to crack all the major drug rings,
So I started mixing and getting into- 
mixing with all the big, massive drug dealers.
Initially, I questioned whether these experiences impacted upon Anita’s sense 
of personal identity. Later, in my fourth level coding, my conclusions are as 
follows:
The impression gained is that o f helplessness in an unstoppable current o f  
ideation (A combination o f  mania and obsessive-compulsive disorder?). As 
such, mental illness was an integral part o f  Anita’s identity at the time. And, as 
she looks back, she finds the episode hard to believe.
Anita was kidnapped by a rival drug gang and gang-raped, resulting in 
pregnancy. Following this, she was rescued by the police and hospitalised due 
to physical injuries. This effectively ended her uncontrolled mania: however, 
Anita now entered into another traumatic phase due to:
i) attending court (in connection with her rape)
ii) counselling for same from Women’s Aid
iii) birth of child conceived during rapes
Eventually, Anita succumbed to depression: she described this as ‘a worse 
state than she had been, ever’:
And that’s when I started experiencing 
the massive, massive lows: 
really, really lows.
But I mean crippling lows;
lows where the only movement I made
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was involuntary-
you know, like blinking and breathing.
Couldn’t even be bothered 
to get up and go to the toilet- 
lows till I was hospitalized, 
because I was dehydrated, 
and cathetered: 
crippled with depression.
Following partial recovery, Anita had a relationship with another partner, by 
whom she had her fourth child. This was followed by another episode of 
puerperal psychosis. Later, associated with problems in the relationship, she 
entered into another pregnancy, resulting in miscarriage. This caused what 
Anita describes as ‘aggravated depression’. Another pregnancy followed: at 
thirty-two weeks pregnant, Anita was admitted to hospital due to mental illness 
(probably symptoms of bipolar disorder). Following this, around the time that her 
child was born, she was diagnosed with borderline personality disorder. This led 
to another crisis: associated with this diagnosis and suggested treatment, it was 
suggested to Anita that her children should be taken into care. Refusing this 
option, she chose to fight a protracted battle with Social Services, finally winning 
her case after one year and five months, However, the effort required left her 
exhausted:
through my turbulence 
and my chaos, 
my mental health,
I’d lost my professional career,
I’d lost any relationships 
I ’d tried to establish,
I’d lost my children,
I’d had loads o f  labels and judgements.
I just felt very, very, very scorned 
and a bit o f a self-fulfilling prophecy 
o f what my nana and my mother had called me: 
the spawn o f the devil.
I felt this evil.......
sort o f monster, gremlin, devil, demon 
rolled into one skin.
I had a terrible, absolutely terrible identity crisis 
1 didn’t know who the hell 1 was any more.
The identity crises detailed above led to suicide attempts, including throwing
herself under a bus (injury caused) and attempting to throw herself off a bridge
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(prevented by police). The medical response to this was a further regime of 
medication: gradually Anita improved to a level at which she could participate in 
voluntary mental health groups. Accordingly, I close examination of this phase 
of her narrative at this point.
9.3. Summary and conclusions 
9.3.1: The totality of overwhelm
Common to all nine narratives of overwhelm was at least one prolonged 
episode of complete dominance by the mental health narrative. Within this, four 
respondents (Mr. Gwent; Mr. P.; Anne; Anita) experienced the extremely 
powerful nested narrative of suicidal ideation. Yet, whilst a view of this as the 
‘ultimate’ expression of overwhelm would be understandable, it would be a 
gross over-simplification. Of far greater significance is that all of the 
respondents described processes wherein their identities were effectively lost: 
of thoughts and actions beyond their conscious control. Despite this, they were 
(with the possible exception of Anne in the early stages of her illness) aware of 
the turmoil within, thus they became unwilling observers of their own aberrant 
mental processes. Thereafter, all are able to remember their trauma, as proven 
by the fact that they provided the often extraordinary level of detail to provide for 
these interviews.
Thus, this examination of overwhelm has been to share the uncontrolled 
currents within phenomena diagnosed as mental illness in their immediacy. It 
has been to share in the initial consequences of those experiences, of personal 
narratives interrupted by the domination of an illness narrative. Moreover, it has 
often revealed the reactions of the respondents to overwhelm. Sometimes this 
was guilt, as described by Mr. Gwent; sometimes it was numbness and 
hopelessness (Mr. CBA; Mr. P.; Anita); sometimes bewilderment (Eddie 
Hooper-Smith); resignation (Sandra); anger and dismay (Dorothy) and even 
initial denial (Anne).
And also desperation. Although this word was never used by any of the
respondents, I believe it is the most appropriate to describe the accumulative
combination of factors within overwhelm. As weeks, then months pass by, so a
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respondent lived through their symptoms, expressing themselves through the 
lens of their dominant mental health narrative. Sometimes -  as was proper 
procedure -  medical staff were watching and recording their progress. 
Sometimes, as detailed by Eddie Hooper-Smith and Mr. K., this may have been 
applied too diligently. Thus every nuance of behaviour became open to scrutiny, 
thereafter assessed in the light of on-going symptoms. Yet such judgements 
are not confined to hospitals or medical staff: some of the transcripts (Dorothy, 
Anne, Anita) tell of family, friends, professionals, and even oneself as perceiving 
the self as an expression of aberrant thoughts and actions instead of a person 
in their own right. This is the true weight of overwhelm: the crushing of self­
belief.
9.3.2: Overwhelm as crisis
Ostensibly, overwhelm can be viewed as the culmination of gradually worsening 
phenomena diagnosed as mental illness. In practical terms, it is a crisis: an 
event that necessitates an immediate response. However, possible aetiological 
factors mean that this may be a simplification of a process involving several 
nested narratives. Concerning these, probably the most important issue is the 
relative importance of genetic complement in comparison to environmental 
factors. In effect, was mental illness inevitable, or was it as result of adverse 
experiences? To attempt an answer to this question is far beyond the purpose 
of this study. Nevertheless, it is highly relevant in that it informs concepts of 
mental illness as a condition that may require treatment on several levels: 
medical, cognitive, and social.
Nevertheless, this chapter concludes on an optimistic note. Associated with the 
experience of crisis was the recognition of a problem by at least one party (see 
Chapter Three). Thus overwhelm was also a turning point in the mental health 
narrative from which recovery could begin. The following chapter will explore 
recovery in terms the degree to which overwhelm has been mediated and the 
long-term effects (if any) of same.
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Chapter Ten: Recovery
10.1: Introduction: The limits of recovery
In this chapter it will be suggested that recovery from overwhelm is conditioned 
by the dominance of the relevant significant narrative becoming reduced to a 
level whereby other important narratives within the personal narrative can 
resume significance. Following this, it is possible that the personal narrative 
can, ultimately, recover balance. More specifically, it will be suggested that the 
extent to which any person can recover from a profound experience appears to 
depend upon four conditions:
i) The possibility that the experience remains active sufficient to constitute 
a significant narrative.
ii) Associated with the above, the degree of that activity.
iii) Any lasting consequences deriving from the dominant narrative.
iv) Evaluation and re-evaluation of the whole experience in terms of a 
significant narrative in the life story (Linde, 1997, 283)
The first and second criteria refer to the possibility that a person continues to 
experience phenomena diagnosed as mental illness. Whilst it is stressed that 
the severity of these is not sufficient to constitute continuing overwhelm, it is 
possible that they remain a significant, even a dominant narrative. Deriving 
directly from the first two criteria, the third and fourth criteria lie at the heart of 
this study. This is because all nine respondents have experienced a dominant 
narrative of mental illness and have recovered sufficiently to be able to reprise 
same. Thus in the interviews they talked not only of the experiences of illness, 
but of events before, during and after those experiences, and their reflections 
upon them.
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As explained in the examination of personal identity, all experiences can, 
potentially, contribute to the memories and understanding of the person. In turn, 
these will be deployed in the assimilation of new experiences which, in a 
reciprocal process, may be applied to the evaluation of existing experiences. 
Thus, concerning any experience, it can be stated with some justification that 
understanding is never complete. Concerning recovery, this leads to a complex 
question concerning degree: in effect, can recovery ever be complete? In 
response, the stages of recovery would seem to depend upon the ability of the 
person to assimilate the experience. Initially, a dominant narrative severely 
compromises assimilation by causing overwhelm. Only as the dominance 
lessens can assimilation proceed. Thereafter, the degree to which it can be 
achieved seems to be conditioned by the four factors above.
In theory, therefore, it is possible that assimilation, and thereby recovery, can be 
complete. In practice, however, recovery depends upon the continuing process 
of re-evaluation. From examining people’s narratives about recovery, I shall 
explore in this chapter whether these have returned to their state at the 
prologue stage or how else these have evolved.
In keeping with the previous chapters, I begin by summarizing the experiences 
of the nine respondents (Table 10.1).
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Table 10.1: Summary of Recovery
Name
Conditioning Factors
Status of 
recoveryMedicaltreatment
Statutory
agencies
Other
agencies
Other factors
Mr.
Gwent
None None
Support from 
wife and 
friends
Involvement in 
voluntary 
organisation 
Return to work
Complete:
equilibrium
regained
Mr. P. None Attended 
day centre
Counselling
from
volunteer
Involvement in 
voluntary 
mental health 
services:
New career 
direction 
(mental health)
Complete: 
Equilibrium 
improved due 
to positive 
insights 
gained
Mr. K Medication Not known Support from 
family
Involvement in 
voluntary 
mental health 
services; paid 
employment
Complete:
Equilibrium
regained
Sandra Medication Not known Not specified
Involvement in 
voluntary 
mental health 
services. 
Return to 
chosen career
Equilibrium 
improved due 
to insights 
gained
Eddie
Hooper-
Smith
Medication Support
worker
Support from 
family
Involvement in 
voluntary 
services; Able 
to live alone
Improving but
recovery
incomplete
Mr.
CBA.
Medication
CBT
C.P.N. 
Others but 
not
specified
Private
counsellor
Involvement in 
local church. 
Private tuition 
of children
Recovery 
compromised 
by persisting 
phenomena
Dorothy Medication
CBT
Support 
worker 
Others but 
not
specified
Support from 
family
Involvement in
various
voluntary
agencies
including
mental health
Recovery
compromised
by persisting
phenomena
and need to
understand
same
Anne Medication Not
specified
Support from 
non-related 
persons in 
same 
household
Involvement in 
voluntary 
mental health 
services 
Break-up of 
relationship
Recovery 
compromised 
by persisting 
phenomena 
and
relationship
problem
Anita medication Social
worker
Not specified 
but children 
mentioned
Involvement in 
voluntary 
mental health 
services. 
Physical illness
Recovery
compromised
by
ineffectiveness 
of medication
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10.2: THE NARRATIVES
10.2.1: Mr. Gwent: I genuinely think I’m a better person
Mr. Gwent stressed the role of his wife in encouraging him to join her in a 
voluntary capacity at her place of work. Also important was the input of friends:
It was my wife who stopped me 
from being curled up in bed 
in a foetal position ....
‘Why don’t you come to work with me?
Why don’t you come 
and keep me company 
in the car going to work?
Keep me company in the car coming home?’
And that’s how it all started... [....]
It was part o f  my rehabilitation
that I helped at (Farmer’s Organization)[....]
Yes. And actually I built up my own self-esteem  
by helping the farmers
The above narrative is somewhat similar to Mr. P.’s (see later) in that it 
describes the therapeutic effect of involvement in voluntary work. I suggest in 
my fourth level coding that self-esteem can be raised by exercising and/or 
regaining a position of responsibility. Associated with this is the opportunity to 
exercise interpersonal bonding, acquisition of skills and so on. This is reinforced 
by the following extract, in which Mr. Gwent expresses his anger concerning his 
employer’s reaction to his illness:
For six months
the company didn’t contact me in any way at all- 
they just left me to flounder.
And, o f  course, that made me think 
that they didn’t want me anyway [...... ]
In my fourth level coding, I speculated that non-contact could be a logical, if 
misguided, policy. However, I also expressed surprise that it appeared that 
none of Mr. Gwent’s colleagues contacted him informally. Indeed, as shown in 
the following extract, the opposite occurred:
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And er.... one superior- [....] 
he actually phoned me on Christmas Eve 
and gave me a hell o f  a grilling: said,
“It’s not up to you to decide 
when you come back to work.
W e’ve got to decide
when you come back to work.”
And I said, “Excuse me, 
my doctor is the person 
who put me on the sick: 
he’s also the person 
who says I’m fit for work.
I’m coming in on the 1st o f January.”
It was awful- awful...
Whilst this narrative describes a clumsy exercising of protocol, it has a greater 
significance in that Mr. Gwent’s response indicates that his self-confidence had 
been re-established. After consultation with the occupational health section, he 
returned to work after about six months illness. Initially, his intention was to 
retire after three months. However, his recovery was sufficient to encourage him 
to change his mind: four years later, he will retire next year. After free 
conversation concerning reminiscences and ancillary details, this prompted the 
following question:
(Ray :) Do you regard yourself as completely cured?
I don’t think I ever will be.
There’s some part o f  me um is scarred
died inside me or whatever......
That I never will have 
the emotional stability 
that I had a few years back.
There’s a vulnerability- 
an emotional vulnerability inside me
The above passage is extremely important. Whilst Mr. Gwent retains his 
emotional acuity (see prologue) there is now an additional significant nested 
narrative; a small ‘worm of doubt’ ready to awaken. However, given the severity 
of his episode of depression, any caution deriving from this narrative should be 
regarded as a positive quality. After talking further about the virtues (and 
disadvantages) of showing emotions in public, I asked Mr. Gwent another direct 
question:
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(Ray :) This isn’t as strange as it might sound: 
do you feel any positives have come out of your experience?
I’m a better person.
I genuinely think I’m a better person 
because I always feel as though 
a strength in me has been empathy:
I like people.
Except Tony Blair:
well, he doesn’t count as people.......
And I think my empathy is enhanced
by the experience that I’ve been through.
And therefore as an employer, as a boss,
I actually think that 
I’m a better boss in the way 
I think people should be respected and treated. [....]
So I count it as a strength- 
And I also think it has had a .... 
very positive effect on my wife as well, 
having experienced that,
having shared that with me........
Yes, that’s positive.
And I’m recovered- that’s another positive:
I’m through it. I’m here now.
In that Mr. Gwent feels that he has recovered and is the better for his 
experience, his narrative can be compared to a ‘quest narrative’ (Frank, 1997). 
Following this exchange, an obvious question was whether or not there were 
any negative consequences:
I didn’t like it. (Said very quietly with feeling)
I didn’t like it at all......
It was an awful experience and......
It’s funny, if  somebody should say 
everybody should experience 
what I’ve gone through and all that (inaudible) 
- no, I wouldn’t say that,
I wouldn’t wish it on anybody.
Thus Mr. Gwent’s viewpoint can be contrasted with that of Mr. P., (see later) 
who was adamant that he would not change his experience. The following 
extract concerns stigma:
(Ray :) You give me the impression 
that you haven’t personally encountered stigma.
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Oh God, yes... .Oh, absolutely.
Y es... I should have mentioned this. [...... ]
I don’t think I’m paranoid about it- maybe.
But if  at any time,
after having a breakdown,
you respond in any kind o f emotional way
to something at work
you can see them going,
‘Uh-Oh, he’s o ff again.’
Although Mr. Gwent provided other examples of his actions or demeanour being 
misinterpreted, I feel that there is no need to include these. Instead, I draw 
attention to the similar experiences of Eddie Hooper-Smith whilst in hospital, 
also to Sandra’s tendency to self-diagnose. Thus stigma impacts upon sense of 
personal identity in that one is aware that others are suspicious of your mental 
competence.
This was the final exchange of importance in the interview. In connection with 
Mr. Gwent’s cheerful demeanour, insightful remarks, and self-assessment of 
recovery, I view his personal narrative to have regained balance. Of the nine 
respondents, his illness narrative showed the shortest period of dominance; 
thus complying with Charmaz’s (1997) description of illness as interruption.
10.2.2: Mr. P.: it has certainly given me a lot of insight into who I am
Apart from Mr. Gwent, Mr. P.’s recovery differs from the other respondents in 
that he did not take medication. Following discharge from hospital he lived in a 
residential unit for two years and attended a day centre for nearly three years, 
where he received counselling. This was the beginnings of his recovery:
I got my own one-hour-a-week counselling through her, [......]
which really helped me a lot
And also for a course o f anger management
because I had a lot o f anger there as well.
Over my father....
And over myself really
the way I behaved in the whole process.
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Mr. P. explained that in addition to helping him find positives in his experiences, 
his counsellor enabled him to acknowledge that much of his reactions to his 
misfortunes were justified. This evaluation and re-evaluation of previously 
unresolved narratives was important in affirming his identity and sense of worth:
I concluded that 
I wasn’t the weakling
that everybody made me out to be [.....]
That I did have a voice-
that although I didn’t cry out at the time,.....
I was crying out then, saying,
“This is what I am;
this is what I’ve been through.”
And it has been shit, basically. [.....]
And I feel, well, from that, 
the positives are 
that I’m an okay person, 
that’s it’s okay to be like that
A crucial aspect of Mr. P.’s self-realization was that he felt he could now 
express his emotions without guilt, so successfully challenging the core belief 
described in his prologue:
And from that
it’s okay to be sad.[ ]
I was sort o f..........
at home, more or less told to bottle it up- [..... ]
I actually did that to myself- 
in the end that’s what I was doing.
I was actually like a............
like a Lamb to the slaughter.
Perhaps the most important aspect of this significant nested narrative is that Mr. 
P. is aware that it retains potential and must therefore be alert for its influence:
I sometimes even now- 
when I know I’m doing it
I’ll kick myself- say.....
“You didn’t say a thing;
you’re blocking your emotions,
you’re not showing how you’re feeling,”
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As he improved, Mr. P. became involved in voluntary work, both at the day 
centre and at a nearby hospital. This was important to his recovery in that he 
made new friends and also found that he could cope with the occasional 
stresses involved. Later, he became the first chairperson of a drop-in centre and 
obtained work in mental health with the local authority. Eventually, after two 
years, he was housed in accommodation provided by a housing association. 
Unfortunately, however, he suffered a number of setbacks, as precised below. 
All of the events listed would be considered significant stressors on the Holmes- 
Rahe scale:
i) Mr. P. had been victimised by ‘kids on the estate’ because he is gay.
This became increasingly serious until his house was vandalised and 
rendered uninhabitable. He reported that the police were helpful; he also 
received advice from a gay organisation called ‘Mesmac’. However, he 
said that he ‘never really settled’ for a long time afterwards despite being 
rehoused in a council flat.
ii) The break-up of a significant relationship. Six months later, his former 
partner died from a heart attack.
iii) Uncertainty at work due to the imposition of temporary contracts lasting 
three months.
iv) The break-up of a further relationship, which Mr. P. attributed to his 
partner having psychological problems arising from childhood abuse. He 
found this event particularly stressful due to the fact that he had become 
engaged to this partner.
v) Associated with the failure of this relationship, Mr. P. felt very lonely, 
therefore spent much more time on the ‘gay scene’, during which he 
freely admitted that he spent too much money.
vi) This led to non-payment of his rent, following which he lost his flat. Thus, 
at the time of the first interview, he lived in bed and breakfast 
accommodation.
A consequence of this combination of stressors is that Mr. P. feels that his 
illness has returned to some extent:
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To a certain degree 
I think it has come back.
I’m not suicidal........
and I wouldn’t say I’m totally depressed 
but I’ve been through a -  low period.
Associated with this are existential questions:
I do find m yself going back into that......
scenario o f  a feeling, you know,
‘Why is this happening again?’
And I sometimes think, ‘Is it me?’
And even to the point where I say,
‘Do I do this to m yself because 
I don’t want it to be good....?’
Is it because it’s going so good
That I’ve somehow got to cock it up? [...... ]
Or is it just another run o f  bad luck?’
Given the events involved, Mr. P.’s reaction is hardly surprising. Moreover, he 
expresses the opinion that he cannot ‘offload at work’. In this his views echo 
those of Eddie-Hooper-Smith (see later) in that he seeks contact and 
conversation outside mental health:
When I’m out,
I don’t want to talk about mental health.
It’s more... more what’s going on around the world, [....]
(Laughs) Sometimes you don’t dwell on crises.
Not just in your own life-
you don’t want to dwell on anybody else’s.
The first of the final two extracts in this section details Mr. P.’s overview of his 
personal narrative:
...sometimes I question 
why people say I’m over this.
This was a bad time in my life -
and all this is not affecting me now at all.
I’m sorry
but I’m o f  the belief that 
whatever happens is a part o f  you 
and it stays with you 
for the rest o f  your life.
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The second is specific to his experience of mental illness:
I ’m glad it happened.
Although I wouldn’t wish it anybody,
I am glad it happened to m e.... 
because it has certainly given me 
a lot o f insight into who I am.
This journey that I’ve been on.
And it’s given me a career 
So from that point o f view 
I am happy that I have been through it.
It has been tough, yes, 
and its-
very much it’s had its moments.
But I wouldn’t change it,
I wouldn’t change it.
Associated with the many events current in Mr. P.’s life, both his work situation 
and financial status should be considered as slightly negative significant 
narratives. However, the mental health narrative appears to have been virtually 
assimilated. Notably, his personal narrative has achieved a greater degree of 
equilibrium due to the gaining of self-knowledge as detailed above, and all the 
more so given the considerable challenges and life events he described. In this, 
it can be compared with Franks’ (1997) construct of a ‘quest narrative’.
10.2.3: Mr. K.: a lot of people say it’s a real achievement for a service user 
to achieve something
As stressed in the previous chapters, Mr. K. ranged far and wide with regard to 
all manner of issues when interviewed. As a consequence, there is little 
chronological detail of his recovery. Instead, it is obvious that, despite his 
complaints regarding lack of information (see previous chapter), his medication 
was effective. Thus I begin with his present evaluation of his illness:
1 mean I’m not ashamed 
o f me having a mental health problem- 
what I mean by that I didn’t ask for it 
like the majority o f  the people 
but if, err, I feel it was G od’s will.
I f  I was going to get it- no problem.
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However, Mr. K. is less comfortable with the term ‘user’:
I mean ‘user’ -
Are we heroin users, cocaine users?
That was one o f  the first things 
that came into my mind
and that was one o f the first......
‘User’.
Because the word ‘user’- 
they will automatically think, 
strongly think that users will be heroin users 
or drug users or cocaine users
but not necessarily mental health user you understand?
Whilst noting in my first level coding that ‘mental health services user’ is 
somewhat unwieldy, I sympathized with Mr. K.’s viewpoint. On further scrutiny 
during third and fourth level coding, I concluded that his stance represents a 
strong affirmation of personal identity. Not only does Mr. K. acknowledge the 
mental health label, he is determined to keep it.
Nevertheless, despite his self-confidence, Mr. K. is aware of stigma in that he 
remarks upon the different attitude to users shown by mental health 
professionals in contrast to the general population. At this point, however, the 
interview became less focused as he embarked upon an indignant 
condemnation of the apparent lack of interest shown by the health service 
hierarchy in user activities. For the purposes of this study, this was informative 
only in that it stressed Mr. K.’s ability and confidence to express his opinions. 
Therefore I have not included any extracts pertaining to this subject. Instead I 
note the role of participation in user activities in Mr. K.’s recovery, particularly 
two and a half years as a user-volunteer-researcher. This has led to a lasting 
interest in mental health which, in turn, has led to employment: Concerning this, 
Mr. K. is realistic but proud of his achievements:
(Ray :) What’s the job you’re going to do, please?
Support Time Recovery Worker.
[....]
Duties include looking after aiding recovery, 
taking them shopping, 
taking then to the town centre,
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writing reports
and making sure that they’re O.K. -
it’s not a fantastic job but this was said casually, without complaint
(Ray :) It’s a difficult job: 
it’s like the first stage to being a CPN, isn’t it?
It’s the first stage which is really happy.
I mean, a lot o f  people say 
it’s a real achievement
for a service user to achieve something. [..... ]
I want to go to university in the future.
Probably get a PhD.
I don’t want kind o f  courses 
there are for mental health- 
not from the medical side 
but from the managerial...
Service Users Policy, things like that.
On this note of optimism, I conclude the narrative of Mr. K.’s recovery. The 
dominant narrative of mental illness has weakened to become assimilated as he 
has become stabilized with the help of medication. Cautiously, I posit that his 
personal narrative has regained the same level of equilibrium as the prologue 
stage. This is based on the assumption that he would have obtained 
employment much earlier if he had not experienced illness. However, this raises 
an awkward question regarding the course of his personal narrative: unlike Mr. 
Gwent or Mr. P., he did not refer to gains in personal understanding (This is 
despite his many observations concerning the status of users, mental health 
services and so on). Rather his assessment of his experience is pragmatic, of 
events that have come and passed. Nevertheless, through those events he has 
gained new interests and a different purpose.
10.2.4: Sandra: you can’t get on with your life if you’re constantly 
monitoring yourself
Sandra’s narrative is similar to Mr. K.’s in that she provided few details of the 
recovery process. Instead, she spoke at length about her understanding of her 
illness in terms of the knowledge gained through her degree. As a 
consequence, she is the only one of the nine respondents to take a rather 
detached, academic view of phenomena and associated events.
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I think I look at psychosis
as a negative thing
in the fact that
it stops me from working,
stops me from functioning
in an everyday society;
but I look at it in a positive way
if  it’s short-lived
and that it brings about my creativity.
[ ]
I also think it’s a positive thing 
because I want to work
with mental health: [.........]
So that when I work with others:
I suppose I can empathize with it more slightly, 
because I’ve been there myself.
Sandra also expressed uncertainty concerning her knowledge, explaining that, 
by virtue of knowing the significance of given responses to questions, she could 
use it to manipulate the outcome of any consultation with medical personnel. 
Whilst she felt that she would not do this deliberately, she felt she could do so 
inadvertently: a possibility that she extended to self-assessment. The following 
extract can be directly compared to Eddie Hooper-Smith’s complaint (see later) 
that medical staff would misinterpret normal emotions:
I think I do worry.
Like, as you’re saying, 
there is those symptoms,[sic] 
so every time I’m happy:
‘God, am I getting elated?’ [........]
You do sort o f  do that to a degree.
And I think I sometimes
watch for it too much, [...... ]
you can’t get on with life
if  you’re constantly monitoring yourself.
Given that Sandra’s knowledge of psychology permeated both interviews, I 
asked her a direct question: ‘What do you think makes you you?’ Interestingly, 
her first recourse was her experience of mental illness. Including this narrative, I 
identified nine significant nested narratives in my fourth level coding:
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I think the fact that I’ve been diagnosed -  
and I always say diagnosed 
with a mental illness -
(ii)
[ ]
With it having such an effect 
on my last few years.
To be honest
I think mental health is too much o f  my life.
(■ii)
My Dad’s ill
more or less all o f  the time,
(iv)
I’ve had my own couple o f  episodes;
(v)
I studied it at uni;
(vi)
I’m wanting to work in it
(vii)
and my friends
have mental health problems.
at this point Sandra returns to the second nested narrative...
(ii)
I have let it take over my life 
but I choose to do that.
Maybe’s it’s a bit sad,
I don’t know,
but just to make sure
it doesn’t get on top o f  me again, I guess.
Then she adds a little more:
(viii)
I think my moral, my morals: 
the way I’ve been brought up 
has a lot o f  impact on who I am.
Finally:
(ix)
Well, the fact that now 
I consider myself to be gay or bi- 
I think that’s part o f  it: 
it’s all this equal opportunities things.
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In Interview 1 a question concerning coping strategies led to reflection upon 
Sandra’s shyness and self-imposed isolation as described in her prologue and 
overwhelm. Following this, she described the positive effects of her illness:
Every time I’ve had an illness it’s like,
‘Right- I’m going to get something out o f  life: [...... ]
it’s made me come out
with a vengeance basically. [...... ]
and I was aiming just getting through basically.
And then I had my first breakdown-
and that’s when, well:
that’s when my life started really.
We reappraised this understanding in Interview 2:
Just in the fact that
I like less isolation and less... [....... ]
I think I just opened up more.
Whereas before I was just more closeted or whatever.
Associated with these observations was a passage in which Sandra saw both 
benefits and disadvantages in her illness:
I wish to work in mental health 
so I think it being-
I think the episodes are beneficial. [....]
I see it as having one episode every couple o f  years.
I like those aspects.
Although they might not seem 
good at the time,
I’m glad I have them.
But yeah, if  affects me continuously, 
and I’m unaware o f  that, 
then I’d rather not have it.
Associated with this was a positive observation:
Are you not sort o f  glad 
because it makes you 
appreciate the rest o f  your life?
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Yet Sandra then contradicted herself:
I’ve glad I’ve had them
but I’m not saying
I’d want to have one again.
Amid general conversation about symptoms, relationships, hospital, and 
psychology, Sandra reaffirmed that she felt stronger and was going out more. 
When I pursued this, her response was very similar to that of Mr. P. concerning 
the importance of diagnosis: the following extract eloquently summarizes the 
internal conflict of doubts and emotions amid reasoned assessment. For many 
years, Sandra saw her unhappiness in terms of personal weakness (c.f. Mr. P.) 
Later, following her illness, she was able to accept a new interpretation wherein 
she was not to blame:
....it’s like I’ve always questioned 
why I’m unwell.
It’s like I feel like shit,
I feel like this,
but there’s nothing wrong with me;
no-one will think there’s anything wrong with me.
That’s what I’ve always queried;
and this is like when I going into hospital
and I was pretending to be unwell
because I’m just pitying myself.
The second part of this extract can be compared with ‘epiphany’ (Frank, 1993):
And the fact that 
I’ve been given a label-
it’s like ‘Shit, there is something wrong with me.’
It’s not me.
It’s like, I- you know,
I’ve got a diagnosis
I’ve got a reason that I feel I have done.
After explaining that she is perfectly happy to take medication, Sandra moved to 
the question of genetic inheritance. In doing so, she raised the possibility of a 
situation similar to Anita’s experiences concerning her capability to look after 
her children (see overwhelm):
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But I don’t know
whether I’ll ever have kids
And one o f  the reasons for this
Is because I’ve been diagnosed with bipolar-
and if  I was to have kids then
Unless I was in a settled relationship etcetera
[inaudible] could take them away from me
Just things like relationships
I don’t know i f —
I wouldn’t want to put them through the episodes 
This led to an extraordinary confession........
The thing is that 
I’ve always hated my Dad 
and I’ve always hated their illness, 
then when I see him myself,
I think, ‘God... ’ I don’t . ..
It’s a bit terrifying really
 followed by an expression of nascent understanding:
He tries to manipulate people,
I always seen him
as the powerful one-
but he’s the one who’s vulnerable:
he’s been in hospital for the last year.
It’s like starting
to change my views and that a bit. [...... ]
he was talking about his mum [...... ]
it was certain that she had it.
And he said 
how he hated his mum 
for most o f  his life, 
and I said,
“Well to be honest Dad,
I’ve hated you for most o f  my life, 
only like now I understand that behaviour 
because it’s like the same.”
I close this examination by reaffirming that the ‘epiphany’ theme (Frank, 1993), 
whereby new understanding can be described in terms of illumination, is a 
strong element in Sandra’s personal narrative. Similarly to that of Mr. Gwent, 
her narrative can also be likened to one of Frank’s later models (1997), that is, a 
‘quest’ narrative whereby learning is the outcome of a personal journey. The 
consequences of this are, like the narrative of Mr. P., that the insights gained
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have enabled an equilibrium absent in her prologue. Associated with the 
introspection arising from her knowledge of psychology and intention to work in 
that field, the mental health narrative can be viewed as remaining dominant in 
Sandra’s recovery. Arguably, owing to Sandra’s positive self-view, this can be 
deemed a slight positive.
10.2.5: Eddie Hooper-Smith: it’s just something I live with now
Following his first experience of overwhelm, Eddie explained that it was ten 
years before he became stable through treatment with Clozaril. Associated with 
this is considerable anger concerning medication and its side-effects: indeed, 
he expressed the opinion that ‘doctors should be made to try it themselves’. The 
first stage in his recovery was living with his parents and learning to control his 
voices:
They were pretty unpleasant voices.
But as- over the years
I’ve got used to dealing with them
and I do actually find them quite reassuring now,
because I have a girl
who I talk to now. [...... ]
and I actually find it reassuring.
It’s like when you’re a child 
and you have a secret friend.
In association with assimilation, Eddie said that his psychiatrist explained a 
possible explanation for voices, the essence of which can be described as a 
function of auditory memory. In my fourth stage coding, I note that now he has 
learned to manage his voices, Eddie does not seem unduly distressed or even 
bothered by them. Thus it is possible to speculate that this represents 
reclamation of his identity in terms of self-determination.
Later, as he improved, he left his parents’ home and obtained a flat: this has 
greatly increased his level of personal control:
For the last couple o f  years 
I’ve had my flat
and it’s been very good for me really.........
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Because I have my own space 
and then I can do 
what I like to do and...
It’s no problem.
I don’t drink any more­
l ’ll have a glass o f wine 
or a Malibu and Coke or something.
And then-1 was smoking a lot as well; i.e. tobacco, not cannabis 
I was up to eighty a day at one stage 
but I’m not smoking either.
During the overwhelm stage of his illness, Eddie was unable to read a book or 
watch television because they would trigger delusions akin to paranoia. 
Gradually, this has eased off over the years to the extent that he is now able to 
re-engage with his former hobbies. Associated with this stage of recovery, he is 
assisted by a support worker:
Yes, I feel more confident in myself.
I’ve actually got
a support worker at the moment
and he’s slowly introducing me
to doing things
like going shopping
and things like that
which I wouldn’t have done before.
Noting the various elements of the above extract in my first level coding, I noted 
Eddie’s tone and demeanour: he was entirely matter-of-fact about his situation, 
implying that he did not feel compromised or diminished thereby:
(Ray :) So this is once again where... 
there’s rebuilding is going on, yes?
How do you find that?
U m ... Very good. Very happy with it.
When we talked about Eddie’s social life, he explained that he goes out to the 
pub once a week with a group of friends who have had similar experiences to 
his own. Notably, they do not talk about mental illness:
We don’t like actually doing it 
because if  someone hears you saying,
‘Oh I’m hearing a voice,’ 
or something like that,
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they might think,
‘Oh, I’m not going to talk to them ’, you know.
We project ourselves 
as if  w e’re quite confident
As in Mr. P.’s interview, this passage is important in that it underlines an 
intention to be included in society as persons rather than users. Concerning the 
question, ‘Has mental illness impacted on sense of personal identity?’ I apply 
two viewpoints:
i) Y E S ... Eddie and his friends are aware o f their problems and are trying to 
overcome them.
ii) NO.... The illness may be on-going but Eddie and his friends are trying to 
assert themselves as persons. In other words, there is life after and beyond 
the illness.
We talked about the future in the light of the present: as a part of his 
rehabilitation, Eddie has become involved in the same user-research group as 
Mr. K. In more general terms, he is aware that his recovery is not complete:
Well, I ’m a lot better 
I’m a lot happier but 
I ’ve still got to try
and make something o f my life. [...... ]
I ‘ m looking at trying to ....
Trying to get a relationship, 
get a girlfriend, proper girlfriend, 
get a relationship, 
get a job, you know.
I conclude discussion of Eddie’s recovery by noting that he describes his 
continuing illness as, “It’s just something I live with now, you know.” Thus, in 
terms of a dominant narrative, its influence is gradually waning.
10.2.6: Mr. CBA: there’s room for optimism...other times I feel.... I’ve
gone nowhere. I switch from one to the other
Mr. CBA has not worked since he was discharged from hospital in 1987. Early 
in the first interview, he gave an overview of his recovery that stated clearly the 
need for time to repair from overwhelm:
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As the years roll on it gets easier. [..... ]
I find it easier and more natural 
and more philosophical 
rather than hot... 
burning sort o f thing....
Recently, Mr. CBA had received cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) and 
counselling with a view to addressing a tendency to judge himself in negative 
terms. Whilst there are similarities between Mr. P. and Sandra, Mr. CBA’s 
problems have persisted for much longer (at least nineteen years):
 I think that was to lance old wounds, you know.
There were other things as well 
but that one sticks... 
really sticks in my mind....
Y es... I felt very bad, failure, sort o f  thing...
Unfortunately, the therapy was not entirely successful in that Mr. CBA found it 
‘too prescriptive’. On pursuing discussion, he elaborated on his continuing 
tendency to ruminate and interpret, explaining that it was a burden when in 
company:
When I’m with people for a long time 
1 begin to get a bit ragged...
It takes an effort to keep it at bay 
and I know it’s going to get out:
I feel guilty ... so it’s ....
U m .... I quite often, sometimes just disappear 
because I can feel it 
It’s getting too much....
Care must be taken concerning the following extract, in which Mr. CBA further
describes the persistence of his ruminations. As opposed to auditory
hallucinations such as those resulting from schizophrenia, I suggest that the 
following describes a constant process of evaluation and re-evaluation:
It’s stuck there and 
It’s going round and round
Yes- it’s like a little w h ee l  [.......]
I can’t live with—
You know, it’s very compulsive- [...... ]
It’s in- at the base o f the skull, 
it’s like a little wheel that turns
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- chuntering away to itself... [...... ]
It makes me slightly high as well, 
it makes me feel
I’ve got some sort o f  understanding from it...
If I’m listening to it that is
In my first level coding, I suggested that evaluation of the reaction of others 
during social contact may be relatively commonplace. However, in my fourth 
level coding, I speculated that Mr.CBA experiences problems because of the 
degree to which his evaluative ruminations occur. Whilst I believed that he was 
not describing voices, he was undoubtedly describing powerful intrusive 
ideation and conflicting emotions. As explained in the following extract, the 
consequences of this are undermining of his self-confidence.
And perhaps if  I do this
or perhaps if  I do that......
Um, and watch out
because you’re going to do something wrong. [....]
You shouldn’t have said that,
you should have waited until then- ah- yes
(Ray :) Would fear of failure be fair?
Yes. Oh yes....
Mr. CBA’s description of constant interpretation and associated self-doubt led to 
a direct question:
(Ray :) Do you worry about your symptoms returning?’
I said that to local GP, yes.
It can be-1 mean,
I make mistakes, slight wobble and I think,
‘Oh crumbs, panic stations’
(Ray :) That you could be in for a full-blown.........
Yes, yes, or something sufficient 
to cause disruption somehow.
Maybe not hospitalization,
I’ve only been in hospital once
and that was long ago,
but an actual disruption and upset,
I think that’s going to happen.
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Aware of the problems of loneliness, and in an effort to re-establish himself, Mr. 
CBA has recently started to attend church. Also, he has studied a foreign 
language: this has led to him giving private tuition to young children; a pursuit 
that requires considerable organizational skills:
I would never, never,
you know, never have tried it-
it would have been,
‘No, I can’t do it.’
But reality is I had to do something 
and that’s been very positive.
Yet, overall, despite these improvements, Mr. CBA remains pessimistic:
Sometimes, I - sometimes I think, 
you know, things have really m oved... 
over the last twenty years
there’s room for optimism......
other times I feel, you know,
I- ... I’ve gone nowhere.
I switch one to the other.
Um  sigh It goes with my moods......
The next extract is extremely evocative of loneliness associated with low self­
esteem. Speaking of a friend, Mr. CBA compares himself unfavourably to her 
with regard to achievement and, possibly, on-going experience of mental 
illness. Concerning the possibility of a relationship, whereas Eddie Hooper- 
Smith’s overall tone is optimism, Mr. CBA’s is sadness and pessimism:
There’s a personal coach working at {educational centre) 
who’s invited me for coffee...
That would be very nice.....
but I don’t want to feel you know....
Being a single guy with no sort o f .... 
on my own ....
with someone I like very much.
It’s- There’s tension there.... [....]
Between you, I’d love to go out with her 
but it wouldn’t happen ...
I just don’t want to do it.
To be reminded o f  that fact... [.....]
And how I am you know........
It’s sort of.......
I feel constrained in that respect 
and meeting for coffee
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would ram that home 
I mean, she got over depression,
I’ve never known anyone so depressed
and she got over it and out o f  it
and I admire her tremendously for doing it.
I close this examination by reporting that on the day following the second 
interview, Mr. CBA telephoned me to say that I could use the data as I wanted 
but he didn’t want to talk about it. He also said that although June and I can 
analyse our feelings, he cannot: ‘it just leads to me having bad thoughts’. 
Arguably, his narrative has returned to the level it was at the prologue stage. 
However, given the duration of the mental illness narrative, the significant 
narratives associated with the consequences of same, and repeated themes of 
pessimism, I speculate that a negative imago may be been created. My 
overriding impression of Mr. CBA is that of a solitary traveller, dogged by 
memories and a belief that his narrative will remain lonely. Unlike Eddie 
Hooper-Smith, he sees no likelihood of rebuilding. If so, then the impact of 
phenomena diagnosed as mental illness may have been massive.
10.2.7: Dorothy: I’m obsessed by the link between what’s your personality, 
what’s the symptoms of your mental illness
At the time of interview, Dorothy takes medication and receives assistance from 
a support worker. Like Mr. CBA, she describes ruminations and interpretations 
to the point of obsession. Unlike Mr. CBA, her efforts are focussed on the 
nature of her illness: particularly on the possible aetiology of the phenomena 
concerned. Essentially, she is asking the question, “Why me?” Moreover, as 
noted in my first stage coding with reference to the following extract, she is 
asking, “Which is me, and which is my illness?”
I’m obsessed between the link
between what’s your personality,
what’s the symptoms o f  your mental illness,
what’s  you being weak,
what’s you being strong,
what’s you- all things like that
and how inextricably linked they are
and you can’t separate them [......]
I can’t do it, I can’t work it out...
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Associated with this is a damning self-assessment in the second interview. This 
can be directly compared with Mr. CBA’s self-view:
I look back 
To try and find out 
why I’m like this 
and why I ’m such a failure.
You know, it’s not very nice
when your friends
all have proper good jobs.
You know?
And they think all you need to do 
is relax.
Dorothy has received assistance from her occupational therapist in her efforts to 
resolve her questions and internal conflicts. In a long extract she describes the 
identification of character traits which, in combination, lead to a constant drive 
for answers amid achievement. For clarity I list these:
i) Bipolar disorder (diagnosed mental illness)
ii) Hypermobility syndrome (physical impairment)
iii) Perfectionism (personality trait)
iv) Completer-finisher
v) Knowledge-seeking
vi) Analytical personality
Following observation and analysis, the therapist turned to advice concerning 
Dorothy’s way of life regarding sleep, diet, time management, and symptom 
recognition. However, Dorothy explains that this is not straightforward: in doing 
so, she evokes comparisons with the overwhelm period of her narrative:
She said that,
“If you’ve got a packed diary
you take on more and more stuff
to sort o f  validate yourself
you go to these stupid bloody meetings
to validate your own sense o f worth
you won’t cancel them
if  you’re feeling unwell.
You go to -  all costs 
and you end up poorly [....]
But you see I’m-
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I don’t like stopping.....
I’m not very good if  I stop 
because my mood drops low
In connection with the above extracts, I noted in my fourth level coding that the 
potent combination of personality traits means that:
‘Dorothy is her own ruthlessly exacting judge: if  she fails to meet her own high 
expectations then she condemns herself.’
Additionally, I speculated that any on-going effects of bipolar disorder would 
both affect her capacity to meet her allotted tasks, thus becoming a source of 
anger and frustration. Indeed, despite the advice of her therapist and other 
medical personnel, Dorothy remains tormented by the lack of answers:
I’ve got to learn to accept it 
and I can’t do it,
I don’t know how to do it. 
and that is what my goal is, really.
I think if  I could have a better- [..... ]
I really can’t come to terms 
with the fact
that I’ve got to deal with this 
and maybe not function any better 
than I do now
for the rest o f  my life, (voice strained)
I can’t bloody deal with it 
but I have to,
because there’s no choice (Dorothy starts to cry)
In the second interview, we talked about the possibility that phenomena 
diagnosed as mental illness have a biochemical or neurophysiological origin. 
Dorothy’s response to this was, “God, I’d be devastated if there wasn’t”, 
prompting me to note in my first level coding that she:
 needs the reassurance o f  believing that her condition is due to a bona-fide
medical illness.’
This is supported by the fact of her keeping her Section III form (see Chapter 
Nine, Overwhelm) in the context of her rejection of the diagnosis of personality 
disorder:
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So that is my proof
that I have been poorly (voice breaks)
Because I keep thinking I’m imagining it- 
No, I do, Ray, it’s the truth, 
they brainwashed me
that I had personality disorder for four years.
The tension between intellectual understanding of her illness and emotional 
acceptance of same causes Dorothy to express guilt:
I feel absolutely so guilty-
there’s a lot o f  guilt
in my personality for no reason.
Feel a lot o f  guilt about
having these emotions and thoughts and behaviours 
when I’ve got a lovely flat-
The above extracts merit direct comparison with the experiences of Mr. P. and 
Sandra, who both reported emotions akin to liberation by virtue of being able to 
re-assess previous events as due to illness. However, that avenue is effectively 
denied to Dorothy by a diagnosis that she interprets as blameworthy. In 
consequence, doubt and anger form a potent combination that reinforces the 
dominant mental health narrative. This is demonstrated by her description of 
CBT, during which she challenged her therapist:
I said to her, [...... ]
Imagine that you’re the patient
and I’m the therapist
and I’ve come into you and said
“You’ll never believe what w e’ve discovered:
the world is flat after all, it’s not round,
- you wouldn’t believe me, would you?”
And she went ‘N o’.
I said, “But that is how ridiculous 
the extremeness o f  what you’re trying 
to tell me
to change my thoughts is.
You’re trying to tell me 
that I’m not a failure 
and I’m trying to tell you 
the depth o f  the meaning 
o f that is like me saying to you,
‘The world is flat.’
You wouldn’t believe me:
I’m not believing this...
236
effing percentage evidence;
It’s rubbish because I’ll give you 
all the evidence in the world 
o f how I am a failure.
And my evidence is better than your evidence.”
Despite her confusion, Dorothy is determined to retain her diagnosis of bipolar 
disorder. Like Mr. P. and Sandra, the label is a part of her identity: Who and 
what I am’:
Now, for m e...
I hold on to my label
and I’m not ever letting it go.
Not after how differently 
I’ve been treated in those years 
when I had to live
with the diagnosis o f  personality disorder.
Associated with Dorothy’s continuing view of herself is the issue of stigma, 
particularly the denial of her illness by friends:
Another friend,
who’s had a terrible hard time herself [........]
....when I was very poorly and asked for help 
turned round to me and said,
“Why are you asking me to validate your illness?
Because to me
there is no such thing as mental illness 
and any form o f  diagnosis or medication 
is abuse as far as I’m concerned 
and it is an illness o f  the spirit’ 
and I’ve never got over that. [....]
She will acknowledge that I have difficulties
that mean I can’t work
but that’s as far as it goes.
and how hurtful that is,
to reconcile that and still be someone’s friend.
Thus the interview proved to be a release for Dorothy:
On one hand it’s quite therapeutic, [..... ]
like a discharge,
and especially with people like yourselves... 
who, I’ve got in my heart 
that you believe me.
So it wouldn’t be the same-
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it would not be the same and I can-
This is something so a hundred percent true
if  it was somebody interviewing me who- well-
who I was suspicious o f
I’ve got a very great mistrust o f  people...
and I’ve got a great paranoia
that people do not believe me.
I’ve had it,
I’ve experienced over and over again in my life.
At this point I close my examination of Dorothy’s recovery. Probably the 
strongest theme throughout both interviews was the feeling of isolation caused 
by an illness that continues to defy her attempts at understanding. Thus, 
although she would probably resent the epithet, I saw this aspect of her as 
‘tormented’. Despite this, she takes pride in her flat and, as implied in an above 
extract, tries to occupy herself with as many pursuits as possible. Accordingly, I 
summarize her recovery as partial; similar to that of Mr. CBA in that it has 
probably recovered to the level it was during prologue. Like Mr. CBA, she 
remains troubled by a dominant narrative relating to phenomena diagnosed as 
mental illness. However, additionally, there is a dominant narrative pertaining to 
the understanding of same: in short, Dorothy wants to know why she is ill. Until 
this question is answered to her satisfaction, she will remain plagued by doubt 
and confusion.
10.2.8: Anne: it’s really, really hard for me to come to terms with it 
because of the time and effort I put into being successful
As the interview with Anne progressed, so it became increasingly complicated. 
This was due to two factors:
i) Anne switched rapidly between past and present, interspersed with 
overviews of both.
ii) Anne would abruptly change subjects, mostly between her own illness 
and the break-up of her relationship.
I begin review of Anne’s recovery narrative by noting that after discharge from 
hospital, she lived in a bed-sit for two years before moving to a flat in a family 
house:
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Since I’ve moved
into this household....
my friendship network is changing
for the better
because living in
that small little self-contained prison 
for two years,
I was isolated,
I couldn’t manage- [..... ]
manage everything on my own [..... ]
I need to be part o f  a group, 
a group identity
Although she did not provide details, Anne indicated that she has become 
involved in local user groups. Opining that this enables some social contact, she 
uses somewhat prejudicial terms when making an oblique reference to her 
former status. This is important in that it is unequivocally an expression of loss:
I’m starting to   .
to leave the idiots behind, [...... ]
I’m starting to mix 
with more educated people,
which is great [...... ]
I’ve got to know o f...
quite a few people that have had these-
um, been to university
and done their degrees
and they’ve suffered from the same illness,
which is reassuring
because a lot about my issues
are support networks
Er.................... Finding...........
I guess the right friends really.
At this point, I interrupt Anne’s narrative to provide her own view of her present 
mental health. With reference to further aspects of her narrative, this is 
important in that whilst she appears to acknowledge on-going phenomena, she 
attributes her demeanour to boredom and past events:
I don’t, I, I don’t .. .1 don’t think ....
No, the landlord would disagree with me [..... ]
It’s what other people think
rather than yourself sometimes [....]
another resident thinks
I’m quite ill still.
But it’s boredom and lack o f  stimulation........
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Regrets, Fear:
I think they’re natural things, don’t you?
I don’t think it’s an illness.
Examination of the above extract suggests that boredom is an inevitable 
function of her present circumstances. More important is her use of the terms 
‘regret and fear1. The following extract, which elaborates upon the loss of her 
former career and associated lifestyle, raises a complex question concerning 
the nature of imagoes. That is, Anne’s words suggest that she still sees herself 
as a career woman, that the Anne-as-career-woman imago remains active. If 
so, it persists despite being denied, a reminder of what has been and what 
should still be:
....it’s really, really hard for me 
to come to terms with it
because......o f ..... the amount o f  time and effort
that I put in to being successful
or having money
and having that lifestyle, okay?
Some people never had it 
and go on to do these things.
What I find difficult is that I know 
what that life’s like
Whilst noting in my first and fourth level coding Anne’s insistence that she is to 
blame for her present situation (compare Mr. P.’s self-questioning), I draw 
attention to a measure of uncertainty:
It’s like with the acts that I did.
Was I just being lazy?
I don’t know.
Did I give up on my working life 
because I was lazy?
Or did I do it 
because I was too ill?
In connection with the above, I draw attention to the fact that Anne left her 
employment immediately prior to her holiday (see overwhelm). Accordingly, 
there is a question as to whether or not this choice was influenced by nascent 
phenomena diagnosable as mental illness. Associated with the loss of Anne’s 
employment and social status is the break-up of her relationship, for which she
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continually castigated herself throughout the interview. The following detail 
describes a dominant unresolved narrative that has resulted from this event:
Yes, when he left me,
with no closure, with no discussion,
with no support, nothing.
And every fucking waking day 
and every fucking waking hour 
I think about him.
And I need to see him
and I need closure
but he’s not willing to give me that.
In connection with the above extract, my first level coding noted that the 
interview became increasingly concerned with Anne’s partner from this point. 
As will be explored later, this narrative is relevant to Anne’s recovery despite its 
subject matter not being the focus of this study. In tandem with this, she often 
returned to the theme of loss of her former life, as is summarized evocatively in 
the following brief extract, which describes her loss of independence. This is in 
direct contrast to the narrative of Eddie Hooper-Smith, who welcomes the input 
of his support worker:
I’m on benefits in [named town]
U m ... N ow  I have to have an advocate 
to go an Orange shop 
to sort my bills out.
That’s sad- got my Master’s degree
with a distinction
and I can’t sort my bills out.
The theme of loss of former identity is reiterated with reference to Anne’s 
relationship with her family:
I feel that my family position’s changed, 
which is really frightening.
My relationship with my mother as well: 
it’s abig-
I really hurt her. [......]
Just my mom wants Anne back.
And if  anything in the big wide world
I wish I hadn’t done it to my mum [..... ]
And this is a family position thing-
I want to go and stay
with some relations there.......................
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But I’m really-
I’m not the person that they knew either.
In more general terms, Anne describes her attempts to mediate her isolation. 
The following extract describes an attitude to her illness that is in stark contrast 
to those of Eddie and Mr. P. On one level, I find her behaviour extraordinary. 
However, in my first level coding I speculate that she is trying to normalize her 
illness by seeking an unconcerned response:
But I live and breathe mental health 
because I don’t have a boyfriend,
I don’t have.... That... That thing.
And I know it’s up to me 
to make friends,
I know friends aren’t going to come to me-
I’ve got to go to them. [........ ]
Because I’ll meet somebody in a pub 
and they’re really nice.
“H i.................. Hi, I’m schizophrenic.
Nice to meet you.” [...... ]
But that’s another identity issue.
Labelling theory.
Because I’m not making any friends doing that- 
and it’s such a small town.
The final extract from Anne’s interview is another overview. This is a statement 
of denial: that all, including her experiences of illness, could have been avoided. 
By attempting to minimize the seriousness of her problems, she takes on the 
burden of responsibility for them:
Honestly, on a ground le v e l...............................
I was a young woman-
young professional woman 
who went on holiday 
and did a few drugs 
and that was it: 
it’s quite simple really, 
but I had to-
I had to make it into a problem. i.e. personal responsibility for illness
I consider that Anne’s recovery narrative is complicated by two dominant 
narratives. Whilst on-going phenomena diagnosed as mental illness are 
undoubtedly active, their consequences are magnified and exacerbated by the
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unresolved narrative pertaining to the ending of her relationship with her 
partner. Indeed, I view this latter narrative as more dominant than the mental 
health narrative, and fear that she will never regain equilibrium until she obtains 
closure.
10.2.9: Anita: i’m not bothered about what other people think about me 
because I’m going to justify and re-create my life
Anita’s narrative begins with her response to her suicide attempts and resultant 
medication. In common with previous events in her narrative, the following 
extracts emphasize her force of personality in deciding that she would attempt 
to resurrect her career:
That’s what I decided: 
get back into work;
live for my family......
You know, establish my career again.
I’m not bothered about 
what other people think about me 
because I’m going to justify 
and re-create my life; 
because the power and control’s 
in my hands:
I’m going to do it.
I don’t give a sod
about all these stupid records
and people’s interpretation,
because they just don’t understand me.
I’m going to be my own driver in my own life: 
and I started taking control 
and getting back to work 
and looking after my children.
And it was hard-1 make it sound easy
Unfortunately, Anita’s physical health deteriorated:
but it was then-
that’s when I started getting irregular heartbeats
and they said it was anxiety
and then I became really poorly with it
and I got admitted onto Ward Number, Hospital A
and it was a side effect o f  the meds.
Also, Anita suffered serious physical illness:
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Anyway, I was so ill one night, 
went to the Supermarket,
collapsed in the Supermarket ambulance, acronym given. [....] 
the next thing I remember 
was a morphine drip set up- 
pancreatitis, six weeks.
Following her illness, Anita was taken off medication. About this time she met a 
user volunteer representative, which she describes as a ‘mixed blessing’. To a 
reader, the following extract will be confusing in that details are implied as 
opposed to stated. This is due to the fact that the situation Anita describes was 
already known to us: that is, although the volunteer was supportive in many 
ways, they did not agree with medication:
I met a user volunteer representative.
Y es.... And that’s been a mixed blessing.
Because I’ve been in services 
for that many years 
I’ve got a pretty service-way 
o f thinking about illnesses.
And she’s quite... [Sigh]
The way she is-
and I find it quite contradictory
and I get very confused, so ...
I don’t know. [..... ]
I don’t think there is THE answer 
because if  there was the answer,
w e’d conduct the world by that theory. [..... ]
I think it’s a bit o f that, a bit o f  this, 
but she is so... 
one and I feel so...
You know when you’re unwell
and she’s va-va-va? ( ‘va-va-va ’ said very quickly)
And she beats me into submission; 
beats me into submission.
With reference to the above and the following extract, I note in my first level 
coding that Anita is obviously hurt by what she perceives as a lack of sympathy 
and understanding. Chadwick (1997a) observes that ‘paraprofessionals’ such 
as ‘volunteers, parents, and students’ often try to ‘normalize’ mental illness. 
However, he suggests that such advice is often associated with a poor 
knowledge of the possible aetiology of mental illness and associated 
medication. Also, he argues that such persons may be motivated by an
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antagonism towards psychiatry: in consequence, such persons often claim 
‘there’s nothing medically wrong with you’. The following extract should be 
compared with Dorothy’s feelings of rejection concerning a friend who denies 
mental illness:
She keeps on saying to me that, (i.e. the volunteer cited above)
“All feelings get hard
when your emotions are involved,”
and all that.
And she doesn’t think
I’m having bipolar episodes;
she thinks my emotions are bouncing
from one extreme to the other and...
I don’t know.
And she doesn’t think I need meds 
and I feel that sometimes when I need- 
Doctor C says I need to go on meds;
I feel like a failure because she says that....
Concerning these extracts, I feel that by far the most important aspect is the 
questions of belief and implied judgements. From one point of view, it is 
reasonable for any person to believe in an ‘anti-psychiatry’ model of mental 
illness. Thereafter, it is also reasonable for that person to attempt to persuade 
someone such as Anita, who is experiencing phenomena diagnosed as mental 
illness, of the worth of their belief. However, if that persuasion ultimately results 
in questioning the attitudes and motives of another person, then it is, inevitably 
destructive. In this, Anita’s narrative can be compared strongly with that of 
Dorothy, who felt challenged by a diagnosis of personality disorder on the 
grounds that it implied that she was responsible for her own misfortune. Also, 
her narrative should be compared with others such as Sandra (above) who 
feels that a label reifies her illness.
Later in the interview, Anita elaborated upon the attitude shown to her by 
professionals concerning her personal competency. Having experienced this 
issue to some degree myself, I was surprised that she was the only one of the 
nine respondents to raise it. In my third level coding, I note there are two 
different aspects to Anita’s narrative, both of which are relevant to personal 
identity:
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i) The challenge posed by persons believing that phenomena diagnosed as 
mental illness are synonymous with learning difficulties.
ii) A potentially more serious problem of having one’s competency to make 
decisions challenged:
Some social workers 
and some o f the system
confuse mental health with learning disabled, [sic]
And they were talking to me 
in sentences o f one syllable [laughs]
You know, dum -  dum -  dum -  dum and asking me, 
you know, like one barrister said to me,
“Can you read and write?” [..... ]
And the social workers when they talk to you.... [..... ]
And all o f  a sudden
everything that I ’ve ever owned was denied.
I was a lunatic
At the time of the interview, Anita’s overall mental health is beginning to 
deteriorate. Therefore, she is awaiting hospitalization in an effort to determine 
suitable medication. In my fourth level coding I note that she is caught in a 
classic dilemma: if she takes medication then she suffers from side effects; if 
she does not take medication then she experiences the return of her illness.
Right, so I ’ll get back to 
where I am in my mind:
U m  I ’m not on any meds at the moment
because o f the side-effects... [....]
At the moment they say 
I ’m in a mixed episode.
And my moods have been 
like really sort o f not okay.
Like suicide;
four weeks ago I tried it {means not specified) 
and all this, that, and the other.
Despite this, we concluded on a positive note:
(Ray :) Is there any chance o f regaining professional qualification. ?
That’s what w e’re trying to do, Ray.
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Thus Anita’s personal narrative is one of partial recovery in which suicidal 
ideation remains active. Moreover, the issue of medication remains unresolved, 
thus, despite her obvious determination, her personal narrative remains 
compromised by a dominant mental health narrative despite some improvement 
since overwhelm.
10.3. Summary and conclusions 
10.3.1 Initiating recovery
To ascertain a point at which recovery can be said to have begun in a narrative 
involves too much conjecture to be of value. Rather, it is better to understand 
the mental health narrative as passing through a period of transition wherein 
overwhelm was gradually mediated. Associated with this was the involvement of 
the following other parties in all nine narratives:
i) medical personnel
ii) voluntary organisations
iii) family and/or friends
When comparing and contrasting the nine narratives, difficulty arises due to the 
wide range of phenomena described and associated diagnoses. Initially, it can 
be observed that both Mr. Gwent and Mr. P. were diagnosed with depression, 
whereas the other seven respondents were diagnosed with psychotic illnesses. 
However, it would be an error to use this as the sole criterion for severity: 
notably, Mr. Gwent reported suicidal ideation, whilst Mr. P. took an overdose. 
Similarly, it should be noted that in some narratives the consequences of the 
mental health narrative were complicated by other narratives. Thus recovery 
may be more than the alleviation of phenomena: it may necessitate the 
restoration of other nested narratives and even the initiation of new narratives.
Concerning medical treatment, all but Mr. Gwent were admitted to hospital, 
sometimes on several occasions. However, it is notable that he describes 
himself as virtually helpless (‘curled up in a foetal position’) before recovery 
began, and that he had the support of his wife at home. This description raises
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the question of why hospital treatment was deemed necessary in response to 
the other eight mental health narratives, in particular the differing forms of 
associated helplessness. Like Mr. Gwent, for Mr. P. it was akin to mental 
exhaustion. This resulted in extreme inertia, wherein assistance and 
encouragement were needed to fulfil the basic demands of daily life. However, 
unlike Mr. Gwent, Mr. P. had become homeless and lacked close family 
support: accordingly, he was obliged to live in residential care following a brief 
period of hospitalization.
Common to the seven narratives describing psychotic illness is a build-up of 
phenomena resulting in crisis. Thereafter, these narratives include descriptions 
of multiple admissions (all except Mr. CBA), lengthy in-patient care (especially 
in the case of Eddie Hooper-Smith) and continuing regimes of medication 
and/or cognitive therapy. Importantly, some of the respondents, namely Mr. K., 
Eddie Hooper-Smith, Mr. K, Dorothy, Sandra, and Anne, received strong 
parental support. From this, it can be surmised that home care was not a 
suitable option because medical personnel considered that recovery had not 
progressed sufficiently. This raises a vexed and often emotive subject: by what 
standards should recovery be judged?
10.3.2: Immersion
In the anthology ‘Speaking Our Minds' (1996), the editors make a stark 
complaint against psychiatric practice:
Why is it that a psychiatric in-patient who feels and expresses the full range of 
human emotions is in danger of having them interpreted as a symptom of their 
mental illness?
(Read and Reynolds, 1996, 76)
Unfortunately, however, this is not supported by the examples cited, namely
Laing (ibid); Hart (ibid) and Brunner (ibid). Rather, these narratives describe
what these authors interpret as unreasonable demands for conformity. This is a
pity, because the consequences of this are to discredit what is possibly a valid
argument. In response, it is incumbent to consider the issue from both points of
view, namely those of medical staff and of patient. Medical staff are obliged to
assess a patient’s symptoms on admission and, thereafter, monitor their
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progress. With regard to this, a patient may be highly unpredictable: in addition 
to their symptoms, they may be emotionally labile, also resentful. For them, 
admission to hospital is a new significant narrative within an already traumatic 
dominant mental health narrative. My own reaction to my first admission was 
that I was entering a new realm of strangeness, a place of madness where I 
would be forced to confront my own madness.
To describe the days and weeks that follow admission, I use my own 
experiences and those in some of the nine narratives (particularly Dorothy and 
Eddie-Hooper-Smith). With respect to the overall experience, Charmaz’s model 
of immersion (1997) is highly appropriate in that it provides an overview of life 
dominated by hospital routine. My own experiences are of a curious inertia, 
often boredom, punctuated by occasional tests and minor consultations. My 
view then, and to this day, is that this was a deliberate policy to reduce 
stimulation and thereby the potential for emotion to escalate into a psychotic 
episode. However, this inevitably leads to two problems. The first is essentially 
unavoidable, namely the fact that one is aware of being watched, no matter how 
unobtrusively. The second is the aforementioned question of the full range of 
human emotions: what is a normal reaction to a particular event?
As the first problem is unavoidable, so the second is unanswerable. Firstly, a 
hospital environment is in itself an on-going dominant narrative of much 
potency, whether necessitated by physical or mental illness. As stressed above, 
it is immersion in routine. Accordingly, one is obliged to adapt personal agency, 
possibly against one’s better judgement, possibly against one’s will. Is it so 
surprising, therefore, that emotional affect is difficult to assess and may be 
misinterpreted? Secondly is the obvious observation that it is unlikely that 
medical staff knew the person before admission. Therefore, they will not know 
whether a person laughs easily, dislikes television, is given to thinking aloud, 
and so on. Whilst information can and should be sought from family members, 
this area may always remain difficult due to its inherent subjectivity.
Thereafter, although this area is undoubtedly important to personal identity, 
further exploration will not be pursued. It is sufficient to state that the number of
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and links between the nested narratives within a ‘hospital care narrative’ 
undergo constant change. For example, in a review of studies of residential 
alternatives to hospital, Lloyd-Evans et al (2009) state that:
The potential for emergency residential accommodation outside the hospital 
setting to improve service user choice and thus the acceptability of services, 
while relieving bed pressure on acute wards, was identified 10 years ago.
(Lloyd-Evans et al, 2009:115)
However, despite awareness of user dissatisfaction, the authors imply that this 
should not be the sole momentum for change. Indeed, they suggest that some 
models described as ‘promising’ have yet to be widely adopted because 
‘...clinical practice is running ahead of the research evidence base’ (ibid).
10.3.3: Reclaiming the personal narrative
Although all of the respondents had recovered sufficiently to tell me their 
stories, it was evident that for all but Mr. Gwent the personal narrative had 
undergone massive change. In some cases this was, ultimately, positive (Mr.
K.; Mr. P.; Sandra) whilst in others it was negative (Mr. CBA; Dorothy; Eddie 
Hooper-Smith; Anne; Anita). However, with regard to the latter, whether or not 
such change can or should be regarded as irrevocable is highly conjectural and 
subjective. Instead, it is stressed that recovery is an on-going process, a nested 
narrative within an active personal narrative. As such, reclamation of what was 
is not a prerequisite; instead recovery should be understood in terms of 
regaining personal autonomy. Exactly how this might be measured also 
involves subjectivity, although an appropriate summary could be seen in terms 
of involvement in the PCS system (see Chapter Three) to one’s personal 
satisfaction. In this way, continuing contact with medical services, including a 
regime of medication, need not necessarily be seen as a disadvantage. In turn, 
this invites reappraisal of the respondents’ narratives: instead of viewing them in 
terms of positivity and negativity, they can be understood as stages in recovery, 
always possessing the potential for significant change. This possibility will be 
reviewed in the following chapter, which will compare and contrast the nine 
personal narratives in entirety.
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Chapter Eleven: Integration of findings: towards cross-case analysis
11.1: Introduction: reflections and review
This chapter opens by querying if narrative theory is over-prescriptive; in 
particular if persons perceive and review their memories and concepts 
according to the many constructs hitherto described. In conjunction with this 
exercise, it will also critique the methodology of the research: whether or not a 
given area might have benefited from a different approach, or if avenues of 
interest are unexplored. In doing so, it will lay the foundations for integrating the 
findings with reference to the research questions.
At this juncture, therefore, it is appropriate to make a declaration that will inform 
this entire discussion. At face value, the Central Research Question is 
incomplete: it should seek to establish the manner, degree and duration of that 
impact. Above all, it should recognize that it does not occur in isolation, but is 
part of the complex, continually evolving construct that is the personal narrative. 
In turn, constant objective and subjective assessments of the personal narrative 
by the intrinsic self maintain development of the personal myth, the uniquely 
personal view of the personal narrative, within which personal identity is an 
integral part. Therefore the final part of this chapter will compare and contrast 
the narratives of the nine respondents. Integral to this exercise is the 
respondents’ own understanding of their mental health narrative; in particular 
whether it is an aspect of the past or an on-going part of the present. In this 
way, it will examine the processes of review and introspection and ascertain the 
impact upon their personal myths, and thereby their personal identity.
11.2: The ubiquity of narrative
As soon as we acquire language, it is inevitable that we employ it to describe 
events and concepts. However, at a purely personal level, we can exceed the 
boundaries of words by recourse to memory and/or imagination. Nevertheless, 
if our thoughts are to make sense, they must be sufficiently coherent to assume
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a recognizable form or construct. Therefore, according to these parameters, 
narrative can justifiably be described as ubiquitous. Concerning personal 
reflection as detailed above, it is appropriate to recall Barbara Hardy’s summary 
of narrative:
We dream in narrative, daydream in narrative, remember, anticipate, hope, 
despair, believe, doubt, plan, revise, criticise, construct, gossip, leam, hate, and 
love by narrative.
(Hardy, 1987,1)
11.3: The interview as a vehicle of recall
By interviewing an individual, I invited them to review the relevant aspects of 
their life story, so facilitating reconstruction as described in Chapter Three with 
reference to Linde (1997):
The life story is thus comprised exactly of the most significant narratives of a 
speaker’s life, which are told and retold, reinterpreted and reshaped for different 
situations.
(Linde, 1997, 283)
This raises a fundamental question, To what extent is interviewing an artifice?’ 
Expressed another way, Would a respondent have reflected upon their 
experience of mental illness to the same degree if I had not interviewed them?’ 
Or would their memories be disjointed, a group of fragments? If so, then my 
constructs of significant and dominant narratives would have little real meaning. 
Accordingly, it is incumbent to challenge the entire concept of narrative as a 
coherent construct incorporating beginning, middle, and end.
11.4: Challenges to narrative theory: the 'discontinuity view’
One area of objection to narrative is due to its ‘everyday use’:
The concept of narrative does not hold an established theoretical place in 
sociological school or tradition.
(Williams, 2001:187) [Original paper 1984]
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Against this, it can be successfully argued that, properly applied, narrative and 
narrative analysis meet scientific rigour. However, a more substantial challenge 
has been made by postmodernism, which focuses on the difference between 
reality and representation. Applying the generalized term 'discontinuity theory 
Carr (1986) notes that, at best, narrative is viewed by some postmodernists as 
a product of creativity, and at worst, a deliberate attempt at social manipulation. 
Instead it is sufficient to meet the postmodern challenge directly. Firstly, 
William’s observation (above) serves only to demonstrate that the application of 
narrative is not restricted to an academic environment. In truth, it has been an 
area of research for decades, albeit subject to healthy scrutiny and question 
appropriate to its setting. Secondly, the fact that narrative is a communicative 
vehicle in everyday life means it is unavoidably true that it can be crafted to 
facilitate specific aims. Thirdly, and most importantly, it has already been 
stressed that narrative is representational of experience and that language is a 
necessarily artificial means of description. Accordingly, there is a parallel with 
the philosophical constructs of direct realism or ‘naive’ realism, representative 
realism, and relativism (Horner and Westacott, 2000; Hammersley, 1992).
Also noted by Carr (ibid), proponents of the discontinuity theory challenge the 
concept of beginning-middle-end by arguing that these distinctions do not exist 
in real life. His response is to note MacIntyre’s (1981) observation that they are 
‘forgetting death’ before mentioning ‘birth’ and stating that:
They are forgetting all the other less definitive but still important forms of
closure and structure to be found along the path from one to the other.
(Carr, 1986:122)
It must be emphasized that the postmodern objections deserve more than 
casual dismissal: as a result, MacIntyre’s observation can been seen something 
of a ‘cheap shot’. Instead, it is necessary to apply some common sense in 
support of the beginning-middle-end construct. In simple terms, concerning the 
question, “What did you do yesterday afternoon?” an answer has to start 
somewhere. Obviously, this is at a point decided by the narrator; thereafter, it 
must be relevant: it would be nonsensical to reply by talking about events that 
happened days previously. However, it is crucial to appreciate that this is a
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simple illustration of a simple example. With reference to more complex 
narratives, the postmodernist considerations cited can and should be 
acknowledged. For example, Rimmon-Kenan (2002) both acknowledges and 
eschews artifice with reference to illness narratives by averring that:
Types of narrative are analytic categories. In reality, narratives never belong 
“purely” to one category or the other; each contains elements of the other and 
the distinction is based on emphasis and dominance rather than a clear-cut 
polarity.
(Rimmon-Kenan, 2002:15)
Nevertheless, it must be stressed that the author does not reject the application 
of narrative but moderates it. In effect, she enables the obvious but crucial 
observation that although a person may think in narrative, as described by 
Hardy (above) they may make little or no use of named constructs such as plot, 
genre, or even narrative itself. However, this in no way negates the basic 
concept of narrative in the life story, as detailed by Linde (above). Thus this 
discussion concludes by acknowledging that whilst the precise application of 
narrative remains a matter of debate, it should be considered a viable analytical 
tool, both in everyday life and academia.
11.5: Narrative and imagoes
As discussed in Chapter Three, imagoes are described by McAdams (1993) in 
terms of archetypal patterns deriving from idealized concepts of behaviour and 
achievement. Inevitably, these constructs incorporate a degree of subjectivity; 
therefore they can be seen as an artifice, an emotive generalization. As such, in 
keeping with the previous section, their worth in academia can be doubted. Are 
they no more than an invention, a product of various authors’ imaginations? Or 
are they founded upon observations of real life? In response, it is necessary to 
explore the linguistic nature of an imago. Whilst some are obviously derived 
from societal roles (‘husband’, ’wife’, ‘carer, friend’, others are adjectives 
(sporty, bookish, arty,), and some are formed by transition from an adjective to 
a noun: in other words, a description can become a label. For example, a 
person can be seen as ‘a success’; ‘an animal-lover’, an ‘artist’ and so on. With
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reference to this research, by far the most common imago associated with 
mental illness is the user. Also important, but much more contentious, are the 
iconic forms in named ‘illness narratives’.
11.6: Illness narratives
Illness narratives can be divided into two broad categories. The first, being 
wholly descriptive with respect to narrative trajectory, is, essentially, an 
objective view. This category includes Gergen and Gergen’s (2001) basic 
narrative models; also Charmaz’s (1997) levels of intrusion, interruption, and 
immersion. The second is both descriptive and nominal in that it accords a 
narrative trajectory a name, so implying the creation of an imago. This category 
includes; ‘phoenix’ (May, 1991); ‘epiphany’ (Frank, 1993); ‘restitution’, ‘chaos’, 
and ‘quest’ (Frank, 1997). Concerning the latter types, it is undeniable that they 
can be interpreted as both subjective and prescriptive. Thus, in his text The 
Wounded Storyteller, Frank (1997) feels obliged to refute the enthusiasm of his 
1993 approach by concluding his exploration of his three narrative types with a 
considered and pragmatic assessment of the relationship between them. 
Perhaps the most telling of his observations is that;
III people need to be regarded by themselves, by their caregivers, and by our
culture as heroes of their own stories.
(Frank, 1997,135)
Rapidly, on further reading, it becomes evident that the author is using ‘hero’ in 
terms of ‘valour’ as opposed to ‘central character’. Thereafter, he observes that 
‘quest’ stories risk romanticizing illness, and that the ‘phoenix’ metaphor can 
become an instrument of condemnation against those who fail to recover from 
their illness. This shift in stance is noted with satisfaction by Rimmon-Kenan 
(ibid); nevertheless she continues to express reservations. Possibly this is 
because of her own illness which informs her paper (ocular myasthenia) and 
also because of her extensive use of Christina Middlebrook’s (1998) memoir 
‘Seeing the Crab: a Memoir of Dying’. Rather than a continuous narrative, this 
harrowing, sometimes disjointed, work is a collection of significant narratives 
concerning the central theme of the author’s breast cancer. Maybe it was
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written as a catharsis, maybe not: whatever Middlebrook’s motives, Rimmon- 
Kenan rightly uses her text to advocate awareness of narratives ‘without 
epiphanies and for writing that does not overcome chaos’ (ibid, 24).
Nevertheless, in any plea for balance and pragmatism, there is a real issue 
concerning societal attitudes to illness. Concerning restitution narratives, Frank 
(1997) writes:
Anyone who is sick wants to be healthy again. Moreover, contemporary culture 
treats health as the normal condition that people ought to have restored. Thus 
the ill person’s own desire for restitution is compounded by the expectation that 
other people want to hear restitution stories.
(Frank, 1997:77)
Probably more than any other, this statement lies at the core of attitudes to 
health in the western world. Fundamental to its understanding is the fact that a 
person can be both narrator and audience with respect to their own narrative. 
Accordingly, within any long-term illness, such as those described by the nine 
respondents, any understanding based on knowledge and pragmatism may be 
tempered by the weight of expectation. Unchecked, such a burden may become 
oppression.
11.7: Unresolved and failed narratives
Throughout this study, I have harboured misgivings concerning the potential
importance of ‘unresolved’ narratives. As explained in Chapter Three, this
construct derived from Labov’s (1997) construct of a ‘failed narrative’, namely a
narrative that is rejected by its audience. To this construct must be added my
own subjectivity in conjunction with the fact that a person can be both narrator
and audience. With reference to my own personal narrative, I cannot avoid the
stark judgement that it contains many failed narratives. In such cases, my only
recourse is to attempt to reassure myself that I have learned something, even if
only not to repeat a mistake. Nevertheless, the belief in failure remains strong,
resisting such facile logic. Thus, with reference to the transcripts, my viewpoint
was ambivalent. As a person, I could appreciate what I believed to be the very
real possibility of a respondent deeming a particular event to be a failed
narrative. Flowever, as a researcher, taking an objective view, I found that I did
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not want to designate a narrative as failed. Thus, either way, my assessment 
was, ultimately, compromised by subjectivity. To this dilemma, my recourse is to 
reprise the nature of dominance; namely that even the most potent of failed 
narratives may later become subordinate to a new dominant narrative. Thus it 
may remain, unassimilated but insignificant, an unhappy memory within the 
multitude that is the personal narrative.
By applying this viewpoint, a narrative can be understood to be unresolved in 
the sense that it might (and, ideally, should) be subject to review in the light of 
new experience. In contrast, the term ‘failed’ would be inappropriate in that to 
deny such change, and thereby hope, would represent an unacceptable 
absolute. However, as explained above, it must be acknowledged that this view 
is largely objective and, moreover, that of a detached observer. Therefore, to 
pursue deconstruction to its logical extent, it is incumbent to focus upon the 
individual’s subjective view of their own experiences. For example, whilst one 
can opine that Anne’s relationship narrative may, one day, be resolved, it is 
evident that, at present, she is desperate for closure. Also, it is important that 
despite her relatively active lifestyle, Dorothy used the term ‘failure’ throughout 
the interview with reference to the personal circumstances. Similarly, Mr. CBA 
reported feelings of failure many years after overwhelm.
The concepts of unresolved and failed negatives lead naturally to the possibility 
of the formation of negative imagoes. This important subject is discussed in the 
next section.
11.8: The creation of imagoes in response to experience of phenomena 
diagnosed as mental illness
Fundamental to this discussion is that an illness can become a label and, 
thereby, an aspect of identity. Thus, a person suffering from diabetes can be 
described as ‘a diabetic’; a person suffering from schizophrenia can be 
described as ‘a schizophrenic’. As explained above, this also occurs in the 
event of an adjective becoming a noun. Concerning illness narratives, this is not 
necessarily the case, as for example, Charmaz’s (1997) categories of
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interruption, intrusion, and immersion. However, in complete contrast are those 
narrative types named by Frank (1993,1997). To describe an illness narrative 
as a form of journey implies the existence of an appropriate imago, that is a 
‘traveller’, a ‘seeker ‘, or even, as detailed above, a ‘phoenix’. Associated with 
these, as explained above, are value judgements derived from idealized 
concepts of illness narrative. The ill person should recover: thus the traveller 
should reach his goal, the seeker should complete his quest, and the phoenix 
should be reborn.
It is stressed that this research did not deliberately seek data concerning 
concepts of imagoes. Instead, any such understanding derives from terms used 
by the respondents both with reference to their illness and other nested 
narratives. In most, but not all, of the interviews the ‘user5 imago was declared 
or implied. Initially, this term appears value-neutral, a generalized function of 
experience as opposed to ability or achievement. However, on examination, it 
appears to have several meanings as opposed to being a single imago, 
depending upon the course of the mental health narrative. For instance, the 
narratives of Mr. K., Mr. P., Sandra, and Mr. Gwent included elements of 
discovery that could be applied to help other persons. In contrast, the narratives 
of Eddie Hooper-Smith and Anita include the role of long-term patient; those of 
Dorothy and Mr. CBA failure; and that of Anne loss. Thereafter, I am reluctant to 
make further observations save that focus on imagoes could prove an important 
adjunct to this research. Accordingly, this issue will be discussed again later in 
the conclusion to this chapter.
Gradually, this exploration has turned full circle. Undoubtedly the various illness 
narratives and concept of imagoes are useful constructs for illustrating aspects 
of the self and personal identity. Yet, with reference to everyday life, are they so 
well defined? Or are they figments in the imagination of social science 
researchers? In answer, I believe the issue centres on sensitization. Initially, 
awareness and conceptualization is at the level cited by Linde (1997) [see 
above] whereby the life story is comprised of ‘significant narratives’. Almost 
identical, but possibly slightly more refined is Rimmon-Kenan’s (ibid) description 
of narratives in terms of ‘emphasis’ and ‘dominance’. Thereafter, once
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established, it is possible that a person may apply an imago to a particular 
aspect of their life story; if so, it is also possible that this is socially constructed, 
either by reading or verbal means. This possibility has important implications for 
this study; accordingly, it will be reprised later.
11.9: The applicability of significant and dominant narratives in analysis 
of personal narratives
All persons recognize that some events in their lives have been more important 
than others; similarly all persons recognize that some aspects of their lives are 
more important -  more significant -  than others. As explained previously, the 
personal narrative, and therefore the equilibrium within, is in a state of constant 
flux due to a combination of internal and external environmental forces. Yet this 
observation can be turned against itself by positing that, in the absence of 
events contrary to normal expectations, many people would consider their 
personal narratives to be stable. This is the basis of the illness narratives 
described above: that an abnormal event, such as illness, causes disequilibrium 
and may bring the entire personal narrative into focus.
Concerning the personal narrative during illness, the description of Rimmon- 
Kenan (ibid) possesses the beauty of simplicity. By describing the impact of 
illness in terms of emphasis and dominance, she draws attention to the fact that 
named illness narratives are an elaboration. Although undoubtedly illuminating, 
they are not essential to the understanding of illness. Instead, it is sufficient to 
measure the impact of illness in terms of severity of symptoms and the 
consequences of same. Concerning these, I suggest that her description can be 
differentiated into areas of importance (emphasis) and degree of effect on same 
(dominance).
At this point, it is essential that I review my application of significant and 
dominant narratives in the analysis of the transcripts. Undoubtedly, a valid 
question is whether I allowed my enthusiasm to invent the concepts I required: 
that what I believed to be a self-evident truth is non-existent. As noted earlier 
(Chapter Seven), the term ‘significant narratives’ is employed by Linde (1993, 
283) with reference to the life story. Associated with this, my considered
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response is founded on a combination of observations and questions, including 
avenues of exploration that were later abandoned due to the need for brevity. 
First and foremost of these were elaborations upon objective and subjective 
reactions to stimuli, which, in turn, led to scrutiny of phobias. The main 
characteristic of a phobia is excessive and seemingly irrational fear 
(McDonough, 2004). As such, it can be described as a supreme example of the 
domination of an objective response by a subjective reaction.
In conjunction with earlier explorations into the intangibility of the self-construct, 
study of such interactions between objective and subjective responses led to 
consideration of the personal narrative. A related but different approach, namely 
the Hassles-Uplift Index, brought attention to the fact that our attention can 
alight on many events in a single day. In turn, this enables the obvious but 
crucial observation that, if required, we can focus our concentration upon a 
single area. At such times, our thoughts are occupied with but one narrative or a 
group of related narratives. Meanwhile, it is an undoubted truth that many other 
narratives continue unaffected within the personal narrative. This is the central 
tenet of significant and dominant narratives: that our minds can be voluntarily or 
involuntarily focussed on a single chain of events.
Given the data in the transcripts, I had no quantitative assessments of the 
importance of given narratives. Instead, my use of significance and dominance 
was, essentially, an approximation derived from qualitative descriptions in the 
data. Concerning these, it is an unfortunate aspect of presentation that limits the 
amount of written detail that can be included. I cannot stress enough that the 
data resulting from the interviews was not solely a mental illness narrative, but a 
personal narrative. This was by virtue of having talked about many subjects, of 
which experience of mental illness was but one. Of course this was not true of 
all respondents: for example, Eddie Hooper-Smith and Mr. K. deviated little, 
whilst Anne spoke entirely of her illness and her partner. However, others, 
particularly Dorothy, Mr. P., Sandra, and Anita, precised their entire life stories 
in the course of exploration. As a consequence, I felt that I gained considerable 
insight into the experiences relevant to this study.
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11.10: Overview of the mental illness narrative
The data indicated that the mental illness narrative impacts upon the personal 
narrative in two areas, direct and indirect The direct area pertains to experience 
of the constituent phenomena:
• The content of the phenomena
• Emotional, intellectual and behavioural reaction to phenomena
• The form of the phenomena as determined by classification of content
• Medical and/or other treatment (if any)
• Duration of phenomena
The indirect area concerns other nested narratives which may be affected by 
the mental illness narrative. Although the consequences are usually negative, it 
would be inaccurate to generalize to that effect, particularly with reference to 
intimate and family relationships. These include, though not necessarily in 
order of importance:
• Intimate relationships
• Family relationships
• Social and cultural relationships (including personal freedom)
• Employment status; ability to work
• Financial status
In positing the above list, I stress that they are broad categories, of which any 
one of the nine personal narratives included some, but not necessarily all.
11.11: Assessing the impact of phenomena diagnosed as mental illness 
upon personal identity 
11.11.1: Prologue: so when did it all begin?
Common to all prologues are indications of possible overwhelm, some vague 
and spanning many years, (e.g. the unhappiness reported by Mr. P.) and some 
that could be interpreted as ‘warning rattles’ (e.g. stress, as reported by Mr.
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Gwent; social phobia and night fears as reported by Dorothy). However, the 
question of the degree to which the respondents were aware of incipient 
phenomena and their potential severity is exceedingly complex. To elaborate, it 
might be helpful to detail my own experiences of phenomena diagnosed as 
mental illness. Looking back, I can speculate with confidence on certain core 
beliefs and trends and I can describe in vivid detail the many phenomena 
associated with my various diagnoses. Yet, despite my best efforts, I cannot 
pinpoint exactly when an episode began. With the wisdom of hindsight I can 
identify warning signs, but I cannot ascertain when unhappiness or insecurity 
metamorphosed into something more. To explain this to someone who has 
never experienced mental illness, I use the obvious example of a physical
illness. We all recognize when we are succumbing to a common cold Or do
we? Far more likely is that we recognize the first symptom: a soreness in the 
throat or nose, a first sneeze. By the time we are aware of the cold, it has long 
begun: we did not recognize the prologue until overwhelm was imminent.
To this construct I wish to add a further large measure of uncertainty.
Concerning a physical illness such as a common cold, we may entertain doubts 
until the symptoms are unarguable. Similarly, we may entertain doubts about 
the significance of particular thought processes. However, as detailed in 
Chapter Four, physical illness can eventually be ascertained by a combination 
of primary and secondary qualities and, probably, the ‘tertiary quality’ of pain. In 
contrast, phenomena diagnosed as mental illness are felt exclusively in terms of 
‘fourth degree’ qualities, namely thought processes. Thus, not surprisingly, the 
nine narratives demonstrated a wide range of response to incipient phenomena.
Mr. Gwent was unlike any other respondent in that he was unaware of any 
incipient phenomena despite reporting a diagnosis of stress, accompanied by a 
warning to respond appropriately, by his GP. Subsequently, overwhelm was 
sudden and unexpected. Similarly, neither Eddie Hooper-Smith nor Anne 
appeared to be aware of precursors to sudden overwhelm. However, Anne’s 
narrative describes a prolonged period of strangeness that is probably best 
described as ‘limbo’ in that overwhelm was not diagnosed. Therefore, strictly 
speaking, this should be included in her prologue.
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The narratives of Mr. CBA and Mr. P. share commonalities in that they show a 
gradual decline of which they appeared to be aware but seemed powerless to 
arrest. Thus, whilst overwhelm was not inevitable, it was the culmination of the 
constituent nested narratives. In comparison, the narratives of both Dorothy and 
Sandra described an intensifying of unease in social circles and, eventually, 
overwhelm in the form of mania. Interestingly, by virtue of deliberate isolation, 
Sandra appears to be able to have controlled her symptoms to a greater 
degree. Mr. K. also describes awareness of phenomena at an early stage but, 
in contrast, sought aid to control same from a spiritual healer. However, 
unfortunately, he did not elaborate upon the circumstances that subsequently 
led to overwhelm. Lastly, the complex narrative provided by Anita includes 
several significant nested narratives, any one of which could have been a 
precursor to overwhelm. Accordingly, further analysis is withheld pending 
further examination of her narrative in the following sections.
11.11.2: The experience of overwhelm
Common to all nine narratives of overwhelm was at least one prolonged 
episode of complete dominance by the mental health narrative. Within this, four 
respondents (Mr. Gwent; Mr. P.; Anne; Anita) experienced the extremely 
powerful nested narrative of suicidal ideation. Yet, whilst this ‘ultimate’ 
expression of overwhelm would be understandable, it would be a gross over­
simplification. Of far greater significance is that all of the respondents described 
processes wherein their identities were effectively lost; of thoughts and actions 
beyond their conscious control. Despite this, they were (with the possible 
exception of Anne in the early stages of her illness) aware of the turmoil within, 
thus they became unwilling observers of their own aberrant mental processes. 
Thereafter, all are able to remember their trauma, as proven by the fact that 
they provided the often extraordinary level of detail about their experiences in 
these interviews.
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11.11.3: The intensity and duration of overwhelm
From any point of view, this section must be regarded as highly arbitrary. With 
reference to the transcripts, onset of overwhelm ranged from a gradual decline 
(Mr. CBA, Mr. P.) to sudden onset (Mr. Gwent; Eddie Hooper-Smith).
Thereafter, however, how should duration of overwhelm be defined? Whilst 
hospitalization is undoubtedly one parameter, it must be stressed that recovery 
begins there. Thus duration becomes a question of balance, of an indeterminate 
point when health begins to attain dominance over illness. By adopting this 
diffuse construct, the possibility of temporary relapse and/or sudden events can 
be included. Specifically, it is pertinent to refer to the suicide attempts by Anne 
and the suicidal ideation of Mr. Gwent, which occurred after the onset of 
overwhelm. Notably, these had very different origins: whereas Anne reacted to 
the ending of a relationship, Mr. Gwent suffered a surge in depressive thoughts. 
However, in narrative terms, both represented dominant narratives of 
tremendous potency, sufficient to suppress all other considerations.
11.11.4: The aftermath of overwhelm
Undoubtedly, if one views a personal narrative in terms of a journey, then 
overwhelm could be expressed as crossing a Rubicon. More dramatically, some 
descriptions in the data could be described as opening Pandora’s Box.
However, such descriptions imply irrevocable action, whereas the data included 
narratives whereby overwhelm was partially or entirely mediated. Thus it is 
sufficient to acknowledge overwhelm as a profound experience arising from 
dominance of a mental illness narrative. Included in this was a process of 
recognition, maybe even the beginnings of a new understanding, whereby 
mental illness is now known to be ‘the problem’. As explained in the overview of 
the mental illness narrative (see above), the aftermath of overwhelm may be 
direct, in that phenomena continue; and indirect in that other nested narratives 
within personal narrative may have suffered impact. This leads to a concept of 
recovery as a reclamation, repair, and possible restructuring of the personal 
narrative. Within this, in the course of normal interactions within the personal
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narrative, evaluation and re-evaluation of relevant memories may take place, 
including those described in the prologues.
Associated with this is a need for some qualification, particularly with regard to 
direct effects of phenomena. That is, recovery is a state of being as opposed to 
something possessing specific boundaries. Therefore, it is possible to recognize 
varying degrees and/or qualities of recovery without contradiction. Thus, 
recovery can be said to be complete if phenomena are effectively treated with 
medication. Similarly, recovery can be partial in that phenomena can continue, 
even remaining a significant narrative. However, as stressed throughout this 
study, an objective view is virtually certain to be influenced or even 
compromised by how it is appraised. Thus, as will be shown in the following 
review of the recovery narratives, an integral part of recovery is a belief that one 
is recovering or has recovered. If this is absent, then the aftermath of 
overwhelm may be experienced as chronic illness, maintained in part by the fact 
of its existence.
11.11.5: Recovery
Since an overview of the recovery narratives was made at the conclusion to the 
previous chapter, this section will discuss individual personal narratives in turn, 
making comparisons with other personal narratives as and when appropriate.
At the time of interview, Mr. K. enjoyed complete recovery with the aid of 
medication. His narrative was important for what he did not say: even amid his 
occasional grumbling regarding hospital facilities, there was little mention of the 
reason he was there. Overall, the impression gained was of ready acceptance 
followed by eventual assimilation. Notably, his experience of illness led directly 
to user involvement, first as a volunteer then as a paid worker. However, at no 
time did he speculate upon other career avenues, therefore whether or not this 
represented a change of direction must be regarded as a moot point. 
Accordingly, I feel that Mr. K. views his illness as an unfortunate event that 
ultimately turned out for the best in that it enabled an interest and a career. In 
this, the mental health narrative remains active in that his personal identity now 
includes a positive user imago.
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Like Mr. K., Mr. Gwent now enjoys almost complete recovery, but without the 
aid of medication. When reviewing his narrative I am struck forcibly by the 
totality and suddenness of overwhelm: that transformation from competent 
professionalism to tearful helplessness was virtually instantaneous. As such, it 
appears to have constituted what was, for him at the time, a previously 
unimaginable vulnerability. In connection with this, he made a succinct 
summary:
I didn’t like it.
I didn’t like it at all......
It was an awful experience and......
It’s funny, if  somebody should say 
everybody should experience
what I’ve gone through [..... ]
no, I wouldn’t say that,
I wouldn’t wish it on anybody.
Nevertheless, he drew attention to a beneficial consequence of his experiences:
I genuinely think I’m a better person [...... ]
And I think my empathy is enhanced
by the experience that I’ve been through.
Almost certainly, much of this can be attributed to experience of human 
kindness in the persons of Mr. Gwent’s wife and friends. However, it is 
noteworthy throughout his interview that he made mention of emotional reaction 
(specifically, tears) in response to ostensibly joyful occasions, particularly 
renditions of music. Therefore, there is a possibility that experience of 
phenomena diagnosed as mental illness somehow intensified this quality. 
Concerning this, exploration would have been a valuable aspect of a second 
interview: looking back, I regret that I did not think to ask the appropriate 
question at the time. Unlike Mr. K., Mr Gwent does not appear to have acquired 
a user imago; instead, I posit cautiously that his data implies a form of ‘survivor’ 
imago. This is by virtue of his description of emotional vulnerability (see 
previous chapter).
Mr. P.’s narrative is similar to Mr. Gwent’s in that both were diagnosed as 
suffering from depression. However, in virtually all other respects, they are
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entirely different. Whereas Mr. Gwent was a successful professional, Mr. P. 
described a succession of unfulfilling occupations and eventual unemployment. 
Whereas Mr. Gwent’s marriage was stable, Mr. P. was alone and unhappy. As 
a consequence of his combined circumstances, Mr. P. entered into a period of 
decline, culminating in overwhelm. Thereafter, again in contrast to Mr. Gwent, 
his rehabilitation began in sheltered accommodation: at this time he appeared 
to have had no prospects of a return to employment.
Once the impetus of overwhelm had passed, Mr. P., with the aid of counselling, 
came to see his illness as an affirmation of the negative nested narratives that 
had blighted his past:
I concluded that 
I wasn’t the weakling
that everybody made me out to be [.....]
That I did have a voice-
that although I didn’t cry out at the tim e,.....
I was crying out then, saying,
“This is what I am;
this is what I ’ve been through.”
And it has been shit, basically. [..... ]
As detailed above, counselling resulted in successful challenge of a negative 
imago: this important concept will be discussed in the conclusion. Also 
applicable is Frank’s (1993) construct of ‘epiphany’: Mr. P. became able to see 
himself as an independent individual with a potential in his personal narrative 
that exceeded all that had gone before. His rehabilitation was gradual but 
progressive, approximating to Frank’s ‘quest narrative’ (1997) whereby illness 
leads to self-discovery. Later, applicable to his narrative is the ‘melodrama’ 
genre detailed by Gergen and Gergen (2001) in that it contains many later 
setbacks amid triumphs. As such, this is an extremely important aspect of Mr. 
P.’s later narrative: given the details in his transcripts, it is evident that he has 
acquired a resilience that he did not possess before. Therefore, despite his 
relationship and financial problems at the time of interview, he remained 
positive, averring that he was glad he had had his illness:
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I am happy that I have been through it.
It has been tough, yes,
And its-
Very much it’s had its moments.
But I wouldn’t change it,
I wouldn’t change it.
The central theme of the narratives of both Eddie Hooper-Smith and Anne is 
loss. Both had professional careers prior to overwhelm; both suffered relatively 
sudden onset of severe psychotic symptoms; both suffered the break-up of a 
relationship; both continue to be troubled by phenomena, albeit mediated by 
medication. Also, stated in both transcripts is the fact that their parents 
remained supportive, though Anne appears to be living alone at a far earlier 
stage in her recovery than Eddie. Concerning recovery, there are important 
differences, some of which may derive from the fact that Eddie’s narrative is 
over a longer time period than Anne’s. Throughout his interview, his approach 
was pragmatic, even when describing florid symptoms and expressing his 
opinions concerning medication. With regard to the present and the future, his 
life strategy can be described as ‘assisted assimilation’, that is, a gradual re­
integration into society with the aid of a Support Worker. Notably his voices 
remain, albeit mediated by selective listening. The impact upon his sense of 
personal identity seems to be considerable: despite his progress, phenomena 
diagnosed as mental illness can be viewed as remaining a dominant narrative.
In contrast, Anne has yet to come to terms with the consequences of her illness.
Therefore, it remains dominant amongst a complex of unresolved narratives in
that schizophrenia is at the core of all that she has lost. Throughout the
interview, a recurring theme was a pernicious introspection centred on loss and
what might have been. Undoubtedly, her convictions are driven by the
unresolved narrative of her relationship, which exacerbates feelings of
loneliness and rejection. Nevertheless, mental illness should be viewed as the
precipitating factor in what Anne views as a catalogue of catastrophe: if she had
not become ill, then no misfortune would have occurred. Associated with this
are feelings of guilt: however, on repeated scrutiny, I remain uncertain
concerning the precise focus of this. Although she cites smoking skunk, the
pivotal event was her trip to the Far East: however, whether this was influenced
268
by illness phenomena (e.g. grandeur) is not clear. What is certain is that she 
regards her illness as culpable, something that could have been prevented.
I posit that Anne’s feelings of guilt should be regarded as a third significant 
narrative, aligned with the mental health and relationship narratives, but a 
distinct narrative in its own right. As such, it serves to exacerbate both of the 
other narratives, particularly the latter. Of crucial importance is that it is a 
definitive example of an unresolved narrative: by its very nature, guilt can 
remain corrosive until mediated by understanding and forgiveness. Thus, like 
Eddie Hooper-Smith, phenomena diagnosed as mental illness remain dominant 
in Anne’s narrative. However, whilst the impact upon personal identity in both 
cases is considerable, I suggest that there is a fundamental difference between 
them. In terms of imagoes, Eddie’s schema is that of user, whereas Anne's is 
that of victim.
From one viewpoint, the narrative of Mr. CBA is similar to that of Eddie Hooper- 
Smith in embracing hope by virtue of nascent narratives of social involvement. 
From another, it is pessimistic, containing the same aspects of loss as that of 
Anne. However, the presentation of the narratives was markedly different, 
whereas Anne’s theme conveyed torment, Mr. CBA’s often conveyed a fatalistic 
weariness. It is incumbent to mention Mr. CBA’s adverse reaction to the second 
interview, namely the fact that he felt unable to cope with the self-analysis 
involved. The impression gained is that his on-going illness and its 
consequences continue to weigh heavily upon him in that they constitute a 
powerful dominant narrative. For Mr.CBA, his efforts at rehabilitation provide but 
a short respite as opposed to release and hope.
Arising from the above observations, and as speculated in the previous chapter, 
the impact of phenomena of phenomena diagnosed as mental illness upon Mr. 
CBA’s sense of personal identity may have been massive. To describe this, I 
submit that the trajectory of his mental health narrative has reached a plateau. 
Whilst it is evident that he makes efforts to ascend beyond his present 
boundaries, these are compromised by recriminations, regrets, and on-going 
experiences. However, associated with this summary, I point out that an
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important aspect of Mr. CBA’s narrative has been previously explored with 
reference to failed and unresolved narratives. That is, if the nature of 
unresolved narratives is rigorously applied, then it may be that future events 
and/or understandings may mediate the impact of phenomena diagnosed as 
mental illness upon his personal narrative.
Concerning the narratives of Dorothy and Sandra, it is evident that there are 
significant similarities. Both began to experience problems in adolescence, 
which continued during university. Eventually, in the second year of her course, 
Dorothy experienced the first of a series of severe episodes over a period of 
many years. On the other hand, Sandra made a deliberate decision to live at 
home during her course, so suppressing, if not alleviating, her problems. This 
policy was successful until, following her exams, she experienced the first of 
two psychotic episodes, each of which necessitated detention under Section III 
of the 1983 Mental Health Act. With reference to the nature of their phenomena, 
both respondents described uncontrolled episodes of erratic and/or violent 
behaviour. However, despite these common significant narratives, their 
personal narratives had, at the time of the interviews, taken very different 
courses.
Much centres on the degree of understanding of phenomena that each 
respondent has (or believed they have) achieved. In connection with this, I draw 
attention to Sandra’s knowledge of psychology, which she has applied to both 
her own and her father’s illness. In both interviews, my overriding impression 
was that she had gained an understanding of her narratives to a degree at 
which she felt satisfied, especially that of her relationship with her father. 
Although these narratives may remain unresolved in the sense that they are 
unfinished and may yet become negative once more, they are now resolved 
with respect to past events. Accordingly, despite my reservations, Frank’s 
(1997) construct of a ‘quest narrative’ can be properly applied: for Sandra, much 
that was painful is now known, thus its power is diminished. Associated with 
this, I suggest that the exchange with her father, as detailed in the previous 
chapter, was an example of ‘epiphany’.
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In contrast, Dorothy remained tormented by her continuing illness despite her 
vigorous researches into its nature. Undoubtedly, this was exacerbated by the 
possible diagnosis of personality disorder, which she saw as a conferring of 
blame for all that had transpired. On repeated scrutiny of her interviews, this 
event represents a distillation of her central concern: that the causes of her 
illness are unknown. It is not enough to constantly trawl the past, looking for 
clues: always it will be possible to focus upon a significant nested narrative, a 
possible reason why. However, before that, there will always be another 
significant narrative, and before that another, until, eventually, events in the 
personal narrative have occurred too early to remember. Denied certainty as a 
result, one is forced to resort to speculation, thus the whole process of looking 
for that elusive pivotal event continues anew, probably never to be fulfilled. As 
such, the quest for knowledge can become a troublesome and debilitating 
unresolved narrative.
The data indicate that this has become a potent nested narrative within 
Dorothy’s mental health narrative. Although she often enjoys many social 
pursuits, some requiring a high degree of commitment, she remains vulnerable 
to both her on-going illness and the question, “Why?” Permeating virtually all of 
her self-appraisals, it appears to hinder rather than aid her progress: for 
instance, her antagonism towards cognitive therapy was, in part, due to her 
conviction that people were asking the wrong questions. Whether or not 
Dorothy will, eventually, assimilate her mental health narrative must, at this 
juncture, remain a moot point. Such is her evident confusion that she 
undoubtedly sees herself a user and, maybe even a victim of her illness and the 
mental health system. Nevertheless, she has not succumbed to disenchantment 
(Chadwick, 1997b, 584)) but strives to maintain a healthy lifestyle. Thus I feel 
obliged to make comparison with Eddie Hooper-Smith, who appears to have 
accepted the fact of his illness (see above), and speculate that Dorothy may, 
one day, find sufficient answers to satisfy her unresolved narratives. Until then, 
the user imago in terms of continuing experience of phenomena seems likely to 
remain strong.
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Anita also presented a positive outlook when interviewed. However, to pursue 
this review, I am obliged to stress my own limitations when speculating upon the 
possible impact of Anita’s experiences. There are many events that I know of 
but do not understand, also that there are many events that I have believed to 
have understood, only to learn that I did not. Concerning the events described 
in her personal narrative, I query whether my own capacities for sympathy and 
empathy are sufficient to fully appreciate the fullness of some of the significant 
nested narratives. Thus, in unreservedly focussing on Anita’s early childhood as 
the first instance of significant nested narratives, I stress that I do not intend a 
form of amateur psychoanalysis. Instead, I wish to emphasize that she suffered 
two serious stressors before the age of ten:
• Sexual abuse by her father leading to rejection by her mother
• Strict and repressive upbringing by her grandmother
As a child, Anita was vulnerable to social negotiation, including guilt and 
reciprocity (Gergen and Gergen, 2001). Moreover, the dark statements of her 
grandmother can be likened to Novitz’s (2001) ‘politics of narrative identity’ 
wherein a person can deliberately subvert another’s sense of self. With 
reference to the constant admonitions described, it is highly significant that 
Anita uses those terms to describe the aftermath of overwhelm (see 
below).Thus, in tandem with her mother’s rejection, Anita’s personal narrative 
was, in all probability, severely compromised. However, it should be stressed 
that she described no instances of mental illness until she spoke of her first 
pregnancy.
Paradoxically, if being taken into care was an affirmation of rejection, it was also 
described as liberation. On reflection, I suggest that this was due to the fact that 
Anita could now exercise her full potential. However, it is also possible that this 
event represents a severance from the past, so marking a new course for her 
personal narrative, or even the subjective beginnings of a new personal 
narrative. Anita’s transcript concerns survival strategies to meet institutional 
bullying and also abuse: on balance, I interpret this as the assumption a 
necessary ‘mask’ representing learned reactions to a hostile world.
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There is a risk that any summary of Anita’s personal narrative in adulthood will 
be hopelessly inadequate. In consequence, I retain the concept of a mask with 
reference to Chadwick’s (1997a) autobiographical account of internal conflicts 
resulting in delusion and attempted suicide. Likewise, Anita’s relationship 
problems followed by involvement with drugs gangs can only be described as 
unhappiness followed by a prolonged period of delusion and mania. Like 
Chadwick’s account, the data provided describe the construction of an 
alternative identity: this was so complete as to constitute a wholly dominant 
narrative. If so, this raises a complex hypothetical question concerning the 
impact of this experience upon Anita’s sense of personal identity. That is, was 
the construct defined by interaction with her former personal narrative 
quiescent, in suspension, so allowing the formation of an entirely new identity? 
Or was it responding at a level unrecognized at the time? Whilst I suspect it is 
virtually impossible to answer this, I draw attention to the fact that Anita was 
able to remember many of the events of the delusory narrative. Thus, although 
the possible impact at the time must remain unknown, the later impact was 
described in considerable detail.
Following overwhelm, Anita was reduced to a state of mind-numbing exhaustion 
from which she gradually recovered with the aid of counselling and medication. 
Unfortunately, however, her personal narrative continued to be dogged by 
several negative nested narratives:
• Puerperal psychosis after the birth of her fourth child
• Relationship problems: concerning these, she did not specify whether or 
not the two narratives were linked.
• Another pregnancy was ended by miscarriage and what Anita describes 
as ‘aggravated depression’.
• Another pregnancy and eventual birth proceeded amid narratives of 
hospital admission due to possible bipolar disorder and later, a diagnosis 
of borderline personality disorder.
• An extended legal battle concerning Anita’s suitability to look after her 
children.
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At this point, I turn to the expression ‘battle fatigue’ to describe Anita’s state of 
mind. In the following extract she summarizes the entirety of the negative 
narratives that have nested or continue to nest in her personal narrative:
through my turbulence and my chaos, 
my mental health,
I ’d lost my professional career,
I ’d lost any relationships I ’d tried to establish,
I ’d lost my children,
I ’d had loads o f  labels and judgements.
I just felt very, very, very scorned 
and a bit o f a self-fulfilling prophecy 
o f what my nana and my mother had called me: 
the spawn o f the devil.
I felt this evil.......
sort o f monster, gremlin, devil, demon 
rolled into one skin.
I had a terrible, absolutely terrible identity crisis 
I didn’t know who the hell I was any more.
The failed suicide attempts that followed can be compared with Chadwick’s 
(ibid) autobiographical account in that one of Anita’s methods (attempting to 
throw herself under a bus) was the same. On the other hand, whereas 
Chadwick was driven by delusion and paranoia, Anita appears to have 
responded to hopelessness. Crucially, in the above extract, she appears to use 
‘turbulence and chaos’ as descriptive of her mental health. Yet, to explore fully, I 
believe that these two terms must be taken in the context of ‘labels and 
judgements’ and ‘a self-fulfilling prophecy’. Through this linkage, another 
careful comparison can be made with the narrative of Mr. P. That is, he saw the 
onset of mental illness and gradual recovery as an affirmation of his beliefs; 
more importantly, that he had had a right to be ill. Likewise, Anita saw the 
succession of crises due to illness as an affirmation. However, in her case, it 
was not that she had a right to be ill, but that she was fundamentally flawed. For 
Anita, phenomena diagnosed as mental illness represented the inevitable 
outcome of those character traits -  those imagoes -  that others had seen in her 
as a child.
On reviewing the data in conjunction with her demeanour at the time of 
interview, I feel that Anita had begun to assimilate this overview. Throughout
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her transcript, her resilience is undeniable; therefore it was not surprising that 
she was, yet again, attempting to rebuild her life. I close this review of Anita’s 
narrative as I began: amid speculation and uncertainty. In particular, I ask, and 
will continue to ask, “Which came first?” The Central Research Question asks if 
phenomena diagnosed as mental illness impact on personal identity. Yet, in 
Anita’s case, such is the complexity of her experiences that it might be more 
appropriate to ask if sense of personal identity impacts upon the mental health 
narrative.
11.12: Conclusion
The overview of Anita’s recovery narrative completes the integration of findings. 
This chapter began by exploring and challenging the applicability of narrative 
constructs to the experiences described in the data. Thereafter, the data itself 
were reviewed with reference to two groups of consequences. These are:
• A direct area that pertains to experience of the constituent phenomena in 
terms of content, duration, emotional and behavioural reaction, and 
medical treatment including diagnosis.
• An indirect area that concerns other nested narratives which may be 
affected by the mental illness narrative. Examples of these included 
intimate relationships, family relationships, social and cultural 
relationships (including personal freedom), and ability to work, which in 
turn, affected employment status and, possibly, financial status
The following and final chapter in this study reviews the main findings and 
weighs their importance with reference to the Central Research Question, 
namely ‘How do phenomena diagnosed as mental impact upon sense of 
personal identity?’ Following this, it will explore possible avenues for further 
research and the possible significance and application of narrative constructs to 
current mental health practice.
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Chapter Twelve: Epilogue: reflections, conclusions and
Recommendations
12.1: Introduction: the role of myself as researcher and narrator
Throughout this study, I have emphasized my own role as a user of mental 
health services and that of my wife, June, as user and carer. Inevitably, this 
raised questions of reflexivity, particularly in the event of shared experiences 
such as hospitalization. Also, there is the valid question as to whether 
knowledge of my experiences encouraged an interviewee to be ‘more open’ 
concerning their own.
To a large extent, the first issue was met by the demands of interview 
technique. As explored in Chapter 5, the fact that I was in ‘interview mode’ as 
opposed to ‘conversation mode’ meant that both my intention and attention 
were directed towards the purpose of the interview. This experience was, I 
found, very similar to my former activities as a Samaritan and my present role 
as an advocate/befriender. In both cases, listening to another person is 
mediated by their perceived need: accordingly, one is constantly aware not only 
of what is being said, but of its importance to the on-going situation, and to the 
other’s demeanour. In effect, one is analyzing an unfolding narrative at the 
same time as participating in it: whilst this may seem somewhat callous, I stress 
that it does not necessarily impede emotional reaction. Indeed, I often found 
myself empathizing with respondents.
Thereafter, it is important to question whether or not this discipline was 
maintained in later analysis. In answer, whilst reflexivity can never be entirely 
avoided, the practice of successive coding levels served to check on preliminary 
conclusions. With reference to my own experiences, I found that it was relatively 
easy to avoid undue comparison by identification. To elaborate, I draw attention 
to my reflection in Chapter Five, where I ask if only a user can understand 
another user. Also, in connection with this, I draw attention to the wide range of 
experiences described by the nine respondents. As explored in Chapters Eight,
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Nine, and Ten, it is inevitable that there will be commonalities. However, there 
are also many examples of highly individual experience. Accordingly, any one 
narrative, including my own, is sufficiently singular to stand on its own without 
being inadvertently integrated with another.
The question of whether or not knowledge of my own narrative influenced the 
readiness of the respondents to speak of their own is extremely difficult to 
answer, if not imponderable. Intuitively, I felt that all of the respondents wanted 
to tell their story on the grounds that they were contributing to what might be 
useful research. Obviously, however, this may be wishful thinking on my part. 
Nevertheless, I suggest that if a researcher is able to convey that they 
recognize the worth of prospective interviewees as persons, then much can be 
achieved. To this end, a full and sympathetic information sheet explaining the 
proposed research, possibly supported by a short talk to a user group as a 
whole, may be a vital link in the chain of recruitment.
12. 2: Reflections (i): the value of a research accompanier
In Chapter Five I discussed the role of my wife, June, as research assistant. In 
summary, these were:
i) As chaperone when interviewing female respondents.
ii) Provision of support should an interviewee become unwell during 
interview.
iii) Monitoring of my own health in response to interviews.
Rapidly, we found that the interactions of an interview were facilitated by three 
as opposed to two persons. However, on reflection, it would be remiss to claim 
that this was the product of a calculated approach. Rather, by virtue of our close 
relationship, June instinctively recognized that I was content to allow a 
respondent to dictate the pace and content of an interview. Accordingly, in the 
main, her interjections were in tandem with my own, often with relation to a 
medical issue such as diagnosis or medication. Notably, only once did she
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inadvertently assume the role of counsellor; namely in response to Anne’s 
pleading for reassurance.
In addition, I must emphasize June’s many supporting roles in this study.
Initially, also as explained in Chapter Five, she was instrumental in providing 
several useful references. Thereafter, and throughout the study, she was the 
sounding-board for many of my musings and speculations concerning 
background reading and methodology (However, lest I create the impression 
that this was one-way traffic, she found discussion useful with respect to her 
own voluntary research activities with the Mental Health Research Network 
North-East Hub; also, later, in her training as a ‘Cruse Bereavement Care’ 
volunteer). Later, as the thesis began to take form, she performed the 
invaluable role of proof-reader and occasional critic.
Over and above these roles, by far the most important was that of confidante 
and support. To tread the path of a distance learning student is often lonely, 
despite the encouragement of one’s supervisors. Instead of being able to seek 
the solace of consultation with a colleague ‘down the corridor’, one is obliged to 
glower at an unresponsive computer screen. In this context, it is appropriate to 
be brutally honest by stating that I am frequently handicapped by obsessive 
ruminations due to my illness. Similarly, my illness is probably the source of 
sudden despair leading to destructive gestures. Thus, often -  too often -  has 
June been obliged to listen to my mutterings and grumblings to the effect that 
this study should be cast into a convenient abyss (As explained in Chapter Five, 
at one point I did burn all my work, including computer records; fortunately, 
most of this could be retrieved). Indeed, particularly in the later days when 
doubt constantly gnawed, she assured me that walking away forever is a 
common desire held by PhD students. Accordingly, I state unequivocally that all 
PhD students should be aware of the need for support and be prepared to seek 
same. It is as this juncture therefore, that I wish to add my thanks to Julie 
Repper, Gordon Grant, and, latterly, Mark Doel as supervisors.
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12.3: Reflections (ii) limitations of the study 
12.3.1: Convenience sample
As explained in Chapter Five, the predominant consideration when inviting 
persons to participate in the study was that of informed consent. Associated 
with this, I made an early decision that I would not attempt to interview any 
person who was undergoing in-patient treatment in a hospital. This policy raises 
conflicting questions that are important both ethically and with reference to 
research. By declining to interview an in-patient, am I depriving them of an 
opportunity to tell their narrative at a time when it might be most important to 
them? From a pragmatic research viewpoint, it can be argued that valuable data 
could be obtained by interview. However, this is surely outweighed by the 
ethical considerations associated with the fact of hospitalization. At this time, it 
is highly probable that an individual’s personal narrative is dominated by a 
complex of nested narratives associated with and deriving from mental illness. 
Accordingly, the question of informed consent is too compromised: whilst an 
interview may have benefits, it could also be much too intrusive.
Concerning other possible respondents, my view is that membership of a user 
group is helpful but should not be mandatory. Undoubtedly, many useful 
contacts were made through the User and Carer Involvement Co-ordinator at 
the Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys Trust. However, two of the interviewees (Mr. 
CBA; Mr. Gwent) were contacted directly. This was for two reasons, firstly 
distance from the ‘main’ recruitment group; and secondly, the basic fact that 
their participation in organized user activities was minimal (Mr. CBA) or nil (Mr. 
Gwent). Similarly, I know of other persons in my home area who might have 
been willing to be interviewed. Therefore, I suggest that the main criterion for 
future participation should be informed consent, including permission to advise 
the User and Carer Co-ordinator of the relevant N.H.S. Trust should the first 
contact be made by myself or another researcher (It should be emphasized that 
this would almost certainly be required by a Research Ethics Committee).
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12.3.2: Reflections (iii): the retrospective nature of narrative
Associated with the research question is a straightforward but extremely 
awkward observation, namely that I did not interview the respondents before 
their experiences of mental illness. Therefore, all of the data from the transcripts 
is expressed through the lens of recovery. In response, one can resort to 
pragmatism by stating that it would have been impossible to include the 
necessary foresight in any research. However, far better is to draw attention to 
the focus of the research: to ascertain the possible impact of phenomena upon 
personal identity, it was necessary to obtain the respondents’ own viewpoints of 
same. As opposed to a prescriptive lead by me, each respondent decided which 
nested narratives were significant with reference to the overall experience of 
mental illness. Thus four respondents (Dorothy, Mr. P., Sandra, and Anita) 
began their narratives with recall of their childhood, whereas the other five (Mr. 
CBA, Mr. K., Eddie Hooper-Smith, Anne, and Mr. Gwent) chose to begin their 
narratives much closer to the onset of phenomena.
12.4: The Central Research Question: How do phenomena diagnosed as 
mental illness impact upon personal identity?
With reference to the data contained in the respondents’ narratives, this section 
will explore the possible impact of phenomena diagnosed as mental illness 
upon sense of personal identity. To do so, it must first summarise the many 
possible aspects of experiencing phenomena diagnosed as mental illness.
They may be far more than to know a sometimes uncontrollable maelstrom of 
conflicting thoughts and emotions. They are to experience the nascence and 
continuation of an illness narrative, a nested narrative that may be but short, or 
may remain active throughout the continuing personal narrative. Within this 
narrative, they can be the direct consequences of illness: periods of invalidity, of 
contact with medical personnel, of treatment. It may be that there are additional 
consequences: the effect upon personal relationships; the effects upon 
employment and financial status. They can be to involuntarily focus upon a 
complex of understandings and beliefs derived from societal and cultural 
concepts and expectations.
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Thereafter, caution is required lest generalizations metamorphose into 
assumptions. Given the discussion so far, it is permissible to view the personal 
narrative as including some significant nested narratives that can be designated 
with identities of their own, namely imagoes. Applying this construct, personal 
identity can be understood in terms of an interaction between imagoes of 
differing qualities. However, in making this assertion, it is essential to appreciate 
that this interaction may be of extreme complexity due to the number and 
potency of imagoes involved. In this context, it is a justifiable criticism that to 
‘name’ every individual imago would be exhaustive and, ultimately meaningless. 
Instead it is sufficient to concentrate upon those imagoes of greatest 
significance: in this way, the concept of dominant narratives enters into 
consideration. As explained in earlier chapters, a single narrative, and thereby a 
single imago, may dominate the entire personal narrative.
Nevertheless, this event does not, in itself, necessarily impact upon personal 
identity. Rather, as explained in the opening paragraph, the question centres on 
the consequences of this event. For, in the same way that experience may lead 
to the formation of an imago, so experience may lead to the extinction of an 
imago. Moreover, and of extreme importance, some narratives, for example 
those of Mr. P. and Sandra, show that positive imagoes may be generated by 
the initially negative experience of illness. Thus, maintaining caution, the 
narrative data suggests that much depends upon the duration and severity of 
overwhelm. Accordingly, at this point, it is necessary to support the assertions 
made by direct reference to the respondents’ narratives.
Mr. Gwent experienced what can be justifiably described as a brief but massive 
overwhelm, followed by a comparatively short period of recuperation and 
rehabilitation enabling return to work. Despite the intensity of the illness 
narrative, it is now virtually dormant, maintained only by the wariness of some 
colleagues. Crucially, as described in Chapter Ten, recovery is marked by the 
formation of a positive ‘carer’ imago. In Mr. K. ’s case, recovery was much more 
gradual, being enabled by medication; this led to first employment, so creating a 
positive imago associated with this new societal role.
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I hesitate to designate Mr. P.’s narrative as similar to the above narratives due 
to his descriptions of extended stressors during childhood and unhappy events 
in adulthood. Arguably, it can posited that the inevitable creation of negative 
imagoes (‘victim’; ‘loner’) may have gradually inculcated a vulnerability that 
culminated in depressive overwhelm. If so, then it is a moot point as to when 
mental illness phenomena became active. Moreover, I stress that this is 
conjecture, no matter how plausible. Therefore, it is better to concentrate on the 
nature of overwhelm which, like that of Mr. Gwent, was sudden and massive. 
Thereafter, however, his recovery narrative differed in that counselling led him 
to focus on those negative imagoes, that is, re-interpreting nested narratives 
and imagoes formed previous to the onset of mental illness. Thus, crucially, his 
recovery to the formation of an ‘okay person’ imago which valued, as opposed 
to denigrated, his emotional response to setbacks (it’s okay to be sad). In this 
way, his personal myth was revitalised. Nevertheless, the former negative 
‘loner’ imago occasionally intrudes, causing him to ask questions of himself (is it 
me?).
Another, far more complex example of the revitalisation of the personal myth is 
demonstrated by Sandra when talking about her ‘psychotic’ imago. The 
impression gained is that diagnosis was an act not of creation, but of 
elucidation: that Sandra was now able to name and perceive in depth an 
integral part of her identity. Thereafter came emancipation: she describes her 
new understanding of her father’s illness (I always seen him as the powerful 
one -  but he’s the one who’s vulnerable), plus her intention to apply her self- 
knowledge to her former career.
Using the terminology employed by Frank (1997) the first two narratives adhere 
to the restitution model whereas the second two are examples of the quest 
model. In turn, both types, particularly the latter, derive from the basic 
monomyth of Campbell (1993[1949]), which likens the personal narrative to a 
journey of discovery:
....a separation from the world, a penetration to some source of power, and a
life-enhancing return.
(Campbell, 1993, 35)
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Whilst it is necessary to guard against enthusiasm in connection with 
Campbell’s religious themes, it is also an easy matter to ‘ground’ his text in 
relation to the above narratives. That is, discovery is often synonymous with 
learning, which, as exemplified by the narratives, may derive from direct 
experience. Moreover, learning is not restricted to the acquisition of new 
narratives but can embrace the reinterpretation of existing narrative. Applying 
this understanding, it becomes evident that the personal identities of the four 
respondents named were enhanced differently. For Mr. Gwent and Mr. K., there 
was little or no reinterpretation described, whereas for Mr. P. and Sandra, it was 
the most important aspect of their narratives. Indeed, Sandra’s new 
interpretation of her father’s illness can be viewed as in accord with Frank’s 
(1993) description of ‘epiphany’.
In comparison, the data provided by Eddie Hooper-Smith can also be described 
as a restitution narrative, but complicated by the fact that illness phenomena 
remain significant within the mental health narrative. Alone amongst the 
respondents, Eddie has been obliged to deliberately create a ‘friend’ imago, 
whereby he can achieve a measure of control. On repeated examination of the 
relevant data, the impression is gained that this has become less significant 
than might be supposed. In effect, by acknowledging his voices in terms of ‘a 
secret friend’ (Chapter Ten) he diminishes them to the same level as 
imaginative wanderings. However, of greater impact upon his sense of identity 
are the admittedly limited descriptions of social difficulties caused by prolonged 
overwhelm. In that the data describes a programme of rehabilitation assisted by 
a support worker, the ‘user’ imago must be viewed as active. Nevertheless, in 
keeping with a restitution narrative, Eddie’s outlook remains positive.
The remaining four narratives exhibit varying degrees of contrast to those 
already discussed. Strictly speaking, all should be designated as restitution 
narratives in that a degree of recovery has been achieved. However, this is 
compromised either by continuing phenomena, the consequences of same, or a 
combination of both. Thus, for all four respondents, the ‘user’ imago is strong, 
an integral part of their personal identity. In addition, a sense of loss and/or
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failure is pervasive; of positive imagoes that became extinguished. Dorothy 
remains tormented by the nature and aetiology of her phenomena: in this 
sense, she is engaged in an unfulfilled quest narrative. Moreover, as detailed in 
Chapter Ten, awareness of her employment status in comparison to her friends 
has engendered a potent ‘failure’ imago (I look back to try and found out why 
I’m like this and why I’m such a failure). Similarly, Mr. CBA is also greatly 
troubled by a ‘failure’ imago, though the data suggests much appears to derive 
from on-going phenomena. In his case, his entire personal identity is 
compromised due to constant evaluations of his actions by the ‘wheel 
chuntering away to itself (Chapter 10).
In assessing the possible impact of illness phenomena upon Anita’s personal 
identity, one is therefore obliged to recognize that the data describes many 
severe stressors in her personal narrative. This is especially so concerning her 
childhood, which included several events that probably led to the formation of 
negative imagoes. Whether these were directly linked with later illness 
phenomena must remain speculative. Instead, all that can be stated with 
confidence is that it is not until her adult narrative that she begins detail of 
illness phenomena. With reference to these, some events are so extreme that, 
as suggested in the previous chapter, they constituted the formation of an entire 
‘alternative identity’ as opposed to an imago. Thereafter, she entered into a 
period which I shall compare to Frank’s model of a ‘chaos’ narrative in that her 
personal narrative was dominated by the day to day flow of on-going crises. It 
was only when these were resolved that she felt able to ‘resume’ her life. Yet, 
as the opportunity for reflection became possible, so the ‘user’ imago gained 
importance. At the time of her interview, it was dominant in that her efforts to 
maintain positivity and progress were being compromised by the failure of her 
medication regime.
Finally, the combination of consequences of illness means that Anne’s narrative 
can be regarded as a ‘chaos narrative’ or even a ‘broken narrative’ (Hyden and 
Brockmeier, 2008; Frank, 2008). This is because her personal narrative is 
dominated not only by the loss of employment status but by the failure to rebuild 
her relationship with her former partner. Throughout the interview, coherence
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was punctuated by pleading and questions: in effect, her personal myth is lost in 
recrimination. This observation leads to a summary of the nine narratives to the 
effect that it must be emphasized that any named narrative model or construct 
is but an approximation, relating to the main trajectory. Thus within a ‘quest’ 
narrative there will be instances of ‘chaos’, within chaos there will be instances 
of ‘restitution’ or maybe even ‘epiphany’, and so on.
The impact of phenomena diagnosed as mental illness upon sense of personal 
identity can be measured in the same way that the impact of any significant 
narrative can be measured. That is, in terms of causation and plot of what was 
before, of what happened, and what is now. As exemplified by the narrative 
data, the personal narrative, and thereby the personal myth, can be wholly 
dominated by the intensity of overwhelm. Thereafter, often with the assistance 
of other persons, restitution is possible and the personal myth can be restored, 
even enhanced. On the other hand, if the illness experience leads to the 
creation of negative imagoes then the impact of mental illness may be profound. 
Notably, these imagoes may also exist by virtue of the consequences of mental 
illness as opposed to the phenomena themselves. They may be generated by 
the consequences of overwhelm: as, for example, through the loss of 
employment (e.g. Mr. CBA); the ending of a relationship (e.g. Anne). They may
even be, as Novitz (2001, 151) states, have been ‘ actively imposed on us by
others’: such is the nature of stigma, as experienced by Dorothy. Thus the 
impact of illness phenomena upon sense of personal identity may be bleak 
indeed, whereby the personal myth, and thereby personal identity, is darkened 
by recrimination and despair.
This section closes with an important qualification to the above observations. As 
has been stressed throughout this thesis, the personal narrative is not static but 
constantly evolving due to the impact of new experiences. Thus recovery should 
not be regarded as a return to former status, but as an indication of restored 
narrative equilibrium. Crucially, as demonstrated by Mr. Gwent, Mr. P., Mr. K., 
and Sandra, recovery involved the acquisition of new understanding. Moreover, 
as an integral part of the personal narrative, the nature and influence of any one 
nested narrative may alter. Similarly, the nature and influence of any one imago
285
may alter due to the impact of new experience. Accordingly, any impact of 
phenomena diagnosed as mental illness upon personal identity should not be 
seen as indelible, but potentially changeable. Whilst experience cannot be 
unmade, its consequences can be nullified by new experience. Thus, it is 
possible that a person may again be overwhelmed by a future dominant 
negative narrative. Likewise, it is possible that a present negative narrative will 
yield to a burgeoning recovery.
The remainder of this chapter discusses recommendations for further research 
and the possible additions to present application of narrative theory in NHS 
practice. As an introduction to this, the following section briefly elaborates upon 
a construct of despair and how it can be challenged by the active pursuit of 
hope.
12.5: Hope: the resolution of unresolved narratives? 
12.5.1: Personal narrative and personal myth
This section opens by focusing on the crucial distinction between the personal 
narrative and the personal myth. Despite objective and subjective 
understanding of memories, the personal narrative is essentially factual, being 
comprised of experience. In contrast, as defined in Chapter Three, a personal 
myth is a complex expression of personal identity deriving from the perceived 
role of the person in those experiences. Thus, in this way, understanding of 
nested narratives within the personal narrative leads to formation of the 
personal myth: concerning this, Novitz’s (2001) detail of ‘narrative identities’ is a 
useful definition of imagoes. However, through internalized processes of 
reciprocity, the personal myth influences subjective understanding of the 
personal narrative.
Concerning the personal myth, it is essential to appreciate that it is an 
introspective construct as opposed to an idealized construct. Not only does it 
include notions of what we would like to be, it also includes notions of what we 
are. Therefore, it includes awareness and impressions of both positive and 
negative qualities, possibly in the form of imagoes. As explained above,
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concepts of these arise from the perceived role of the person in the experiences 
that are part of their personal narrative. Thus it follows that a group of related 
positive experiences may lead to the formation of a positive imago; similarly a 
group of related negative experiences may lead to the formation of a negative 
imago. However, once an imago is formed, this relationship becomes much 
more complex. As explained above and with relation to the data, the personal 
narrative and the personal myth are reciprocal. Thus an imago not only 
maintains itself through understanding of past experiences, it may increase in 
potency through influencing understanding of new experiences (e.g. Sandra’s 
deliberate use of her ‘psychotic’ imago; the involuntary negative impact of 
‘failure’ cited by Mr. CBA and Dorothy)
In the previous chapter, I reviewed the constructs of unresolved and failed 
narratives which, by their nature, pertain to negative experiences. From an 
objective point of view, a narrative cannot be described as failed; instead, it can 
only be designated as unresolved. However, this distinction is, effectively, 
irrelevant concerning the possible effect of such a narrative, namely the creation 
of a negative imago. This is the true potential of any significant negative 
experience: that it will initiate the construction of a self-entity that influences 
subjective understanding of the personal narrative. In this way, depending upon 
the strength of the imago, the nature of narrative can become distorted, and 
unresolved narratives may indeed become to be seen as failed. Associated with 
this, the dynamics of the entire personal myth may be adversely affected. This 
is particularly so if a person comes to believe that their personal narrative, and 
thereby their personal myth, has lost agency. With reference to Butler (1975) 
and Erikson (1963), McAdams (1993) suggests that:
During the later years of life, our mythmaking may subside somewhat as we
begin to review the myth that we have made.
(McAdams, 1993:278)
At face value, this construct is straightforward in that many experiences will 
have long ended. Nevertheless, if it is applied indiscriminately then it can 
contradict the fundamental principles of narrative theory and, potentially, deny 
any hope for the future. Should one come to believe that their personal myth is
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effectively complete, then the personal narrative will lose its vitality: within new 
experiences, opportunities for new understanding will be overlooked, for the 
simple but erroneous reason that the time for change is past. Yet, if the nature 
of the personal narrative is recognized as constantly evolving then hope may 
flourish. Always there is the possibility of a new significant narrative being 
initiated late in life. Secondly, it is possible that the very process that McAdams 
cites, namely review, will prove to be the vehicle by which major revisions of the 
personal myth are made. This is because review is not -  or should not be -  
passive recall but an active process of reconstruction in the light of past and 
new understanding.
12.5.2: Revitalizing the personal myth
In an exploration of recovery, Roberts and Wolfson (2004:38) explain that focus 
is on two main areas:
i) A ‘familiar’ dimension of clinical and social recovery
ii) Personal and existential dimensions of recovery
Given the second of these, which draws on subjective and self-evaluated 
accounts, there are obvious comparisons with the original data obtaining in this 
study. Thereafter, the authors (ibid, 39) opine that the ‘most widely accepted 
contemporary definition of recovery’ is that by Anthony in 1993. However, on 
examination of that author’s text, it appears to be a description deriving from 
several sources, as opposed to a definition perse:
Recovery is described as a deeply personal, unique process of changing one’s 
attitudes, values, feelings, goals, skills, and/or roles. It is a way of living a 
satisfying, hopeful, and contributing life even with limitations caused by illness. 
Recovery involves the development of new meaning and purpose in one’s life 
as one grows beyond the catastrophic effects of mental illness.
(Anthony, 1993, 527)
Thereafter, Roberts and Wolfson (ibid) explore recovery with relation to 
psychiatric practice, of which some concepts will be briefly explored later. This 
section, however, is concerned with a potential paradox within the above
288
recovery construct. That is, if recovery is a way of living a satisfying and hopeful 
life, it follows that hope must be a significant nested narrative within the 
personal narrative. Yet, as discussed previously, unresolved narratives may be 
contrary to this possibility, may be vehicles of despair. Thus, it becomes 
incumbent to address a hypothetical question. If hope is lost, extinguished by 
despair, how may it be rekindled so that recovery may be initiated?
A detailed exploration of hope is undertaken by Repper and Perkins (2003). 
Compassionate but pragmatic, the authors define hope as ‘....the motivating 
force that gives life purpose and direction’ (ibid, ix). As such, it is self-evident 
that hope is, therefore, the foundation of recovery. However, fundamental to the 
author’s construct is the initial fragility of hope; in effect, the potentially 
ephemeral nature of a nascent narrative. To be sustained, hope must be allied 
with opportunity, so realising the potential to exercise personal agency. Later in 
their text (ibid, 52) the authors revisit their discussion by noting a distinction 
between hope and optimism by Deegan (1996). Again, emphasis is on 
pragmatism as opposed to romanticism: optimism is transitory, whereas hope 
necessitates self-belief, a willingness to acknowledge occasional hardships. 
Thus, in summary:
Hope is not like a bolt of lightening [sic]. Rather it begins as a ‘small and fragile
flame’ that can be either fanned or snuffed out’
(Repper and Perkins, 2003, 52)
Focusing on revitalization of the personal myth as a fundamental aim in 
recovery, the remainder of this chapter makes recommendations for further 
research into narrative constructs and their application in mental health practice.
12.6. Recommendations 
12.6.1: The role of narrative in empowerment
As detailed in Chapter Ten, medical treatment of phenomena diagnosed as 
mental illness is sometimes viewed by users as akin to a form of imprisonment 
in that every nuance of behaviour is closely monitored. However, an exhaustive 
discussion of this topic is outside the remit of this study. Accordingly, I draw 
attention to relevant extracts in the respondents’ narratives, plus discussion in
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Chapter Ten. Thereafter, I feel it is sufficient to note that this is an area of 
sometimes extreme controversy, centring on patient autonomy in connection 
with the suitability of medical care. In doing so, however, I wish to emphasize 
that it is a complex narrative comprised of many nested narratives, each of 
which could provide sufficient material for an entire series of studies. In 
consequence, it is necessary to make cautious recourse to generalisations in 
suggesting possible avenues for future research, also application in mental 
health practice.
Quoting O’Hagan (2001) plus Repper and Perkins (2003), Roberts and Wolfson 
(ibid) suggest that:
‘....a change in the role of the psychiatrist is required, from someone who is 
perceived as a remote expert or authority to someone who behaves more like a 
coach or personal trainer ’
(Roberts and Wolfson, 2004:42)
Essentially, therefore, the authors are espousing empowerment of the user or 
patient in the process of their own recovery. In an ideal world, this would be fully 
potentiated: an individual would be free to choose the most effective and 
compassionate form of treatment leading to an eventual cure. Unfortunately, 
however, this is not the case. Whilst resources are undoubtedly one issue, 
another, and far more fundamental issue, is that medicine is an on-going 
narrative. In simple terms, as shown by the experiences of some of the 
respondents (e.g. Dorothy, Anita), the most that can be achieved is 
containment: a permanent cure is not yet possible. Thus the mental health 
narrative remains nested within the personal narrative; itself a complex narrative 
containing its own nested narratives. Of these narratives, potentially one of the 
most important is detailed collaboration between the user of services and 
medical personnel.
In Chapter Two, I stressed the importance of recognizing the person as an 
individual. In connection with this, I had earlier drawn attention to authors such 
as Laing (1990) in explaining that whilst one might know of another person’s 
conscious processes, they cannot directly access them. Ultimately, these
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considerations led to my use of the Kanizsa Triangle to emphasize the essential 
intangibility of the seat of personal identity, namely the subjective sense of self. 
In turn this inevitably led to discussion of narrative constructs: if an individual’s 
thought processes cannot be experienced by another, then they must be 
described. This is the all-important function of narrative: not only the detail of 
experience, but the way in which that experience is narrated. Most importantly, 
narration is not necessarily a one-way process between narrator (the patient, 
client or respondent) and audience (the practitioner or researcher). Often a 
narrator can be encouraged by apposite questions or comments, or even a 
temporary interruption involving the audience’s own narrative. In an ideal 
situation, all facilities are directed towards eliciting a detailed and informative 
narrative. True empowerment begins with the opportunity to gain as complete 
an understanding as possible by those parties that matter.
How this might be achieved in current mental health practice is the subject 
matter of a later section. Firstly, I suggest how future research into means of 
narration could lead to valuable insights applicable to same.
12.6.2: Future research
Whether or not research into the impact of phenomena diagnosed as mental 
illness should be exclusively concerned with personal identity is debateable. 
Rather, in connection with the sentiments of the above section, the principles 
and constructs described in this study could be better applied to the whole 
personal narrative. In support of this basic premise is a coda to the interviews, 
namely an encounter with Dorothy, who is now working part-time for a user- 
support group. In the course of chatting, she asked about my study, causing me 
to grumble about the difficulty of drawing narrative trajectory on the computer. 
On hearing about dominant narratives, she immediately seized on the concept, 
agreeing with me that it might show how active illness was at a given time. This 
concurred with what I believe would have been an extremely useful adjunct to 
the interviews if I had thought about it at the time. That is, a sheet of paper, 
blank apart from a vertical line dividing it into halves designated ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’. Towards the end of an interview, my approach would have been:
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‘Given the various issues that we have talked about, what do you feel are the 
most important things that are going on in your life at the moment? I f  we put
them as positive or negative lines on this piece o f paper ? Great. Anything
else you can think of?’
The aim of such an exercise would be to support, possibly confirm, impressions 
gained during the interview. Additionally, and more importantly, the temporary 
shift in focus might cause a respondent to name an issue not previously 
stressed (For example, in his first interview, Mr. P. did not cite low self-esteem 
or financial difficulties after losing his job despite both being highly probable). 
However, concerning this, I feel it is necessary to exercise caution lest one 
encourages categories that would not otherwise be named. Therefore, I suggest 
that any interventions should be limited to reminding a person of an issue 
already mentioned. The end product of the exercise would be two-fold. Firstly, it 
would inform first and subsequent levels of analysis. Secondly, it would inform 
the iterative processes of a second interview. Against this, it is possible that this 
technique could be deployed at the start of an interview. The main advantage of 
this would be to facilitate conversation with a respondent, particularly if the 
person is known to have ‘flattened affect’ due to illness, medication, or both. 
Another possible approach that could utilize this basic narrative format is a 
questionnaire. Fundamental to this would be a yes or no question, ‘Have you 
ever been treated for experience of phenomena diagnosed as mental illness?’
Thereafter, only one question would be necessary, namely requesting a 
considered self-assessment of issues important to a person. This device could 
be extremely useful in that it could facilitate a comparison between those who 
had experienced or are experiencing phenomena, and those who have had no 
experience. Another possible advantage of this approach is that respondents 
could remain anonymous if desired. However, anonymity should not be a 
prerequisite. A possible development of questionnaires is that of organizing 
focus groups to explore the research question. Against this, the potential 
emotional vulnerability of respondents might render such an exercise 
inadvisable. In this context, it should be stressed that in the course of this study
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some respondents were obviously distressed at times during interview. 
Therefore, the possibility of adverse reaction to any form of questions should 
always be included in the methodology of future research.
Finally, it is also possible that the diagrammatic representation of significant and 
dominant narratives could be refined and developed into a useful research tool. 
This could be particularly so concerning the trajectory, and therefore the 
improvement or worsening, of any chosen factor within the personal narrative 
(for example, mental health in Dorothy’s narrative; family relationships in 
Sandra's narrative). Flowever, whether or not this could, or should, be extended 
to include quantitative assessment is a moot point. My own view is that such 
devices are sometimes an unnecessary embellishment: to state that one is 
better or worse can often be enough.
I close this section by noting two mental health assessment tools which could 
be deployed in a research setting as well as in mental health practice. These 
are the Camberwell Assessment of Need, developed by Phelan et al in 1995, 
and the WRAP (Wellness Recovery Action Plan) developed by Mary Ellen 
Copeland in 1997. Although Slade et al (2005) suggest that the former can be 
used as a self-assessment tool, the detail of some of its categories (e.g. 
psychotic symptoms, safety to others) appear more orientated towards 
professional use. In contrast, the WRAP is much more orientated towards self- 
assessment in that it aims to identify helpful strategies for recovery, including 
the identification of ‘early warning signs’. Notably, it suggests that many persons 
may benefit from a supporter, who could be a family member, friend, or health 
profession (WRAP Workbook, 2004, 15).
In effect, this vehicle of self-assessment is, in itself, a means of empowerment: 
maintenance of a WRAP workbook (2004) enables awareness of and agency 
within the personal narrative. As such, it might prove extremely in a research 
setting as a daily record of the currents within a respondent’s personal 
narrative. However, with respect to both a mental health and a research setting 
there is a pertinent question as to whether or not the necessary introspection is 
invariably beneficial. Inevitably, WRAP encourages focus on both positive and
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negative significant narratives. In consequence, it focuses on both positive and 
negative imagoes. Unavoidably, therefore, it is possible that this may 
exacerbate a problem instead of alleviating it: for example, Mr. CBA’s narrative 
concluded with his expressing his aversion to self-analysis (Chapter 10).
12.6.3: Application of findings to mental health practice
Since the mid-1990’s, mental health practice in this country has been driven by 
a series of major initiatives:
• In 1999, the Department of Health’s laid out a strategy for the mental 
well-being of adults of working age. Entitled ‘the National Service 
Framework for Mental Health’, it set out standards of care which were 
intended to cover a 10-year period. The strategy included a commitment 
to research or evidence-based interventions and distinguished between 
the needs of people with ‘common’ mental illness such as depression 
and anxiety, and those with severe mental illness such as psychosis. The 
strategy began a process by which the National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence (NICE) would lay down treatment protocols for each illness 
area.
• In January 2005, the economist Lord Layard presented a report that 
identified mental health as a major social and economic problem.
Notably, it stated that the majority of mental health resources were 
allocated to treatment of psychotic problem; in contrast, spending on 
‘common’ mental illness was insufficient. The report advocated greater 
spending on psychological treatments for depression and anxiety 
disorders (pp 16 -  17).
• In late 2009, a policy document entitled ‘New Horizons’ replaced the 
National Service Framework. The Department of Health currently places 
great faith in talking treatments for common mental health problems and 
advocates that these should also be available for people with psychosis. 
In tandem with this, a programme which trains and increases the
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availability of cognitive therapy called IAPT (Increasing Access to 
Psychological Therapies) has offered much greater access to treatment 
for people with common mental health problems.
Essentially, these are based on a desire to find adjuncts and/or alternatives to 
medication for phenomena diagnosed as mental illness. As such, it copies the 
practice termed psycho-social intervention (PSI), which was developed in the 
mid-1990’s, having its root in the family education and support programmes in 
the 1990’s (Brooker et al, 1994). Sin and Scully (2008) define PSI, with 
reference to Brooker and Brabban 2004, also NIHME 2005, as follows:
.... a term used to describe collaborative work with service users which 
integrates a range of medical, social and psychological interventions delivered 
within the recovery perspective.
(Sin and Scully, 2008,162)
Crucially, therefore, PSI combines many possible responses to mental illness, 
including medication, structured family intervention, and cognitive behavioural 
therapy (CBT). Notably, PSI is designed to empower users of mental health 
services when engaging with practitioners, as emphasized by O’Neill et al
(2008):
Practitioners viewed clients not as people with mental health problems or 
illness, but as people experiencing illness in the context of their daily lives.
(O’Neill, Moore, and Ryan, 2008, 584)
However, in recent years, mental health policy appears to have entered a state 
of uneasy flux. Brooker and Brabban (2008) suggest that national strategy 
appears to favour CBT, as advocated in the Layard Report (above). If so, it 
should be noted that this approach is but part of the multi-disciplinary construct 
that is PSI. Accordingly, the authors opine that any significant trend towards 
CBT could, ultimately, lead to ‘decommissioning’ of PSI. Unfortunately, part of 
the problem may lie in that the essentially simple concept of PSI has become 
unwieldy by virtue of over-inclusion. Earlier in their review, the authors note with 
concern that progress in this field has been mixed, also that:
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 the teaching curriculum can appear to be a ‘complex matrix of theoretical
concepts, philosophies, competencies and frameworks.
(Brooker and Brabban, 2008) [italics in original text]
Yet, on examination, the comparison with the narrative constructs described in 
this study is self-evident. PSI concentrates upon the entire personal narrative, of 
which mental health is a nested narrative. Associated with this is a statement by 
a practitioner that coincides with identification of dominant narratives as 
proposed above:
Clients identify areas that are the most problematic, and I think that at that level 
you are going to get a lot more co-operation because you are working at 
something they want to look at, and that’s what makes it a collaborative 
process.
(O, Neill, Moore, and Ryan, ibid)
It should be recognized that the first contact with medical services by a person 
almost certainly means that phenomena have become active. Thereafter, as 
explained earlier, the possible formation of a dominant narrative derives from 
objective and perception of on-going experiences, including activation of 
existing imagoes. The PSI approach recognizes that medication alone may not 
be sufficient to meet this combination: whilst it may counteract the direct effects 
of phenomena, other nested narratives may be impacting upon the person. 
Thus, a comprehensive response is required whereby the social needs of the 
person are incorporated: in this way, it may be possible to counter both the 
direct and indirect effects of phenomena. Of more importance, however, are the 
mechanisms by which a negative imago might be formed. This research 
stresses that an imago can be sustained by reciprocity. Accordingly, it is 
arguably a more powerful entity than a dominant narrative, which can be viewed 
as deriving from on-going experiences. Therefore, it is evident that much 
therapeutic advantage can be effected if the formation of an imago is prevented.
Consultation with a mental health professional can be likened to an interview in 
that one party hopes to elicit a viable and relevant narrative from another. 
Accordingly, the same observations concerning narrative constructs apply to 
interactions between users of mental health services and medical personnel as 
to those outlined above in connection with future research. It cannot be stressed
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enough that the purpose of any interaction, research interview or consultation, 
should be based on achieving a relaxed and mutual understanding. Narrative 
constructs could be applied equally well to CBT and PSI. Significance, 
dominance, and imagoes could all be linked with ‘core beliefs’ as identified in 
CBT (Beck, 1995). Meanwhile, in keeping with PSI strategy (Sin and Scully, 
ibid; National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence National Clinical 
Guideline Number 82 (Revised 2010) 243 -  327) other psychosocial factors 
could be explored in terms of nested narratives within the personal narrative.
I close this section, and the entire study, with reflection upon the personal 
narrative of Mr. P. Having listened to what were, at times, descriptions of 
extremely intimate experience, I feel sure that he will not object to further 
scrutiny. By virtue of assisted introspection through counselling, he prevailed 
not only over his depression, but also over an existing negative imago. Thus, 
ultimately, phenomena diagnosed as mental illness proved beneficial, the 
beginnings of new narratives and positive imagoes. So what if he had not 
received counselling? What then?
What then?
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Appendix I
Local Research Ethics Committee Approval
Following a request for further information and revised documentation, the study 
was given a favourable ethical opinion by the Hartlepool and North Tees Local 
Research Ethics Committee on 5th May, 2006.
The REC reference number of the research is 06/Q1001/25
The final list of documents reviewed and approved by the Committee is as 
follows:
Application
Investigator CV
Protocol
Covering letters
Peer Review
Interview Schedules/Topic Guides 
GP/Consultant Information Sheets 
Participant Information Sheet (Version Two)
Participant Consent Form (Version Two)
It was a condition of approval that a progress report for the study was submitted 
12 months after the date of approval, and then annually thereafter.
Research Governance Approval
This was granted by the Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Trust on 5th 
November, 2007.
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Appendix II: Participant Information and Consent
This section includes the following documents:
i) Participant Information Sheet: this was given to potential respondents to 
read at a convenient time. Agreement to participate in the study was 
notified directly to myself in person or by telephone. (Note: there were no 
refusals.)
ii) Consent Form: this was provided and explained immediately before the 
beginnings of the interview proper.
iii) Letter of notification to participants GP or consultant: a reminder that this 
facility was offered was given in connection with signing the Consent 
Form. Only one participant (Mr. Gwent) asked me to do so.
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Appendix II: 1 Specimen Information Sheet
UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD HALLAM 
Centre for Health and Social Care Research: Faculty of Health and Wellbeing
Ray Wainwright 
Research and Development Team 
Tees, Esk and Wear valleys NHS Trust 
Teaching and Development Centre
Berwick Hills 
Middlesbrough 
TS3 7SE 
Telephone 01642 516981
Participant Information Sheet 
(Version Two: April 2006)
1. Study Title: How does experience of mental illness affect a person’s
sense of personal image and identity?
2. Invitation:
I am inviting you to take part in this study by agreeing to take part in a series of 
personal interviews. Before you decide anything, it is important for you to 
understand why I am doing this research and what it will involve. Please take 
time to read the following information carefully. You are welcome to talk about 
this study to other people if you wish.
Part 1 of this sheet tells you the purpose of my study and what will 
happen if you agree to take part. 
Part 2 gives you more detailed information about the conduct of the study.
You can contact me (Ray Wainwright) via the Research and Development 
Department of the Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Trust (i.e. the person who 
gave you this information sheet) if there is anything not clear or if you would like 
more information. Please take time to decide whether or not you wish to take 
part in this study.
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PART ONE
3. What is the Purpose of this Study?
This study is a five years part- time post graduate research project for the award 
of PhD at Sheffield Hallam University.
The purpose of the study is to gain insight into what it feels like to experience 
mental illness. Another way of expressing this is to investigate how experience 
of mental illness has affected individuals as persons. To understand this fully I 
will divide it into three parts:
i) To investigate the various symptoms (phenomena) involved in 
individual experiences of mental illness.
ii) To investigate personal reaction to those symptoms in terms of coping 
with any problems they may have caused and or still cause.
iii) To investigate personal reaction to any treatment if it was required.
4. Why are you being invited to volunteer?
My research requires input from a small number of volunteers (about six). This 
information sheet is being passed to you by a member of the Research and 
Development Department of Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Trust. This 
person already knows that you have experience of what Medicine describes as 
mental illness. Unless I already know you personally, it is probable that I know 
nothing about you at this stage.
5. Do I expect everyone 1 ask to take part?
No. It is entirely up to you whether or not you take part. If you decide NOT to 
take part, then your decision will be respected. No persuasion to take part will 
be made now or at any future time. This is true for everyone who is invited to 
volunteer.
If you DO DECIDE to take part I will give you this Information Sheet to keep. I 
will also ask you to sign two copies of a Consent Form, one which will be yours 
to keep. However, please note that you will be free to withdraw from the study 
at any time. If you do decide to withdraw you do not have to give me any 
reasons for withdrawing and I will not try to persuade you to stay.
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6. What will happen to you if you decide to take part?
I will interview you about your experiences of mental illness. I expect that the 
time needed for the first interview will be about an hour and a half. However, we 
could finish before then if you wanted to. Please note that more than one 
interview will be needed. The reason for this is that at least one follow-up 
interview will be needed to check the results of the first interview. Also, the first 
interview may raise issues that are worthwhile investigating more deeply. 
Similarly a second interview may raise issues that can be investigated in a third 
interview etc.
With your agreement I would be accompanied by an assistant who will tape the 
interview. Afterwards I will transcribe the details so that I can send you a copy.
You can check this so we can talk about it at the next interview.
Please note that any tapes will be kept in a locked filing cabinet, of which 
I will have the only key. When my study is complete, all tapes will be 
destroyed.
I would like to conduct the interviews at a mutually convenient private place 
where you will feel as relaxed as possible. For this reason, a private office on 
Trust premises would be a good place. However, if you would prefer 
somewhere else such as your home, then a suitable venue would be arranged.
Please note that travel expenses will be paid if necessary.
7. Are there any risks or disadvantages if you agree to take part in this 
study?
It is only fair to warn you that I will be asking questions about your own 
experiences of mental illness in the context of your life story. Since these are 
highly personal, you may find these intrusive or distressing no matter how 
tactful and sympathetic I try to be. Therefore I remind you that you are free to 
ask me to stop any interviewing immediately if you do not wish to continue.
For the same reasons there will be ample opportunity to chat informally with
myself and members of Trust staff after interviewing if you should wish to do so.
A5
IMPORTANT, please note that one of the items (No. 7) on the Consent Form 
seeks your permission to contact your GP to inform him that you are 
participating in this research. It is the usual practice to offer this in studies such 
as mine.
You do not have to agree to this. Instead you can initial item 8 on the 
Consent Form to indicate that you do not wish me to contact your GP.
Similarly, I offer to seek your permission to contact your GP should you be 
distressed by the interview. Alternatively, you can provide me with a named 
contact instead of your GP. Also we can seek advice from the Patient Advice 
and Liaison Service (PALS) provided that you agree to this.
8. What are the benefits of taking part in this study?
Unfortunately I cannot offer you any personal benefits as a result of 
volunteering to take part. It is possible that you may gain a deeper 
understanding of mental illness as a result of the interviews, but I cannot 
guarantee this.
9. What will I do with the data gained from the interviews?
I hope to use the information obtained from the interviews to gain insight into 
what it feels like to experience mental illness. This information will then be 
written up in conjunction with existing texts as a PhD thesis.
Please note that I will be subjecting the interview data to a process called 
Narrative Analysis. This means that I will analyse and interpret your story and 
retell parts of it from my own understanding. Although much of this will be done 
with your agreement during interviewing and checking of interview data, it is 
possible that some of my conclusions will differ from your own ideas. If there is 
a marked difference in our ideas, then your ideas can be recorded in 
conjunction with mine as part of the study. (This is a research practice 
recommended by Smythe and Murray (2000)*.
*Smythe, W.E., and Murray, M.J., (2000) Owning the Story: Ethical 
Considerations in Narrative Research in Narrative research Ethics and 
Behaviour, 10(4), 311-336
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10. What if there is a problem?
Any complaint about the way you have been treated during the study will be 
addressed. The detailed information on this is given in Part 2.
11. Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?
YES. The only time your true name will be used is when you sign the Consent 
Form. Full information on this is given in Part 2.
12. Contact Point
I can be contacted as follows:
Ray Wainwright
Research and Development Team 
Tees, Esk and wear valleys NHS Trust 
Teaching and Development Centre 
Ormesby Road,
Berwick Hill 
Middlesbrough 
TS37SE
Telephone 01642 516981
This completes Part 1 of the Information Sheet. If the information in Part 1 
has interested you and you are considering participation, please continue 
to read the additional information in Part 2 before making any decision.
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PART TWO
13. What will happen if you do not want to carry on with the study?
As previously stated, if you do decide to withdraw, you will not have to give me 
any reasons for withdrawing and I will not try to persuade you to stay. Any 
records of interviews, both taped and written, will be destroyed immediately. No 
references to you will be made in the final results of this study.
14. What if there is a problem?
If you have a complaint about the research you should contact:
Jacqui Lovell
Research and Development Manager 
Tees, Esk and Wear valleys NHS Trust 
Teaching and Development Centre,
Ormesby Road,
Berwick Hills,
Middlesbrough TS3 7SE Telephone 01642 516983
15. Will your taking part in this research be kept confidential?
Any tapes used in interview will be labelled according to a coded labelling 
system which will not be available to a third party. They will be kept in a locked 
filing cabinet until they are no longer required. Then they will be destroyed by 
fire.
Similarly, transcripts will be identified via a coded labelling system. Records of 
transcripts on computer files will be available via a user- password which will be 
known only to me. Please note that these will be kept on a memory stick, not a 
computer hard drive. Written records of transcripts will be kept in a locked filing 
cabinet until no longer required, upon which they will be destroyed by fire. 
Details of transcripts will be used in the final thesis. This detail will include 
quotations. Anonymity will be preserved via the same coded labelling system 
that will be used for storing of transcripts.
It should be recognised that the use of pseudonyms will not be enough in itself 
to ensure anonymity. Other people may recognise you from personal details 
when they read the final study. Therefore, as many personal details as
possible will be altered by mutual agreement (e.g. Age, home, town etc.).
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NB: Involvement of your family doctor (GP) I would like to remind you that it 
is usual practice in studies such as mine to offer to notify a volunteer’s GP in 
writing to the effect that he or she is taking part. However, this action will only 
be taken provided you give your express permission.
16. What will happen to the results of the research study?
After analysis, the results of this study will form part of a PhD thesis. In turn this 
will help other researchers (including members of the medical profession) to 
gain a deeper understanding of how mental illness affects patients as persons.
17. Will volunteers be able to obtain a copy of the findings of your study?
Yes. Copies of my thesis will be made available to all volunteers upon 
completion.
18. Who is organising and funding the research?
The research is being organised by me, Ray Wainwright, following consultations 
with my University Supervisors and under the jurisdiction of the Research and 
Development department of the Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Trust. In 
order that I may conduct it on Trust premises, I have been awarded an 
Honorary Contract by the Trust.
I am not receiving any payment for this research.
19. Who has reviewed this study?
This study was given a favourable ethical opinion in the NHS by the North Tees 
and Hartlepool Local Research Ethics Committee.
Thank you for reading this Information Sheet. If, after consideration, you would 
like to take part then you can contact me directly or via a member of the 
Research and Development Department of the Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys 
NHS Trust. A Specimen Consent Form is attached for your inspection. If you 
agree to participate in this study then you will be asked to sign two Consent 
Forms, one of which you will keep and one of which will be kept by me.
Signed (Ray Wainwright)
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Appendix 11.2 Specimen Consent Form
Consent Form for Research Interviews (Version Two April 2006)
Title of Project: How does experience of mental illness affect a person’s sense of 
image and identity?
Name of Researcher: Ray Wainwright
Please initial where indicated:
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the Information Sheet
dated.................for the above study and that I have had the opportunity to ask
questions.....................................................(initials).
2. I agree to take part in this study..............................(initials).
3. I agree that my participation is voluntary and that no pressure has been brought 
to bear on me to participate..................(initials).
4. I understand that I am free to leave the study at any time and that I do not have 
to give any reasons for doing so. I also understand that no person will attempt 
to change my mind if I decide to leave the study................(initials).
5. I note that interviews will be taped provided that I agree otherwise they will be 
transcribed in not form. The tapes and transcripts will be stored for four years in 
a locked filing cabinet at the researcher’s home address.................. (initials).
6. I note that anonymity and confidentiality will be maintained..............(initials).
Please initial EITHER item 7 OR 8
7. Either: / agree that you can contact my GP by a letter countersigned by myself 
to advise him or her that I am participating in this
research.......................(initials).
8. Or: I do not agree that you can contact my GP (initials)
9. I agree that you can seek support from the Patient Advice and Liaison Service 
and/or a contact named by me on my behalf if needed (initials).
Please sign this form to indicate your consent to participate in this research 
(This section to be countersigned by the researcher)
Name of volunteer Date Signature
Name of researcher Date
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Signature
Appendix 11.3: Specimen letter to GP
(Address as for Participant Information Sheet)
Dr A. N. Other 
Address
Date
Dr. Other,
Re. MrI Mrs/ Miss/ Ms Patient
i am researching a PhD on ‘Impact of experience of mental illness on sense of 
personal identity’. This research is monitored by the School of Nursing at 
Sheffield Hallam University.
Ethical approval for the research has been obtained via the Hartlepool and 
North Tees Local Research Ethics Committee.
The above person has accepted an invitation from me to participate in a series 
of interviews regarding their personal experiences of mental illness. After 
reading an information sheet (copy enclosed) and discussion with me they 
understand that the personal revelations involved may prove distressing. 
Accordingly, they have given me permission to notify you so that you are aware 
that they are participating in this research.
I will be pleased to further any additional information that you may require.
Yours sincerely,
(Signed)..................................................................................... Ray Wainwright
cc. Participant
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Appendix III: Coding of interviews 
Introduction:
The purpose of this Appendix is to demonstrate my method of coding.
Initially, all tapes were transcribed in prose form. Coding was pursued in four 
stages:
i) FIRST -  LEVEL CODING was observations made by myself at the time 
of transcribing. Including the highlighting of relevant passages, it includes 
memories of the ‘feel’ of the interview plus my reflexive observations, 
particularly to data that reminded me of my own experiences of 
phenomena diagnosed as mental illness.
ii) SECOND -  LEVEL CODING was a detailed summary of observations 
made in first-stage coding plus an early description of the personal 
narrative. This was written following completion of transcription.
iii) THIRD -  LEVEL CODING derived from close examination of the 
transcript to determine any significant narratives that could be identified 
and/or surmised from the data. Significant narratives may also be termed 
as codes, categories, sub-dimensions, or themes.
The results of the above coding exercises were all expressed in prose form.
iv) FOURTH -  LEVEL CODING was the reduction of passages of text 
detailing significant narratives into ‘idea-units’ (Gee, 1989, as detailed by 
Reissman, 1993). This device served to support third-stage coding by 
allowing more detailed examination. Also, individual nested narratives 
were given brief labels at this point for the purposes of reference and 
easy comparison with other transcripts.
It is important to appreciate not all of the data was subjected to fourth level 
coding. Instead, only the passages deemed most relevant by virtue of first, 
second, and third level coding were thus analyzed. At this point, the personal 
narrative was arranged in chronological order by manually sorting printed 
copies of the data. In this way, data from interviews 1 and 2 were intermingled.
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For the purposes of demonstration, my coding system will be explored in two 
stages:
i) A section of ‘raw’ data subjected to first-level coding. Originally, for ease 
of reference, I underlined in blue. In connection with this exercise, I 
stress that the data is in its original state, that is, complete with 
interjections, word whispers, irrelevances and comments that were not 
used in later coding.
ii) The same section summarized and expressed as ‘idea units’. 
Interspersed with this data are comments from first, second, and third 
level coding.
Section 1: The ‘raw data’
This section begins with my preliminary notes preceding the first interview with 
‘Mr. P.’. This practice was carried out for all interviews. As noted above, data 
deemed to be of importance was underlined in blue.
1.1: Preliminary Notes
Mr. P. has been known to the researcher’s wife, June, for six years. In this time 
he has often worked closely with her on User Involvement projects. Although he 
has known Ray for approximately the same time, they do not know one another
well.
Important Note: This transcript contains a great deal of confidential material that 
could identify Mr. P. Certainly it would be easy for people who know him 
reasonably well (co-workers; friends) to identify him from the transcript. 
Nevertheless, after careful consideration, this detail has been left in on the 
grounds of continuity and to provide a context for other aspects of the interview. 
It is also important to note that it is the usual practice to use only short excerpts 
-  as opposed to entire transcripts -  in the final write-up of a study such as this 
one.
On completion, this transcript will be shown to Mr. P. for discussion.
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1.2: Notes on transcript
Principal researcher: Ray Wainwright
Assistant researcher and occasional interviewer: June Wainwright.
Ray’s questions and comments are written in Arial Font 12 aligned LEFT.
June’s questions are in Times New Roman Font 12 aligned LEFT and preceded by 
her name in brackets. (June).
The respondent (Mr. P’s) text is in Arial Font 12 aligned RIGHT.
Interjections are shown in brackets. ( )
Interruptions are indicated by a dash -
Personal details that might compromise confidentiality are italicised and 
enclosed in brackets. ( )
Pauses are indicated by dots................
Stressed words or phrases indicated by underlining
Passages deemed to be of particular relevance are underlined in blue.
Occasionally, Mr. P. gives a detailed response that covers more than one 
important topic. In such instances the response is subdivided by use of Arial
Font 16 numbers 1 , 2 , 3 .
1.3: Extract from Interview One
For ease of reference, line numbers were appended to the interviews. However, 
it should be noted that in this they vary from the original due to the need to 
conform to the prescribed margin format for this study.
47 What I’d like to do is have a conversation (right) and.... In many ways
48 what you think is most important will be some of the things that you
49 mention. (Right) So.... When do you think your experiences started with
50 respect to...?
51
52 Well-1 was actually thinking about this last night really... because I
53 have, as Time’s gone on, reflected over the years about when it
54 first started, although it didn’t really appear on the surface until I
55 was nearly thirty. I actually think it was there in mv childhood. I had
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57
58
59
60
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69
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72
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74
75
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81
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90
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93
94
95
96
97
98
it in mv childhood-1 think it stemmed from being an ill child, 
physically, even the fact that I was one of three: I was the middle 
one and I was quite protected as a child. Mv mom would stick up 
for me. more so than mv dad, but I was still - Even mv sisters to a 
certain degree protected me in a cocoon if you like, from the
outside world: in a sense
(See Mr. P ’s elaboration on his illness below)
FIRST -  LEVEL CODING:
There is much detail in this section concerning childhood problems. Review  
in the light of later data
THIRD -  LEVEL CODING:
Family Dynamics (past) This statement is unequivocal:
i) Mr. P. states that he believes his problems began in childhood
despite not manifesting until he was thirty.
ii) Mr. P. states that he was physically ill.
iii) As a consequence, he was cocooned.
HOWEVER, in itself this is little more than an opener.
You have two sisters?
I’ve got two sisters- I’ve got an older sister and a younger sister. 
My older sister’s two and a half years older than me. My younger 
sister’s thirteen months. (Mhmm) So that’s the difference.
How old are you, please?
Forty one next month. I’m forty one in May. Before any of us came 
along, the three of us, my mom had two miscarriages- so I think in 
some ways that also set the scene before I was born and the 
problems that my mom had with me initially. I wouldn’t -  I couldn’t 
take my milk, any form of milk, even powdered: I would just throw 
it up. So although I was born chubby, quite a big baby at birth, I 
had lost quite a lot of my weight in the first six months of my life 
just throwing up. It wasn’t until I was six months that they actually 
found a formula that I could keep down- (right) it was okay for me.
I was also born with what we call ‘brittle bones’? So by the time I 
was three and a half I had been in hospital three times with broken
femurs.
Wow!
(On this basis it is not surprising that Mr. P. was ‘cocooned’)
(June)Nasty
Very nasty and my parents and my grandmother- because all the 
instances of my breaking them happened at my gran’s- didn’t 
happen anywhere else. All brought into question at the time.
(June) Oh God- so did they blame your grandmother at the time?
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Yes. In actual fact it was just me jumping off a pouffe. Twice 
jumping off a pouffe and once in the kitchen, on a mat: I just 
slipped on a mat in the kitchen. (Oh dear) And so I was in a 
hospital for those times, getting mended, you know, legs in the 
air...chuckles. So for the first seven years of my life I was 
backwards and forwards for one thing or another, with not only an 
awkward G.P. but also at the Children’s Hospital in place before 
Hospital A was built. So for the first seven years of my life... And 
I’ve still got a phobia of going to that many doctors around me in
white coats.
Not surprised. I’m not surprised. So the brittle bone — Did that slowly go 
or-?
Yes. It gradually resolved itself. I mean my mom did have to give 
me certain things when I was younger, to build my calcium up-
Yes, that’s what-
-but apart from that it did resolve itself eventually.
So physically- you haven’t got that any more?
I haven’t got that any more. But because of all those physical problems 
and because I was also born with a speech problem, which will come
across on the tape, I do know that! 1 . I was quite protected as a child. 
And because of that all the other voices in the household were more 
dominant than mine. I felt as though mv voice wasn’t heard. Although 
they protected me. I wasn’t heard as a child. So when it came to anything 
emotional. I bottled it up. Bottled u p  inside- and I think that’s why
eventually mv mental health came into- came into effect. 2. And also 
when I was seven years old mv dad -  through work -  went to work awav 
and suddenly, although he’d shown a lot of love and affection before he 
went awav: suddenly that all stopped. (Mhmm) And I was told that I had 
to be the man of the house and protect mv sisters and look after mv 
mom. And that had quite a large lasting effect on me as well (mmm) and I 
never really- Although he retired early I never really gained that 
relationship back that I lost with him. I mean on the surface we looked 
okay, we could joke about certain things, but we couldn’t get emotionally 
or deeply involved in either of our-: I couldn’t get involved in his emotions
and he couldn’t get involved in mine. 3. Even to the point of- even when 
mv mom died we never showed any emotion to each other: it all went to 
mv sisters. I’d show mv emotion to mv sisters: he’d show his to mv 
sisters: it wasn’t to each other. It wasn’t that affection really there- and
that lasted until the day he died And I never really got to show how
much I loved him really. And so that played a real large part in mv
depression as well.
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148
149 FIRST-LEVEL CODING:
150
151 1) Physical protection has metamorphosed into dominance,
152 resulting in reported suppressed emotion.
153 2) Childhood family relationships would be vastly complicated by
154 the paradox described.
155 3) The description o f regret is obviously important. See later notes
156 (Pages 14; 19) and concluding remarks.
157
158 SECOND -  LEVEL CODING:
159
160 (Note: A fu l l  summary o f my firs t level coding was written follow ing
161 transcription. For purposes o f instruction I have placed the relevant section at
162 this juncture :
163 Given that the transcript describes depression in response to unfavourable events,
164  it is reasonable to assume that the diagnosed mental illness was precipitated by
165 those events. Thereafter, the extent to which Mr. P. was affected by the described
166 events in childhood (physical illness; speech impediment) must remain highly
167 conjectural. The events (Death of father; ending of long-term relationship;
168 ‘coming out’; loss of home) that led to his depression and suicide attempt could
169 be reasonably described as sufficient to severely distress many people.
170
171 THIRD LEVEL CODING:
172
173 Family Dynamics (past) This strays into the nature vs. nurture argument.
174 Although Mr. P.’s childhood should not be described as dysfunctional, it
175 was troubled in the sense that certain circumstances have made a lasting
176 impression
This data and observations were explored in their own right and as a lead to 
iterative questioning in Interview 2. In fourth level coding, significant narratives 
identified in both interviews were further analysed by deconstruction into ‘idea 
units’. This is demonstrated in the next section with reference to the above data. 
As noted above, it is important to appreciate not all of the data was subjected to 
fourth level coding. Instead, only the passages deemed most relevant by virtue 
of first, second, and third level coding were thus analyzed. At this point, the 
personal narrative was arranged in chronological order by manually sorting 
printed copies of the data.
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Appendix 111.2: Example of data subjected to fourth -  level coding
In fourth level coding I deemed individual line numbers unnecessary. Instead, 
for reference purposes, the origins of the data were indicated in terms of 
interview number (i.e. 1 or 2) and line numbers. As part of my analysis, 
individual idea units are appended with my observations. In addition, any first, 
second, or third level coding is detailed at the appropriate juncture. In this way, 
a personal narrative in chronological order is obtained. Thereafter, comparison 
and contrast with other narratives is effected using the prologue-overwhelm- 
recovery construct.
Concerning this presentation, it is important to recognize that it is a 
faithful reproduction of the data subjected to fourth level coding. From 
this body of text were selected relevant passages for inclusion in the main body 
of the thesis. Associated with this exercise, my appended comments were 
removed.
We began the interview proper by speculating when Mr. P ’s mental health 
problems may have begun....
[1:53-59]
 although it didn’t really appear on the surface
until I was nearly thirty,
I actually think it was there in my childhood. Childhood problems:
note assisted insight through counselling (see later notes)
I had it in my childhood-
I think it stemmed from being an ill child, physically,
even the fact
that I was one of three:
I was the middle one
and I was quite protected as a child.
My mom would stick up for me,
more so than my dad, but I was still -
Even my sisters to a certain degree protected me
in a cocoon if you like,
from the outside world; Evaluation (refer to later notes)
mi: present in childhood? 
Physical health -ve 
Significant others (mother/sisters) +ve 
Family dynamics: slight -ve): over-protective; ‘cocooned’ - ‘smothered’?
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Mr. P talked about his role In the family:
[1: 119-124]
I was quite protected as a child.
And because of that
all the other voices in the household
were more dominant than mine. low status within family
I felt as though my voice wasn’t heard loneliness
Although they protected me,
I wasn’t heard as a child.
So when it came to anything emotional,
I bottled it up. felt unable to express self (Emotions bottled up)
Bottled up inside-
and I think that’s why eventually
my mental health came into-
came into effect. (Childhood: Loneliness/ Low selfesteem)
(Family dynamics: -ve)
Mr. P. described a significant change in his family circumstances when he
was seven years old
[1:124-128]
when I was seven years old
my dad -  through work -  went to work away
and suddenly,
although he’d shown a lot of love and affection 
before he went away;
suddenly that all stopped withdrawal of love and affection
And I was told that I had to be
the man of the house sudden altering of personal status
and protect my sisters 
and look after my mom.
Life event: -ve  (see later notes) 
Possible internal conflict due to enforced self-concept of ‘strong man’
cf. Chadwick 1997
Mr. P ’s relationship with his father changed forever:
[1:130-139]
Although he retired early 
I never really gained that relationship back
that I lost with him. perceived gulf between father and self
I mean on the surface we looked okay, 
we could joke about certain things, 
but we couldn’t get emotionally or deeply involved 
I couldn’t get involved in his emotions
and he couldn’t get involved in mine. withholding of emotions
Even to the point of-
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even when my mom died
we never showed any emotion to each other:
it all went to my sisters.
I’d show my emotion to my sisters; 
he’d show his to my sisters;
it wasn’t to each other.........................Emotions repressed; ‘bottled up
It wasn’t that affection really there-
and that lasted until the day he died.....
And I never really got to show
how much I loved him really.....................Unresolved narrative: regret
And so that played
a real large part in my depression Significant others: (father-ve)
Life event: (death of mother)
FIRST-LEVEL CODING
i) Physical protection by family has metamorphosed into dominance, resulting in 
reported suppressed emotion.
ii) Childhood family relationships would be vastly complicated by the paradox 
described.
iii) The description of regret is obviously important. See later notes and concluding 
remarks.
THIRD-LEVEL CODING:
Family Dynamics (past)
This strays into the nature vs. nurture argument. Although Mr. P.’s childhood should not 
be described as dysfunctional, it was troubled in the sense that certain circumstances 
have made a lasting impression.
Appendix 111.3: Summary and further observations
The data were stored in the following forms:
i) The ‘raw data’ subjected to first, second, and third level coding. For the 
purposes of easy reference, the lines were numbers.
ii) Data deemed important were then subject to fourth level coding.
iii) The data were arranged in chronological order to obtain a personal 
narrative.
iv) Relevant extracts were used in the main body of the thesis.
When writing the main body of the thesis, it was occasionally necessary to 
check the context of a section of data. This was done by returning to the original 
interview as described in section (i).
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Appendix IV: Diagrams of personal narratives to show trajectory and 
dominance of nested narratives
As explained in Chapter Seven, the personal narrative is shown as a band 
spanning an axis of neutral value. Each short line in the banded narrative 
represents a short-lived nested narrative pertaining to a minor positive or 
negative event, such as those detailed in the Hassles-Uplift Index developed by 
Lazarus et al in the 1980’s.(Cooper and Dewe, 2004). The first diagram shows 
a personal narrative containing an even distribution of positive and negative 
nested narratives.
Figure 1: Personal narrative drawn as a band containing equal positive and 
negative values: a Balanced Narrative
+ ve
TIME
-  ve
However, in the event of a nested narrative becoming dominant, the equilibrium 
of the entire personal narrative will be affected to some degree. If the dominant 
narrative is positive, then the personal narrative will become elevated (Figure
2). On the other hand, if the dominant narrative is negative, then the personal 
narrative will become depressed (Figure 3):
Figure 2: Personal narrative elevated due to the influence of a dominant 
positive nested narrative
+ ve
Dominant
nested
narrative
*  TIME-------___
■ve
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Figure 2: Personal narrative depressed due to the influence of a dominant 
negative nested narrative
+ ve
-ve
TIME
t  ►Dominant 
nested 
narrative
This basic concept can be applied in constructing trajectory diagrams that 
summarize the relevant periods of a respondent’s personal narrative. For 
purposes of illustration, I compare the personal narratives of two respondents, 
namely Mr. P. and Anne. As explained in the main body of the study, personal 
narratives were divided into three stages, namely prologue, overwhelm, and 
recovery. The prologue of Mr. P’s narrative is depressed during childhood then 
becomes balanced in adulthood:
Figure 4: Mr. P. Prologue:
Childhood compromised by dominant narratives o f ill-health and bullying at primary 
school
+ve
- ve
CHILDHOOD
Dominant negative narratives:
(Brittle-bone (bullying at 
Disease) school)
ADULTHOOD
Dominant
positive
narrative:
(relationship)
TIME
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In contrast, the prologue of Anne’s personal narrative was elevated due to a 
successful education and career, plus a stable and happy relationship:
Figure 5: Anne: Prologue
Personal narrative elevated due to positive dominant narratives pertaining to career 
and stable relationship
CHILDHOOD
+ ve
ADULTHOOD
Dominant
positive
narratives:
(career,
Relationship)
TIME
- ve
Following the prologues, the narratives of Mr. P. and Anne serve to underline 
the arbitrary nature of the overwhelm construct. Initially, it is obvious and, as 
such, unequivocal: it is the point at which the mental health narrative becomes 
wholly dominant over all other nested narratives. How long it should be viewed 
as such is questionable, requiring a degree of informed speculation. That is, 
response to overwhelm almost always involves a period of invalidity, whether at 
home, at hospital, or both. Essentially, the person has ceased to function due to 
the dominance of the mental health narrative. Thereafter, recovery is not 
instantaneous but gradual as other nested narratives become sufficient to 
lessen to the dominance of the mental health narrative. Thus, I show overwhelm 
as continuing until recovery becomes evident. However, I emphasize that the 
exact point at which this occurs is heavily reliant upon subjectivity: for recovery 
to be viable, the person must believe that it is happening.
For both respondents, overwhelm was associated with the break-up of a 
relationship. For Mr. P, his decline in mental health was a consequence of 
several factors, namely relationship problems and other emotional difficulties,
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plus job loss. Following a suicide attempt and brief hospitalization, overwhelm 
can be understood as gradually giving way to recovery as Mr. P. regained his 
self-confidence and agency with the assistance of counselling. In contrast, 
Anne’s narrative differs in that the break-up of her relationship was almost 
certainly due to disinhibited behaviour associated with her mental health 
narrative. In her case, I interpreted overwhelm as the period during which she 
was hospitalized several times, including two suicide attempts. Thereafter, her 
recovery is partial, compromised by continuing mental illness and the 
unresolved narrative concerning her former partner.
The following figures show the mental health narrative trajectory as the personal 
narrative enters overwhelm. For clarity, the prologue and overwhelm stages are 
patterned differently:
Figure 6: Mr. P. Overwhelm
Gradual onset o f  depression leading to personal neglect and dominant mental illness 
narrative resulting in suicide attempt.
+ ve
ve
PROLOGUE OVERWHELM
sfcsTIME
m;
I-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:
I-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-::-:-:-:-:-::-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:
Closure of 
overwhelm 
WM facilitated by 
stable
Dominant narratives: 
Break-up of 
relationship; job loss; 
emotional difficulties
and 
counselling
I
Suicide attempt
In contrast, Anne’s narrative is complicated by another negative dominant 
narrative pertaining to the break-up of her relationship. As a result, the resultant 
diagram could become cluttered: this is resolved by regarding the trajectories of
A24
the mental health narrative and the relationship narrative as identical until 
Anne’s first suicide attempt:
Figure 7: Anne: Overwhelm
Overwhelm characterized by disinhibited behaviour during and after trip to Far East. 
Subsequent effects o f mental illness exacerbated by break-up o f relationship: this 
included periods o f hospitalization follow ing suicide attempts.
+ve
-ve
TIME
PROLOGUE OVERWHELM
r
-►TIME
Disinhibited
behaviour
including
drug-taking
(skunk,
opium) T
Suicide attempts 
(due to break-up 
of relationship (?)
Mental health 
narrative
Relationship
narrative
For the purposes of comparison, I felt it was helpful to include a summary of 
overwhelm when showing recovery trajectory. Gradually, the personal narrative 
of Mr. P. achieves an even balance as the mental health narrative is restored. 
Perhaps surprisingly, although the breaking of his engagement had led to an 
accumulation of stressors, his demeanour remained positive. Accordingly, 
although I have indicated these on his narrative diagram, I do not consider them 
to have influenced his mental health narrative (and thereby his personal 
narrative):
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Figure 8: Mr. P: Recovery
Gradual recovery over a three-year period sufficient to enable return to work. Personal 
narrative restored to balance despite recent stressors.
+ ve
- ve
OVERWHELM RECOVERY
V x
★
TIME
Recent
Stressors
Mental health narrative
In contrast, Anne's personal narrative was dominated by the unresolved 
relationship narrative. This was inextricably interwoven with her mental health 
narrative in that she believed her illness had led to her partner leaving. 
Nevertheless, the mental illness narrative was also dominant in its own right by 
virtue of the loss of her career and continuing symptoms. Unlike Mr. P, Anne is 
unequivocally a user of services: in terming herself ‘a schizophrenic’, she 
accepts and maintains her label:
Figure 9: Anne: Recovery
Partial recovery but progress compromised by combination o f dominant mental health 
narrative with strong negative dominant relationship narrative
OVERWHELM RECOVERY
+ ve
— ► TIME
Mental health 
narrative
•:\V
Relationship
narrative
ve
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The final stage in the series of diagrams is to combine all three stages. Due to 
the amount of information contained, I found that a landscape format was more 
useful. These are shown overleaf.
At this point it is pertinent to question my hopes and motives for creating these 
series of diagrams. Firstly, they provide a visual summary of individual narrative 
stages and, if desired, the individual personal narrative. Originally, they were 
included in the main body of the text; however, my supervisors felt that they 
interrupted the narrative flow of the chapters concerned. Accordingly, it is 
probably better to stress the ancillary use of the diagrams, that is, as a guide to 
understanding with reference to further research. This may be particularly so 
concerning a second or third interview. If so, my strategy would be to use 
thefirst interview to construct diagrams for the three stages plus the personal 
narrative diagram. These could then be printed and used in connection with an 
iterative approach in subsequent interviews. Concerning this, one obvious 
avenue is that any significant narratives not mentioned in the first interview 
could be added to a diagram during same. Another would be to add and/or 
clarify dates so that an accurate time scale can be established.
Thus I close this Appendix by referring to my proposal for the use of narrative 
diagrams in further research. Initially, a researcher could explain the principle of 
narrative trajectory by using basic details of their own personal narrative as an 
example. Thereafter, all that would be needed is a rudimentary construct upon 
which narrative trajectories could be drawn as an interactive exercise between 
researcher and respondent.
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